IR 05000272/2018007
| ML18099A086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/2018 |
| From: | Glenn Dentel Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Sena P Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| IR 2018007 | |
| Download: ML18099A086 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 9, 2018
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2018007 AND 05000311/2018007
Dear Mr. Sena:
On March 2, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Salem Nuclear Generating Stations (Salem), Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment of the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000272/2018007 and 05000311/2018007
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 50-272 and 50-311 License Numbers: DPR-70 and DPR-75 Report Numbers: 05000272/2018007 and 05000311/2018007 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-007-0005 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)
Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Units 1 and 2 Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Inspection Dates: February 12, 2018 to March 2, 2018 Inspectors: E. DiPaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector L. Dumont, Reactor Inspector C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector Observer: E. Rosenfeld, Nuclear Engineer, New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Approved By: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring PSEGs performance at
Salem Units 1 and 2 by conducting the triennial fire protection team inspection in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
Licensee-identified non-cited violations (NCVs) are documented in report Section 71111.05T.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Perform Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass Switches Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green P.2 - Problem 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000272,05000311/2018007-01 Identification and Closed Resolution,
Evaluation The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10) of the respective facility operating licenses for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program. Specifically, PSEG did not periodically test or check the EDG bypass switches to verify that they were capable of performing their intended design functions during safe shutdown operation in the event of a significant fire.
INSPECTION SCOPES
===This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure (IP) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program -
Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.05T - Fire Protection (Triennial)
The inspectors evaluated the following from February 12, 2018 to March 2, 2018:
Fire Protection Inspection Requirements ===
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected fire areas:
- (1) 1FA-AB-100A, Unit 1 Relay Room, Elevation 100
- (2) 1FA-AB-64B, Unit 1 Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area, Elevation 64
- (3) 2FA-EP-78C, Unit 2 Lower Electrical Penetration Area, Elevation 78
- (4) 2FA-AB-84A, Unit 2 460 Volt Switchgear Room, Elevation 84 In performing this review, the inspectors performed an analysis of the following electrical circuits:
- (1) 2CV175, Unit 2 Borate Line Isolation Valve
- (2) 1RH1, Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inside Isolation Valve
- (3) 1RH2, Unit 1 RHR/RCS Outside Isolation Valve
- (4) 1AFE6, Unit 1 Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 13
- (5) 2PR6, Unit 2 Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valve Isolation Valve
- (6) 1PT534, Unit 1 Steam Generator 13 Pressure Instrument B.5.b Inspection Activities (3 Samples)===
The inspectors evaluated feasibility of the following B.5.b Mitigating Strategies:
- (1) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003, Alternate Power Supply to Battery Chargers
- (2) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008, Emergency Fill to Spent Fuel Pool
- (3) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, Flooding Containment Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Perform Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass Switches Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green P.2 - Problem 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000272,05000311/2018007-01 Identification Closed and Resolution, Evaluation The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10) of the respective facility operating licenses for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program. Specifically, PSEG did not periodically test or check the EDG bypass switches to verify that they were capable of performing their intended design functions during safe shutdown operation in the event of a significant fire.
Description:
On January 12, 2018, PSEG completed a focused self-assessment of the Salems fire protection program. During the self-assessment, an extent-of-condition review was performed on an NRC-identified NCV identified during the 2016 Hope Creek triennial fire protection inspection documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000354/2016007 (ML16116A301). The NCV was associated with the failure to establish and perform periodic testing to verify the transfer or isolation functions of the EDG normal-emergency takeover switches. On January, 31, 2018, PSEG staff generated Notification (NOTF) 20785891, because no periodic testing was performed on the equivalent EDG bypass switches at Salem.
The function of the EDG bypass switches are to isolate the EDGs from Control Room and Relay Room circuitry in the event of a fire in these areas. PSEG concluded that there were no existing requirements to test the switches based on a review of the safe shutdown analysis, the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR).
However, because the switches were not tested since they were installed in 1984, the NOTF recommended an enhancement to periodically test the switches. The NOTF was given a routine priority (>20 weeks) to implement routine testing of the switches.
On February 12, 2018, the team reviewed NOTF 20785891 and the Salem licensing basis and determined that the EDG bypass switches were required to be periodically tested in accordance with the Facility Operating License condition to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR. Therefore, NOTF 20785891 should have received a higher priority for resolution in the corrective action program. In addition, the team determined that a functionality assessment was warranted because the EDG bypass switches had not been tested since they were installed in 1984 and could have degraded over time. Based on the inspectors value added, this issue was determined to be NRC identified.
Corrective Action(s): On February 28, 2018, PSEG staff completed a functionality evaluation for the EDG bypass switches and concluded that the EDG bypass switches were considered functional and capable of performing their post fire safe shutdown functions. Furthermore, two recommended actions were added to NOTF 20785891: 1) to complete an extent of condition review to determine whether any similar switches associated with fire safe shutdown from outside the control room have testing inadequacies; and 2) implement routine testing of the EDG bypass switches.
Corrective Action Reference(s): NOTF 20785891
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that PSEGs failure to establish periodic testing of the EDG safe shutdown bypass switches, as required by the Salem fire protection program, was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within PSEGs ability to foresee and prevent, and should have been corrected. Specifically, PSEG failed to periodically verify or demonstrate that EDG bypass switches would perform their intended safe shutdown functions in the event of a significant fire.
Screening: This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the EDG during a post fire safe shutdown event. Specifically, failure to periodically test the EDG bypass switches to demonstrate that they will perform satisfactory in service could affect their availability, reliability, and capability due to degradation over time.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP. This issue screened to very low safety significance (Green) in Phase 1, Task 1.4.5, Post-fire Safe-shutdown, because it did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. This was based on a functionality evaluation performed by PSEG for the EDG bypass switches that concluded that the switches were considered functional and capable of performing their post fire safe shutdown function. The conclusion was based on the construction of the switch, the capability to monitor certain failures during normal plant operations, and the mild environment where they are installed.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate the issue of not periodically testing the EDG bypass switches, which are required to operate during post fire safe shutdown operation, to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. [P.2]
Enforcement:
Violation: Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10), in part, require PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR. UFSAR Section 9.5.1.1.5, Quality Assurance Program for Fire Protection, states that the Quality Assurance Program at Salem assures that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety related areas are satisfied.
UFSAR Section 17.2 states that the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) describes how the Quality Assurance Program is to be functionally implemented at Salem.
The QATR is the highest tiered document that assigns major quality assurance functional responsibilities for Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2. QATR Chapter 11, Test Control, Section 2.1.1 states that a documented test program shall be established to assure that all testing required demonstrating that the structures, systems, and components within the scope of this Quality Assurance Program will perform satisfactory in service. In addition, the test program includes, as appropriate, procedures to ensure those structures, systems, and components will perform in service at the Salem Generating Station. CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5, describes the provisions for post fire safe shutdown. CC-AA-211, Step 4.1.3.3 states that equipment and components required to perform various manual actions needed for fire safe shutdown are checked periodically to verify they are available to meet the manual action steps during fire safe shutdown operation.
Contrary to the above, since 1984, when the EDG bypass switches were installed and placed in operation, PSEG had not established or performed periodic testing, or checking on the EDG bypass switches of both units to verify that they will be available to meet manual action steps during fire safe shutdown operation.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.05T This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Salem Unit 2 Facility Operating License Condition 2.(C).(10), in part, requires PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the fire protection program as described in the UFSAR, as approved by the NRC. SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis, Revision 0, establishes the basis for demonstrating a capability to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown as described in the UFSAR, Section 9.5.1.1, Fire Protection Program. SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3 states that 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L describes the safe shutdown requirements when an alternate or dedicated shutdown capability is provided as required in Appendix R,Section III.G.3. Appendix R,Section III.L.3, states, in part, that alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area. SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3 designates Fire Areas 2FA-AB-84A and 2FA-AB-64A as alternative shutdown areas.
Contrary to the above, as of January 10, 2018, PSEG identified that the power cable that supplies power to both the Nuclear Instrumentation System Wide Range Amplifier Panel 962 and Signal Processor Panel 964 is routed through Fire Areas 2FA-AB-84A and 2FA-AB-64A without a required fire barrier and, therefore, was not independent of the specific fire area. As a result, for a fire event in either of these alternative shutdown areas, the power supply to the Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel Source Range and Power Range monitor could be lost and result in the loss of the neutron monitoring function. PSEG promptly implemented compensatory measures for this deficiency that included establishing a fire watch for the affected area.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into PSEGs Corrective Action Program (NOTF 20785256), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Significance/Severity Level: The team performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP, Task 1.4.5: Post-fire Safe-shutdown. This issue screened to very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. Specifically, the Hot Shutdown Panel Source Range and Power Range monitor only provides a process monitoring function for reactivity control and safe shutdown actions would be determined using reactor coolant system chemistry sampling for boron concentration.
Corrective Action Reference: NOTF 20785256
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On March 2, 2018, the inspector presented the triennial fire protection team inspection results to Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Fire Protection Licensing and Design Basis Documents
DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A4-SSC, Salem Fire Protection Report Safe Shutdown Cables, Revision 5
NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q), Programmatic Standard for Fire Protection, Revision 3
NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A1, Salem Fire Protection Report - Technical Standard General,
Revision 2
NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Comparison of Salem Fire Program to BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A,
Revision 2
NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Salem Fire Protection Report-General, Revision 2
NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire
Protection for Nuclear Power Plants
NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated 1/7/04
NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated 11/20/79
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown
Analysis Volume 6, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building Elevation 64, 1FA-AB-64B, dated
3/16/16
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(045), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 45, Diesel Generator Room 1A, 1FA-DG-100D, Diesel Generator Control Room
1A, 1FA-DG-100D1, dated 3/16/16
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(047), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 47, Diesel Generator Room 1B, 1FA-DG-100E, Diesel Generator Control Room
1B, 1FA-DG-100E1, dated 3/16/16
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(049), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 49, Diesel Generator Room 1C, 1FA-DG-100F, Diesel Generator Control Room
1C, 1FA-DG-100F1, dated 3/17/16
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(053), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 53, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Room 11, 1FA-DG-84D, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage
Room 12, FA-DG-84E, CO2 Equipment Room, 1FA-DG-84F, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
Pump Transfer Room 11, 1FA-DG-84G, Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Transfer Room 12,
1FA-DG-84H, dated 3/17/16
S1.ER-PS.FP-001-A3(059), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 59, Control Room Complex 12FA-AB-122A, Unit 1 Relay Room, 1FA-AB-100A,
Unit 1 Battery Rooms, 1FA-AB-100B-1, B-2, and B-1, dated 3/17/16
S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(024), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 24, 460V/230V Switchgear Room Elevation 84, 2FA-AB-84A, dated 5/8/16
S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis,
Volume 32, Lower Electrical Penetration Area Elevation 78, 2FA-AB-78C, dated 5/8/16
Salem Unit 1 Facility Operating License
Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification
Salem Unit 2 Facility Operating License
Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Salem Fire Protection Report - Fire Hazards Analysis, dated 12/2/11
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(003), Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision 3
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(001), Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis Volume 1
Safe Shutdown Equipment List, dated 3/16/16
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(002), Technical Standard SFPR-SSA Safe Shutdown Fault Three,
dated 3/16/16
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Technical Standard Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown
Analysis, 12FA-AB-122A, 1FA-AB-100A, dated 2/5/18
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Technical Standard Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown
Analysis, 2FA-EP-78C, dated 5/8/16
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis, dated 2/2/18
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Manual Action
Feasibility Assessment, dated 8/17/17
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A4, Fire Events in Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Risk Evaluations, Revision 0
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,
Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection, Revision 29
Calculations, Analysis, and Engineering Evaluations
DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSA, Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis, Revision 5
DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR(042), Safe Shutdown Analysis 12FA-AB-100A, Revision 0
Generating Station Unit 1 and Unit 2, Revision 3
S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Safe Shutdown Analysis Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building
1FA-AB-64B, Revision 0
S-1-FP-MDC-2333, Salem Unit 1 Main Power Transformers Fire Suppression System Hydraulic
Calculations, Revision 0
S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(024), Safe Shutdown Analysis 460 Volt/230Volt Switchgear Room
2FA-AB-84A, Revision 0
S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Safe Shutdown Analysis Lower Electrical Penetration Area,
2FA-AB-78C, Revision 0
S-2-FP-FEE-1988, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation for
2FA-EP-78C, Revision 0
S-2-FP-FEE-1989, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation for
2FA-AB-84A, Revision 0
S-2-FP-MDC-2331, Salem Unit 2 Main Power Transformers Fire Suppression System Hydraulic
Calculations, Revision 0
SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(003), Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision 1
S-C-ABV-MDC-1881, Salem Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Gothic Appendix R
Scenarios, Revision 1
S-C-ABV-MEE-1472, Effect of the Loss of Auxiliary Building Ventilation on Appendix R Safe
Shutdown Electrical Equipment and the Heat Stress of the Capacity to Perform Manual
Actions, Revision 1
S-C-CAV-MDC-1583, Salem Generating Station - Compensatory Actions for Appendix R &
IPEE Loss of Ventilation Scenarios, Revision 5
S-C-FBW-FEE-1553, Evaluation of Fire Wrap Requirements for Supports in
1(2)-78C, Revision 1
S-C-FP-FEE-1888, Relay Room Halon System Acceptance Test Review, Revision 0
S-C-ZZ-EEE-1430, Loss of Offsite Power Evaluation for a Postulated Appendix R Fire at Salem
Generating Station Units 1 & 2, Revision 2
S-C-ZZ-NDS-0387, Design Specification Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Salem
Generating Station Units 1 & 2, Revision 1
S-C-ZZ-SDC-1203, Moderate Energy Pipe Break Analysis (Reconstitution) for Salem
Technical Evaluation 40198737-0030, Functionality Evaluation for the Emergency Diesel
Generator Bypass Switches, dated 2/28/18
Technical Evaluation 70061473-0075, Evaluation of Salem Generating Station Post Fire Safe
Shutdown Manual Action, dated 1/6/09
Drawings and Wiring Diagrams
153441, Drawing No. M-03, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Cylinder Foundation and
Weighing Rack Unit 1, Revision D
153442, Drawing No. M-04, Sheet 1, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Piping
Unit 1, Revision D
153442, Drawing No. M-04, Sheet 2, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Piping Unit 1,
Revision D
153443, Drawing No. M-06, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Actuation Details Unit 1,
Revision A
203767, A 1364-17, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Fire Protection Smoke & Fire
Detectors, Revision 17
205826, A 8775-30, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building Conduits &
Trays below EL 84-0, Revision 30
205827, A 8775-32, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building Conduits &
Trays below EL 84-0, Revision 32
207095, A 8798-41, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Building
Exterior and Interior Door Schedule, Revision 41
605501 A-00, Sht. 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration
Elevation 78 Details S2FBW-2EP78C-07, Revision 0
605501 A-00, Sht. 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration
Elevation 78 Details S2FBW-2EP78C-07, Revision 0
605508 A-00, Sht. 10, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration
Elevation 78 Details S2FBW-2EP78C-03, Revision 0
605508 A-00, Sht. 8, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration
Elevation 78 Details S2FBW-2EP78C-03, Revision 0
605508 A-00, Sht. 9, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration
Elevation 78 Details S2FBW-2EP78C-03, Revision 0
605811, A -0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones
Auxiliary Building Elevation 64, Revision 0
605812, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones
Auxiliary Building Elevation 78, Elevation 84 & Service Water Pipe Tunnel
Elevation 88-8 Location, Revision 0
605813, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones
Auxiliary Building and Containment Elevation 100, Revision 0
605819, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building Boundary
Locations Floor Plan Elevation 64-0, Revision 0
605820, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building Boundary
Locations Floor Plan Elevation 78-0 & Elevation 84-0, Revision 0
605821, A-1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building Boundary
Locations Floor Plan Elevation 100-0 & Elevation 110-0, Revision 1
605822, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building Boundary
Locations Floor Plan Elevation 122-0, Revision 0
Drawing No. FA-01, Detection Design Layout 480V Switchgear Room Unit No. 2 Elevation 84,
Revision 0
Drawing No. FA-01, Detection Design Layout Electrical Penetration Room Unit No. 2
Elevation 78, Revision 0
Drawing No. FP-01, Sprinkler Design Layout 480V Switchgear Room Unit No. 2 Elevation 84,
Revision 0
Drawing No. FP-01, Sprinkler Design Layout Electrical Penetration Room Unit No. 2
Elevation 78, Revision 0
203000, No. 1 & No. 2 Units Generators & Main Transformers, One Line Control, Revision 69
203002, No. 1 Unit, 4160 Volt Vital Buses One Line, Revision 35
203007, No.1 Unit 125 Volt Direct Current One Line, Revision 31
203061, No. 2 Unit 4160 Volt Vital Buses One Line, Revision 35
211357, Sheet 1, No.1 Unit, 28 Volt Direct Current One Line, Revision 15
211357, Sheet 2, No.2 Unit, 28 Volt Direct Current One Line, Revision 13
23720, No. 2 Unit, 125 Volt Direct Current One Line, Revision 34
211364, Unit 1 Control Area No.1A 115 Volt. Vital instrument Bus, Revision 26
20105, No. 1 & 2 Units - Control Room Area, Reactor Protection Channel I Rack 5,
Revision 14
203319. No. 1 Unit - Auxiliary Feedwater System, No 13 Aux. Feed Pump & Turbine,
Revision 24
203464, No. 1 Unit Reactor Containment Pressurizer & Pressurizer Relief Tank Valves and
Temperatures, Revision 39
203318, No. 1 & 2 Units - Auxiliary Feedwater System, No. 13 & 23 Auxiliary Feed Pumps &
Turbines, Revision 11
203414, No. 1 & 2 Units - Auxiliary Feedwater System No. 11, 12,13,14, 21, 22, 23 & 24
Auxiliary Feedwater Inlet Valves, Revision 2
203377, No.1 & 2 Units - Turbine Generator Area, Feedwater Flow & Pressure Transmitters,
Revision 21
211505, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit - Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 11SJ44, 11RH4 & 1RH2,
Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 31
211506, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit - Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 12SJ44, 12RH4 & 1RH1,
Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 11
211507, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit - Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 12SJ44, 12RH4 & 1RH1,
Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 35
24389, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit-Residual Heat Removal System, No.11SJ44, 11RH4, 1RH2,
Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 9
24390, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit-Residual Heat Removal System, No.12SJ44, 12RH4, 1RH1,
Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 9
24321, No. 1&2 Units - Control Room Area, Solid State Reactor Protection System Train B
Input Cabinet 35, Revision 15
24445, No. 1& 2 Unit 2 HS67 Batching System Inlet Valves ICV175 & 2CV175 Rapid Borate
Stop Valves. Revision 4
244083, No.2 Unit Pressurizer, Pressurizer Power Relief & Stop Valves and Overpressure
Protection System Channel 1, Revision 18
218858, No. 2 Unit-Chemical and Volume Control System, No. ECV175 Rapid Borate Stop
Valve, Revision 8
231356, No. 1 & 2 Units - Pressurizer 1PR6 2PR6, 1PR7 Pressurizer Relief Stop Valves,
Revision 5
231448, No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Feedwater System No. 13 & 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,
Revision 8
219456, No. 1 & 2 Units - Auxiliary Building Elevation 84-0, Hot Shutdown Station, Revision 0
606356A, NSR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1AFE12, Revision 0
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
205222, A 8760-61, Sheer 3, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire
Protection, Revision 61
205222, A 8760-64, Sheet 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire
Protection, Revision 64
205222, A 8760-65, Sheet 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire
Protection, Revision 65
205222, A 8760-66, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, No. 1 & 2 Units Fire Protection,
Revision 66
205222, A 8760-7, Sheet 7, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire
Protection, Revision 7
205222, SIMP-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Fire Protection, Revision 0
205232, No. 1 Unit, Residual Heat Removal Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram,
Revision 1
205232, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 43
205232, Sheet 2, No. 1 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 40
205236, No. 1 Unit, Auxiliary Feedwater System Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram,
Revision 1
205236, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Feedwater, Revision 62
205328, Sheet 1, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision 57
205328, Sheet 2, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision 70
205328, Sheet 3, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision 41
205332, No. 2 Unit, Residual Heat Removal Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram,
Revision 2
205332, Sheet 1, No. 2 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 38
205332, Sheet 2, No. 2 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 33
207574, A 8802-36, Sheet 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Yard Fresh Water and Fire
Protection Piping, Revision 36
218723, A 8921-17, Sheet 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Yard Fresh Water and Fire
Protection Piping, Revision 17
600256, A 8703-20, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit Carbon Dioxide Fire
Protection System, Revision 20
600256, A 8703-21, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Carbon Dioxide Fire
Protection System, Revision 21
Revision 21
Large Fires and Explosions Mitigation Strategies Documents
HC.FP-PT.KC-0025(Z), Non-Class 1 Fire Hose Station Hydrostatic Test performed on
7/11/2015
Long Range Training Plan 17-18, Revision 2
Memorandum of Understanding between PSEG, LLC and Township of Lower Alloways Creek,
dated January 6, 2014
OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Revision 10
Order 30315018, B.5.b Equipment Inventory
Order 80096177, Operation 0030, B.5.b Scenario Calculation, Revision 3
SC.OP-AM.TSC.1001, Salem Extensive Damage Mitigating Guideline Initial Plant Assessment,
Revision 0
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Manually Depressurizing Steam Generators Utilizing MS10s, Revision 2
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003, Alternate Power Supply to Battery Chargers, Revision 3
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008, Emergency Fill to Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 11
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, Flooding Containment Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Revision 2
SC.OP-AM.TSC-1000, Salem Extensive Damage Mitigating Guideline Initial Plant Response,
Revision 1
SC.OP-PT.SF-0001(Q), Portable Spent Fuel Pit Pump Operability Test, Revision 12
SH.OP-AM.TSC-0002, Remote Response Center Operations, Revision 2
Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Design Changes
70178658-0260, GL 86-10 Evaluation for Converting the Automatic CO2 Fire Suppression
Systems in Salem Diesel Generator Areas to Manual Operation, Completed 9/9/15
70179579-0210, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation for Spurious Operation of Pressurizer Relief
Valves PR1 and PR2, Completed 7/14/16
80108570, Replace Sprinkler Heads on #11 and #12 Feedwater Pumps & #1, 2, 3 SAC Deluge
System, Revision 0
80108571, Replace Sprinkler Heads on #21 and 22 Feedwater Pump Deluge
System, Revision 0
80109928-0744, GL 86-10 Evaluation for Reduction of Hose Stream Allowance from 1000 GPM
to 500 GPM, Completed 3/2/15
80110341-1555, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation for Separation of MS-10 Valves in the Inner
and Outer Penetration Fire Areas, Completed 9/30/15
80120910, Unit 1 FP Zone 84 Thermal Detectors Design Equivalent Change, Revision 0
Quality Assurance Audits and Self Assessments
Fire Protection Audit Report, Audit NOSA-HPC-16-07 (80117974) Hope Creek and Salem
Stations, 9/6/16 to 9/23/16
Order 80121006, Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Self-Assessment Report, Focused Area
Self-Assessment, dated 1/12/18
Procedures
CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5
CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5
CC-AA-211-1001, Generic Letter 86010 Evaluations, Revision 1
FP-AA-002, Fire Protection Impairment Program, Revision 3
FP-AA-005, Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program, Revision 3
FP-AA-006, Tracking Incomplete Testing of Fire Protection Equipment, Revision 1
FP-AA-008, Fire Prevention for Hot Work, Revision 9
FP-AA-011, Control of Transient Combustible Material, Revision 4
FP-AA-014, Fire Protection Training Program, Revision 4
FP-AA-015, Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program, Revision 9
FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Performance, Revision 1
FP-SA-003, Actions for Inoperable Fire Protection, Revision 5
NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment Inventory,
Revision 10
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures, Revision 5
S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Revision 24
S2.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Unit 2 Control Area HVAC, Revision 5
S2.OP-AB.CR-0002, Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire in the Control Room, Relay Room,
460V/230V Switchgear Room, or 4KV Switchgear Room, Revision 31
S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 11
S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002, Fire Damage Mitigation, Revision 8
SC.DE.PS.ZZ-0051(Q), Fuse Control Program for Salem Generating Station Unit 1, 2, &3,
dated 6/3/99
SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001, Installation of Temporary 4KV Power Cables to CCW and RHR Motors,
Revision 7
Penetration Seal Documents
CALC S-1-CAN-SDC-1055, Seismic II / I Evaluation of Penetration Seals, 8/6/92
VTD 309896, Penetration Seal Detail SE-Foam with Cable Thru Fire and / or Pressure Barrier,
8/20/92
VTD 309914, Pen Seal Detail Pipe or Conduit Thru Fire and / or Pressure Barrier, 8/21/92
VTD 312303, SF-60 in Spare Penetrations Thru Fire Barrier, 8/28/92
VTD 431198, Bisco Fire Test Report No. 748-175 for SF-60 with Pipe Thru Blockout, 2/1/85
VTD PA-400F-0140, Bisco Product Equivalency Test for SF-20 and SE-Foam
Test Report 748-134, 10/29/85
VTD PA-400F-0229, Three Hour Fire Test of Multiple Penetration Seal Configurations, PSEG
Test 89-004,89-006 (Bisco Fire Test 748-237), 4/8/10
Fire Fighting Strategies (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans)
FP-SA-1532, U/1 Monitor Tank Area, Laundry Area El. 64, Revision 0
FP-SA-1533, U/1 Waste Hold-up Tank Area, El. 64, Revision 0
FP-SA-1534, U/1 CVCS Hold-up Tank Area, El. 64, Revision 0
FP-SA-1551, U/1 Relay & Battery Room Corridor, El. 100, Revision 0
FP-SA-1555, U/1 Diesel Generator Area, El. 100, Revision 0
FP-SA-1651, U/1 Service Water Intake Structure, Revision 0
FP-SA-2541, U/2 460V Switchgear Rooms & Corridors, El. 84, Revision 0
FP-SA-2546, U/2 Electrical Penetration Area, El. 78, Revision 0
FP-SA-2555, U/2 Diesel Generator Area, El. 100, Revision 0
Fire Brigade Training
PSEG Fire Department Annual Training Record, 2/14/18
PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Confined Space and Rope Rescue Training, April 2017
PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Hazardous Material Requalification, April 2017
PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Live Fire Training, April 2017
PSEG Fire Protection Operator Training Plan, 1st Quarter 2018
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Barrier Inspection, Revision 0
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator-Basic,
Revision 0
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator-Electrical
Tasks, Revision 0
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator-Industrial
Safety Tasks, Revision 0
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator-Water
Systems, Revision 0
TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Pump Operation and Testing,
Revision 0
Fire Brigade Drills and Critiques
FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Salem Service Water Bay 1 Pump Room Announced Drill,
Completed 2/28/18
Transient Combustible, Hot Work, and Ignition Source Permits and Evaluations
Hot Work Authorization Log, Permit Numbers SA 18001 - SA 18006, 1/23/18
Transient Combustible Permit Log, Permit Numbers 270 - 337, 1/23/18
Completed Tests and Surveillances
NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0001(Z), Ambulance and Medical Inventory Inspection, completed 12/15/17
NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007(Z), Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, completed 1/10/18
NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment Inventory,
completed 12/24/17
S1.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/15/15
S1.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/8/16
S1.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors,
completed 5/9/17
S1.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors,
completed 9/7/15
S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 12/28/17
S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 1/11/18
S1.FP-ST.FS-0024(Q), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Flow Verification, Completed 7/22/16
S1.FP-ST.FS-0025(Q), Triennial Fire Hose Service Test, completed 12/26/14
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection,
completed 7/23/15
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection,
completed 1/4/17
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 2/16/17
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 8/17/17
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 7/14/14
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 10/13/15
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 2/27/17
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 12/31/15
S1.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 7/6/17
S1.FP-SV.FS-0023(Q), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Detailed Inspection, completed 10/28/17
S1.OP-PT.HSD-002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel / Local Pane Functional Test, completed 7/5/16
S2.FP-PM.FS-0023(Z), Fire Hose Station Detailed Inspection, completed 12/23/17
S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/19/15
S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 11/13/16
S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 1/24/16
S2.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors,
completed 6/20/17
S2.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors,
completed 10/3/15
S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 12/21/17
S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 1/4/18
S2.FP-ST.FS-0024(Q), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Flow Verification, completed 10/18/15
S2.FP-ST.FS-0025(Q), Triennial Fire Hose Service Test, completed 1/20/18
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection,
completed 7/14/15
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection,
completed 1/18/17
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 6/29/17
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 1/1/18
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 2/16/16
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 12/21/15
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 5/25/17
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0071(Q), Inspection of Marinite Boards, completed 3/23/15
S2.FP-SV.FBR-0071(Q), Inspection of Marinite Boards, completed 8/3/16
S2.OP-PT.HSD-0003(Q), Alternate Shutdown and appendix R Equipment Storage Cabinet
Inventory, completed 11/20/17
S2.OP-PT.HSD-002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel / Local Pane Functional Test, completed 4/27/17
SC.FP.SO.FP-0001(Q), Fire Protection Water Suppression Systems Operation, completed
8/10/13
SC.FP.SO.FP-0001(Q), Fire Protection Water Suppression Systems Operation, completed
8/27/16
SC.FP-ST.FS-0004(Q), Fire Suppression Water System Flush, completed 6/26/16
SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, completed 10/7/15
SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, completed 8/18/16
SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, completed 8/10/13
SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, completed 8/27/16
SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026(Q), Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, completed 2/1/18
SC.FP-TI.FP-0002(Q), Fire Protection Equipment / Systems Contingency Plans, completed
10/29/17
Notifications (NOTFs) [ADD * when NOTF was written as a result of the NRC inspection]
296479 20623627 20634568 20665975
20678200 20678644 20679351 20713638
20717822 20718940 20724851 20726884
20727500 20733631 20738186 20741786
20741790 20742653 20742722 20749724
20749737 20754597 20754599 20754616
20766638 20772169 20775730 20776681
20777139 20777139 20779801 20779856
20780489 20782444 20782463 20782505
20783306 20784313 20784785 20784984
20785058 20785118 20785155 20786393
20787393 20787819 20785915* 20786350*
20786351* 20786610* 20786817* 20787012*
20787384* 20787392* 20787402* 20787509*
20787538* 20787539* 20787908* 20788027*
20788028* 20788031* 20788152* 20788158*
20788184* 20788254* 20788274* 20788275*
20788277* 20788278* 20788279* 20788933*
20788934*
Orders
70061473
70196898
Work Orders
30172211 30185833 30186636 30216393
233213 30240577 30247387 30261021
261024 30264931 30265720 30266048
266284 30266508 30266731 30269608
270442 30271293 30272696 30273404
274092 30278480 30281599 30286545
286867 30288987 30289278 30289510
290034 30290198 30292533 30292723
295542 30296777 30299128 30300636
30301587 30304872 30305973 30307756
30312517 30315730 30316975 30317321
30317845 30318096 30318351 30318469
50118083 50141309 50145650 60114632
60125598 60133930 80115237
Vendor Manuals
BNZ R-3261-W, BNZ Materials Inc. Marinite 1 Fire Resistant Thermal / Structural Insulation,
11/97
VTD 172432, Ansul Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System, 10/1/78
VTD 304068, Prefco 11/2 Hour Rated Fire and Smoke Dampers, 4/25/86
VTD 306353, Fire Damper Model Numbers FD-100 V/H, FD-200 V/H, FD-400 V, 7/31/87
VTD 306384, Qualification Fire Test of a Protective Envelope System, 11/6/89
VTD 316651, Installation Booklet for 3M Interam E54A Fire Protection Mat 1 Hour Wrap System
for HVAC Duct Work, 8/12/93
VTD 317518. Type E50 Endothermic Mat in 3 Hour Rated Electrical Circuit Protective Systems
for Cable Tray and Conduit Systems, 5/8/86
VTD 325338, Omega Point Laboratories 1 Hour E50 Mat Cable Tray Fire Test with
Appurtenances, 4/8/02
Miscellaneous Documents
Salem/Common - Fire Protection System Health Report, 4th Quarter 2017, 1st Quarter 2018
S-C-M500-EEE-1636, Availability of the UHF Radio Systems Following an Appendix R Fire,
Revision 0
NRC Generic Letter 81-12, Fire Protection Rule, dated 2/20/81
Reportability Evaluation for Notification 2078602, dated 1/10/18
Fire Protection Impairment Tracking Report, 1/22/18
Daily Firewatch Inspection Log, 2/14/18