Letter Sequence RAI |
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MONTHYEARML0603704272006-02-0909 February 2006 Request for Additional Information Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-Basis Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors (TAC MC4692 & MC4693) Project stage: RAI ML0608904212006-03-0101 March 2006 Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Brunswick Steam Electric, Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. MC4639 and MC4640) Project stage: Approval ML0807301312008-02-28028 February 2008 Response to Request for Additional Information on GL-04-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request ML0812804882008-04-30030 April 2008 Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Request ML0830803502008-11-18018 November 2008 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Supplemental Responses to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Project stage: RAI ML0921605972009-07-28028 July 2009 Update on Status of 11/18/08 Request for Additional Information & Additional Testing Pursuant to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors Project stage: Request ML0921101202009-07-28028 July 2009 Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 -Update on the Status of the November 21, 2008 Request for Additional Information (RAI) and Additional Testing Pursuant to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Reci Project stage: Request ML0922908922009-08-18018 August 2009 Notice of Conference Call with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke), Regarding Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Catawba 1 and 2) and McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Other ML0927304602009-10-0707 October 2009 09/01/2009 Summary of Conference Call with Duke Regarding Responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. Meeting Handouts Project stage: Request ML0926700202009-10-0707 October 2009 Summary of Conference Call with Duke Regarding Responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 Project stage: Other ML1012604632010-05-0707 May 2010 Notice of Forthcoming Conference Call with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) to Discuss Duke'S Responses to Generic Letter 2004-02 at Catawba 1 and 2 and McGuire 1 and 2 Project stage: Other ML1028701002010-09-30030 September 2010 Catawba Units 1 & 2, Draft Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents on Pressurized-Water.... Project stage: Request ML1029306502010-10-20020 October 2010 Notice of Forthcoming Conference Call with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 and Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Project stage: Other ML1030810242010-11-10010 November 2010 Summary of November 1, 2010, Meeting with Duke to Discuss Responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 (Tac Nos. MC4673, MC4674, MC4692, and MC4693) Project stage: Meeting ML13141A4032013-05-0808 May 2013 Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance in Resolution of Final Issues Related to Generic Letter Project stage: Other ML13231A1132013-07-31031 July 2013 Closure Option 1 Response to In-Vessel Downstream Effects Request for Additional Information for Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance in Resolution.. Project stage: Request ML14085A0652014-04-24024 April 2014 NRC Staff Review of the Documentation Provided by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, for McGuire Concerning Resolution of Generic LTR 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressuriz Project stage: Request ML14090A4442014-04-24024 April 2014 Closeout of Generic Letter, 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC MC4692 and MC4693) Project stage: Other 2009-08-18
[Table View] |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000369/20240032024-11-0404 November 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2024003 and 05000370/2024003 ML24303A4212024-10-30030 October 2024 Mcguire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2, Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection FPTI NRC 05000369/2025010, 05000370/2025010 and Request for Information RFI IR 05000369/20244022024-10-0808 October 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2024402 05000370/2024402 IR 05000369/20240052024-08-26026 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, (Report 05000369-2024005 and 05000370-2024005) IR 05000369/20244042024-08-0101 August 2024 Cover Letter Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2024404 and 05000370/2024404 IR 05000369/20253012024-07-29029 July 2024 Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000369/2025301 and 05000370/2025301 IR 05000369/20244032024-07-25025 July 2024 – Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000369/2024403 and 05000370/2024403 Rev IR 05000369/20240022024-07-24024 July 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2024002 and 05000370/2024002 ML24183A0972024-07-12012 July 2024 ISFSI; Catawba 1, 2 & ISFSI; McGuire 1, 2 & ISFSI; Oconee 1, 2, 3 & ISFSI; Shearon Harris 1; H. B. Robinson 2 & ISFSI; and Radioactive Package Shipping Under 10 CFR 71 (71-266 & 71-345) – Review of QA Program Changes EPID L-2024-LLQ-0002 IR 05000369/20244012024-07-0303 July 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2024401 and 05000370/2024401 ML24176A2802024-06-26026 June 2024 Notification of Target Set Inspection and Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report 05000369-2024404 and 05000370-2024404) IR 05000369/20240112024-06-0404 June 2024 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000369/2024011 and 05000370/2024011 ML24149A1772024-05-28028 May 2024 NRC Response to Duke Energy 2025 FOF Schedule Change Request (Catawba and McGuire) IR 05000369/20240012024-05-0808 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369-2024001 and 05000370-2024001 and 07200038-2024001 ML24110A0382024-04-30030 April 2024 – Correction to Issuance of Amendment Nos. 330 and 309, Regarding Implementation of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF 505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - Ritstf ML24100A8742024-04-10010 April 2024 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000369/2024403; and 05000370/2024403 ML24052A3062024-04-0808 April 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 331 & 310, Regarding Adoption of Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Plants ML24031A5402024-03-26026 March 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 330 and 309 Regarding Implementation of TSTF 505,Rev. 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B ML24085A2402024-03-21021 March 2024 Requalification Program Inspection - McGuire Nuclear Station IR 05000369/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2023006 and 05000370/2023006 ML24024A2182024-02-0505 February 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting) IR 05000369/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023004 and 05000370/2023004 ML24019A1392024-01-25025 January 2024 TSTF 505 and 50.69 Audit Summary ML24019A2002024-01-24024 January 2024 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection IR 05000369/20234022023-12-14014 December 2023 – Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000369/2023402 and 05000370/2023402 05000369/LER-1923-001, Automatic Actuation of the 1A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due to Human Error2023-12-13013 December 2023 Automatic Actuation of the 1A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due to Human Error ML23317A2272023-11-17017 November 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Transmittal of Dam Inspection Report - Non-Proprietary ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230032023-10-24024 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023003 and 05000370/2023003; and Inspection Report 07200038/2023001 IR 05000369/20240102023-10-13013 October 2023 Notification of McGuire Nuclear Station Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000369, 370/2024010 IR 05000369/20230102023-10-13013 October 2023 Age Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000369/2023010 and 05000370/2023010 ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds IR 05000369/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station - NRC Examination Report 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23230A0652023-08-31031 August 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Relief Request Use of Later Edition of ASME Code ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000369/2023005 and 05000370/2023005) IR 05000369/20234012023-08-0404 August 2023 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2023401 and 05000370/2023401 (OUO-SRI) Cover IR 05000369/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023002 and 05000370/2023002 IR 05000369/20234202023-07-24024 July 2023 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 050003692023420 and 050003702023420 ML23206A0092023-07-24024 July 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station – Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23207A0762023-07-14014 July 2023 EN 56557 - Update to Part 21 Report Re Potential Defect with Trane External Auto/Stop Emergency Stop Relay Card Pn: XI2650728-06 ML23159A2712023-06-20020 June 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Relief Request Impractical Reactor System Welds ML23237A2672023-06-13013 June 2023 June 13, 2002 - Meeting Announcement - McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations 50-369, 50-370 and 50-413, 50-414 ML23159A0052023-06-0505 June 2023 56557-EN 56557 - Paragon - Redlined ML23124A0862023-05-0303 May 2023 Cycle 29, Revision 1, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI IR 05000369/20230012023-05-0101 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023001 and 05000370/2023001 ML23115A2122023-05-0101 May 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23094A1832023-04-18018 April 2023 Audit Plan TSTF-505, Rev. 2, RITSTF Initiative 4B & 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems & Components for Nuclear Power Reactors (EPIDs L-2023-LLA-0021 & L-2023-LLA-0022) ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility 2024-08-26
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24197A1702024-07-15015 July 2024 Request for Additional Information Two Proposed Alternatives (RA-23-0242) for the Inspection of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetrations ML23151A3482023-05-30030 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23142A2732023-05-22022 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23030B9032023-01-30030 January 2023 Formal Release of RAIs for McGuire Unit 1, Relief Request Impractical RPV Rx Coolant System Welds, Due March 1, 2023 (Email) ML23017A2232023-01-13013 January 2023 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Issuance for McGuire Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (Email) ML22175A0162022-06-24024 June 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22115A1412022-04-25025 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Common EOF Relocation - Request for Addition Information ML22102A2962022-04-13013 April 2022 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Response to Request for Additional Information ML22063B1782022-03-0909 March 2022 Request for Additional Information Regarding LAR for Revision to the Conditional Exemption of the End of Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology (EPID L-2021-LLA-0198) NON-PROPRIETARY ML22010A0732022-01-0606 January 2022 50.59 Inspection Information Request ML21354A8612021-12-15015 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Fleet Request RA-19-0352 - Alternative for RPV Closure Stud Exams (L-2020-LLR-0156) ML21267A2782021-09-23023 September 2021 50.59 Inspection Information Request ML21252A0532021-09-0808 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of Rais, 30 Day Response, Mcguire Relief Request, Ref: Later Edition Addenda ASME Code, Section XI, 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) ML21103A0542021-04-13013 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension to Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21067A6742021-03-0505 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21049A2632021-02-0404 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Energy Fleet License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan ML21020A0682021-01-20020 January 2021 Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI) (NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2021011 and 05000370/2021011) and Request for Information (RFI) ML20346A0212020-12-10010 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of RAIs - License Amendment to Change TS 3.8.1 Due Jan. 29, 2021 ML20323A4072020-11-18018 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Brunswick License Exemption Request from 10CFR73 Annual Force on Force Exercise Requirements (EPIC L-2020-LLE-0180) ML20216A3512020-08-0303 August 2020 Mcquire U-1 ISI RFI ML20101L3132020-04-10010 April 2020 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML20071D0962020-03-0505 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Delay in Update of the Code of Record for in Service Inspections ML20050D3382020-02-21021 February 2020 Letter RAI 1 MAGNASTOR-Catawba and McGuire Exemptions with Enclosure ML19354B6372020-01-0707 January 2020 Exemption Request for NAC Magnastor Cask Loaded to Incorrect Helium Backfill Density Request for Additional Information ML19011A1372019-01-10010 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet RAIs - Relief Request 18-GO-001 - Proposed Alternative for Depth Sizing Qualification Examination of Welds (L-2018-LLR-0117) ML19007A3422018-12-21021 December 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet Draft RAIs - Relief Request 18-GO-001 - Proposed Alternative for Depth Sizing Qualification Examination of Welds (L-2018-LLR-0117) ML18352A8052018-12-18018 December 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - MRP-227 Review ML18306A9372018-11-0202 November 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Esps LAR ML18285A0812018-10-11011 October 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - TORMIS LAR RA-18-0011, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2018-05-30030 May 2018 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools ML18138A4662018-05-18018 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - TORMIS LAR ML18088B2822018-03-29029 March 2018 Requalification Program Inspection - McGuire Nuclear Station ML18057A2182018-02-23023 February 2018 Enclosurequest for Additional Information (Letter to A. Zaremba Request for Additional Information for Review of Duke Energy'S Decommissioning Funding Plan Update) ML17331B1492017-11-21021 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Nsws One-Time LAR (CACs MG0242 and MG0243, EPID L-2017-LLA-0299) ML17317B0932017-11-13013 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Irlt (CACs MF9020 and MF9021; EPID L-2016-LLA-0032) ML17230A1512017-08-15015 August 2017 Notification of Inspection of Inspection and Request for Information ML17192A4842017-07-11011 July 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet RAIs Alternative for Reactor Pressure Vessel Flange Threads Examination (MF9513 to MF9521) ML17135A0322017-05-12012 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire TSTF-197 ML17114A4992017-04-17017 April 2017 Emergency Preparedness Inspection and Request for Information ML16302A1122016-11-0404 November 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program (CAC Nos. MF2934 and MF2935) MNS-16-077, Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2016-09-29029 September 2016 Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program ML16228A2612016-08-15015 August 2016 Email - McGuire Unit No. 1: Request for Additional Informati- Relief Request 16-MN-003 Alternative to Defect Removal Prior to Performing Temporary Repair Activities on Three-Inch-Diameter Nuclear Service Water System Piping. ML16194A2862016-07-12012 July 2016 E-Mail - Mcguirai Ice Condenser Door Position Alternate Verification, (ML16089A228) CAC Nos. MF7526 and MF7527 ML16175A0222016-07-12012 July 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program ML16014A6882016-01-20020 January 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Level Scheme ML15348A2602015-12-17017 December 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Use an Alternative Fission Gas Gap Release Fraction ML15320A3862015-11-19019 November 2015 RAI LAR to Adopt TSTF-523 ML15314A3592015-11-10010 November 2015 Duke Energy Draft RAIs Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6413-MF6422) ML15314A3562015-11-10010 November 2015 E-mail from J. Whited to A. Zaremba Duke Energy Draft RAIs License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6413-MF6422) ML15289A5552015-10-26026 October 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension 2024-07-15
[Table view] |
Text
February 9, 2006 Mr. G. R. Peterson Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078
SUBJECT:
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 2004-02, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DEBRIS BLOCKAGE ON EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENTS AT PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTORS (TAC NOS. MC4692 AND MC4693)
Dear Mr. Peterson:
On September 13, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors, as part of the NRCs efforts to assess the likelihood that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) pumps at domestic pressurized water reactors (PWRs) would experience a debris-induced loss of net positive suction head margin during sump recirculation. The NRC issued this GL to all PWR licensees to request that addressees (1) perform a mechanistic evaluation using an NRC-approved methodology of the potential for the adverse effects of post-accident debris blockage and operation with debris-laden fluids to impede or prevent the recirculation functions of the ECCS and CSS following all postulated accidents for which the recirculation of these systems is required, and (2) implement any plant modifications that the above evaluation identifies as being necessary to ensure system functionality. Addressees were also required to submit information specified in GL 2004-02 to the NRC in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.54(f). Additionally, in the GL, the NRC established a schedule for the submittal of the written responses and the completion of any corrective actions identified while complying with the requests in the GL.
By letter dated March 1, 2005, as supplemented by letter dated September 1, 2005, Duke Energy Corporation provided responses to the GL. The NRC staff is reviewing and evaluating your responses along with the responses from all PWR licensees. The NRC staff has determined that responses to the questions in the enclosure to this letter are necessary in order for the staff to complete its review. Please note that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Division of Component Integrity is still conducting its initial reviews with respect to coatings.
Although some initial coatings questions are included in the enclosure to this letter, the NRC might issue an additional request for information regarding coatings issues in the near future.
G. Peterson Please provide your response within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1345.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John Stang, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page
G. Peterson Please provide your response within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1345.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John Stang, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page Distribution:
Public BSingal, DORL DPR RArchitzel LPL2-1 r/f WBateman THaffera RidsNrrDorlLplc RidsNrrPMJHopkins JLehning RidsNrrLAMOBrien MMuprhy HWagage RidsNrrPMJStang PKlein SLu RidsOgcRp MYoder JHannon RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter MScott RidsRgn2MailCenter Accession No.: ML060370427 *by email NRR-088 OFFICE LPL2-1/PM LPL2-1/LA DSS/SSIB DCI/CSGB LPL2-1/BC NAME JStang:ckg MOBrien DSolorio* EMurphy* EMarinos DATE 2/9/06 2/9/06 2/6/06 2/8/06 2/9/06 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 cc:
Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn Ms. Karen E. Long Duke Energy Corporation Assistant Attorney General 526 South Church Street NC Department of Justice P. O. Box 1006 P.O. Box 629 Mail Code = EC07H Raleigh, NC 27602 Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Mr. R.L. Gill, Jr., Manager County Manager of Mecklenburg County Nuclear Regulatory Issues &
720 E. Fourth St. Industry Affairs Charlotte, NC 28202 Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church St.
Mr. C. Jeffrey Thomas Mail Stop EC05P Regulatory Compliance Manager Charlotte, NC 28202 Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Site Division of Radiation Protection 12700 Hagers Ferry Road NC Dept of Environment, Health & Natural Huntersville, NC 28078 Resources 3825 Barrett Dr.
Senior Resident Inspector Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Mr. T. Richard Puryear Huntersville, NC 28078 Owners Group (NCEMC)
Duke Energy Corporation Dr. John M. Barry 4800 Concord Road Mecklenburg County York, SC 29745 Department of Environmental Protection 700 N. Tryon St Mr. Henry Barron Charlotte, NC 28202 Group Vice President, Nuclear Generation
& Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. Peter R. Harden, IV P.O. Box 1006-EC07H VP-Customer Relations and Sales Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Westinghouse Electric Company 6000 Fairview Road, 12th Floor Charlotte, NC 28210 NCEM REP Program Manager 4713 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4713
GL 2004-02 RAI Questions Plant Materials
- 1. Identify the name and bounding quantity of each insulation material generated by a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA). Include the amount of these materials transported to the containment pool. State any assumptions used to provide this response.
- 2. Identify the amounts (i.e., surface area) of the following materials that are:
(a) submerged in the containment pool following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA),
(b) in the containment spray zone following a LOCA:
- aluminum
- zinc (from galvanized steel and from inorganic zinc coatings)
- copper
- carbon steel not coated
- uncoated concrete Compare the amounts of these materials in the submerged and spray zones at your plant relative to the scaled amounts of these materials used in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear industry jointly-sponsored Integrated Chemical Effects Tests (ICET) (e.g., 5x the amount of uncoated carbon steel assumed for the ICETs).
- 3. Identify the amount (surface area) and material (e.g., aluminum) for any scaffolding stored in containment. Indicate the amount, if any, that would be submerged in the containment pool following a LOCA. Clarify if scaffolding material was included in the response to Question 2.
- 4. Provide the type and amount of any metallic paints or non-stainless steel insulation jacketing (not included in the response to Question 2) that would be either submerged or subjected to containment spray.
Containment Pool Chemistry
- 5. Provide the expected containment pool pH during the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) recirculation mission time following a LOCA at the beginning of the fuel cycle and at the end of the fuel cycle. Identify any key assumptions.
- 6. For the ICET environment that is the most similar to your plant conditions, compare the expected containment pool conditions to the ICET conditions for the following items:
boron concentration, buffering agent concentration, and pH. Identify any other significant differences between the ICET environment and the expected plant-specific environment.
Enclosure
- 7. For a LBLOCA, provide the time until ECCS external recirculation initiation and the associated pool temperature and pool volume. Provide estimated pool temperature and pool volume 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a LBLOCA. Identify the assumptions used for these estimates.
Plant-Specific Chemical Effects
- 8. Discuss your overall strategy to evaluate potential chemical effects including demonstrating that, with chemical effects considered, there is sufficient net positive suction head (NPSH) margin available during the ECCS mission time. Provide an estimated date with milestones for the completion of all chemical effects evaluations.
- 9. Identify, if applicable, any plans to remove certain materials from the containment building and/or to make a change from the existing chemicals that buffer containment pool pH following a LOCA.
- 10. If bench-top testing is being used to inform plant specific head loss testing, indicate how the bench-top test parameters (e.g., buffering agent concentrations, pH, materials, etc.)
compare to your plant conditions. Describe your plans for addressing uncertainties related to head loss from chemical effects including, but not limited to, use of chemical surrogates, scaling of sample size and test durations. Discuss how it will be determined that allowances made for chemical effects are conservative.
Plant Environment Specific
- 11. Provide a detailed description of any testing that has been or will be performed as part of a plant-specific chemical effects assessment. Identify the vendor, if applicable, that will be performing the testing. Identify the environment (e.g., borated water at pH 9, deionized water, tap water) and test temperature for any plant-specific head loss or transport tests. Discuss how any differences between these test environments and your plant containment pool conditions could affect the behavior of chemical surrogates.
Discuss the criteria that will be used to demonstrate that chemical surrogates produced for testing (e.g., head loss, flume) behave in a similar manner physically and chemically as in the ICET environment and plant containment pool environment.
- 12. For your plant-specific environment, provide the maximum projected head loss resulting from chemical effects (a) within the first day following a LOCA, and (b) during the entire ECCS recirculation mission time. If the response to this question will be based on testing that is either planned or in progress, provide an estimated date for providing this information to the NRC.
ICET 1 and ICET 5 Plants
- 13. Results from the ICET #1 environment and the ICET #5 environment showed chemical products appeared to form as the test solution cooled from the constant 140 oF test temperature. Discuss how these results are being considered in your evaluation of chemical effects and downstream effects.
Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) Plants
- 14. (Not Applicable).
- 15. (Not Applicable).
- 16. (Not Applicable).
Additional Non-Coatings Questions
- 17. (Not Applicable).
- 18. (Not Applicable).
- 19. (Not Applicable).
- 20. (Not Applicable).
- 21. (Not Applicable).
- 22. (Not Applicable).
- 23. (Not Applicable).
- 24. (Not Applicable).
Coatings Generic - All Plants
- 25. Describe how your coatings assessment was used to identify degraded qualified/acceptable coatings and determine the amount of debris that will result from these coatings. This should include how the assessment technique(s) demonstrates that qualified/acceptable coatings remain in compliance with plant licensing requirements for design-basis accident (DBA) performance. If current examination techniques cannot demonstrate the coatings ability to meet plant licensing requirements for DBA performance, licensees should describe an augmented testing and inspection program that provides assurance that the qualified/acceptable coatings continue to meet DBA performance requirements. Alternately, assume all containment coatings fail and describe the potential for this debris to transport to the sump.
Plant Specific
- 26. (Not Applicable).
- 27. (Not Applicable).
- 28. (Not Applicable).
- 29. (Not Applicable).
- 30. The NRC staffs safety evaluation (SE) addresses two distinct scenarios for formation of a fiber bed on the sump screen surface. For a thin bed case, the SE states that all coatings debris should be treated as particulate and assumes 100% transport to the sump screen. For the case in which no thin bed is formed, the staffs SE states that the coatings debris should be sized based on plant-specific analyses for debris generated from within the ZOI and from outside the ZOI, or that a default chip size equivalent to the area of the sump screen openings should be used (Section 3.4.3.6). Describe how your coatings debris characteristics are modeled to account for your plant-specific fiber bed (i.e. thin bed or no thin bed). If your analysis considers both a thin bed and a non-thin bed case, discuss the coatings debris characteristics assumed for each case. If your analysis deviates from the coatings debris characteristics described in the staff-approved methodology, provide justification to support your assumptions.
- 31. Was/will leak before break be used to analyze the potential jet impingement loads on the new ECCS sump screen?
- 32. You indicated that you would be evaluating downstream effects in accordance with WCAP 16406-P. The NRC is currently involved in discussions with the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) to address questions/concerns regarding this WCAP on a generic basis, and some of these discussions may resolve issues related to your particular station. The following issues have the potential for generic resolution; however, if a generic resolution cannot be obtained, plant-specific resolution will be required. As such, formal RAIs will not be issued on these topics at this time, but may be needed in the future. It is expected that your final evaluation response will specifically address those portions of the WCAP used, their applicability, and exceptions taken to the WCAP. For your information, topics under ongoing discussion include:
ee. Wear rates of pump-wetted materials and the effect of wear on component operation ff. Settling of debris in low flow areas downstream of the strainer or credit for filtering leading to a change in fluid composition gg. Volume of debris injected into the reactor vessel and core region hh. Debris types and properties ii. Contribution of in-vessel velocity profile to the formation of a debris bed or clog jj. Fluid and metal component temperature impact kk. Gravitational and temperature gradients ll. Debris and boron precipitation effects mm. ECCS injection paths nn. Core bypass design features oo. Radiation and chemical considerations pp. Debris adhesion to solid surfaces qq. Thermodynamic properties of coolant
- 33. Your response to GL 2004-02 question (d)(viii) indicated that an active strainer design will not be used, but does not mention any consideration of any other active approaches
(i.e., backflushing). Was an active approach considered as a potential strategy or backup for addressing any issues?
- 34. You stated that the containment walkdown for Unit 1 will be completed in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 02-01 during the fall 2005 outage. Please discuss the plans to incorporate the results of this future containment walkdown into the sump design analyses.
- 35. You stated that Microtherm insulation (currently installed on portions of the reactor vessel heads) will be replaced, and that this replacement will reduce the postulated post-accident debris loading on the sump strainer. Please discuss the insulation material that will replace the Microtherm insulation, including debris generation and characteristics parameters. Has the new insulation been evaluated in the debris generation, transport, head loss analyses and other sump design analyses?
- 36. You did not provide information on the details of the break selection, ZOI and debris characteristics evaluations other than to state that the NEI and SE methodologies were applied. Please provide a description of the methodology applied in these evaluations and include a discussion of the technical justification for deviations from the SE-approved methodology.
- 37. Has debris settling upstream of the sump strainer (i.e., the near-field effect) been credited or will it be credited in testing used to support the sizing or analytical design basis of the proposed replacement strainers? In the case that settling was credited for either of these purposes, estimate the fraction of debris that settled and describe the analyses that were performed to correlate the scaled flow conditions and any surrogate debris in the test flume with the actual flow conditions and debris types in the plants containment pool.
- 38. Are there any vents or other penetrations through the strainer control surfaces which connect the volume internal to the strainer to the containment atmosphere above the containment minimum water level? In this case, dependent upon the containment pool height and strainer and sump geometries, the presence of the vent line or penetration could prevent a water seal over the entire strainer surface from ever forming; or else this seal could be lost once the head loss across the debris bed exceeds a certain criterion, such as the submergence depth of the vent line or penetration. According to Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 3, without a water seal across the entire strainer surface, the strainer should not be considered to be fully submerged.
Therefore, if applicable, explain what sump strainer failure criteria are being applied for the vented sump scenario described above.
- 39. What is the minimum strainer submergence during the postulated LOCA? At the time that the re-circulation starts, most of the strainer surface is expected to be clean, and the strainer surface close to the pump suction line may experience higher fluid flow than the rest of the strainer. Has any analysis been done to evaluate the possibility of vortex formation close to the pump suction line and possible air ingestion into the ECCS pumps? In addition, has any analysis or test been performed to evaluate the possible accumulation of buoyant debris on top of the strainer, which may cause the formation of
an air flow path directly through the strainer surface and reduce the effectiveness of the strainer?
- 40. Please provide a detailed description of the analyses/testing performed to evaluate the new strainer head loss.
- 41. Please describe, in detail, the analysis performed to determine the minimum water level, and explain how the water source from the ice condenser is determined.
- 42. Your September 2005 GL response stated that the design of the modified containment sump would accommodate the effects of debris loading as determined by the baseline evaluation, which was under review by Duke, and the ongoing refined evaluation for McGuire and that the evaluations use the guidance of NEI 04-07, Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance Evaluation Methodology, Revision 0, dated December 2004. Please supplement your response after completing the review.