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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217E0711999-10-14014 October 1999 Grants Approval for Util to Submit Original,One Signed Paper Copy & Six CD-ROM Copies of Updates to FSAR as Listed,Per 10CFR50.4(c),in Response to ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217D3261999-10-0808 October 1999 Responds to Re Event Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature Being Undetected for Approx Two Days at Browns Ferry Unit 3 ML20217F7751999-10-0808 October 1999 Confirms 991006 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & a Belisle of NRC Re Meeting to Be Conducted on 991109 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Various Maintenance Issues ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212M1481999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to Management Meeting Conducted on 990927 at Region II for Presentation of Recent Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML20212D3651999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990430 Proposed Rev to Plant, Unit 3 Matl Surveillance Program ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20211G6491999-08-26026 August 1999 Confirms Telcon with T Abney on 990824 Re Mgt Meeting Which Has Been re-scheduled from 990830-0927.Purpose of Meeting to Discuss BFN Status & Performance ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML20210Q4421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006. Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr with List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210N1051999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990326 Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210G8991999-07-28028 July 1999 Discusses 990726 Open Mgt Meeting for Discussion on Plant Engineering Status & Performance.List of Attendees & Presentation Handout Encl ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210G8051999-07-22022 July 1999 Discusses DOL Case DC Smith Vs TVA Investigation.Oi Concluded That There Was Not Sufficient Evidence Developed During Investigation to Substantiate Discrimination.Nrc Providing Results of OI Investigation to Parties ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML20209J0251999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards SE Which Constitutes Staff Review & Approval of TVA Ampacity Derating Test & Analyses for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Configurations as Required in App K of Draft Temporary Instruction, Fpfi, ML20210B2671999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990702 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & Author Re Mgt Meeting Scheduled for 990830 at Licensee Request in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Status & Performance ML20209E3421999-07-0707 July 1999 Confirms Arrangements Made During 990628 Telephone Conversation to Hold Meeting on 990726 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Plant Engineering Status & Performance ML20209E5511999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 Rai,Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes TACs MA1180,MA1181 & MA1179 ML20196J3531999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to Re Boeing Rocket Booster Mfg Facility Being Constructed in Decatur,Al.Nrc Has No Unique Emergency Planning Concerns Re Proximity of Boeing Facility to BFN ML20196G9111999-06-28028 June 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8741999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206G6611999-05-0404 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting GL 88-20,submitted by TVA Re multi-unit Probabilistic Risk Assessement (Mupra) for Plant, Units 1,2 & 3 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 DD-99-06, Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9904281999-04-28028 April 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990428 ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML20206C8591999-04-23023 April 1999 Informs That Util Has Determined,Dr Bateman No Longer Needs to Maintain His License,Effective 990331,per Requirement of 10CFR55.55(a) ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping ML18039A7581999-04-23023 April 1999 Responds to Item 4 of 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376 Re Extended EDG Allowed Outage Time,In Manner Consistent with Rgs 1.174 & 1.177 ML20206C1241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, IAW TS Section 5.6.1.Rept Reflects Radiation Exposure Data as Tracked by Electronic Dosimeters on Radiation Work Permits ML20205T0971999-04-15015 April 1999 Submits Change in Medical Status for DM Olive in Accordance with 10CFR55.25,effective 990315.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7441999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00,providing Details Re Inoperability of Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Due to Breaker Trip on One Train in Conjunction with Planned Maint Activities on Other.Ltr Contains No New Commitments ML18039A7431999-03-30030 March 1999 Responds to NRC 990112 RAI Re BFN Program,Per GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs. ML18039A7421999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Results of Analysis of Design Basis Loca,As Required by License Condition Re Plants Power Uprate Operating License Amends 254 & 214 ML18039A7411999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Partial Response to NRC 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376,proposing to Extend Current 7 Day AOT for EDG to 14 Days ML18039A7371999-03-26026 March 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,1989 Edition.Encl Contains Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7331999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bnfp,Unit 2,Cycle 10 COLR, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5.d.COLR Was Revised to Extend Max Allowable Nodal Exposure for GE GE7B Fuel Bundles ML18039A7291999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Index,Rev 26A to EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure & Rev 26A to EPIP-5, General Emergency. Rev 26A Includes All Changes Made in Rev 26 as Well as Identified Errors ML20204G8471999-03-19019 March 1999 Reports Change in Medical Status for Ma Morrow,In Accordance with 10CFR55.25.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld from Pdr,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6).Without Encl ML20207M0611999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Goals & Objectives for May 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3,radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.Plant Exercise Is Currently Scheduled for Wk of 990524 ML18039A6971999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Typed TS Pages,Reflecting NRC Approved TS Change 354 Requiring Oscillation PRM to Be Integrated Into Approved Power uprate,24-month Operating Cycle & Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML18039A6961999-02-19019 February 1999 Provides Util Response to GL 95-07 Re RCIC Sys Injection Valves (2/3-FCV-71-39) for BFN Units 2 & 3.Previous Responses,Dtd 951215,1016 & 960730,0315 & 0213,supplemented ML18039A6911999-02-19019 February 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Unit 2 Cycle 10 & Rev 1 to Unit 3 Cycle 9, Colr.Colrs for Each Unit Were Revised to Include OLs Consistent with Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML20203B6031999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Temporary Partial Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.65,maint Rule for Unit 1.Util Requesting Exemption to Resolve Issue Initially Raised in NRC Insp Repts 50-259/97-04,50-260/97-04 & 50-296/97-04,dtd 970521 ML18039A6741999-01-21021 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981209 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/98-07,50-260/98-07 & 50-296/98-07,respectively. Corrective Actions:Will Revise Procedure NEPD-8 Re Vendor Nonconformance Documentation Submission to TVA ML20199F6951999-01-0808 January 1999 Submits Request for Relief from ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Valve Program to Extend Interval Between Disassembly of Check Valve,Within Group of Four Similar Check Valves for EECW Dgs,From 18 to 24 Months 1999-09-09
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ACCELERATE DOCUMENT DISTtuSUTION SYSTEM REGULAT ZNFORMATZON DZRTRZRUTZONlETEM (RZDE)
ACCESSION NBR:9308240352 DOC.DATE: 93/08/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZERINGUE,O.J. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Describes TVA current plans for compliance w/Generic SER,BWR scram discharge sys,included in NRC 801209 ltr.Discussion of background of issue, which includes description of long-term mods previously implemented on Unit 2 encl.
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TITLE: TVA Facilities Routine Correspondence NOTES:
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Tennessee Valley Authority. Post Otfice Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 O. J. "Ike" Zering Ue Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant AUG 17 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) BWR SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME - LONG-TERM MODIFICATIONS
References:
- 1) NRC letter to All BWR Licensees, dated December 9, 1980, BWR Scram Discharge System
- 2) TVA letter to NRC, dated October 6, 1982
- 3) NRC letter to TVA, dated June 24, 1983
- 4) TVA letter to NRC, dated June 27, 1984 This letter describes TVA's current plans for compliance with the Generic Safety Evaluation Report (SER), BWR Scram Discharge System, which was included in Reference 1. In References 2 and 4, TVA submitted a description of the long-term scram discharge volume modifications to be performed at BFN. As stated in those letters, TVA's review indicated that its proposed modifications were in accordance with the criteria contained in the generic SER. In Reference 3, TVA received Confirmatory Orders that required modifications be completed, which conform with the generic SER, on Units 1 and 3 prior to their operation during the next cycle. The modifications were completed on BFN Unit 2 prior to the issuance of the Orders on Units 1 and 3.
9308240352 930817 PDR '*DOCK-05000259
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission llU6 if 1993 During the recovery effort for Unit 3, TVA reevaluated the necessity of the scram air header pressure switches scram function. TVA has determined that the scram air header pressure switches scram function is not necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the scram system. In addition, the overall scram system design, without the scram air header pressure switches, still satisfies the criteria contained in the generic SER. Therefore, in accordance with Section 4.3 of the generic SER, pre-implementation review of this design change by the NRC staff is not required. However, in order to correctly reflect our method of compliance with the generic SER, we are informing you of these changes. contains a discussion of the background of this issue, which includes a description of the long-term modifications previously implemented on Unit 2 and a review of the reanalysis performed. A design change will be implemented on Units 1 and 3 to remove the scram air header pressure switches scram function prior to the restart of each unit,.
TVA also intends to submit a Technical Specification Amendment, to request deletion of the Class 1E scram air header pressure switches scram function from the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, to allow this design change to be implemented on Unit 2.
A summary list of commitments contained in this letter is provided as Enclosure 2. If you have any questions, please contact Pedro Salas, Manager of Site Licensing, at (205) 729-2636.
Sincerely, J. Zeringue Enclosures cc: See page 3
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission au8 Xv 1993 cc (Enclosures):
NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. R. V. Crlenjak, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 101 II Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
ENCLOSURE 1 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
Scram Dlschar e Volume Lont-Term Modifications BACKGROUND:
On June 28, 1980, 76 of the 185 control rods failed to fully insert during a routine shutdown at Browns Ferry Unit 3. After two additional attempts to manually scram, 47 rods remained partially withdrawn. Following a longer drain of the scram discharge volume (SDV), the remaining rods fully inserted. The elapsed time from the initial scram to the time that all rods were inserted was approximately 15 minutes.
During the investigation of the above event, the following problem scenario was postulated:
The scram outlet valves open at a slightly higher set point than the scram inlet valves. The control air system typically operates at about 75 PSI. If the pressure decreases to approximately 40 PSI, the scram outlet valves open. The scram inlet valves open at about 30 PSI. If a slow loss of air pressure occurs such that the scram outlet valves remain slightly open while no movement of the control rods take place, the SDV could fill scram inlet valves open. Similarly, a slow with water before the fill event caused by excess Control Rod Drive (CRD) leakage (approximately 10 gpm) could also events would allow the SDV to reactor scram, if required.
fillfill the SDV. These with water and prevent a By Generic Letter to all BWR's, dated July 7, 1980, and through Bulletin 80-17 and its supplements, Licensees were requested to propose Technical Specification changes that included surveillance requirements for SDV vent and drain valves, LCO surveillance requirements for RPS and control rod block SDV level switches, and required the installation of a system to continuously monitor, record, and alarm water levels in the SDVs.
Specifically, Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 3, dated August 22, 1980, required, as a short-term measure, an immediate manual scram when low pressure occurs in the CRD air system or when other indications occurred, such as multiple rod drift alarms or a marked change in the number of control rods at high temperature.
By Generic Letter, dated October 1, 1980, NRC asked if BWR licensees intended to reevaluate their present scram system and modify it, as necessary, to meet the additional design and performance criteria being developed by the BWR Owners Group (BWROG). In our October 27, 1980 response, TVA declined to commit to the BWROG criteria. The generic Safety Evaluation Report (SER) regarding BWR scram discharge systems was issued by Generic Letter, dated December 9, 1980. At that time, all licensees, except TVA, had agreed with the NRC approved BWROG criteria for establishing permanent long term modifications.
One of the deficiencies identified in the December 1, 1980 SER was a specific failure mode of the control air system, which could cause an inability to scram the control rods. As previously mentioned, Supplement 3 of Bulletin 80-17 required an immediate manual scram when low pressure occurs in the CRD air system or when other indications occur. However, only a short time could be available for the operator to successfully initiate a reactor scram. Since a human factors evaluation determined that this manual scram could not be assured, the NRC staff issued orders to provide prompt added protection for credible degraded air conditions in the BWR control air supply system. These orders required an automatic system initiate control rod insertion if the air pressure decreased below a prescribed value.
By NRC letter to TVA, dated January 9, 1981, BFN was Ordered to install an automatic system to accomplish this scram.
By letter dated October 6, 1982, TVA provided a description of the long term modifications that were being performed on Unit 2 and would be performed during the subsequent Units 1 and 3 outages:
- 1) Piping Modifications Each SDV would have an independent but closely coupled scram discharge instrument volume (SDIV). The vent lines would be cross-tied and contain vacuum breakers.
- 2) Valving Modifications The vent and drain lines would have two isolation valves in series and the installed relief valve on the drain piping would be removed.
- 3) Instrumentation Modifications Each SDIV would have two main control room alarms (3-5 gallons not drained and the 24 gallons CRD withdrawal inhibit). Each SDIV would have 1 out of two taken twice logic to scram with the accumulation of 50 gallons of water in the SDIV. Magnetrol float switches and diverse Rosemount sealed rP transmitters and electronic switches would be installed.
Interim commitments, such as the Continuous Monitoring System, the automatic scram on low CRD air pressure, and the functional testing of the SDIV instrumentation following a scram were withdrawn. TVA also stated in this letter that the committed modifications were in accordance with the December 9, 1980 generic SER. In accordance with Section 4.3 of the generic SER, since TVA met the acceptance criteria contained in the compliance section, no staff pre-implementation approval was required.
NRC issued an Order to TVA on June 24, 1983, to require the installation of the long term modifications during the Cycle 5 outage for Units 1 and 3 (These modifications had previously been performed on Unit 2). The Order stated that:
"The licensee shall install the long term BWR scram discharge system modifications in conformance with the staff's Generic SER, which incorporates the BWR Owners Subgroup criteria, before reactor operation in Cycle 6 or, in the alternative, the licensee shall place and maintain the facility in a cold shutdown or refueling mode of operation until such modifications are made."
By letter dated June 27, 1984, TVA informed NRC of changes in the design of the long term modifications. The submittal stated that a 2-inch vent pipe would be installed between the SDV and the SDIV to reduce air binding between the volumes. In addition, although the aP transmitters provided acceptable results with the scram air header pressure switches installed, the final configuration would have instrumentation with a more reasonable actuation time. Consequently, the design was changed to replace the ~P transmitters with heated reference resistive temperature devices (RTDs). The letter also stated that since BFN had no experience with the RTDs and the post-modification tests were not conclusive for validating the modeling of the fast fill event, the scram air header pressure switches were left installed to provide an additional degree of safety.
In addition, another problem with the instrumentation was discovered. Based upon analyses of scrams on Units 1 and 2 since the modifications, it was determined that under scram conditions, the Magnetrol float switched had a response time delay of approximately 20 seconds compared to the RTDs. TVA believed that the RTDs provided a more realistic representation of SDIV water level based upon previous scram data and analyses. Assuming a time delay for the normal leakage events, the response time remained acceptable. However, for the fast fill event, the scram air header pressure switches were left installed due to concerns regarding the SDV the float switches.
fill up rate versus the response time delay in
The inclusion of the Class 1E scram air header pressure switches were proposed for inclusion in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications as part of Supplement 3 to Technical Specification No. 199, dated April 29, 1986. Their inclusion in the Unit 2 Technical Specification was approved as part of Amendment No. 125, dated August 19, 1986.
SUMN2WY OF GENERIC SER REQUIREMENTS The scram air header pressure switches perform the same function as the diverse and redundant high water level switches in the SDIV for fast fill events in which the high level instrument response time may have been inadequate. Section 4.2.4.1 of the generic SER states that the CRD system shall be analyzed based on a plant-specific maximum inleakage to ensure that the system function is not lost prior to initiation of automatic scram. The maximum inleakage is the maximum flow rate, past the CRD seals and through the scram discharge line, without control rod motion, summed over all control rods. The analysis should show no need for vents or drains. The Technical Basis for this section states that a maximum flow rate past the scram outlet valve, without rod motion, is 5 gpm per rod. This value should be used in the analysis to assure system function, or justification should be provided for using a different value. Any value that is used must be verified to be conservative by assured CRD seal maintenance requirements based on stall flow tests.
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SUMMARY
OF REEVALUATION TVA's previous analyses of the scram discharge system were performed assuming the 5 gpm per rod inleakage flow rate. This resulted in approximately 465 gpm inleakage into a SDV. The fast fill transient reanalysis was based upon unit specific CRD leakage rates and SDIV water level instrumentation characteristics. The intent of the analysis was to determine if a successful scram would be achieved using only the water level instrumentation and not the scram air header pressure switches.
As discussed above, the water level in the SDIV is monitored by diverse and redundant Magnetrol and RTD level switches. Since the level switches are diverse and redundant, diversity and redundancy in the instrumentation that initiates the scram signal is maintained even with the removal of the scram air header pressure switches scram function. The RTD switches were confirmed to respond within two seconds and the response time delay associated with the Magnetrol float switches was included in the analysis. No credit was taken for vents or drains and control rod motion was assumed not to occur until scram initiation. A copy of the supporting calculation for this reanalysis is available for review at TVA s Rockville office.
The reanalysis concluded that the water level in the SDIV would not rise high enough to prevent a successful scram and a successful scram would be achieved, with the level instrumentation and without the scram air header pressure switches, provided that the CRD leakage rate and the water level instrumentation response characteristics remain within the success criteria region shown below:
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1.8 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Average Withdrawal Stall Flow Rate, GPM Definitions:
The Magnetrol Versus RTD Response Time Delay is the maximum allowable response time delay between the RTD and Magnetrol level switches as measured following a reactor scram. The Maximum allowable response time delay for either the East or West SDIV is defined as the maximum delay between any RTD level switch and any Magnetrol level switch for that SDIV.
The Average Withdrawal Stall Flow Rate is the CRD stall flow rate averaged over all fully withdrawn rods.
As shown on the above figure, during Unit 2 Cycle 6, the average stall flow leakage was 1.9 to 2.1 gpm per CRD. The maximum response time delay between the RTD and Magnetrol level switches for either SDIV was less than 28 seconds. This combination of stall flow rate and instrument delay is well within the acceptable region.
TVA's current procedures require measurements of CRD stall flow rates for a group of CRDs. In addition, prior to the restart of Units 1 and 3, TVA will revise its procedures to monitor and take appropriate actions to ensure CRD and scram discharge system performance within the acceptable response time delays and stall flow rates. These systems can degrade over time due to long term mechanisms such as crud buildup and corrosion. However, these mechanisms are relatively slow. Therefore, TVA considers an acceptable frequency of confirmation of the response time delay and stall flow rate to be once per operating cycle or at the next scram if a scram has not occurred during that cycle.
TVA also intends to submit a Technical Specification Amendment, to request deletion of the Class 1E scram air header pressure switches scram function from the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, to allow this design change to be implemented on Unit 2.
CONCLUSION In summary, the inclusion of the Class 1E scram air header pressure switches was over and above the requirements of the December 9, 1980 generic SER. These switches perform the same function as the high water level switches in the SDIV for fast fill events in which the high level instrument response time may have been inadequate. Based on further analysis, TVA has determined that administrative controls on the average control rod drive withdrawal stall flow rate and level switch response time will preclude the need for the scram air header pressure switches. In addition, the potential for a plant transient due to the mal-operation or testing of these pressure switches, the resources required for surveillance and maintenance of the switches, and the costs associated with installing the Class 1E sdv low air pressure switches in Units 1 and 3 outweigh the safety benefits of this redundant scram feature.
Consequently, TVA has decided not to finalize the installation of the scram air header pressure switches scram function on Units 1 and 3. In accordance with Section 4.3 of the December 9, 1980 generic Safety Evaluation Report, since withdrawing this commitment on Units 1 and 3 does not change TVA's compliance with the generic acceptance. criteria, no staff pre-implementation approval is required. TVA also intends to submit a Technical Specification Amendment, to request deletion of the Class 1E scram air header pressure switches scram function from the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, to allow this design change to be implemented on Unit 2.
ENCLOSURE 2 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
Summar of Commitments
- 1) A design change will be implemented on Units 1 and 3 to remove the scram air header pressure switches scram function prior to the restart of each unit.
- 2) Prior to the restart of Units 1 and 3, TVA will revise its procedures to monitor and take appropriate actions to ensure CRD and scram discharge system performance within the acceptable region.
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