ML14101A343

Notification of Part 21 - Potential Defect in General Electric Type CR120 AD Control Relays

ML14101A343
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	04/10/2014
From:	Thelen M Qualtech NP
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
50015
Download: ML14101A343 (3)

Text

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/U.S. Nuclear Re-ulatorv Com isso n Onerations Center Event Renort Par I Part 21 (PAR) Event# 50015 Rep Org: QUALTECH NP Notification Date I Time: 04/09/2014 15:21 (EDT)

Supplier: QUALTECH NP Event Date I Time: 04/09/2014 (CDT)

Last Modification: 04/09/2014 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: HUNTSVILLE Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: AL NRC Notified by: MATTHEW THELEN Notifications: MALCOLM WIDMANN R2DO HQ Ops Officer: STEVE SANDIN JAMES DRAKE R4DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY NRR PART 21 GROUP EMAIL 10 CFR Section:

21.21 (d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE CR120AD CONTROL RELAYS The following information was received via fax:

"This letter is being issued by QualTech NP, Huntsville, AL, to provide an initial notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nebraska Public Power District [NPPD] Cooper Nuclear Station concerning a potential defect in General Electric Type CR120AD control relays. A failure analysis revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. This failure is classified as infant mortality, which is similar to the failure mode identified in the 10 CFR part 21 30 day report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.

"Investigation of documents dating back to 1997 revealed that the manufacturer issued an informal recommendation to detect infant mortality in these relays by performing burn-in testing and mechanical cycle aging of the relay. QualTech NP, in conjunction with NPPD, determined that the risk of infant mortality can be mitigated by subjecting these relays to a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in and performance of 100 mechanical cycles prior to installation.

"It has been confirmed that only two orders, with two units each, for this particular relay are affected. Both orders have been shipped to Nebraska Public Power District as requested by purchase orders 4500149953 and 4500142705. All subject relays shall be subjected to a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> bum-in and exposed to 100 mechanical cycles or returned to QualTech NP for replacement.

"Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Matthew Thelen at 256-924-7441 (office) or mthelen@curtisswright.com for additional information.

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04/10/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenterEvent Report Page 2 "Matthew Thelen Project Manager QualTech NP Huntsville Operations a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company http://qualtechnp.cwfc.com"

04/09/2014 15

21 2567229670 EGS PAGE 01/01 9AHuntsville Operations 125 West Park Loop cHuntsville, Cw AL 35806 QualTech NP 256-722-8500 (File No.: QTHuntsvillelOCFR21-201.4-01)

April 9, 2014 To whom it may concern:

This letter is being issued by QualTech NP. Huntsville to provide an initial notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station concerning a potential defect in General Electric Type CR120AD control relays. A failure analysis revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. This failure is classified as infant mortality, which is similar to the failure mode identified in the 10 CFR part 21. 30 day report (accession number 9706190261.) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.

Investigation of documents dating back to 1997 revealed that the manufacturer issued an informal recommendation to detect infant mortality in these relays by performing burn-in testing and mechanical cycle aging of the relay. QualTech NP, in conjunction with NPPD, determined that the risk of infant mortality can be mitigated by subjecting these relays to a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in and performance of 100 mechanical cycles prior to installation.

It has been confirmed that only two orders. with two units each, for this particular relay are affected. Both orders have been shipped to Nebraska Public Power District as requested by purchase orders 4500149953 and 45001.42705. All subject relays shall be subjected to a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in and exposed to 100 mechanical cycles or returned to QualTech NP for replacement.

Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Matthew Thelen at 256-924-7441 (office) or mthelen @eurtisswright.com for additional information.

Sincerely, Matthew Thelen Project Manager QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company http://qualtechnp.cwfc.com