Text

Request for Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination
	ML062650255
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	09/15/2006
From:	Harden P; Nuclear Management Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML062650255 (229)
	v • d • e

NMC Commited to Nuclear Excellen~c Palisades Nuclear Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC September 15, 2006 10 CFR 50.55a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Request for Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination

References:

1)Westinghouse Owners Group Topical Report, WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval," dated October 2003 2) Letter from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Westinghouse Electric Company, "Summary of Teleconference with the Westinghouse Owners Group Regarding Potential One Cycle Relief of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Weld Inspections at Pressurized Water Reactors Related to WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals," dated January 27, 2005 3) Letter from NMC to NRC, "Request for Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination," dated March 31, 2005 4) Letter from NMC to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination," dated October 11, 2005 5) Letter from NRC to NMC, "Palisades Nuclear Plant -Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC654 7)" dated November 29, 2005 6) Letter from NRC to NMC "Palisades Nuclear Plant -Corrected Page for Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated December 14, 2005 AC)4. 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway e Covert, Michigan 49043-9530 Telephone:

269.764.2000 AX '.15 Page 2 Document Control Desk Per reference 3, NMC submitted a relief request to extend the ISI interval for reactor vessel weld exams by one refueling cycle. The relief request was approved by the NRC by letters dated November 29, 2005 and December 14, 2005 (References 5 and 6). Due to the current status of Reference 1, NMC is requesting approval of the relief request for an additional refueling cycle. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) is requesting Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval for the use of an alternative to the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, paragraph IWB-2412, Inspection Program B, for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. NMC is submitting this relief request because the Westinghouse Owners Group Topical Report (Reference

1) is currently being reviewed by the NRC and not yet approved.

Palisades third inspection interval began on May 12, 1995, and considering the ASME Code-allowed extensions, will end on December 12, 2006. The examination of the reactor vessel welds (Category B-A), the nozzle-to-vessel welds and inner radius sections (Category B-D), and reactor vessel nozzle-to-piping welds (Category B-J), for the third interval is currently scheduled for the fall 2007 refueling outage, as allowed by the previously approved relief request (Reference 5 and 6). As a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, the Category B-J welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams. NRC approval is requested to extend the third inspection interval for the Category B-A, B-D, and B-J welds for one additional refueling cycle for the subject examinations.

The technical justification for this request is consistent with the guidance provided in Reference

2. The extension of the inspection interval for these examinations will still provide for an acceptable level of quality and safety, as described in the enclosed request. NMC requests approval by September 1, 2007. Summary of Commitments Tcontains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Paul A. Harden Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC Enclosures (1) Attachments (5) CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC ENCLOSURE 1 REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO EXTEND THE THIRD 10-YEAR INSERVICE INSPECTION INTERVAL FOR REACTOR VESSEL WELD EXAMINATION PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 1.0 ASME Code Component(s)

Affected The affected component is the Palisades Nuclear Plant reactor vessel (RV), specifically, the following American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code,Section XI examination categories and item numbers covering examinations of the RV. These examination categories and item numbers are from IWB-2500 and Table IWB-2500-1 of the ASME BPV Code,Section XI. Examination Category Item No. Description B-A BI1.11 Circumferential Shell Welds B-A B1.12 Longitudinal Shell Welds B-A B13.21 Circumferential Head Welds B-A B1.22 Meridional Head Welds B-A B1.30 Shell-to-Flange Weld B-D B3.90 Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds B-D B3.100 Nozzle Inner Radius Areas B-J* B9.11 Circumferential Welds in Piping

As a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, the Category B-J welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams. (Throughout this request, the above examination categories are referred to as "the subject examinations," and the ASME BPV Code,Section XI, is referred to as "the Code.") 2.0 Applicable Code Edition and Addenda The Palisades Nuclear Plant third interval Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Plan is prepared to the 1989 Edition of the Code. 3.0 Applicable Code Requirement IWB-2412, Inspection Program B, requires volumetric examination of essentially 100% of RV pressure retaining welds identified in Table IWB-2500-1, once each ten-year interval.

In accordance with IWA-2430(d) and IWA-2430(e), Palisades third inspection interval is currently scheduled to conclude on December 12, 2006. However, the interval has been extended until the fall 2007 refueling outage for the subject examinations as allowed by a previously approved relief request (references 12 & 13).Page 1 of 8 4.0 Reason for Request An alternative is requested from the requirement of IWA-2412, Inspection Program B, that volumetric examination of essentially 100% of RV pressure retaining welds, examination categories B-A, B-D and B-J, be performed once each ten-year interval.

Extension of the inspection interval, for examination category B-A, B-D and B-J, by an additional refueling cycle beyond the currently scheduled inspection is requested for the subject examinations.

The intent of the requested additional refueling cycle extension is to allow for deferment of the subject examinations to allow time for NRC review of industry efforts to extend the ISI interval for the subject examinations from 10 to 20 years. These efforts use ASME Section XI, Code Case N-691 (Reference 4), as a basis for using risk-informed insights to show that extending the inspection interval from 10 to 20 years results in a change in RV failure frequency that satisfies the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.174 (Reference 7). Following NRC approval of these efforts, NMC intends to submit a separate request to extend the current 10-year interval for Palisades Nuclear Plant to 20 years. 5.0 Proposed Alternative and Basis for Use The third inspection interval for Palisades started on May 12, 1995, and will end on December 12, 2006. This inspection interval includes credit for the IWA-2430(d) allowed one-year extension and the IWA-2430(e) allowed 215-day extension, due to the 2001 extended maintenance outage. The subject examinations are currently scheduled during the fall 2007 refueling outage, as allowed by the previous relief request that was approved by letters dated November 29, 2005, and December 14, 2005 (References 12 & 13). The proposed inspection date is two refueling cycles beyond the Code-allowed inspection interval.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), this interval extension is requested on the basis that the current inspection interval can be extended, while providing an acceptable level of quality and safety. The requirements for a technical basis to extend the 10-year RV ISI interval by one refueling cycle are contained in a letter to the Westinghouse Owners Group, dated January 27, 2005 (Reference 3). This letter provides the basis for the one refueling cycle extension of the 10-year inspection interval for the subject examinations.

This justification continues to be applicable as a basis for extending the inspection interval for the subject inspections by two refueling outages.

The technical justification for the extension of the inspection interval for the subject examinations was developed based on the guidance provided in Reference

3. The technical justification consists of five areas. These are: 5.1 Plant specific RV ISI history 5.2 Fleetwide RV ISI history 5.3 Degradation mechanisms in the RV 5.4 Material condition of the RV relative to embrittlement 5.5 Operational experience relative to RV structural integrity challenging events Page 2 of 8 5.1 Palisades Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection History Palisades is in its third ISI interval for the RV. Two inservice inspections have been performed on the Category B-A, B-D and B-J welds to date. In summary, these inspections have been performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.150 (Reference 8), and have achieved acceptable coverage, with no reportable indications found. Based on the examination method and coverage obtained, it is reasonable to conclude that the examinations were of sufficient quality to detect any significant flaws that would challenge RV integrity.

A detailed inspection history of the subject examinations is contained in Attachment

1. The welds connecting the primary coolant system hot and cold leg loop piping to the RV nozzles are classified as Category B-J welds, in accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI, 1989 Edition. However, as a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, these welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams. These welds were last inspected in 1995, and the results of these exams are included in Attachment

1. By letter dated March 1, 2002 (Reference 9), Palisades submitted to the NRC the Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program. In that submittal, Palisades committed to continue to inspect these welds as part of the ASME Code,Section XI, RV inspection program. By letter dated May 19, 2003 (Reference 11), the NRC issued the safety evaluation approving the Risk Informed Inspection Program. The inspection of these welds is tied to the inspection interval associated with the B-A and B-D welds. Therefore, these welds are included in this relief request The segments connecting the primary coolant system hot and cold leg loop piping to the RV nozzles were ranked as low safety significant by the expert panel as part of the risk ranking process. Additionally, these segments contributed less than 0.01 % of the system total piping segment core damage frequency.

Therefore, the impact on the delta risk evaluation was inconsequential.

Changing the inspection interval for these welds would have no effect on the conclusions in the analyses.

These welds will be inspected during the next mechanized RV examination.

5.2 Fleetwide Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection History As part of the technical basis for ASME Code Case N-691, a survey of RV ISI history for 14 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) was performed.

These 14 plants represented 301 total years of service, and included RVs fabricated by various vendors. These plants reported that no reportable findings had been discovered during examinations of their RVs category B-A, B-D, and B-J welds. It is widely recognized in the fracture mechanics community that fatigue crack growth of embedded flaws is substantially smaller than that of surface breaking flaws. Surface breaking flaws in the RV cladding are typically a result of lack of fusion defects between bands of cladding.

In studies performed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the NRC Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Risk Page 3 of 8 Reevaluation, it was determined that in plants with multi-pass cladding, for a flaw to exist through the cladding, two flaws would have to be aligned on top of one another.

The probability of this occurring is very low (<.0001).

The Palisades RV is constructed with multi-pass cladding, and therefore, has a low probability of containing through-cladding surface-breaking flaws. All PWR plants, except one, have performed their first 10-year ISI of the subject examinations.

No surface-breaking or near-surface flaws of any significance have been found in any of these inspections performed per the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150 or ASME Section Xl, Appendix VIII. 5.3 Degradation Mechanisms in the Reactor Vessel The welds for which the subject examinations are conducted are similar metal low alloy steel welds. The only currently known degradation mechanism for this type of weld is fatigue due to thermal and mechanical cycling from operational transients.

Studies have shown that while flaw growth of simulated flaws in a RV would be small, the operational transient which has the greatest contribution to flaw growth is the cooldown transient.

The cooldown transient is a low frequency transient, and is not expected to occur more than once during the requested inspection extension period. Therefore, any flaw growth during the requested deferral period will be inherently small. The fatigue usage factors for the welds in the subject examinations are much less than the ASME Code design limit of 1.0 after 40 years of operation.

These usage factors are calculated using a very conservative design duty cycle. It is very unlikely that more than a few of these events (e.g. heatup or cooldown) would actually occur during the extension period of this proposed alternative.

It is important to note that this request does not apply to any dissimilar metal welds, including Alloy 600 basemetal, or Alloy 82/182 weld material where primary water stress corrosion cracking is a concern.Page 4 of 8 5.4 Material Condition of the Reactor Vessel Relative to Embrittlement The RV beltline is the limiting area in terms of embrittlement for the subject examinations.

The composition of each material in the RV beltline, along with fluence and embrittlement data, can be found in the NRC RV Integrity Database (RVID). This information is provided for Palisades in the table below. Palisades-Specific Material Values Drawn from the RVID Major Material Region Description cu Ni P Un-Irradiated RTNDT RTPTs # Type ID Location [wt%] [wt%] [wt%] ['F] Method @EOL 1 Axial Weld 3-112A lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 2 Axial Weld 3-112B lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 3 Axial Weld 3-112C lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 4 Axial Weld 2-112A upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 5 AxialWeld 2-112B upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 6 Axial Weld 2-112C upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 7 Circ Weld 9-112 intermediate 0.203 1.018 0.013 -56 Generic 281.5 8 Plate D3804-1 lower 0.190 0.480 0.016 0 ASME NB-2331 187.3 9 Plate D3804-2 lower 0.190 0.500 0.015 -30 MTEB 5-2 159.9 10 Plate D3804-3 lower 0.120 0.550 0.010 -25 MTEB 5-2 106.6 11 Plate D3803-1 upper 0.240 0.510 0.009 -5 ASME NB-2331 194.4 12 Plate D3803-2 upper 0.240 0.520 0.010 -30 MTEB 5-2 194.9 13 Plate D3803-3 upper 0.240 0.500 0.011 -5 ASME NB-2331 194.4 10 CFR 50.61 currently provides PTS screening criteria of RTpTs equal to 270°F for plates and axial welds, and RTpTs equal to 300OF for circumferential welds. For Palisades, the axial welds are the limiting material, and their RTPTS value at end of life (EOL) approaches the current PTS screening criteria.

However, it is recognized by the NRC and industry that a large amount of conservatism exists in the current PTS screening criteria.

In the NRC PTS Risk Re-evaluation, results have shown that it may be possible to remove an amount of conservatism equivalent to reducing a plant's RTpTs value by at least 70 0 F. While the exact amount of conservatism that will be removed has not been determined, it is clear that Palisades will be below the current PTS screening criteria during the extension period, and further below the potential revised PTS screening criteria.Page 5 of 8 5.5 Operational Experience Relative to Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Challenging Events It is widely recognized that the greatest possible challenge to RV integrity for a PWR is PTS. A PTS event can be generally described as a rapid cooling of the RV followed by late repressurization.

Plants have taken steps such as implementing emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and operator training to lower the likelihood of a PTS event occurring.

Due to the implementation of such measures, the number of occurrences of PTS events fleetwide is very small. When considered over the combined fleetwide PWR operating history, the frequency of PTS events is very small. When considering the frequency of PTS events, and the length of the requested extension, the probability of a PTS event occurring during the requested extension is also very low. Combining the low probability of a PTS event with the low probability of a flaw existing in the RV, the probability of RV failure due to PTS is very small. Palisades has implemented EOPs and operator training to prevent the occurrence of PTS events. Palisades EOPs include caution statements at critical locations warning the operator of the potential for causing PTS. Palisades has not performed an analysis in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.154 (Reference 10). Palisades minimizes the amount of neutron fluence accumulated at the RV beltline using a low leakage core, to keep the RV below the PTS screening criterion, obviating the need to perform this analysis.

There is a significant reduction in risk if the safety injection water temperature is increased.

In an effort to minimize plant risk, a Palisades system operating procedure was revised stating the "...preferred

[safety injection refueling water tank] SIRWT temperature band is 85 0 F to 90 0 F," and "...the SIRWT should be maintained greater than or equal to 80°F whenever the PCS is in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4." Additionally, Palisades has performed an assessment of the operating characteristics of the plant that assure that the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which could challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw were present is very low for the various accident sequences.

This assessment is contained in Attachment

1. The current requirements for inspection of RV pressure-containing welds have been in effect since the 1989 Edition of the Code. The industry has expended significant cost and man-rem exposure that have shown no service-induced flaws in the RV for ASME Section XI, Category B-A, B-D, or B-J, RV welds. ASME Section XI Code Case N-691 and industry efforts have shown that risk-insights can be used to extend the RV inservice inspection interval from 10 to 20 years. This extension satisfies the change in risk requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.174, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(3)(i), maintains an acceptable level of quality and safety. Based on these efforts having shown that the risk of vessel failure with a 10-year inspection interval extension is low and achieves an acceptable level of quality and safety, it is reasonable to conclude that a two refueling cycle extension will also achieve an acceptable level of quality and safety. Furthermore, Section 5 provides a qualitative Page 6 of 8 basis that the risk associated with extending the inspection interval by one refueling cycle is small. Therefore, NMC considers the proposed alternative for the subject examinations at Palisades to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(3)(i).

6.0 Duration of Proposed Alternative The alternative is requested to extend the third ISI interval by two refueling cycles beyond the ASME Code required 10-year inspection interval, the Code-allowed twelve month extension, and the Code-allowed 215-day extension.

This request is applicable to the third inspection interval only. If this relief request is approved, the third ISI interval for the subject exams will end at the conclusion of the spring 2009 refueling outage. 7.0 Precedent By letters dated March 31, 2005, and October 11, 2005, NMC submitted this same relief request for Palisades Nuclear Plant. By letters dated November 29, 2005 (TAC NO. MC6547), and December 14, 2005 (TAC NO. MC6547) (References 12 and 13), the NRC approved the relief request for PNP. NMC is resubmitting the same relief request, for an additional one refueling cycle, updated with the information provided by letter dated October 11, 2005 (Ref 14). 8.0 References

1. WCAP-1 6168-NP, "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Interval," October 2003. 2. NRC to WOG, 'WOG Request for the Staff Review of Topical Report WCAP-16168-NP "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals," August 18, 2004. 3. NRC to WOG, "Summary of Teleconference with the Westinghouse Owners Group Regarding Potential One Cycle Relief of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Weld Inspections at Pressurized Water Reactors Related to WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals," January 27, 2005. 4. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case N-691, "Application of Risk Informed Insights to Increase the Inspection Interval for Pressurized Water Reactor Vessels,"Section XI, Division 1, November 2003. 5. NRC Memorandum, Thadani to Collins, 'Technical Basis for Revision of the Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Criteria in the PTS Rule (10CFR50.61)," December 31, 2002. 6. NRC Reactor Vessel Integrity Database, Version 2.0.1, July 6, 2000.Page 7 of 8

7. Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated November 2002. 8. Regulatory Guide 1.150, "Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Preservice and Inservice Examinations," dated February 1983. 9. NMC to NRC, "Relief Request: Alternate ASME Code,Section XI, Risk-Informed Inservice inspection Program," dated March 1, 2002. 10. Regulatory Guide 1.154, "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water Reactors," dated January 1987. 11. NRC to NMC,"Palisades Plant -Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Program (TAC NO. MB4420)," dated May 19, 2003. 12. Letter from NRC to NMC "Palisades Nuclear Plant -Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated November 29, 2005 13. Letter from NRC to NMC "Palisades Nuclear Plant -Corrected Page for Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated December 14, 2005 14. Letter from NMC to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination," dated October 11, 2005 Page 8 of 8 Attachment 1 PALISADES PTS ASSESSMENT The Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) has design characteristics that assure the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which would challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw is present, is very low for the following accident sequences.

The PNP high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump's design shutoff head is low, which limits the pressure challenge in the described sequences below. In addition, the PNP nominal pressurizer operating design value of 2060 psia is about 150 psi less than other operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Therefore, the likelihood of challenging a pressurizer safety relief valve (SRV) is less than that for other PWRs. Furthermore, the PNP pressure and temperature curves are based on Appendix G pressure and temperature limits and utilize a 200 degree subcooling limit. The 200 degree subcooling curve provides extra margin in regard to PTS. The PNP has operating procedures that assure the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which would challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw is present, is very low for the following accident sequences.

The PNP operator response to each of the listed sequences would be in accordance with the PNP Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The EOPs are based on the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) CEN-1 52, "Emergency Procedure Guidelines," for Combustion Engineering (CE) nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants. Sequence 1 This event is characterized as a vapor space loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Upon receipt of a reactor trip, the operators would implement EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," provided as Attachment 2, followed by entry into EOP-4.0, "Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery," provided as Attachment

3. In order to minimize the risk for a PTS event, the operators control PCS temperature, and PCS pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, "Pressure Temperature Limit Curves," provided as Attachment

5. PCS temperature is controlled by steaming the steam generators in accordance with EOP-4.0, Step 4.23. This removes energy from the PCS that could potentially cause PCS pressure to raise leading to a PTS event. Parameters are continuously monitored to determine if safety injection (SI) and charging pump flow can be throttled or stopped. EOP-4.0, Step 4.26 (a continuously applicable step) provides SI throttle criteria.

Step 4.34 provides the instructions for throttling SI and controlling charging and letdown. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to reduce or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing of the reactor vessel. Once the pressurizer SRV closes, and the SI throttle criteria is verified, EOP-4.0 provides several steps to control primary coolant system (PCS) inventory in order to prevent a PTS event.Page 1 of 3 Step 4.33 re-establishes letdown if it was isolated in order to control PCS inventory.

The control of letdown in a solid condition provides the operator a method to control PCS pressure within EOP Supplement 1 limits. Step 4.35 (a continuously applicable step) provides contingency actions to address over-subcooling or pressurizer pressure greater than the limits of EOP Supplement 1 The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement

1. Step 4.71 provides contingency actions should the subsequent closing of the SRV result in water solid conditions in the PCS. The goal of this step is to maintain the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, by controlling PCS temperature and pressure with the steam generators, and by controlling HPSI, charging, and letdown flow. Sequence 2 This event is characterized as an excess steam demand event (ESDE.) Upon receipt of a reactor trip, the operators would implement EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," (SPTA) followed by entry into EOP-6.0, "Excess Steam Demand Event," provided as Attachment

4. During performance of the SPTA, PCS heat removal safety function acceptance criteria are evaluated in Step 4.8. Contingency action, Step 4.8.a.3, requires that, if a steam generator (SG) has an indication of an ESDE, feedwater flow to the affected SG be secured. This supports the strategy outlined in CEN-1 52, that the operator should not feed a suspected faulted steam generator.

Upon entering EOP-6.0, identification and isolation of the affected SG is again addressed in steps 13, 14, and 15. Feedwater is isolated to the affected SG to limit the inventory available to boil off, thus limiting or stopping uncontrolled plant cooldown and stabilizing the plant. The SI throttle criteria are verified in EOP-6.0, Step 4.17 (a continuously applicable step) and throttling is addressed in Step 4.18. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to limit or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing the reactor vessel. As outlined in Step 4.23 (a continuously applicable step) PCS pressure is maintained within the limits of EOP Supplement

1. The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement

1. Contingency actions listed in Step 4.23.1, address over-subcooled conditions in the PCS. These include controlling HPSI, charging, and letdown flows, reducing PCS pressure, and controlling PCS cooldown rate in order to restore PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, thereby minimizing PTS concerns.

Sequence 3 A LOCA is an accident which is caused by a break in the PCS pressure boundary.

The break can be as large as a double ended guillotine break in the hot leg, or as small as a Page 2 of 3 break which results in a loss of PCS fluid at a rate that is just in excess of the available charging capacity of the plant. Small and large break LOCAs differ in their effect on the post-LOCA PCS heat removal process. For a large break LOCA, the only path necessary for PCS heat removal, in both the short and long term, is the break flow with core boil off. For small breaks, heat removal via the flow out the break is not sufficient to provide cooling and, therefore, SG heat removal is required.

The emergency procedure guidelines take this into account with the decisions that must be made. Although distinct small and large break LOCA information is contained in the bases section of EOP-4.0, the action steps to be used during the actual emergency do not require the operator to distinguish between break sizes. There are two paths initially available for PCS heat removal: heat transfer to the secondary side via the SGs, and heat transfer via the fluid flowing out the break. Large break LOCAs have sufficient fluid flowing out the break to provide adequate heat removal without relying on the SGs. Small break LOCAs do not have sufficient fluid flowing out of the break to provide adequate heat removal. Therefore, SG heat removal is required in addition to break flow for adequate heat removal. Because the LOCA EOP does not distinguish between large and small break LOCAs, SG heat removal capability is required at all times during a LOCA (EOP-4.0, Step 4.23). Steaming the SGs removes energy from the PCS that could potentially cause PCS pressure to raise leading to a PTS event. Parameters are continuously monitored to determine if SI and charging pump flow can be throttled or stopped. EOP-4.0, Step 4.26 (a continuously applicable step) provides SI throttle criteria.

Step 4.34 provides the instructions for throttling SI and controlling charging and letdown. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to reduce or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing of the reactor vessel. Step 4.35 (a continuously applicable step) provides contingency actions to address over-subcooling or pressurizer pressure greater than the limits of EOP Supplement

1. The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement

1. Contingency actions listed in Step 4.35.1 address over-subcooled conditions in the PCS, including throttling SI flows. A break location in the pressurizer surge line could impact the ability of the operator to determine if SI throttle criteria are met due to either the inability to refill the pressurizer or lack of PCS pressure indication.

If SI throttle criteria cannot be verified, then the operator would continue to maintain full SI flow, while aggressively steaming the SGs to remove heat from the PCS (EOP-4.0, Step 4.23).Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2 EOP-1, "STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS" 25 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

PALISADES taimmEnd NUCLaAR PLANT PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.D EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Issued Date 2/11/02 STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS Procedure Sponsor Date GGPalmisano

/ 1/2/02 Technical Reviewer Date G UWSlee ser R1/1r01 User Reviewer Date PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 WIP PROCEDURE Page 1 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS USERALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step.1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides the immediate actions which must be accomplished after a Reactor trip has occurred or should have occurred.

These actions are necessary to ensure that the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition or that the plant is configured to respond to a continuing emergency.

End of Section 1.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 2 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS Standard Post Trip Actions may be entered when ANY of the following symptom(s) of a Reactor Trip exist: 1. Reactor Trip alarm (EK-0972).

2. Control Rod bottom lights on. 3. Rapid reduction of Reactor power. 4. Red trip lights lit on Clutch Power Supplies 1 through 4. 5. RPS trip logic lights on. 6. RPS trip setpoint(s) exceeded.

7. Licensed operator evaluation indicates conditions warrant a Reactor trip.End of Section 2.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 3 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS SPTAs may be exited when ANY of the following conditions exist: 1. IE ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0 "Reactor Trip Recovery." 2. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OB ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flow Chart" to diagnose the event.End of Section 3.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 4 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 4.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Record Time of Reactor Trip 1. DETERMINE that Reactivity Control acceptance criteria met: a. VERIFY Reactor power lowering.IU a.1. PERFORM ANY of the following:

PUSH BOTH REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on EC-02 and EC-06.* OPEN CRD Clutch Power Feeder Breakers 42-1 RPS and 42-2RPS.

0 PLACE ALL CRD clutch power toggle switches to CLUTCH OFF.U b. VERIFY negative startup rate. c. VERIFY a maximum of one full length Control Rod NOT fully inserted.U c.1. COMMENCE emergency boration.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 5 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 2. DETERMINE that Main Turbine-Generator acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY Main Turbine is tripped.t- a. 1. IE plant was operating at power AND the MSIVs are open, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) MANUALLY TRIP Main Turbine at Control Panel C-01 (preferred).

2) CLOSE BOTH MSIVs. " CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) U b.1. PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) OPEN Main Generator Output Breakers at Control Panel C-01.

25F7 " 25H9 2) CONNECT jumper between terminals 1 and 10 on Relay 487U (Y Phase) inside Panel C-04.b. VERIFY that the Main Generator is disconnected from grid by ANY of the following:

Main Generator Output Breakers open. o 25F7 " 25H9* MOD 26H5 open.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 .UcLEA. PLANPROCEDURE Page 6 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS WL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 3. CONTROL the Feedwater System as follows: a. PLACE ALL operating Main Feed Pump Individual Speed Controllers to MAN.S S HIC-0526 HIC-0529 U b. IE BOTH Main Feed Pumps are operating, THEN RAMP ONE Main Feed Pump to minimum speed. c. WHEN TAVE lowers towards 5250 F (5350 F preferred), THEN RAMP the remaining Main Feed Pump to minimum speed. d. ENSURE CLOSED ALL Main Feed Regulating Valves and ALL Bypass Feed Regulating Valves for BOTH S/Gs: U b.1. IF a Main Feed Pump's speed can NOT be lowered, THEN TRIP the Main Feed Pump. Lk c.1. IF a Main Feed Pump's speed can NOT be lowered, THEN TRIP the Main Feed Pump. L d.1. IF ALL Main Feed Regulating Valves AND ALL Bypass Feed Regulating Valves can NOT be closed, THEN TRIP the operating Main Feed Pumps.0 0 CV-0701 ('A' S/G) CV-0735 ('A' S/G)* CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 7 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4. DETERMINE that Vital Auxiliaries-Electric acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY that station loads have transferred to offsite electrical power such that ALL of the following conditions exist: 1) Buses 1 C and 1 D energized.

UI 1.1) ENSURE D/G started for bus NOT energized.

1-1 D/G (Bus 1C) a 1-2 D/G (Bus 1D) U 1.2) ENSURE associated D/G output breaker closed (one attempt only)

Bus 1C (D/G 1-1): 152-107

Bus ID (D/G 1-2): 152-213 U U U 2) IE SIAS is NOT actuated, THEN Bus 1 E is energized.

3) Buses 1A and 1B are energized.

4) Y01 is energized.(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 8 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4.(continued)

NOTE: The following indications can be used for status of DC power: DC Bus Indication D11A P-8A Control Power D11-1 CV-0510 MSIV D1l1-2 K-7A Trip Power D21 A P-8C Control Power D21-1 CV-0501 MSIV D21-2 K-7B Trio Power 5) ALL of the following DC Buses are energized:

a Left Channel DC Buses o D1lA O D11-1 o D11-2 4 Right Channel DC Buses o D21A o D21-1 O D21-2 6) At least 3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses are energized.

6 6 S Y10 Y20 Y30 Y40 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 NucLEAPLAN PROCEDURE Page 9 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 5. DETERMINE that PCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY BOTH of the following conditions exist: " Pressurizer (PZR) level between 20% and 85% " PZR level trending to between 42% and 57% NOTE: Determine PCS subcooling using TH with forced circulation and the Average of Qualified CETs with natural circulation.

b. VERIFY PCS at least 25 0 F subcooled.

U3 5.1. IE PLCS does NOT respond, THEN RESTORE AND MAINTAIN PZR level between 42% and 57%: a. OPERATE PZR Level Control System (PLCS). b. MANUALLY OPERATE Charging and Letdown.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 10 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Ul 6. DETERMINE that PCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by verifying that BOTH of the following conditions exist: 0 PZR pressure between 1650 and 2185 psia 0 PZR pressure trending toward 2010 and 2100 psia Lk 6.1. IE PPCS is NOT operating properly, THEN RESTORE AND MAINTAIN PZR pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1: a. OPERATE PZR Pressure Control System. b. MANUALLY OPERATE PZR heaters and PZR spray. U 6.2. IE PZR pressure is less than 1605 psia, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY SIAS initiated

("SAFETY INJ INITIATED" EK-1 342 in alarm) OR PUSH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.S S PB1-1 PB1-2 b. ENSURE ALL available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with the associated loop isolation valves open.U 6.3. IF PZR pressure is less than 1300 psia, THEN STOP PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop. U 6.4. IE PZR pressure is less than minimum PCP operation limits of EOP Supplement 1, THEN STOP ALL PCPs.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 oC RPROCEDURE Page 11 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 7. DETERMINE that Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY at least one PCP is operating.

b. VERIFY Loop AT (TH-Tc) is less than 100 F. NOTE: Determine PCS subcooling using TH with forced circulation and average of qualified CETs with natural circulation.

c. VERIFY PCS at least 25 0 F subcooled.

L1 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 12 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 8. DETERMINE that PCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY at least one S/G has BOTH of the following:

Level between 5% and 70% a Feedwater available to maintain S/G level" a.1. For low level, ENSURE at least one S/G has feedwater flow of at least 165 gpm. " a.2. For high level, REDUCE feedwater flow to the affected S/G. " a.3. IF one S/G has indication of an ESDE or SGTR, THEN SECURE feedwater flow to the affected S/G. U3 b.1. IF TAVE is greater than 5400F, THEN RESTORE TAVE to between 5250F and 540°F using ANY of the following:

b. VERIFY that TAVE is between 5250 F and 5400 F.* Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (continue)(continue)(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 oA PTPROCEDURE Page 13 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 8.(continued)(continued)

Ll b.2. IE TAVr is less than 5250 F, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) ENSURE Feedwater flow is NOT excessive.

2) RESTORE TAVE to between 5250F and 5400F using ANY of the following:

Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves U c.1. IE either S/G pressure is greater than 970 psia, THEN RESTORE S/G pressure to less than 970 psia using ANY of the following:

c. VERIFY BOTH S/G pressures are between 800 psia and 970 psia.S S Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (continue)(continue)(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 14 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS l CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 8. (continued) (continued) " c.2. IF either S/G pressure is less than 800 psia, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE that the Turbine Bypass Valve is closed. 2) ENSURE that the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves are closed. 3) CLOSE BOTH MSIVs.

CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 1 c.3. IF either S/G pressure is less than 500 psia, THEN ENSURE CLOSED the following valves: 1) BOTH MSIVs. a CV-0510 ('A' S/G) a CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 2) Main Feed Regulating Valve and Bypass Feed Regulating Valve on affected S/G only:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0735 ('A' S/G) a CV-0703 ('B' S/G) a CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 15 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 9. DETERMINE that Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY containment pressure less than 0.85 psig.S S PIA-1814 PIA-1815 U a.1. IE Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) VERIFY Containment Isolation Signal initiated

("CIS INITIATED" EK-1126 in alarm) QB PUSH left and right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13. a CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS 2) ENSURE CLOSED the following: " BOTH MSIVs: o CV-0510 ('A' S/G) o CV-0501 ('B' S/G) " Main Feed Reg Valves: o CV-0701 ('A' S/G) o CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

Bypass Feed Reg Valves: o CV-0735 ('A' S/G) " CV-0734 ('B' S/G)(continue)(continue)(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 16 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 9.(continued)(continued)

CCW Isolation Valves: o CV-0910, (KEY: 337) o CV-091 1, (KEY: 338) o CV-0940, (KEY: 336) 3) ENSURE SIAS initiated by performing the following:

a. VERIFY "SAFETY INJ INITIATED" EK-1342 alarmed OB PUSH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.S S PB1-1 PB1-2 b. ENSURE ALL available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with the associated loop isolation valves open.(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 I T EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 17 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 9.(continued)

b. VERIFY Containment Area Monitor alarms clear and NO unexplained rise.0 S S 0 RIA-1 805 RIA-1 806 RIA-1 807 RIA-1808 LI b.1. IE Containment radiation level is greater than 1 x 101 R/hr on ANY Containment Area Monitor, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) VERIFY Containment Isolation Signal initiated

("CIS INITIATED" EK-1 126 in alarm) OR PUSH left and right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13." CHRL-CS " CHRR-CS 2) CORROBORATE Containment Area Monitor readings by comparing to Containment High Range Monitor readings.

a RIA-2321 a RIA-2322 U c. VERIFY Condenser Off Gas Monitor RIA-0631 alarm clear and NO unexplained rise. d. VERIFY Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear and NO unexplained rise.

RIA-2323

RIA-2324 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 18 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS QJ 10. DETERMINE that Containment Atmosphere acceptance criteria are met: a. VERIFY Containment temperature less than 1250 F. b. VERIFY Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig.S 6 PIA-1814 PIA-1815 U 10.1. ENSURE the Containment Air Coolers are in operation as follows: a. IE SIAS is NOT present, THEN ENSURE OPERATING ALL available Containment Air Cooler fans. " V-lAandV-1B " V-2A and V-2B " V-3A and V-3B

V-4A and V-4B b. OPEN Containment Air Cooler high capacity outlet valves as Service Water System capacity permits:

CV-0867 O " CV-0861

CV-0864 " CV-0873 0 10.2. IF Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'A' fans. a V-1A

V-2A

V-3A

V-4A (continue)(continue)

CV-0869 VHX-4 Inlet Valve will be closed if a SIAS has occurred PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 19 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 10.(continued)(continued)

b. ENSURE OPEN ALL available Containment Spray Valves. c. ENSURE ALL available Containment Spray Pumps are operating.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 NA PPROCEDURE Page 20 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 11. DETERMINE that Vital Auxiliaries-Water acceptance criteria met by performing ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY at least two Service Water Pumps operating.

b. VERIFY BOTH Critical SW Headers in operation with pressures greater than 42 psig." a.1. START available Service Water Pumps. " b.1. START available Service Water Pumps. " b.2. IF SW Header pressure is less than 42 psig, AND SIAS is NOT present, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED Containment Air Cooler high capacity valves as necessary to raise SW Header pressure greater than 42 psig.

CV-0867

CV-0861 " CV-0864 " CV-0873 2) IF SW Header pressure is less than 42 psig following the closing of containment Air Cooler high capacity valves, THEN ENSURE CLOSED Non-critical SW Isolation valve CV- 1359. L c.1. START available CCW Pumps.c. VERIFY OPERATING at least one CCW Pump.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 EOPs PT PROCEDURE Page 21 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS U 12. DETERMINE that Vital Auxiliaries-Air acceptance criteria met by verifying Instrument Air pressure greater than 85 psig.U 12.1. START available Instrument Air Compressors as necessary.

U 12.2. IE Feedwater Purity Building Air supply is available, THEN OPEN FWP Air Cross-tie Valve, CV-1221 as necessary.

End of Section 4.0 PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 22 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1. WHEN SIRWT level is less than or equal to 25%, THEN: U2 a. Prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS actions. Refer to EOP Supplement

42. U b. IF RAS occurs, THEN PERFORM Post-RAS actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.U 2. ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 minutes of the time of the Reactor Trip by performing the following:

a. ENSURE at least one Air Filter Unit Fan associated with an operating train is ON: " V-26A

V-26B b. ENSURE OFF the following fans:

V-94 Purge Fan

V-47 Switchgear Exhaust Fan PA'LSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 EPs PROCEDURE Page 23 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS la INSTRUCTIONS iff CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 3. VERIFY BOTH of the following:

U a. At least one Condensate Pump Lk 3.1. CLOSE BOTH MSIVs. operating.

a CV-0510 U b. At least one Cooling Tower

CV-0501 Pump operating.

U 4. IF an SIAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM EOP Supplement 5 "Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS." U) 5. IE a CHP or CHR has initiated, THEN PERFORM EOP Supplement 6 "Checklist for Containment Isolation and CCW Restoration to Containment." U 6. COMMENCE Emergency Shutdown Checklist.

Refer to GOP-1 0, "Balance of Plant Actions Following a Reactor Trip." Uk 7. if Reactor trip was due to Equipment Fire, THEN REFER TO ONP-25.1, "Fire Which Threatens Safety Related Equipment." U 8. IF the MSIV AND MSIV bypass valves are closed, THEN ENSURE TRIPPED BOTH Main Feed Pumps.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 24 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS la CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

ALL safety function acceptance criteria met " No contingency action was taken

Control Room is habitable, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0, "Reactor Trip Recovery."

10. IF ANY of the following conditions exist: 0 ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT met a ANY contingency action was taken

Control Room is NOT habitable, THEN REFER TO Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flow Chart" ANM DIAGNOSE the event.End of Section 5.0 ATTACHMENT 3 EOP-4, "LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY'112 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

I F F: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE Proc No EOP-4,0 Revision 17 Issued Date1 2/15/05 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY----- ------ ------- ---- ---RLTucker 112/13/05 Procedure Sponsor Date VLUocei /.. 1 112B/05 Technical Reviewer Date DSCampbel 3 1 !o.!./.4Lq5 User Reviewer Date PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 1 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY USER ALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step. 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service. These actions are necessary to ensure that the Plant is placed in a stable condition.

The goals of this procedure are to mitigate the effects of a LOCA, isolate the break (if possible), and to establish long term cooling using the Safety Injection System or the Shutdown Cooling System. This procedure achieves these goals while maintaining adequate core cooling and minimizing radiological releases to the environment.

End of Section 1.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 2 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 1 EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," has been performed.

OR The event initiated from a lower mode when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service.

2. Plant conditions indicate that a LOCA has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following:

a. Abnormal Pressurizer level change (low or high) b. Pressurizer pressure low for existing plant conditions

c. SIAS automatically activated

d. Standby Charging Pumps start e. CHP or CHR alarms f. Containment pressure, temperature or humidity high g. Containment Sump level rising h. Quench Tank level, temperature, or pressure high I. Volume Control Tank level dropping End of Section 2.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 t EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOPs NuCARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 3 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS

1. The diagnosis of a LOCA is NOT confirmed.

OR 2. ANY of the Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied AND corrective actions to restore the safety function are NOT effective.

OR 3. The Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery procedure has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:

a. ALL Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are being satisfied

b. Shutdown Cooling entry conditions are satisfied OR The break has been isolated OR The PCS is in long term cooling c. An appropriate approved plant procedure can be implemented End of Section 3.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 wI"2.ýJ PROCEDURE Page 4 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I CAUTION During degraded Containment conditions, the operator should not rely on any single instrument indication due to large instrument errors. Alternate/additional instrumentation should be used to confirm trending of PCS conditions.

a. VERIFY Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet" acceptance criteria:

1) Are satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.

OR 2) Corrective actions to restore Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet," acceptance criteria are effective.

1.1. GO TO ONE of the following:

EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flowchart" AND RE-DIAGNOSE the event.

For events initiated from a lower mode, GO TO the EOP considered appropriate by the Shift Supervisor.

EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure." (continue)

© = Continuously applicable step Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 .9L,,. PROCEDURE Page 5 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1.(continued)

b. IF ALL of the following conditions exist: " Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor, RIA-0707, has NOT alarmed

SIAS has NOT occurred OR has been reset

CHP and CHR signals are NOT present, THEN SAMPLE S/Gs for activity and Lithium AND VERIFY sample results do NOT indicate a SGTR. c. Observation of NO abnormal S/G level rise (NOT attributable to feed flow or swell). © 2. REFER TO the Site Emergency Plan AND CLASSIFY the event per El-I, "Emergency Classification and Actions." 3. OPEN the placekeeper AND RECORD the time of EOP entry. 4. IF PZR pressure is less than or equal to 1605 psia QR Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN VERIFY "SAFETY INJ INITIATED" (EK-1342) is alarmed.4.1. PUSH BOTH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

PBI-1 " PBI-2@ = Continuously awlicable steD t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a lical ser rod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NCAPITPROCEDURE Page 6 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 5. IF SIAS is present, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE available safeguards equipment operated or operating.

Refer to EOP Supplement

5. b. VERIFY at least minimum SI b.1. IF SI flow is NOT within the limits of flow. Refer to EOP Supplement EOP Supplement 4, 4. THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore SI flow: 1) ENSURE electrical power available to SI pumps and valves. 2) ENSURE correct SI valve lineup. 3) ENSURE adequate SI pump seal cooling.

4) START additional SI pumps as needed until Sl flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement

4. c. IE Letdown Orifice Stop Valves are closed, THEN PLACE handswitches in the CLOSE position:

HS-2003

HS-2004

HS-2005@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp =Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NULPAT PROCEDURE Page 7 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 300 0 F. 6. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia AND SIAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE one PCP is stopped in each loop. b. IF PCS is less than 25 0 F subcooled, THEN ENSURE ALL PCPs stopped.

7. WHEN PCS temperature lowers, THEN ENSURE PCPs configured as follows: MAXIMUM PCS Tc OPERATING PCPs <450'F 3 <300, F 2 8. IE PCPs are operating, THEN VERIFY PCP operating limits are satisfied.

Refer to EOP Supplement 1.8.1. STOP PCPs which do NOT satisfy PCP operating limits.@ = Continuously applicable step!ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 UIURI-S-1J PROCEDURE Page 8 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 9. IF open, THEN CLOSE CWRTs Vent Valves:

CV-1064

CV-1065 10. ISOLATE the LOCA by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF PZR pressure is less than a.1. CLOSE the PORV block valves: 2100 psia, THEN VERIFY BOTH PORVs 0 MO-1 042A are closed. a MO-1043A b. ENSURE CLOSED Letdown Stop Valves: a CV-2001

CV-2009 c. ENSURE CLOSED PCS Sample Isolation Valves:

CV-1910 " CV-1911 d. ENSURE CLOSED Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent Valves on C-11A: a PRV-1067

PRV-1068

PRV-1069 a PRV-1070 (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Point© otiuul apicalesepHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MuoW,., PROCEDURE Page 9 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 10.(continued)

e. VERIFY BOTH of the following conditions exist: 0 CCW Radiation Monitor, RIA-0915, alarm clear , "COMPONENT CLG SURGE TANK T-3 HI-LO LEVEL" (EK-1 172) is clear e.1. IF PCS to CCW leak is evident, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) LOCATE the leak. Refer to ONP-23.1, "Primary Coolant Leak." 2) ISOLATE the leak. Refer to ONP-23.1, "Primary Coolant Leak." 3) IF CCW was isolated to any operating PCP, THEN SECURE the affected PCP(s). f.1. REDUCE PCS pressure to less than 1800 psia.f. VERIFY PZR Relief Valve(s) NOT lifting by the following: " Observation of Acoustic Monitor Panel indications on C-11A

PZR Relief Valve Discharge Temperature indicators on C-12

Observation of Quench Tank temperature, pressure and level@ = Continuously applicable step I'Y= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 , PROCEDURE Page 10 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 11. IF LOCA is outside of containment as indicated by ANY of the following: " Abnormal rise in Auxiliary Building Area Monitors.

Abnormal rise in East or West ESS Room Sump levels.

Abnormal rise in Dirty Waste Drain Tanks level THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. LOCATE AND ISOLATE the leak. b. ENSURE applicable areas of the Auxiliary Building are isolated by performing the following:

1) IE any of the following alarms have annunciated, " EK-1364, Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation " EK-1366, Plant Area Monitoring Hi Radiation (continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 11 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 11. (continued)

THEN REFER TO ARP-8, "Safeguards Safety Injection and Isolation Scheme EK-1 3 (EC-13)" AND PERFORM Corrective Actions for any alarming monitors listed. 2) NOTIFY plant personnel to stay clear of the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building.

c. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to one of the following: " SOP-2A, "Chemical

& Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System" d. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13 AND PERFORM EOP Supplement

6.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS e. NOTIFY the TSC.@ = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical ie = odion PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCI2,LI, PROCEDURE Page 12 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 12. PLACE at least one Hydrogen Monitor in operation, ensuring the appropriate Key Switch in the "ACCI" position.

Refer to SOP-38, "Gaseous Process Monitoring System." 13. IF ANY of the following conditions exist: " Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig

Any operable Containment Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 10' R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" a.1. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by (EK-1 126) is alarmed, pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbutton on EC-13.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS b. VERIFY Containment Isolation.

b.1. CLOSE valves that failed to Refer to EOP Supplement

6. automatically operate.@ = Continuously applicable step f'- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp =Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 13 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 14. IF Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY Containment Spray alignment AND at least minimal acceptable spray flow per following table: a.1. OPEN available Containment Spray valves to obtain required configuration and at least minimum flow.NUMBER. I OF I NUMBEROF CS FLOW RUNNING OPEN CS.' MUST BE AT CS PUMPS [VALVES j LEAST: ________ RAS NOT Present 1 _at least 1 2185 gpm total 2 or 3 2 2940 gpm total RAS Present [ 1 1525 gpm 2 or 3 2 3100 gpm total* CV-3001

CV-3002 AND START available Containment Spray pumps S S S P-54A P-54B P-54C I b. ENSURE at least one Containment Air Cooler Accident Fan operating. " V-IA " V-2A

V-3A " V-4A@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 14 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Operation of PCPs should be minimized when seal cooling is NOT present or controlled bleedoff is isolated.15. IF PCP seal cooling is unavailable, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff valves: S 0 CV-2083 CV-2099 b. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff Relief Stop, CV-2191.

c. RESTORE PCP seal cooling.

Refer to ONP-6.2, "Loss of Component Cooling." C = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se I od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 W PROCEDURE Page 15 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 16. IF the Containment Spray System is operating, AND ALL of the following conditions are satisfied:

0 S RAS has NOT actuated Containment Pressure less than 33 psia 16.1. IF Containment Pressure rises to greater than or equal to 70 psia, THEN ENSURE the following:

a. All available Containment Spray Pumps operating.

Refer to EOP Supplement 42 for starting additional spray pumps. b. All available Containment Air Coolers operating in accident mode (Refer to SFSC Table CA.)P1-1805 P1-1812

Containment Air Coolers operating in accident mode (Refer to SFSC Table CA)

SIS Actuated with flow within the requirements of EOP Supplement 4 THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one of the following Containment Spray pumps.

P-54B

P-54C b. IF two Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve as follows: (Continue)

Q = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 %uc,6,.T PROCEDURE Page 16 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 16.(Continued) a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS: " HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Preferred, Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve:

CV-3001 (preferred) " CV-3002 c) STOP one of the following Containment Spray Pumps:

P-54B " P-54C c. VERIFY Containment pressure maintained less than 70 psia. P1-1805 P1-1812@ = Continuously applicable step fj= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apicabe sep Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 17 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Continued operation of the sprays after pressure has been reduced to an acceptable level increases the possibility of wetting electrical connectors (which may result in electrical grounds, shorts and other malfunctions) and containment sump screen clogging.© 17. IF any Containment Spray Pumps operating, AND ALL of the following conditions are satisfied:

Parameter Condition Containment less than 3 psig pressure NOT required for CTMT ambient cooling NOT required for HPSI subcooling NOTE: These conditions must be met prior to securing the last Containment Spray pump. Containment NOT needed for iodine removal Spray as determined by Chemistry operation OR ALL of the following: " Containment high range Gamma monitors read less than 1800 RPHr " Containment isolated per EOP Supplement 6 " less than one hour has elapsed since reactor trip 17.1. IF Containment Pressure rises to greater than 3 psig AND no Containment Spray Pump operating, THEN 1) OPEN one Containment Spray Valve. 2) START one Containment Spray Pump.(Continue)

S= Continuously applicable stepH f/-= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 N IPROCEDURE Page 18 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 17. (Continued)

THEN STOP spray pumps one at a time, waiting to see the effect of reduced spray flow as follows: a. IF three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump as directed by the CRS. b. IF Containment pressure is less than 3 psig, AND two Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following as directed by the CRS: 1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve as follows: a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS: " HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Preferred, Key: 397) " HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key : 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve: " CV-3001 (Preferred) " CV-3002 (Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step It-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 19 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 17. (Continued)

2) STOP one Containment Spray Pump. c. IF Containment pressure is less than 3 psig AND one Containment Spray Pump is operating, THEN STOP the Containment Spray Pump as directed by the CRS. d. WHEN ALL Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves. 1) ENSURE BOTH CHP Bypass Switches in BYPASS: " HS-3001C, CV-3001 Bypass (Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 Bypass (Key: 396) 2) ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Conatinment Spray Valves:

CV-3001

CV-3002 C = Continuouslv ar)Dlicable ster)tl'-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp lHl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 20 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 18. WHEN all Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. LF MFW or Condensate pumps are operating AND feedwater from these sources is NOT desired, THEN PLACE ALL of the following controllers in MANUAL AND CLOSE: 1) Feedwater Regulating Valves

LIC-0701 ('A' S/G) " LIC-0703 ('B' S/G) 2) Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves " LIC-0735 ('A' SIG) " LIC-0734 ('B' S/G) b. IE CCW to containment has NOT been restored, THEN PLACE the following CCW valve keyswitches to CLOSE: CCW, Valve Keyswitch Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 (Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable steo't-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~>= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCLRPLANT PROCEDURE Page 21 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 18. (Continued)

NOTE: Automatic reinitiation of spray will not occur until after SIAS has been reset. c. RESET CHP circuits by pushing left and right HIGH PRESSURE RESET pushbuttons on C-13 S 0 CHPL -Reset CHPR -Reset d. WHEN CHP has been reset, THEN ENSURE both Containment Spray Valve CHP Bypass Keyswitches are in NORMAL: " HS-3001C

HS-3002C@ = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point© =Coninuusl aicabl stpI ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 Lt~ll- PROCEDURE Page 22 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 19. VERIFY BOTH of the following: " At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating o P-39A o P-39B " At least one Condensate Pump operating 19.1. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH MSIVs:

CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 19.2. ENSURE CLOSED from the Control Room BOTH MSIV Bypass valves:* MO-0510 ('A' S/G)

MO-0501 ('B' S/G)0 0 P-2A P-2B a. IF ANY MSIV Bypass valves were open when power/position indication was lost, THEN LOCALLY CLOSE ANY open MSIV Bypass valve. b. ENSURE CLOSED ALL S/G Blowdown Valves: 'A' SIG 3'B' SIG CV-0739 CV-0738 CV-0771 CV-0770 CV-0767 CV-0768 20. IF the LOCA is isolated, THEN GO TO Step 65.C = Continuouslv applicable steD tl- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical sei= odion PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 I ,2LJ PROCEDURE Page 23 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each DIG is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-11) will draw approximately 44 KW.21. ENSURE at least one train of CR HVAC in Emergency Mode. Refer to SOP-24, "Ventilation and Air Conditioning System." NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

Refer to EOP Supplement

35. a. IE Emergency boration is in progress AND PCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.22.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less than required boron concentration, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE emergency boration is in progress.

b. WHEN required boron concentration is reached, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 24 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 200°F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp -spray temp) of 350TF should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle.NOTE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown.

Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used. NOTE: S/G level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown.

Correction curves in EOP Supplement 11, "SIG Level Correction" should be used. NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750F/hr.

NQTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 300 0 F. (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se I HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 u ,2!pEr PROCEDURE Page 25 of ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23.(continued)

23. COMMENCE steaming S/Gs as follows: a. REFER TO the following: " EOP Supplement 1, Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves " EOP Supplement 33, PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data b. IF safety injection flow is causing a cooldown in excess of required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to maintain all of the following as applicable:

S/Gs within 50 psi of Psat for Average of Qualified CETs " As required to establish or support natural circulation " As required to establish or support two phase natural circulation b.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. 1) IF desired to enhance temperature control, THEN ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 23-1.(Continue)

@ = Continuousiv armlicable stei)t= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 26 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23.(Continued)

c. WHEN PCS cooldown rate can be controlled within required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to cooldown at the maximum allowed rate.c.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. 1) !E desired to enhance temperature control, THEN ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 23-1. Table 23-1 'A' S/G MV-MS101, ASDV CV-0782 Inlet MV-CA782, A/S to CV-0782 MV-MS103, ASDV CV-0781 Inlet OR MV-CA781, ANS to CV-0781 'B' S/G MV-MS102, ASDV CV-0779 Inlet OR MV-CA779, A/S to CV-0779 MV-MS104, ASDV CV-0780 Inlet Ct MV-CA780, A/S to CV-0780 CAUTION Operating P-50A and P-50B simultaneously when T, is less than 300OF is prohibited by Techncial Specifications.

d. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one in each loop.)I C = Continuousiv aDDlicable step ti= Hold Point© = Continuously aDolicable steD ~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 ,C.p ,T PROCEDURE Page 27 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 24. IF BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G: " At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags) " A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01:

HS/LPE-50A

('A' S/G)

HS/LPE-50B

('B' S/G) b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G) " CV-0703 ('B' S/G) d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G)

CV-0734 ('B' S/G)0 = Continuously applicable step f/-= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se I HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WoIF,ýIT PROCEDURE Page 28 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101

Spray line temperature, TIA-0103 or TIA-0104 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays)

Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray) © 25. RECORD each occurrence of PZR Spray operation with a AT (PZR vapor phase temp minus spray temp) greater than 200°F in the Narrative Log.@ = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 29 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs:

PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs)

PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation.

Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System." © 26. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied by ALL of the following:

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:

At least 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions

Greater than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10.26.1. IF ANY of the Sl Pump throttling criteria can NOT be maintained, THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

PUMP [ VALVE -[NUMBER DESCRIPTION Train I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1 B [ MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A P-66B I MO-3007 I HPSI Train 1 to Loop IA -[MO-3013 jHPSI Train I to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop I B [ MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A P-66A I MO-3068 I HPSI Train 2 to Loop IA ___.MO-3062 jHPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TUCIPIT:O PROCEDURE Page 30Cof III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 26. (continued)

c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. REFER TO EOP Supplement

11. d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8"). NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

a. OPERATE PZR heaters and Main or Auxiliary PZR sprays. b. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

2) THROTTLE HPSI flow.C = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se B od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 , PROCEDURE Page 31 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 28. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia

SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked * "Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed

A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm: * "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1" (EK-1337)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1. (continue)

@ = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD ti- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a1 Ical t 1 ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 32 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 28.(continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm: * "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-2. 29. IE HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow MR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time. PUMP JVALVE -NUMBER! DESCRIPTION

-' -Train I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1B I MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A P-66B T MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3013 HPSI Train I to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A .I___ IMO-3062 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B@ = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 33 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 30. IE LPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps:

P-67A " P-67B b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B " MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B 31. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSl pumps:

P-67A

P-67B b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSl Loop 1A 0 MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B C = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apIcal seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:ILOSS PROCEDURE Page 34 of ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 32. As resources permit, INITIATE preparations for either of the following:

a. Post-RAS injection from Spent Fuel Pool. Refer to EOP Supplement

44. b. Refill of SIRW Post-RAS.

Refer to EOP Supplement

43. 33. IE Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist:

SI Pump throttling criteria are met

Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement 27.@ = Continuously applicable step f-;= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step = Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 : EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLeARP IT PROCEDURE Page 35 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: PZR level instrument de-calibration occurs due to PCS pressure and containment temperature changes. Level correction is per EOP Supplements 9 and 10. NOTE: IF the PCS is in a water solid condition for PCS Pressure Control, THEN the PZR level limit of 85% may be exceeded.

NOTE: PZR level should be maintained greater than 36% (40% for degraded Containment) to have continued availability of PZR Heaters.

34. IF Sl Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42% to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following:

a. THROTTLE HPSI flow. b. CONTROL Charging and Letdown. (continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TIT2LELOST PROCEDURE Page 36 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 34.(continued)

1) ENSURE normal charging path aligned as follows: a) OPEN Charging Line Stop Valve, CV-21 11. b) OPEN at least one Charging Stop Valve: " CV-2113 " CV-2115 c) IE BOTH Charging Stop Valves fail to open THEN ENSURE greater than 33 gpm flow through CK-CVC2112.

NOTE: IF an interruption in boration via Charging Pump to HPSI Train 2 occurs, THEN a different SI cold leg injection nozzle should be used when restoring flow. 1.1) LFthe normal charging path is NOT available AND HPSI Train 2 is available, THEN CHARGE to the PCS via the HPSI header by performing ALL of the following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps. 2) CLOSE Charging Line Stop Valve, CV-2111.

3) CLOSE Letdown Orifice Stop Valves: " CV-2003 " CV-2004

CV-2005 4) CLOSE Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CV-2009.

5) ENSURE CLOSED HPSI Pump B Discharge to Train 2, CV-3018.(continue)(continue)

C = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD tl- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 _ EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLEARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 37 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 34.(continued)(continued)

6) OPEN ONE HPSI Train 2 Injection Valve: S 6 0 0 MO-3062 MO-3064 MO-3066 MO-3068 7) PLACE SIT Pressure Indicating Controller associated with valve opened above to MANUAL AND CLOSE: S 0 S 0 PIC-0338, MO-3062 PIC-0347, MO-3064 PIC-0346, MO-3066 PIC-0342, MO-3068 8) OPEN Charging Pump Discharge to Train 2, MO-3072.

9) START Charging pumps as necessary to control PZR level.C = Continuously applicable step f;,= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se =HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:,LOSS PROCEDURE Page 38AofT Il TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 35. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by performing ANY of the following:

a. CONTROL the following:

0 0 S PZR heaters Main Spray Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.35.1. IF the PCS is oversubcooled QR PZR pressure is greater than the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or PCS pressure to within the appropriate limit: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits:

Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement

37) c. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows. 35.2. IE PCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs.(continue)(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step f'/= Hold Point© = COntinuously applicable step i~" Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 39 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 35. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1: " PZR heaters

Main Spray " Auxiliary Spray (Supplement

37) ° Letdown c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. © 36. ENSURE at least one SIG has corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. Refer to EOP Supplement 11.@ = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD't-= Hold Point© Cninoul aIcaleseDHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 40 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 37. PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement

2. b. VERIFY BOTH of the following:

The calculated cooldown rate does NOT exceed Technical Specification limits.b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be met are NOT available, THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure." The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path.@ = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 I PROCEDURE Page 41 of III TUCLESO O PLANT TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS © 38. MONITOR for formation of PCS voiding as indicated by ANY of the following:

Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend.

PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow.

Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs -Tc ) or Loop AT (TH -Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates. " Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25"F subcooled. " Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel. 39. IF PCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist:

PCS pressure reduction is inhibited

PCS heat removal is inhibited " The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.0 = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD f,-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aD ical tD lHl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCITAT PROCEDURE Page 42 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 40. IF ANY of the following AC or DC buses are NOT energized, THEN RESTORE power to the affected buses. Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS!: PROCEDURE lC or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1 E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1 E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" YO1 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01" Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of DC Power" 40.1. IF Bus 1D and Bus IE are NOT energized, THEN as resources permit, PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.C = Continuously applicable step f';ý= Hold Point© Cninoul apicalesepHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITELOSSPROCEDURE Page 43Rof1Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 41. IF offsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized: " 'R' Bus * 'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available.

Refer to EOP Supplement

21. b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized: " 'R' Bus * 'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement

29. (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step f- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se t=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 44 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 41.(continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS PROCEDURE 1E 1E) EOP Supplement 29 (without SiS) 1E h1) ESOP-30 (with SS 1A or IB ONP-2.1, "Loss of I__AC Power" d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.0 = Continuousiv applicable step ti= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 W2,.j., PROCEDURE Page 45 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to the following load rating:

2500 KW continuous 2750 KW two hours per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period 42. WHEN 2400V Bus lC or Bus 1D is energized, THEN as resources permit, ENERGIZE Plant buses by performing ALL of the following:

42.1. IF equipment needed to maintain Safety Functions is available from a de-energized 2400V Vital Bus AND a power supply is available, THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IF Bus I C is energized, THE.N PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

152-115(BuslCto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (Bus1C to Transformer

13) (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step f;;= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 ,uar",,, PROCEDURE Page 46 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 42.(continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate: " MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19)

MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11) b. IE Bus 1D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1 D to Transformers 12 and 20) 2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate: " MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12) (continue)

C = Continuousiv awlicable steD t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal se! Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLELLOS PROCEDURE PagI e RECOVERY TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 42.(continued)

NQTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2), THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC. c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs: 1) MCC 1 Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146* Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186 2) MCC 2

Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225

Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285 d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 and D20 are powered by a Battery Charger.d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in operation.

Refer to SOP-30, "Station Power." C = Continuously applicable step 1!-;= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 ,ucAPI,,, PROCEDURE Page 48 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 43. IE ALL PCPs are stopped, 43.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G THEN VERIFY natural circulation feeding and steaming rates. flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following:

Core AT less than 50°F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering

Average of Qualified CETs at least 25°F subcooled

° Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 15°F 44. IF ALL PCPs are stopped, AND natural circulation criteria are NOT satisfied, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist:

All available Charging pumps are operating

SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4 " At least one S/G is available for removing heat from PCS with level being maintained or restored to between 60% and 70% " Average of Qualified CETs is less than superheated 0 = Continuously applicable step f';i= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NoCP 'T PROCEDURE Page 49 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 45. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist: " PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1

PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows: a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1 B, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment

6. b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE:

HS-0105A (Key: 1)

HS-0105B (Key: 4) c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B

HS-1043B d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement

1. 46. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs. Refer to EOP Supplement 3.© = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 .,o,,..A, PROCEDURE Page 50 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 47. WHEN required shutdown boron concentration has been established (approximately 30 to 45 minutes using all charging pumps), THEN ALIGN Charging Pump suction to SIRWT. Refer to EOP Supplement

40. © 48. VERIFY the containment sump level is rising as the SIRWT level is lowering.48.1. IF Containment Sump level is NOT rising as SIRWT level lowers, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CONFIRM the LOCA is outside containment.

b. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to one of the following: " SOP-2A, "Chemical

& Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System" c. IE"CIS INITIATED" (EK-1 126) is clear, THEN MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13 AND PERFORM EOP Supplement

6.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS d. NOTIFY the TSC.C = Continuouslv applicable steD t, = Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 JoAWL,.PLT PROCEDURE Page 51 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 49. WHEN SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, THEN prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.50. IF Control Room HVAC Compressor VC-1 0 or VC-1 1 tripped on high temperature due to low SW flow, THEN RESET AND START VC-10 or VC-11.@ = Continuously applicable step t = Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 52 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Subsequent to the actions in Step 51, the TSC must approve closure of ANY of the failed open valves. 51. WHEN Containment water level approaches the level specified below, THEN ENSURE OPEN the following valves AND OPEN associated breakers:

Cntmt Valve Water Level Number Bkr Description

...... :MCC No. I MO-3008 52-141 LPSI Loop 1A MO-3010 52-147 LPSI Loop 1 B 595' 9" 595'9 MCC No. 2 MO-3012 52-247 LPSI Loop 2A MO-3014 52-251 LPSI Loop 2B ______ MCC No. 1 MO-30091 52-197 HPSITrain Ito Loop 1B MO-3011 52-157 HPSI Train Ito Loop 2A MO-3007 52-137 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 52-151 HPSITrain 1 to Loop 2B 596' 4" .. ... MCC No. 2 MO-3066 152-2571 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B MO-3064 52-237 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 52-261 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A __MO-02 52-241 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B C = Continuously applicable step f/'-= Hold Point©=Cotiuosl apIcal seI 1HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 53 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Premature initiation of RAS can lead to insufficient Containment Sump inventory for SI Pump operation.

Minimum Containment Water level of 593' 6" is necessary for adequate ESS pump NPSH.52. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist:

LOCA inside Containment

° SIRWT level lowers to less than 2% THEN REFER TO EOP Supplement 42 AND PERFORM the following:

a. Post-RAS actions b. MONITOR for indications of sump screen clogging.

53. IE Containment Water level is less than 593' 6" following a RAS, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. NOTIFY TSC. b. INVESTIGATE cause of low containment water level. c. MONITOR for indications of inadequate ESS pump NPSH.@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 " PROCEDURE Page 54 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 54. IE RAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF BOTH HPSI Pumps are operating, THEN VERIFY total HPSI Pump flow greater than 100 gpm.b. IF one HPSI Pump is operating, THEN VERIFY the operating HPSI Pump has flow greater than 50 gpm.a.1. IF total HPSI Pump flow less than 100 gpm, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps. Refer to EOP Supplement 39, "Alternate Methods of Reducing PCS Pressure," as needed to control PZR pressure.

2) IF total HPSI Pump still has flow less than 100 gpm, THEN STOP one HPSI Pump. b.1. IF the operating HPSI Pump has flow less than 50 gpm, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps. Refer to EOP Supplement 39, "Alternate Methods of Reducing PCS Pressure," as needed to control PZR pressure.

2) IF the operating HPSI Pump still has flow less than 50 gpm, THEN STOP the HPSI Pump. 3) CONSULT with the TSC for further guidance.0 = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:LOSS PROCEDURE JCPage 55Rof II TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 55. IF containment sump screen clogging is indicated, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF 3 Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump (P-54B or P-54C preferred.)

b. THROTTLE HPSI flow to achieve 200 to 250 gpm flow to each operating train using either Option 1 or Option 2: b.1. IF HPSI loop isolation valves are de-energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) STOP one HPSI pump. 2) ENERGIZE and CLOSE two HPSI loop isolation valves associated with the operating HPSI pump (Refer to Option 1 or 2).(Continue)(Continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t,7= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step '~ Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 56 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 55.(Continued)(Continued)

OPTION i POSITION NUMBER DESCRIPTION

________ Train I (P-66B) Closed MO-3009 HPSI Tm Ito Loop 1B Closed MO-3013 HPSI Trn to Loop 2B Throttled MO-3011 HPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2A Throttled MO-3007 HPSI Tm I to Loop 1A ______ 2 (P-66A) Closed MO-3064 HPSI Trn 2 to Loop 2A Closed MO-3068 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A Throttled MO-3066 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1 B Throttled MO-3062 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2B _______ OPTION 2 POsITION NUMBER 1; DESCRIPTION

_______ Train I (P-66B) Closed MO-3011 IHPSI Tm 1 to Loop 2A Closed MO-3007 JHPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1A Throttled MO-3009 IHPSI TIto LoopIB Throttled MO-3013 IHPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2B ____.... : Train 2 (P-66A) Closed MO-3066 HPS Tm 2 to Loop 1B Closed MO-3062 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2B Throttled MO-3064 HPSI Trn 2 to Loop 2A Throttled MO-3068 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A OPTION I BKR NUMBER DESCRIPTION Train i (P-66B)52-197 MO-3009 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1B 52-151 MO-3013 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 2B _ Train 2 (P-66A)52-237 MO-3064 _HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2A 52-261 MO-3068 JHPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A OPTION 2 3KR NUMBER DESCRIPTION

______ :Train I (P-66B)52-157 MO-3011 HPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2A 52-137 MO-3007 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1A _______ Train 2 (P-66A)52-257 MO-3066 IHPSI Trn 2 to Loop 1B 52-24 1 MO-3062 IHPSI Tm 2to Loop 2B (Continue)

@ = ContinuousIV applicable step't- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step I~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TIT PROCEDURE Page 57 of 111V TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 55.(Continued)

c. STOP remaining operating Containment Spray Pumps as follows: 1) IF containment pressure greater than 4 psig OR CHP NOT reset, THEN CLOSE one containment spray valve. a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS: " HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve: 0 CV-3001 CV-3002 2) STOP all Containment Spray Pumps.0 0 0 P-54A P-54B P-54C (Continue)

C = Continuously applicable step't-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step f~- Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 58 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 55. (Continued)

3) ENSURE BOTH CHP Bypass Switches in BYPASS.

HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Key: 397) " HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396) 4) ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves: " CV-3001

CV-3002 d. MONITOR HPSI pump for d.1. IF HPSI pump performance does improved or stable NOT improve, performance.

THEN PERFORM the following:

1) IF HPSI loop isolation valves are energized, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow to 50 to 100 gpm on each operating train (low in the band preferred.)

2) IE HPSI pump performance is NOT improved, THEN STOP HPSI pump. 3) IF HPSI pump performance improves, THEN RAISE flow to a point where stable pump performance can be maintained. (Continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se1 =HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLRPLIT PROCEDURE Page 59 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 55. (Continued)

e. NOTIFY TSC to begin monitoring for SAMG entry conditions.

f. GO TO EOP-9.0 56. PLACE the following ESS Room Sump Pump handswitches in OFF AND CAUTION TAG "Do Not Use LOCA in Progress":

S S 0 East P-72A (42-165ASS)

East P-72B (42-165BSS)

West P-73A (42-155ASS)

West P-73B (42-155BSS)

57. IF Charging Pump suction is aligned to the SIRWT AND RAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. STOP ALL Charging Pumps: S P-55A P-55B P-55C b. RACK OUT ALL Charging Pump breakers:

CHARGING BREAKER PUMP ____......

P-55A 52-1205 P-55B 52-1308 52-1206 P-55C 52-1105 (continue)

© = Continuously applicable steD t-= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 up"r,9 PROCEDURE Page 60 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 57. (continued)

c. PLACE a Caution Tag on their handswitches that reads "Do NOT Use -No suction source available"

52-1205CS

52-1206CS

52-1105CS

58. IF ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr AND Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET CHR by pushing the following:

The RESET pushbutton on each Containment Area Radiation Monitor. " BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-13.@ = Continuousiv awlicable steD f/-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl af ca! seI= od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 %U&, T PROCEDURE Page 61 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 59. IF PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 300 psia as read on PI-0104 (NR) or PR-0125 and controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in progress, THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows: a. UNLOCK AND CLOSE the following breakers:

BREAKER OUTLET SIT _____ _ VALVE:., 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C 52-2429 MO-3052 T-82D KEY: 190 b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet Valves: :BREAKER OUTLET KEY ..... ___ VALVE 52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 52-2229 MO-3049 100 52-2429 MO-3052 101 NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs. 59.1. IF ANY SIT could NOT be isolated, THEN VENT the unisolated SIT using ONE of the following:

a. VENT to containment as follows: 1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

CV-1064

CV-1065 2) VENT each unisolated SIT one tank at a time by opening the Vent Valve and closing when tank is vented.SIT VENT VALVE T-82A CV-3067 T-82B CV-3065 T-82C CV-3063 T-82D CV-3051 (c nti ue)(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step lt-ý= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WUCII PROCEDURE Page 62 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 59.(continued)(continued)

3) WHEN ALL the following conditions are met: " Unisolated SITs are vented and their associated vent valve closed

Plant conditions allow venting containment THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

CV-1064 " CV-1065 b. VENT unisolated SITs via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System."© = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 1ECEPNT PROCEDURE Page 63 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 60. IF the elapsed time from event initiation (EOP Entry) is 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months AND Shutdown Cooling will NOT be in service prior to 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after event initiation (EOP Entry) AND ANY of the following conditions are satisfied:

Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:

o Less than 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions o Less than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions " Corrected PZR level is less than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) (Refer to EOP Supplements 9 and 10)

Operable RVLMS channels indicate less than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate, THEN ESTABLISH simultaneous hot and cold leg injection by performing ALL of the following in the order listed: (continue) 60.1. IF hot leg injection can NOT be established via the normal path, THEN INITIATE hot leg injection via HPSI flow through the PZR. Refer to EOP Supplement 20.@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOUCLAPs,.T PROCEDURE Page 64of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 60.(continued)

a. CLOSE HPSI Train 2 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3080. (KEY: 117) b. OPEN HPSI Train 2 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3082. (KEY: 118) c. CLOSE HPSI Train 1 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3081. (KEY: 115)d. OPEN HPSI Train 1 Valve, MO-3083. (KEY: 116)to Hot Leg e. IE HPSI Train 2 is in operation, THEN VERIFY HPSI flow to Loop 1 hot leg on FI-0316A.

f. IF HPSI Train 1 is in operation, THEN VERIFY HPSI flow to Loop I hot leg on FI-0317A.

g. OBSERVE HPSI flow to PCS cold legs on the following indicators:

S S S S FI-0308A FI-0310A FI-0312A FI-0313A (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t;= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 65 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 60.(continued)

h. VERIFY total HPSI flow to Loop 1 hot leg is approximately equal to total HPSI flow to cold legs.

FI-0316A

FI-0317A i. VERIFY the following: " Total HPSI flow is within acceptable limits. Refer to EOP Supplement

4. " Containment spray flow is within acceptable limits. Refer to SFSC, Table CA.0 = Continuouslv amlicable ster)fý= Hold Point©=Cotiuosl aplialesep=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MuLcO2A PROCEDURE Page 66 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 61. IF measured Containment hydrogen concentration is between 1% and 3%, THEN PERFORM ALL the following:

a. CONTACT TSC. b. OPEN MCC 9 Feeder Breaker, 52-1304.

LOCATION:

On Bus 13 62. IF SI Pump Throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System," Attachment 4.I C = Continuously applicable step f;,= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical"te odlon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 67 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 63. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met:

PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment Containment Greater Than or Less Than Equal To 1750F 175F AND OR Greater Less Than Than or Equal 3 pslg at all To 3 psig at any times during the time during the Parameter event event PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement 1 PZR Level Greater than 36% Greater than 40% and controlled and controlled Avg of Qualified Greater than REFER TO EOP CETs Subcooling 251F Supplement 1 PAvg of Qualified Less than 300°F REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop Supplement 1 r.s TemperatureII

TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment.

Containment Spray Pumps are NOT in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function.

Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01. OR (Continue)

© = Continuously applicable step t;= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 IUUr1J PROCEDURE Page 68 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 63.(Continued)

Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established.

REFER TO ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling."

LTOP operable.

Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

o MO-3015 (MCC-1) o MO-3016 (MCC-2) OR Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation.

THtEN PERFORM the following: (continue)

C = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl anIcal Ie I od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 69 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 63. (continued)

a. IF hot leg injection is in use, THEN SECURE hot leg injection as follows: 1) CLOSE HPSI Train 2 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3082. (KEY: 118) 2) OPEN HPSI Train 2 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3080. (KEY: 117) 3) CLOSE HPSI Train 1 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3083. (KEY: 116) 4) OPEN HPSI Train 1 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3081. (KEY: 115) b. STOP operating HPSI and LPSI Pumps. c. ENSURE SIAS is reset. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System," Attachment

4. d. GO TO GOP-9, "Mode 3 _> 525 OF to Mode 4 or Mode 5" or TSC approved procedure.

64. IF SDC entry conditions can NOT be established, THEN MAINTAIN long-term cooling.C = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 L21SPIJ PROCEDURE Page 70 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 65. IF the LOCA is isolated, THEN PERFORM Steps 66 through 97. NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs: " PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs)

PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation.

Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System." © 66. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied by ALL of the following:

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following: " At least 25 0 F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions

Greater than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions 66.1. IF ANY of the SI Pump throttling criteria can NOT be maintained, THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

PUMP ... VALVE [WI UMBER I DESCRIPTION Train 1 MO-3009 HPSI Train Ito Loop 1B P-66B MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 IHPSI Train I to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1 B MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A _MO-3062 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B (c nti fue)@ = Continuously apolicable step't- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 71 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 66. (continued)

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10. c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. REFER TO EOP Supplement

11. d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8").C = Continuouslv awlicable steD ti= Hold Point© Cninoul aica I sepHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 72 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 67. IF HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow OR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time. T .VALVE PUMP NUMBER -DESCRIPTION

--Train I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop i B MO-3010 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A P-66B MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop I B P MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A P-66A I. T MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop IA ____IMO-3062

.1HPSI Train 2 to Loop 28@ = ContinuousIv applicable steD f',= Hold Point irCotiuosl aplicbestp ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 73 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 68. IF LPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps: " P-67A

P-67B b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves: " MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B 69. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSI pumps:

P-67A " P-67B b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A " MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B@ = Continuously applicable step t,= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se I od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 N PROCEDURE Page 74 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 70. IF Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist: " SI Pump throttling criteria are met " Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement

27. © 71. VERIFY the PCS is NOT in a water solid condition as indicated by BOTH of the following:

a. No exaggerated or severe pressure response to PCS inventory or temperature changes.

b. ANY of the following: " Corrected PZR level is less than 100%. REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10

RVLMS indicates voiding 71.1. IF water solid PCS condition is indicated, THEN MAINTAIN the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by ANY of the following:

a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to control the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. b. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.C = Continuouslv aDDlicable ster)t- Hold Point© = Continuously anDlicable steD ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 75 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 72. IF it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE ENERGIZED ALL available PZR heaters.

b. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Both S/G pressures can be maintained below the existing PCS pressure

At least one PCP is operating THEN PERFORM ALL of the following to reduce PCS pressure:

1 ) IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow. 2) INITIATE PCS cooldown within Technical Specification limits. 3) MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate using PPC. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 M PROCEDURE Page 76 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 72. (continued)

4) MAINTAIN PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement

1. 5) MAINTAIN 25°F subcooling.

c. IE a bubble forms in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head region, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow to maintain PCS level greater than the 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8"). 2) CONTINUE efforts to draw a bubble in the PZR. 73. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42% to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following (Refer to EOP Supplements 9 and 10): a. CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

b. THROTTLE HPSI flow.C = Continuousiv applicable steD t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sef lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 T EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 Nu"L PROCEDURE .Page 77 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 74. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement I by performing ANY of the following:

a. CONTROL the following:

0 S PZR heaters Main Spray Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.74.1. IF the PCS is oversubcooled OR PZR pressure is greater than the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or PCS pressure to within the appropriate limit: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits: " Main Spray " Auxiliary Spray (Supplement

37) c. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows. 74.2. IF PCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. (continue)(continue)

@ = Continuously aDDlicable steD ti= Hold Point= Continuously aDplicable sten ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 %"2,PS.T PROCEDURE Page 78 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 74. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1:

PZR heaters

Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement

37) " Letdown c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. © 75. ENSURE at least one S/G has corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. Refer to EOP Supplement 11.Q = Continuouslv awlicable steD ti= Hold Point ,, Cotnuul a Ical se ' HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: LOSS OFPROCEDURE Page 79 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 76. PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement 2.b. Verify BOTH of the following:

The calculated cooldown rate does NOT exceed Technical Specification limits.b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be met are NOT available, THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure."* The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path. 77. EVALUATE the need for a plant cooldown based on ALL of the following:

Technical Specifications require plant cooldown

Plant equipment repair requires plant cooldown

Availability of Auxiliary systems

Available Feedwater reserve inventory

The Shift Supervisor deems plant cooldown is necessary

78. IF a plant cooldown is NOT required, THEN GO TO Step 88.@ = Continuouslv aDDlicable step ti= Hold Point© Cninoul aicalesepHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Page 80 of Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

Refer to EOP Supplement

35. a. IF Emergency boration is in progress AND PCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.79.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less than required boron concentration, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE emergency boration is in progress.

b. WHEN required boron concentration is reached, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.C = Continuousiv applicable steD f/-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal se! Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Page 81 OfC111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 200°F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp -spray temp) of 3500F should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle.NOTE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown.

Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used. NOTE: S/G level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown.

Correction curves in EOP Supplement 11, "S/G Level Correction" should be used. NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750 F/hr. (continue) 0 = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD t= Hold Point , Cninoul appical te ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 II'W'NT PROCEDURE Page 82 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 80.(continued)

EOP Supplement 33, PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data b. IF safety injection flow is causing a cooldown in excess of required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to maintain all of the following as applicable: " S/Gs within 50 psi of Psat for Average of Qualified CETs " As required to establish or support natural circulation

As required to establish or support two phase natural circulation b.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. 1) IF desired to enhance temperature control, THEN ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 80-1.(Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable steD t-;= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 RucLF-N.T PROCEDURE Page 83 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 80.(Continued)

c. WHEN PCS cooldown rate can be controlled within required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to cooldown at the maximum allowed rate.c.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. 1) IF desired to enhance temperature control, THEN ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 80-1.Table 80-1'A' S/G MV-MS101, ASDV CV-0782 Inlet MV-CA782, A/S to CV-0782 MV-MS103, ASDV CV-0781 Inlet OR MV-CA781, A/S to CV-0781 'B' S/G MV-MSI02, ASDV CV-0779 Inlet MV-CA779, A/S to CV-0779 MV-MS104, ASDV CV-0780 Inlet MV-CA780, A/S to CV-0780 CAUTION Operating P-50A and P-50B simultaneously when Tc is less than 300°F is prohibited by Techncial Specifications.

d. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one in each loop.)@ = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t = Hold Point© =Cotiuosl f !ia eeDHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUoPIAIT PROCEDURE Page 84 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 81. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist: " PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1 " PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows: a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1 B, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment

6. b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE:

HS-0105A (Key: 1)

HS-0105B (Key: 4) c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B " HS-1043B d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1.@ = Continuously applicable step t,= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp'IHl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 uc.LLAN, PROCEDURE Page 85 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101 " Spray line temperature, TIA-0103 or TIA-0104 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays) " Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray) © 82. RECORD each occurrence of PZR Spray operation with a AT (PZR vapor phase temp minus spray temp) greater than 200°F in the Narrative Log.C = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp =Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOPL PROCEDURE Page 86 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

a. OPERATE PZR heaters and Main or Auxiliary PZR sprays. b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

2) THROTTLE HPSI flow.@ = Continuously awlicable step ti= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alical sel= odIon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 R&ILIPLAIT PROCEDURE Page 87 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 84. IE BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G: " At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags)

A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01: " HS/LPE-50A

('A' S/G) " HS/LPE-50B

('B' S/G) b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0703 ('B' S/G) d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G) " CV-0734 ('B' S/G)C = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD ti= Hold Point© Cninoul aoIcaeI DHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 %ucIEAR PROCEDURE Page 88 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 85. IF ALL of the following conditions exist: " PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia " SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked * "Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed " A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm: "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1-" (EK-1337)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1. (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl applical tp =Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 89 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 85.(continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm: " "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-2.C = ContinuousIv applicable step f-ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp 1Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 90 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS © 86. MONITOR for formation of PCS voiding as indicated by ANY of the following: " Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend. " PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow. " Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs -Tc ) or Loop AT (TH -Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates. " Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25°F subcooled.

Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel. 87. JE PCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist: " PCS pressure reduction is inhibited " PCS heat removal is inhibited " The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 mlT PROCEDURE Page 91 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 88. IF ANY of the following AC or DC buses are NOT energized, THEN RESTORE power to the affected buses. Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS, PROCEDURE 1C or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" Y01 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01 Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of I_ DC Power" 88.1. IF Bus 1D and Bus 1E are NOT energized, THEN as resources permit, PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.@ = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD t-,= Hold Point= Cntnuosl af c! Ise ' od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TILPS: L S PROCEDURE ACCIDEN 92ECOV TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 89. IF offsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized:

'R' Bus " 'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available.

Refer to EOP Supplement

21. b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized: " 'R' Bus * 'F' Bus " Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement

29. (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step 1ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se! lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 oucLEPL,.T PROCEDURE Page 93 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 89.(continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS I PROCEDURE 1E ( u S EOP Supplement 29 (without SiS) 1E t1) ESOP-30 (with SIS 1A or 1B ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power" d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.@ = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD ti= Hold Point© =Coninuusl a Ical I I= od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 1JCJ"'E-NT PROCEDURE Page 94 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to the following load rating:

2500 KW continuous 2750 KW two hours per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period 90. WHEN 2400V Bus lC or Bus ID is energized, THEN as resources permit, ENERGIZE Plant buses by performing ALL of the following:

90.1. IF equipment needed to maintain Safety Functions is available from a de-energized 2400V Vital Bus AND a power supply is available, THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IF Bus 1C is energized, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

a 152-115 (Bus 1Cto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (Bus 1C to Transformer

13) (continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~'= Hold Point PAISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WKI1 PROCEDURE Page 95 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 90.(continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate:

MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19) " MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11) b. IE Bus 1D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1 D to Transformers 12 and 20) 2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate:

MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12) (continue)

C = Continuously applicable step Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aical se i=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 96 of E_ _ TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 90.(continued)

NOTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2), THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC. c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs: 1) MCC 1 Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146* Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186 2) MCC 2 " Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225 " Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285 d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 and D20 are powered by a Battery Charger.d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in operation.

Refer to SOP-30, "Station Power." 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point© = Continuously aDDlicable steD Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 , PROCEDURE Page 97 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 91. IF ALL PCPs are stopped, THEN VERIFY natural circulation flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following: " Core AT less than 50°F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering

Average of Qualified CETs at least 25 0 F subcooled " Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 15 0 F 92. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs. Refer to EOP Supplement

3. 93. IF a plant cooldown is NOT in progress, THEN GO TO a TSC approved procedure.

91.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G feeding and steaming rates.@ = Continuously applicable step It- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 IUL Li PROCEDURE Page 98 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 94. IF PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 300 psia as read on PI-01 04 (NR) or PR-0125 and controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in progress, THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows: a. UNLOCK AND CLOSE the following breakers:

BREAKER OUTLET SIT BREAKER_ ,VALVE 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C 52-2429 MO-3052 T-82D KEY: 190 b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet Valves: BREAKER: OUTLET BREAKER_ VALVE KE 52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 52-2229 MO-3049 100 52-2429 MO-3052 101 NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs. 94.1. IF ANY SIT could NOT be isolated, THEN VENT the unisolated SIT using ONE of the following:

a. VENT to containment as follows: 1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

CV-1064

CV-1065 2) VENT each unisolated SIT one tank at a time by opening the Vent Valve and closing when tank is vented.SIT VENT VALVE T-82A CV-3067 T-82B CV-3065 T-82C CV-3063 T-82D CV-3051 (continue)(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable steD t= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 99 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 94.(continued)(continued)

3) WHEN ALL the following conditions are met:

Unisolated SITs are vented and their associated vent valve closed

Plant conditions allow venting containment THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves: 0 0 CV-1 064 CV-1065 b. VENT unisolated SITs Via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System."@ = Continuousiv awlicable steD t = Hold Point= oninoul alical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE

[Page NT Rof I1 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 95. IF a SIAS or CHR signal is actuated AND is no longer needed, THEN RESET the signal as follows: a. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied AND Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System," Attachment

4. b. IF ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr THEN RESET CHR by pushing BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-1 3.C = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point© oninoul applical te W ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 101 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 96. IF ALL of the following conditions are met:

Tcis below325 0 F AND prior to Tcs less than 3000 F " SI Pump throttling criteria are met

HPSI pumps are NOT required for inventory control " A cooldown is in progress, THEN DISABLE BOTH HPSI pumps by removing Control Power fuses and fuse holders from the following breakers:

152-207, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66A LOCATION:

'D' Bus 0 152-113, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66B LOCATION:

'C' Bus@ = Continuously applicable step It;= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 102 of Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 97. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met: PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment Containment Greater Than or Less Than Equal To 1750F 175-F AND QR Greater Less Than Than or Equal 3 pslg at all To 3 psig at any times during time during the Parameter the event event, PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement I PZR Level Greater Than Greater than (corrected) 36% and 40% and controlled controlled Avg of Qualified Greater Than REFER TO EOP CETs 25'F Supplement 1 Subcooling Avg of Qualified Less Than REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop 300°F Supplement 1 FHs Temperature " TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment. " Containment Spray Pumps are not in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function. (continue)

I @ = Continuously aDDlicable ster)0ff- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step i~'= H old Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 M , PROCEDURE Page 103 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 97. (continued) " Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01 OR Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established per ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling." , LTOP is operable. " Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

o MO-3015 (MCC-1) o MO-3016 (MCC-2) OR Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation, THEN GO TO GOP-9, "Mode 3> 525OF To Mode 4 or Mode 5" or TSC approved procedure.

End Of Section 4.0 0 = Continuously applicable step fl;, = Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~5= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 , PROCEDURE Page 104 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: TIME OF SIAS: STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 4. Verify SIAS initiated 5 5. Ensure adequate Sl flow and safeguards 6 equipment status 6. If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia 7 then establish one PCP per loop or if PCS subcooling is less than 25°F subcooled, then trip all PCPs 7. Ensure proper PCP configuration as PCS 7 temperature lowers 8. Verify operating limits for any running PCP 7 9. If open, then close CWRTs vent valves. 8 10. Isolate the LOCA 8 11. If the LOCA is outside of Containment, isolate 10 the leak and initiate CIS 12. Place Hydrogen Monitor in service 12 13. If the Containment has pressure greater than or 12 equal to 4.0 psig or has high radiation, ensure Containment Isolation signal initiated

14. If the Containment pressure is greater than or 13 equal to 4.0 psig, verify available Containment Spray Pumps running 15. If PCP seal cooling is lost, isolate seal leakoff 14 and restore PCP seal cooling 16. Early Secure Containment Spray 15 © 17. Secure Containment Spray 17 ©0 = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD f';ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical se = odlon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MCPATPROCEDURE Page 105 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 18. Reset CHP 20 19. Verify condenser cooling or isolate steam to 22 condenser

20. If the LOCA is isolated, go to Step 65 22 21. Ensure at least one train of CR HVAC in 23 Emergency Mode. 22. Verify PCS boron concentration greater than or 23 © equal to required boron concentration.

23. Commence steaming S/G(s) 25 24. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 27 550 psia, block MSIS 25. Record each occurrence of PZR spray with AT 28 © greater than 200O F 26. Verify SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied 29 © 27. Commence depressurizing the PCS to 270 psia 30 © 28. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 31 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS 29. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump 32 throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps 30. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 33 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves 31. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 33 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves 0 = Continuouslv ar)Dlicable steD't= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp !Hl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 106 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 32. As resources permit, prepare post-RAS injection 34 © sources.

33. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 34 restore Letdown 34. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, then 35 maintain PZR level between 20% and 85% (42% to 57% preferred)

35. Maintain PCS pressure within the limits of EOP 38 © Supplement 1 36. Ensure at least one S/G has corrected level 39 © being maintained or restored to between 60% and 70% 37. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 40 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path 38. Monitor PCS for void formation 41 © 39. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 41 elimination

40. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 42 restore power to affected buses 41. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 43 power to plant equipment

42. When 2400V Bus 1C or 1D is energized, then 45 energize Plant buses 43. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 48 loop@ = Continuousiv applicable step f/-= Hold Point© otiuul appl.ical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Page NT Rof 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS

44. Verify two phase natural circulation

45. Place LTOP in service 46. If desired, restart PCPs 47. When cold shutdown boron concentration is established, swap Charging pump suction from the BASTs to the SIRWT 48. Verify Containment Sump level rises as the SIRWT level drops 49. When SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, then prior to RAS, perform Pre-RAS Actions.

50. If VC-1 0 or VC-1 1 trip on high temperature due to low SW flow, reset and start VC-1 0 or VC-1 1 51. When Containment water level approaches SI valve elevations, open and disable SI valves 1ý * ***** bý1.1 10 RAS STEPS 52 to 57 52. When SIRWT level lowers to below 2% and LOCA is inside Containment, then perform Post-RAS Actions.

53. If Containment water level is less than expected post RAS, consult with the TSC for additional guidance 54. If RAS is initiated, ensure adequate HPSI pump flow 55. Actions for when sump screen clogging is indicated.

56. Place ESS Room Sump Pumps in OFF and add caution tag PAGE START DONE 48 49 49 50 50©51 51 52 4444444441<

1< 4 < 1 1<<14444 53 53 54 55 59©C = Continuously aDDlicable steD It- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alIcal seI =HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLPLANT PROCEDURE Page 108 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS

57. If Charging Pump suction is aligned to the SIRWT and RAS has initiated then, disable the Charging Pumps and add caution tag 58. If Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 10' R/hr and Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, reset CHR 59. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs 60. If the elapsed time from the start of the LOCA is 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and SDC will not be inservice prior to 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after the LOCA and any HPSI throttle criteria are not met, initiate hot leg injection

61. If Containment hydrogen concentration is between 1% and 3%, notify TSC and open MCC-9 feeder breaker 62. Reset SIAS 63. If SDC entry conditions are met, go to GOP-9 PAGE START DONE 59 60 61 63 66 66 67 64. If SDC entry conditions can not be established, maintain long-term cooling N '*,0.* 1 1 0 Isolated LOCA steps 65 to 97 65. If the LOCA is isolated, perform Steps 66 through 97 66. Verify SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied

67. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps 69 70 70 72©0 = ContinuousIV applicable step-ej= Hold Point 0=Cotiuosl apical seI=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 RcURPAIWT PROCEDURE Page 109 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 68. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 73 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves 69. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 73 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves 70. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 74 restore Letdown 71. Verify the PCS is not in a water solid condition 74 © 72. If it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, 75 perform the actions to draw a bubble in the PZR 73. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, maintain 76 corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% using Charging, Letdown and HPSI 74. Maintain PCS pressure within the limits of EOP 77 © Supplement 1 75. Ensure at least one S/G has corrected level 78 © being maintained or restored to between 60% and 70% 76. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 79 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path 77. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown 79 78. Routing step if plant cooldown not required 79 79. Verify PCS boron concentration greater than or 80 © equal to cold shutdown boron concentration

@ = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 u PROCEDURE Page 110 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 80. Commence steaming S/G(s) 82 © 81. When PZR Pressure and PCS cooldown within 84 limits, then place LTOP in service.

82. Record each occurrence of PZR spray with &T 85 © greater than 200O F 83. Commence depressurizing the PCS to 270 psia 86 © 84. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 87 550 psia, block MSIS 85. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 88 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS 86. Monitor PCS for void formation 90 © 87. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 90 elimination

88. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 91 restore power to affected buses 89. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 92 power to plant equipment

90. When 2400V Bus 1C or 1D is energized, then 94 energize Plant buses 91. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 97 loop 92. If desired, restart PCPs 97 93. Seek TSC guidance if plant cooldown not in 97 progress C = Continuousiv applicable step t= Hold Point© oninoul aicalesepHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCoA PROCEDURE Page 111 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS

94. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs 95. Reset unnecessary safety actuation signals 96. Disable both HPSI pumps when listed conditions are met 97. When all shutdown cooling system entry conditions are met, exit this procedure PAGE START DONE 98 100 101 102 END OF SECTION 5.0@ = Continuousiv a[)Dlicable steD t- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a lical ser Iod on ATTACHMENT 4 EOP-6, "EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT" 70 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

PA PALISADES NUCLEAR Proc No EOP-&.O PLANT EMERGENCY Revision Is COPERATING PROCEDURE Issued Date 12!15/05 EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT Z3T.flwk er.1/2If 1QW-51 Procedure Sponsor Date Technical Reviewer Date DBCampbell 111/4/05 User Reviewer Date---- ------ ýWmwmmýWýq

-rr PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE I roc No EOP-6.0 Revision 15 Page 1 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT USER ALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step.1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of an Excess Steam Demand Event (ESDE). These actions are necessary to ensure that the Plant is placed in a safe, stable condition.

The goal of this procedure is to safely establish a plant condition that will allow the implementation of an appropriate existing procedure or a procedure provided by the Plant Technical Support Center for operation of the plant in hot shutdown or below.End of Section 1.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 I EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 2 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS

1. EOP 1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," has been performed.

OR The event initiated from a lower mode when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service.

2. Plant conditions indicate an Excess Steam Demand Event has occurred.

ANY of the following may be present: a. Loud noise indicative of a high energy steam line break. b. Lowering PCS TAVE. C. Steam flow/feed flow mismatch.

d. Rise in feedwater flow. e. Possible rise in Containment temperature, humidity, and Containment Sump level, with no significant radiation level increase on Containment Hi Range radiation monitors (Containment Area Monitors may fail high due to high temperature and humidity conditions).

f. Low pressure in affected S/G(s) following MSIV closure.

g. Possible rise in reactor power.End of Section 2.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IEOcS..J PROCEDURE Page 3 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS

1. The diagnosis of an Excess Steam Demand Event is NOT confirmed.

OR 2. ANY of the Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied AND corrective actions to restore the safety function are NOT effective.

OR 3. The Excess Steam Demand Event procedure has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:

a. All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.

b. Shutdown Cooling Entry conditions are satisfied or a cooldown is NOT required and maintaining the plant in Hot Shutdown condition is desired.

c. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists or has been approved by the plant Technical Support Center.End of Section 3.0 PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ,ocLa,,AT PROCEDURE Page 4 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION During degraded Containment conditions, the operator should not rely on any single instrument indication due to large instrument errors. Alternate/additional instrumentation should be used to confirm trending of PCS conditions.

a. VERIFY Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet" acceptance criteria:

1) Are satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.

OR 2) Corrective actions to restore Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet," acceptance criteria are effective.

1.1. GO TO ONE of the following:

EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flowchart" AND RE-DIAGNOSE the event. " For events initiated from a lower mode, GO TO the EOP considered appropriate by the Shift Supervisor. " EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure." (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUcAP,,IT PROCEDURE Page 5 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1.(continued)

b. IF ALL of the following conditions exist: " Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor, RIA-0707, has NOT alarmed

SIAS has NOT occurred OR has been reset

CHP and CHR signals are NOT present, THEN SAMPLE S/Gs for activity and Lithium ANM VERIFY sample results do NOT indicate a SGTR. c. Observation of NO abnormal S/G level rise (NOT attributable to feed flow or swell). © 2. REFER TO the Site Emergency Plan AND CLASSIFY the event per El-i, "Emergency Classification and Actions." 3. OPEN the placekeeper ANM RECORD the time of EOP entry. 4. IF PZR pressure is less than or equal to 1605 psia OR Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN VERIFY "SAFETY INJ INITIATED" (EK-1342) is alarmed.4.1. PUSH BOTH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13. " PB1-1 " PB1-2 0 = Continuously applicable step tk= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 6 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 5. iE SIAS is present, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE available safeguards equipment operated or operating.

Refer to EOP Supplement 5.b. VERIFY at least minimum SI flow. Refer to EOP Supplement 4.b.1. IE SI flow is NOT within the limits of EOP Supplement 4, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore SI flow: 1) ENSURE electrical power available to SI pumps and valves. 2) ENSURE correct SI valve lineup. 3) ENSURE adequate SI pump seal cooling.

4) START additional SI pumps as needed until SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4.c. if Letdown Orifice Stop Valves are closed, THEN PLACE handswitches in the CLOSE position: S 0 HS-2003 HS-2004 HS-2005 (D = Continuousiv applicable steo tý= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUcLEARPLAN PROCEDURE Page 7 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure to close MSIV and MSIV bypass valves on the unaffected S/G will result in steaming the unaffected S/G through the break. 6. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves are closed: IG VALVt Dýý00CRIPITION.

CV-0510 MSIV MO-0510 MSIV BYPASS CV-0501 MSIV .. MO-0501 MSIV BYPASS NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 3000 F. 7. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia AND SIAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE one PCP is stopped in each loop. b. IF PCS is less than 25 0 F subcooled, THEN ENSURE ALL PCPs stopped.0 = ContinuousIv awlicable steD fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a Ical Ie I=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NL PROCEDURE Page 8 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 8. COMMENCE emergency boration to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to the boron concentration needed for TAVE greater than 5250 F as verified by sample or hand calculation.

Refer to EOP Supplement

35. a. WHEN PCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to the required boron concentration, THEN emergency boration may be secured. REFER TO EOP Supplement

40. 9. WHEN PCS temperature lowers, THEN ENSURE PCPs configured as follows: ......e T 0 .pEATG PoPs$ <450'F 3 <300'F 2 10. IE PCPs are operating, THEN VERIFY PCP operating limits are satisfied.

Refer to EOP Supplement 1.10.1. STOP PCPs which do NOT satisfy PCP operating limits.0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© otnuul aplcal sel lHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUCeARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 9 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 11. VERIFY BOTH of the following:

At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating 0 0 P-39A P-39B* At least one Condensate Pump operating o P-2A o P-2B 11.1. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH MSIVs: " CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 11.2. ENSURE CLOSED from the Control Room BOTH MSIV Bypass valves:

MO-0510 ('A' S/G) " MO-0501 ('B' S/G) a. IE ANY MSIV Bypass valves were open when power/position indication was lost, THEN LOCALLY CLOSE ANY open MSIV Bypass valve. b. ENSURE CLOSED ALL S/G Blowdown Valves: .A S/G , B S/G. CV-0739 CV-0738 CV-0771 CV-0770 CV-0767 CV-0768 0 = Continuously applicable step f/1- Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical seIIHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 uLc, P ,T PROCEDURE Page 10 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.12. ENSURE at least one train of CR HVAC in Emergency Mode. Refer to SOP-24, "Ventilation and Air Conditioning System." © 13. DETERMINE the most affected S/G by considering ALL of the following:

High steam flow from S/G

Lowering S/G pressure " Lowering S/G level " Lowering Loop T. temperature C = Continuouslv awlicable ster)ltý= Hold Point© Cninoul alical sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 tU PT PROCEDURE Page 11 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Maintenance of heat removal via the least affected S/G during dual events (SGTR/SGTR, ESD/ESD, or SGTR/ESD combinations) is preferable to isolation of both S/Gs and going to once-through-cooling.

14. IE MSIS has NOT isolated the leak, THEN ISOLATE the most affected steam generator.

Refer to the following applicable EOP supplement:

EOP Supplement 17 ('A' S/G) " EOP Supplement 18 ('B' S/G)0 = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD tý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a Ical Ie l od on PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IUCeI PROCEDURE Page 12 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 15. VERIFY the correct S/G is isolated by comparing ALL of the following: " S/G pressures

S/G levels

PCS Loop Tc temperatures 15.1. IF the wrong S/G was isolated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following on the least affected S/G: a. OPEN the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve air supply valves and manual isolation valves. Refer to the following applicable EOP Supplement: " EOP Supplement 17 ('A' S/G) " EOP Supplement 18 ('B' S/G) b. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Feedwater flow through ANY associated AFW valve: WI 7S'&G W 11 ICV-0737A ICV-0736A CV-0749 I CV-0727 1 15.2. GO TO Step 14 to isolate the affected S/G.0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point©=Cotiuosl apical seI lHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ELOARPL PROCEDURE Page 13 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION When ALL PCPs are stopped, steaming the least affected S/G must occur prior to dryout of the most affected S/G to prevent lifting PZR Code Safety Valves or Pressurized Thermal Shock rupture of the PCS.© 16. STABILIZE PCS temperature as follows: a. MAINTAIN level in the least affected S/G between 60% and 70%. b. IE the steam leak is isolated, THEN ESTABLISH steam flow from BOTH S/Gs using the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step lrý= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUUAR P NT PROCEDURE Page 14 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 16.(continued)

WARNING IE Containment pressure is higher than the most affected S/G pressure AND the ESDE is inside of containment, THEN opening of the ASDVs on the most affected S/G will provide a direct release path to the environment.

NOTE: Steaming BOTH S/Gs using ASDVs is permitted prior to isolation of the most affected S/G if necessary to control temperature

/pressure of the least affected S/G. c. if the steam leak is NOT isolated, THEN STEAM the le=as affected S/G as necessary to maintain the following, as applicable:

WHEN Tcs in the affected loop are lowering, THEN MAINTAIN the least affected S/G pressure within 50 psid above the most affected S/G pressure " WHEN Tcs in the affected loop are NOT lowering, THEN STABILIZE PCS Tcs using the least affected S/G 0 = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical te '=HlPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PLATPROCEDURE Page 15 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs:

PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs) " PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation.

Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System." © 17. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied by ALL of the following:

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:

At least 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions " Greater than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10.17.1. IF ANY of the SI Pump throttling criteria can NOT be maintained, THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

-[ VALVE MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1 B MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3007 HPSI Train ito Loop 1A MO-3013 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 21 trig 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1 B MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A P-66A T MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A ____MO-3062 I.HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NT PROCEDURE Page 16 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 17.(continued)

c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. REFER TO EOP Supplement

11. d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8"). 18. IF HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow OR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time. PIMP' Train; I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1 B MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A P-66B MO-3007 HPSI Train I to Loop 2A MO-3013 HPSI Train i to Loop 2B --i -... .,Tian2 ; A MO-306 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A MO-3062 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B P-66A t [MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1 A ____.MO-3062 I.HPS1 Train 2 to Loop 28 0 = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point© Cninoul apicalesep

%HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 17 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 19. IE LPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps:

P-67A

P-67B b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B 20. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSI pumps:

P-67A

P-67B b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves: " MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1 A " MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B 0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 18 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure to maintain greater than 100 gpm AFW flow to at least one S/G will result in an automatic start of the next available AFW pump if the pump controls are in Auto. © 21. ENSURE the least affected S/G has corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%. Refer to EOP Supplement

11. NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101 Spray line temperature, TIA-01 03 or TIA-01 04 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays)

Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray) © 22. RECORD each occurrence of PZR Spray operation with a AT (PZR vapor phase temp minus spray temp) greater than 2000F in the Narrative Log.0 = Continuousiv awlicable steD t- Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ¶~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 EO T PROCEDURE Page 19 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 23. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by performing ANY of the following:

a. CONTROL the following:

0 0 S PZR heaters Main Spray Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)23.1. IE the PCS is oversubcooled OR PZR pressure is greater than the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or PCS pressure to within the appropriate limit: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits: b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.S S Main Spray Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)c. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.(continue)(continue) 0 = Continuouslv armlicable steD lrlk= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NoUIPL PROCEDURE Page 20 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23.(continued)(continued)

d. IE ALL of the following conditions are met:

Above actions to lower PCS pressure are NOT effective " PORVs are required to open to reduce PCS pressure

PZR level is less than 85% THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) OPEN PORV Isolation Valves: 6 MO- 1042A MO-1043A CAUTION Rupture of the Quench Tank rupture disk is likely during any sustained opening of PORVs. This would result in rising Containment atmosphere temperature and pressure.

Quench Tank temperature and pressure should be monitored during PORV operation.

2) CYCLE the PORVs as necessary to maintain BOTH of the following: (continue)(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t%/= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ¶~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IULPLJ PROCEDURE Page 21 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23. (continued) (continued) a PZR corrected level less than 85% (REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10)

PZR pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement

1. 3) iF ALL of the following PORV closing criteria are met:

PZR pressure is less than 2100 psia

PZR pressure is less than the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1

PORVs are NOT required open to reduce PZR pressure, THEN CLOSE the PORVs:

PRV-1042B " PRV-1043B

4) if the PORV closing criteria are met ANM either PORV will NOT close, THEN CLOSE associated PORV Isolation Valve: ° MO-1042A " MO-1 043A (continue) (continue) 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aDlcal sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UcR PROCEDURE Page 22 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23.(continued)(continued)

5) ENSURE started the following containment cooling fans: a) ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'A' fans for ALL available Containment Air Coolers.

b) IE SIAS not present, THEN ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'B' fans for ALL available Containment Air Coolers.

6) IF ANY of the following conditions exist: " Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig. " Any operable CONTAINMENT Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following: (continue)(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ¶~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE IPage 23 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23. (continued) (continued) a) VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" (EK-1 126) is alarmed OR MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13:

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS b) VERIFY Containment Isolation.

Refer to EOP Supplement

6. 7) IF the Pressure Control safety function is still in jeopardy, THEN GO TO EOP-9.0.

23.2. IF PCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits: a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. (continue) (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IUL--L, PROCEDURE Page 24 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 23. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1: 0 PZR heaters 0 Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement

37) 0 Letdown c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. 24. PLACE at least one Hydrogen Monitor in operation, ensuring the appropriate Key Switch in the "ACCI" position.

Refer to SOP-38, "Gaseous Process Monitoring System." 0 = Continuousiv armlicable ster)t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sellHodPon PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 25 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 25. JF ANY of the following conditions exist: " Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig " Any operable Containment Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" (EK-1 126) is alarmed.a.1. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbutton on EC-13.* CHRL-CS " CHRR-CS b. VERIFY Containment Isolation.

Refer to EOP Supplement 6.b.1. CLOSE valves that failed to automatically operate.Q = Continuouslv armlicable ster)tý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel= odlon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IC2PLI PROCEDURE

[Page 26 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 26. IE Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY Containment Spray alignment AND at least minimal acceptable spray flow per following table: a.1. OPEN available Containment Spray valves to obtain required configuration and at least minimum flow.OP NUMOER OF I CS, FLOW RUNNING OPMNOS MUST B[ AT P'IPS j VALVES .LEAST: NOT Present' 1 at least 1 2185 gpm total 2 or 3 2 2940 gpm total BAS, Preen 1 1 1525 gpm 2or3 2 3100 gpm total* CV-3001

CV-3002 AND START available Containment Spray pumps

P-54A

P-54B

P-54C I b. ENSURE at least one Containment Air Cooler Accident Fan operating.

0 a 0 0 V-lA V-2A V-3A V-4A C = Continuously aDDlicable steD Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ¶~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1UURLJ PROCEDURE Page 27 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 27. IE Containment pressure rises to greater than or equal to 35 psia AND CCW Containment Isolation Valves were opened, THEN PLACE the following CCW Containment Isolation Valve keyswitches to CLOSE: F 610W S-0Keyswitch 3Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 CAUTION Operation of PCPs should be minimized when seal cooling is NOT present or controlled bleedoff is isolated.28. IF PCP seal cooling is unavailable, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff valves: 6 6 CV-2083 CV-2099 b. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff Relief Stop, OV-21 91. c. RESTORE POP seal cooling.

Refer to ONP-6.2, " M Loss of Component Cooling." 0 = Continuousiv awlicable stev tl,= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 28 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 29.VERIFY the containment sump level is rising as the SIRWT level is lowering.29.1. IF Containment Sump level is NOT rising as SIRWT level lowers, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to ONE of the following:

SOP-2A, "Chemical

& Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System" b. JF "CIS INITIATED" (EK-1126) is clear, THEN MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.30. WHEN SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, THEN prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.0 = Continuousiv armlicable ster)fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical te ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ,uI,,2,AI PROCEDURE Page 29 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Premature initiation of RAS can lead to insufficient Containment Sump inventory for SI Pump operation.

Minimum Containment Water level of 593' 6" is necessary for adequate ESS pump NPSH.I 31. WHEN SIRWT level lowers to below 2%, THEN PERFORM Post-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.0 = Continuouslv applicable step t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sellHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 LI2LAN PROCEDURE Page 30 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 32. iE Charging Pump suction is aligned to the SIRWT AND RAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. STOP ALL Charging Pumps: 0 0 0 P-55A P-55B P-55C b. RACK OUT ALL Charging Pump breakers:

CHARING BREAKER P-55A 52-1205 52-1308 52-1206 P-55C 52-1105 c. PLACE a Caution Tag on their handswitches that reads "Do NOT Use -No suction source available" S 6 S 52-1 205CS 52-1 206CS 52-110O5CS

@ = Continuously applicable step lfý= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1WMULo PROCEDURE Page 3,1 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 33. WHEN Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, AND CHP has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. IF CV-3001, Containment Spray Valve, is open, THEN PLACE HS-3001 A to the OPEN position.

b. 1E CV-3002, Containment Spray Valve, is open, THEN PLACE HS-3002A to the OPEN position.

c. LE MFW or Condensate pumps are operating AND feedwater from these sources is NOT desired, THEN PLACE ALL of the following controllers in MANUAL AND CLOSE: 1) Feedwater Regulating Valves " LIC-0701 ('A' S/G) " LIC-0703 ('B' S/G) 2) Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves

LIC-0735 ('A' S/G)

LIC-0734 ('B' S/G) (continue) 0 = Continuousiv awlicable steD lfý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aIca I lt=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE

[Page 32 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 33.(continued)

d. IF CCW to containment has NOT been restored, THEN PLACE the following CCW valve keyswitches to CLOSE: Valve Keyswltch Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 NOTE: Automatic reinitiation of spray will not occur until after SIAS has been reset. e. RESET CHP circuits by pushing left and right HIGH PRESSURE RESET pushbuttons on C-13 6 0 CHPL -Reset CHPR -Reset S= Continuously applicable stepH lfý= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 LR24AJ PROCEDURE Page 33 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Continued operation of the sprays after pressure has been reduced to an acceptable level increases the possibility of wetting electrical connectors which may result in electrical grounds, shorts and other malfunctions.

34. IE the Containment Spray System is operating, ANM ALL of the following conditions are satisfied:

Parameter Coniditionr Containment less than 3 psig pressure NOT required for CTMT ambient cooling NOT required for HPSI subcooling NOTE: These conditions must be met prior to securing the last Containment Spray pump. Containment NOT needed for iodine removal Spray as determined by Chemistry operation QR ALL of the following: " Containment high range Gamma monitors read less than 1800 R/Hr

Containment isolated per EOP Supplement 6

less than one hour has elapsed since reactor trip (continue) 0 = Continuouslv applicable step t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UCLPLANT PPage 34 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 34. (continued)

THEN Containment Spray Pumps may be secured by performing the following:

NOTE: Securing spray pumps one at a time and waiting a short period to see the effect of reduced sprays will aid in the determination of the need for continued spray. a. tE three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump as directed by the Shift Supervisor.

b. IE two Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following as directed by the Shift Supervisor:

1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve.

CV-3001 " CV-3002 2) STOP one Containment Spray Pump. c. IF one Containment Spray Pump is operating, THEN STOP the Containment Spray Pump as directed by the Shift Supervisor. (continue) 0 = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical se = odIon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ,oc..PL,,, PROCEDURE Page 35 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 34. (continued)

d. WHEN ALL Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves. " CV-3001

CV-3002 e. IE CHP has been reset, THEN ENSURE both Containment Spray Valve CHP Bypass Keyswitches are in NORMAL: " HS-3001C " HS-3002C 35. IE ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr ANM Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET CHR by pushing the following:

The RESET pushbutton on each Containment Area Radiation Monitor.

BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-13.0 = ContinuousIv awlicable ster)16-= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~'= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 M PROCEDURE Page 36 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Subsequent to the actions in Step 36, the TSC must approve closure of ANY of the failed open valves. 36. WHEN Containment water level approaches the level specified below, THEN ENSURE OPEN the following valves ANM OPEN associated breakers:

Li~ii Vlv Levot NUMbe B~kr Description

-J~,MC, Na. MO-3008 52-141 LPSI Loop 1A MO-3010 52-147 LPSI Loop 1 B 595' 9" ,"' ..: .. MCC No., 2 MO-3012 52-247 LPSI Loop 2A MO-3014 52-251 LPSI Loop 2B MCC No 1 MO-3009 52-197 HPSI Train I to Loop 1B MO-3011 52-157 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3007 52-137 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1 A MO-3013 52-151 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2B 596' 4" ____ ... MCCNO--2 MO-3066 52-257 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1 B MO-3064 52-237 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 52-261 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A MO-302 241 HPSI Train 2 to Loo 21B 0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 37 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 37. IE Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist: " SI Pump throttling criteria are met

Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement

27. 38. if ANY of the following criteria are met:

PCS boron concentration is at the required shutdown boron concentration based on sample or hand calculation.

REFER TO EOP Supplement

35. " "CONCENTRATED BORIC ACID TANK LO-LO LEVEL" (EK-0716 and EK-0722) are alarmed.

THEN ALIGN the Charging Pump suction to the VCT (if Letdown is in service) or SIRWT as directed by the Shift Supervisor.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.0 = ContinuousIv applicable step fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aical se t=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 WP PROCEDURE Page 38 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 39. VERIFY the PCS is NOT in a water solid condition as indicated by BOTH of the following:

a. No exaggerated or severe pressure response to PCS inventory or temperature changes.

b. ANY of the following: " Corrected PZR level is less than 100%. REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10 " RVLMS indicates voiding 40. IF it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE ENERGIZED ALL available PZR heaters.

b. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Both S/G pressures can be maintained below the existing PCS pressure

At least one PCP is operating THEN PERFORM ALL of the following to reduce PCS pressure: (continue) 39.1. If water solid PCS condition is indicated, THEN MAINTAIN the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by ANY of the following:

a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to control the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs. b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.0 = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RPIT PROCEDURE Page 39 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 40. (continued)

1) IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow. 2) INITIATE PCS cooldown within Technical Specification limits. 3) MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate using PPC. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. 4) MAINTAIN PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement

1. 5) MAINTAIN 25 0 F subcooling.

c. IE a bubble forms in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head region, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow to maintain PCS level greater than the 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621'8").

2) CONTINUE efforts to draw a bubble in the PZR.@ = Continuouslv armlicable ste[)t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apI Ical te ol on PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT ] Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 TPROCEDURE JPage 40 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: PZR level instrument de-calibration occurs due to PCS pressure and containment temperature changes. Level correction is per EOP Supplements 9 and 10. NOTE: IE the PCS is in a water solid condition for PCS Pressure Control, THEN the PZR level limit of 85% may be exceeded.

NOTE: PZR level should be maintained greater than 36% (40% for degraded Containment) to have continued availability of PZR Heaters.

41. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42% to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following:

a. THROTTLE HPSI flow. b. CONTROL Charging and Letdown. (continue) 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aIcal I e = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 MUC.e..PL,..

PROCEDURE Page 41 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 41.(continued)

1) ENSURE normal charging path aligned as follows: a) OPEN Charging Line Stop Valve, CV-21 11. b) OPEN at least one Charging Stop Valve: NOTE: IF an interruption in boration via Charging Pump to HPSI Train 2 occurs, THEN a different SI cold leg injection nozzle should be used when restoring flow. 1.1) IF the normal charging path is NOT available AND HPSI Train 2 is available, THEN CHARGE to the PCS via the HPSI header by performing ALL of the following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps. 2) CLOSE Charging Line Stop Valve, CV-2111.

3) CLOSE Letdown Orifice Stop Valves:

CV-2003

CV-2004

CV-2005 4) CLOSE Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CV-2009.

5) ENSURE CLOSED HPSI Pump B Discharge to Train 2, CV-3018.S S CV-2113 CV-2115 c) IF BOTH Charging Stop Valves fail to open THEN ENSURE greater than 33 gpm flow through CK-CVC2112.(continue)(continue)

© = Continuously applicable step tý= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ,ucL, PLAIT PROCEDURE Page 42 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 41. (continued) (continued)

6) OPEN ONE HPSI Train 2 Injection Valve:

MO-3062

MO-3064

MO-3066 " MO-3068 7) PLACE SIT Pressure Indicating Controller associated with valve opened above to MANUAL AND CLOSE:

PIC-0338, MO-3062 " PIC-0347, MO-3064 " PIC-0346, MO-3066 " PIC-0342, MO-3068 8) OPEN Charging Pump Discharge to Train 2, MO-3072.

9) START Charging pumps as necessary to control PZR level.0 = Continuousiv awlicable stei)t= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel lod on PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 43 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 42. IE ANY of the following AC or DC buses are NOT energized, THEN RESTORE power to the affected buses. Refer to the following applicable procedure:

.BUS PROCEDURE 1C or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1 E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1 E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" Y01 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01' Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of DC Power" 42.1. 1E Bus 1D and Bus 1E are NOT energized, THEN as resources permit, PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.0 = Continuousiv awlicable ster)fý= Hold Point© =Coninuusl a ical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 Page 44 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 43. IE offsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized: " 'R' Bus * 'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available.

Refer to EOP Supplement

21. b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized: " 'R' Bus " 'F' Bus " Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement

29. (continue) 0 = Continuousiv aDdicable ster)f/ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tptl=Hl on PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 45 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 43.(continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure: -BUS lBE (without SIS) wIt SiS SOP-30 1A or 1B ONP-2.1, *Loss of I~ol AC Power" d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.0 = Continuouslv awlicable steD Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aIcal sI I=HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 46 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 44. WHEN 2400V Bus 1C or Bus 1D is energized, THEN as resources permit, ENERGIZE Plant buses by performing ALL of the following:

44.1. IE equipment needed to maintain Safety Functions is available from a de-energized 2400V Vital Bus AND a power supply is available, THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IE Bus 1iCis energized, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

0 152-115(BuslCto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (BuslC to Transformer

13) (continue) 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD 1ýk= Hold Point© = Continuously aDDlicable steD ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 R1,LEJ PROCEDURE

' Page 47 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 44.(continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate:

MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19)

MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11) b. IF Bus 1 D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1D to Transformers 12 and 20) 2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate:

MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12) (continue) 0 = Continuousiv awlicable steD t/= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a ical sei iHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 EOPs UCEARLAT PROCEDURE Page 48 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 44.(continued)

NOTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2), THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC. c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs: 1) MCC 1 " Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146

Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186 2) MCC 2

Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225

Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285 d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 and D20 are powered by a Battery Charger.

45. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs. Refer to EOP Supplement 3.d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in operation.

Refer to SOP-30, "Station Power." 0 = Continuouslv armlicable ster)lný= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal se = odlon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UCRPIAT PROCEDURE Page 49 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 46. IE ALL PCPs are stopped, 46.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G THEN VERIFY natural circulation feeding and steaming rates. flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following:

Core AT less than 50 0 F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering a Average of Qualified CETs at least 25 0 F subcooled a Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 15 0 F 47. I. ALL PCPs are stopped, AND natural circulation criteria are NOT satisfied, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist:

All available Charging pumps are operating

SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4

At least one S/G is available for removing heat from PCS with level being maintained or restored to between 60% and 70%

Average of Qualified CETs is less than superheated

© = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision RUCIFAPLANT PROCEDURE Page 50 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 48. IF measured Containment hydrogen concentration is between 1 % and 3%, THEN PERFORM ALL the following:

a. CONTACT TSC. b. OPEN MCC 9 Feeder Breaker, 52-1304.

LOCATION:

On Bus 13 I (D = Continuousiv applicable ster)f/ý-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl applicbl sep!HldPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 51 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS© 49. PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement

2. b. VERIFY BOTH of the following:

The calculated cooldown rate does NOT exceed Technical Specification limits.

The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path. 50. EVALUATE the need for a plant cooldown based on ALL of the following:

Technical Specifications require plant cooldown

Plant equipment repair requires plant cooldown " Availability of Auxiliary systems " Available Feedwater reserve inventory " The Shift Supervisor deems plant cooldown is necessary b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be met are NOT available, THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure." 0 = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 EOPLAIT PROCEDURE Page 52 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 51. IE plant cooldown is NOT desired, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following: " MAINTAIN the plant in a stabilized condition. " GO TO an alternate TSC approved procedure.

NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

Refer to EOP Supplement

35. a. IF Emergency boration is in progress ANQ PCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.52.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less than required boron concentration, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE emergency boration is in progress.

b. WHEN required boron concentration is reached, THEN SECURE emergency boration.

Refer to EOP Supplement 40.0 = Continuouslv apolicable ster)fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal tel l od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 APROCEDURE jPage 53 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 53. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist: " PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1

PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows: a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1iB, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment

6. b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE: " HS-0105A (Key: 1) " HS-0105B (Key: 4) c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B

HS-1043B d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1.0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ,u1,2IJT PROCEDURE Page 54 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 2000 F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp -spray temp) of 350°F should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle. NOIE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown.

Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used. NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750 F/hr. 54. COOLDOWN by performing the following:

a. DETERMINE the PCS cooldown rate since event initiation using EOP Supplement

33. (continue)

C = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD fý= Hold Point© Cninoul aicaleseDi=HldPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUCeANT PROCEDURE Page 55 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 54. (continued)

b. WHEN the PCS cooldown rate is within required limits, THEN COMMENCE a cooldown within the required limits using the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 3000 F. c. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one pump in each loop). d. MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement

33. 55. MAXIMIZE PZR spray flow while controlling PCS pressure by using PZR heaters to equalize PCS and PZR boron concentration.

56. IE the PCS is to be opened AND PCS activity is acceptable for flow outside of containment, THEN DEGASIFY the PCS. Refer to SOP-2A, "Chemical And Volume Control System Charging And Letdown; Concentrated Boric Acid." Q = Continuouslv applicable ster)fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical tp lHl on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 56 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 57. IF BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G: " At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags)

A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01:

HS/LPE-50A

('A' S/G)

HS/LPE-50B

('B' S/G) b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0703 ('B' S/G) d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G) 0 CV-0734 ('B' S/G)0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl apical se I od on PALSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUUIPATPROCEDURE

[ Page 5 f6 ______ 57 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 58. IE ALL of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia

SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked * "Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed

A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE ANM HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm: "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1" (EK-1 337) 2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1. (continue)

© = Continuously applicable step f/'J-= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 WMULR2 PROCEDURE Page 58 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 58. (continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK. 1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm: " "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend. " PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow.

Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs -Tc ) or Loop AT (TH -Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates.

Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25 0 F subcooled.

Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel.0 = Continuously applicable step 1ý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl appical te ol on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ucLR2PL,.T PROCEDURE Page 59 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 60. IE PCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist: " PCS pressure reduction is inhibited

PCS heat removal is inhibited " The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.Q = Continuouslv applicable step tý= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step ~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 60 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 61. IE PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 300 psia as read on PI-0104 (NR) or PR-0125 and controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in progress, THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows: a. UNLOCK AMD CLOSE the following breakers:

LBREAKER " OUTLET ,.. ________R VALVE SI 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C 52-2429 MO-3052 T-S2D KEY: Locked Valve Key b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet Valves: WEAKER KEYVE 52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 52-2229 MO-3049 100 52-2429 MO-3052 101 NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs. 61.1. IE ANY SIT could NOT be isolated, THEN VENT the unisolated SIT using ONE of the following:

a. VENT to containment as follows: 1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

CV-1064

CV-1065 2) VENT each unisolated SIT one tank at a time by opening the Vent Valve and closing when tank is vented.SIT VENTVALVE T-82A CV-3067 T-82B CV-3065 T-82C CV-3063 T-82D CV-3051 3) WHEN ALL the following conditions are met: Unisolated SITs are vented and their associated vent valve closed* Plant conditions allow venting containment (continue)(continue)

C = ContinuousIv applicable step tý= Hold Point© = Continuously applicable step t~= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 61 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 61.(continued)(continued)

THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves: 0 0 CV-1064 CV-1 065 b. VENT unisolated SITs via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System." 0 = ContinuousIv applicable steD fý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl alical sel= odlon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUCWIEIAT PROCEDURE Page 62 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 62. IE ALL of the following conditions are met: " Tc is below325°F AND prior to Tcs less than 3000F " Sl Pump throttling criteria are met

HPSI pumps are NOT required for inventory control

A cooldown is in progress, THEN DISABLE BOTH HPSI pumps by removing Control Power fuses and fuse holders from the following breakers:

152-207, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66A LOCATION:

'D' Bus

152-113, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66B LOCATION:

'C' Bus 63. IE SI Pump Throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System," Attachment 4.0 = Continuouslv applicable step f/ý-= Hold Point© Cninoul anical seI IHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1CELAT PROCEDURE Page 63 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 64. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met: PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment.

Containment Greater Than or LessThan Equal To 175.F :OGreater Less Than Than or Equal 3 psig at all To 3. pslg at any times during time during the Pa, meter the event event PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement 1 PZR Level Greater Than Greater than (corrected) 36% and 40% and controlled controlled Avg of Qualified Greater Than REFER TO EOP CETs 25'F Supplement 1 Subcooling ,vg of Qualified Less Than REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop Supplement 1 temperature TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment.

Containment Spray Pumps are not in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function.

Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01 (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step tý= Hold Point© Cninoul apical seI IHodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 E~~~~p EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 64 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INTR~UCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 64.(continued)

OR Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established per ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling." " LTOP is operable.

Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

0 0 MO-3015 (MCC-1) MO-3016 (MCC-2)Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation, THEN GO TO GOP-9, "Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby/Shutdown" or TSC approved procedure.

End of Section 4.0© = Continuously applicable step t,= Hold Point PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 __________PROCEDURE___Page 65 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 4. Verify SIAS initiated 5 5. Ensure adequate SI flow and safeguards 6 equipment status 6. Ensure MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves are 7 closed 7. If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia 7 then establish one PCP per loop or if PCS subcooling is less than 25 0 F subcooled, then trip all PCPs 8. Determine required margin boron concentration 8 9. Ensure proper PCP configuration as PCS 8 temperature lowers 10. Verify operating limits for any running PCP 8 11. Verify condenser cooling or isolate steam to 9 condenser

12. Ensure at least one train of CR HVAC in 10 Emergency Mode. 13. Determine the most affected S/G 10 © 14. Isolate the most affected steam generator 11 15. Verify the correct S/G is isolated 12 16. Stabilize PCS temperature 13 © 17. Verify SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied 15 © 18. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump 16 throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps 0 = ContinuousIv applicable ster)tý= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl a lical seI Iod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NCo L PROCEDURE Page 66 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: STE INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 19. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 17 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves 20. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 17 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves 21. Ensure the least affected S/G has level being 18 © maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70% 22. Record each occurrence of PZR spray with AT 18 © greater than 200 0 F 23. Maintain PCS pressure within the limits of EOP 19 © Supplement 1 24. Place Hydrogen Monitor in service 24 25. If the Containment has pressure greater than or 25 equal to 4.0 psig or has high radiation, ensure Containment Isolation signal initiated

26. If the Containment pressure is greater than or 26 equal to 4.0 psig, verify available Containment Spray Pumps running 27. If Containment pressure rises to greater than or 27 equal to 35 psia, then close the CCW containment isolation valves 28. If PCP seal cooling is lost, isolate seal leakoff 27 and restore PCP seal cooling 29. Verify Containment Sump level rises as the 28 © SIRWT level drops Q = ContinuousIv awlicable steD t= Hold Point© Cninoul aplcal se! !HodPon PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 67 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 30. When SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, 28 then prior to RAS, perform Pre-RAS Actions.

31. When SIRWT level lowers to below 2%, then 29 perform Post-RAS Actions.

32. If Charging Pump suction is aligned to the 30 SIRWT and RAS has initiated then, disable the Charging Pumps and add caution tag 33. When Containment pressure is less than 31 3.0 psig and CHP has initiated, align components and reset CHP 34. If Containment Spray System is operating and 33 conditions are satisfied, secure Containment Spray 35. If Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate 35 less than 1 x 101 R/hr and Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, reset CHR 36. When Containment water level approaches SI 36 valve elevations, open and disable SI valves 37. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 37 restore Letdown 38. If requirements are met, then establish charging 37 pump suction from the VCT or SIRWT 39. Verify the PCS is not in a water solid condition 38 © 40. If it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, 38 perform the actions to draw a bubble in the PZR 0 = Continuously applicable step tý= Hold Point© Cninoul apical se = od on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 68 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 41. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, then 40 maintain PZR level between 20% and 85% (42% to 57% preferred)

42. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 43 restore power to affected buses 43. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 44 power to plant equipment

44. When 2400V Bus 1 C or 1 D is energized, then 46 energize Plant buses 45. If desired, restart PCPs 48 46. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 49 loop 47. Verify two phase natural circulation 49 48. If Containment hydrogen concentration is 50 between 1% and 3%, notify TSC and open MCC-9 feeder breaker 49. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 51 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path 50. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown 51 51. Determine alternatives if plant cooldown is not 52 desired 52. Verify PCS boron concentration greater than or 52 © equal to required boron concentration.

53. When PZR Pressure and PCS Cooldown rate 53 within required limits, place LTOP in service.1 0 = ContinuousIv armlicable ster)t-= Hold Point© =Cotiuosl aplcal sel lod on PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUcLEAR PAN, PROCEDURE Page 69 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE 54. Commence a PCS cooldown 54 55. Maximize PZR spray flow while controlling PCS 55 pressure by using PZR heaters to equalize PCS and PZR boron concentration

56. If the PCS will be opened and PCS activity 55 allows, then lineup for PCS degasification

57. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 56 550 psia, block MSIS 58. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 57 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS 59. Monitor PCS for void formation 58 © 60. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 59 elimination

61. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 60 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs 62. Disable both HPSI pumps when listed 62 conditions are met 63. Reset SIAS 62 64. When all shutdown cooling system entry 63 conditions are met, exit this procedure End of Section 5.0 ATTACHMENT 5 EOP SUPPLEMENT 1, "PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMIT CURVES" 5 Pages Follow TT Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves UDDer Portion 2500 tI 2250 2000 1750 1500 200 0 F Subcooling Curve (Use lowest operable temperature)

Supercedes VLTOP curve if PCS has experienced an uncontrolled cooldown which causes PCS temperature to go below 500°F or/ * : Use lowest operable T e xcee :. .....A 2/f ~ -r (7/;I .,j ,

i ....i ....i * ..17..........

I .........'iv>, Klt-. .............CL 7/*9. *.1*'* /- .-(0 -.....--S;;.;.-1250 C) 1000 750-, --...........-.-.-

.-.-. .4 .-.. .- -... ....-I M m -U (D 0 Co 0 0 M) M rn M r> C, 0 -0 m z >)CI) 0 rn >o z

.4--.f ; 2:if-i.J4,<r-.1~E I -I -I -I -I-I -- I -I -, Z~., ...............*Curves based on highest =available temperature 7 .. reading in PCS including Avg. Qualified CETs ..............................................,n -.-,- -,-. -I -I 250 0-I------~0~~* --;--r>25'F Subcoln 25-----------------------------o-:

'a 0 5.... j ~ &. ~ ~--' I.............-.-'-

-Pressure ... .N um Pressure for PCP Operation Use highest operable Tc NON Operating Region *,j**J*~*j*~*j***j***j*J***j****j***j***j***j I. S Aii ~ i i i i ~ i i i i j1 *4-J Co r P.'iII I111'II1 I'II IIII-5 M It z 0 m 0 Co C V 300 325 350 375 400 Temperature (OF)425 450 475 500 525 550 575 600 625 650 Note: Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment condition is or has exceeded 175°F or 3 psig.0 CA (AlI..

I -I Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves Lower Portion go Z MI P Fn ca M 800 700 600 500 p I Ss a .......... ....:. ..: ..... *.... .... ..... ...... .. ...... .... -..................... .IN on O perating Regi n .....................

Minimum temperature with the reactor vessel head tensioned is 75 OF .........................

.............

.. ..... ....... ......... .... .. .... ... ....... ....,,.. .... ... .... ...I ...... ....... ...... ... ........................

...................

..................................

... .................

L ".... .:..... * ... ...... .... i..... ..... .... ... ....... .. ! ..... i .... -..... ...... .....i ..... i ..... i .... .. ... i ..... i .... ..... i... ..... .................!... . .............. /.....-....

Curves based on highest ...:. .... .available temperature

... reading in PCS including Avg. Qualified CETs I...........

.........

... ..............

... .. .. .. ... .. .... ... ....... ..... ...........

... .. .. ...... *...... .....*..... .........

% {..........

................

...........

..............................

..... ... z ... : ... : .... :...... ........ ;....... ...... .............

V: ............

00 Ma..........

.............

...I....IV L T O P .-................

X ..........

i I............

I ..... ............

.............

I ...........

a ,.,400 300 CL 200 100 0..........

..........

....................

L ...........

........................

..... ... ..................

.... ................

..... ..... .........

...............

.........................

: ; ý. ý '. :'ý` * ' * ' *:* ' ' * ' '.' * ' ' * : ... * '.' * ' * ' " ***: ..... 7..........

I ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... I ..... .... ..... ...... I I ..... ..... .................

.... ..........

..........

......................

..... ..... .. ........... ....... , ..... .......... ........ ..............

...........

..... ....... ........ ..... ..... ............

..... ..... ....... ...... .......... ....... ..... ..... .... ...... ..........

..... ..... ..... ................

................

... ..... ...........

..... ...........

..........

.............

!-;6 ----------............

.......................

7, ...........

Minimum Pressure for PCP Operation

...... ............

rang ...... Curve based on use of PI-0104 narrow OF Subcool+/-ing Use highest operable Tc .........

.... ...........

... ..........

I ..... ..... .......................

..... ...........

...........

..... ..... ........................

................

..... ..................

.... ..................

.................

.............

.... ...... ..................

..... ..... ..................

........ ...... Saturation Curve ...........

..... ...... t ...... .....M W U) r 0 (D V)0 0 M M M M M In z 0 0 OUI M z 0 M Cn z a 0 r M z 4 Vl to M CD CA C CD M z 0 M 0 10 U) C 10 V CD 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Note- Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment Temperature (OF) is or has exceeded 1750F or 3 psig.0 ft i _.C1 Y-Y Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves Shutdown Cooling Curve 600 500 400 CL (0 10. a)3 0 0 &.200 100 0.... ..... INon Operating R.gi.n 1 1 .... Minimum temperature with the reactor vessel head tensioned is 7 5 .....7............

..... ..... ............

............

.................

...............

I -I 9 I.-* Curves based on highest available temperature

..... ...... reading in PCS including

..... ..... ... Avg. Qualified CETs .......VLTOP.............................

.............................

.................

...........

...........................

-.6-. 4. 9....... ......"....... ... .... .............

"............

.Shutdown Cooling PORV Tr ... -.-..-".......

...... ............................... .. .. .. .. .. ........... ..... ...Lutdown Cooling Non Overatint Reaion CD rI 0o cc 0 0) rn M M z 0) 0 Mn -I M I"I m Co z 0 r" M-.. .... ...................._. ... .......... .. .._ ...._ _ ._..._.. ......... ........ : ..__ ***. ..._ .. ._....... ...... ..._.. .._. ., ......._ .. .... ... . -.. ..i .. ..i- -..:. .... ........ ........ .... .... ... ... ..... ..... ..... .. ..............

_. : .. ..M inim um Pressure for PCP Operation

.. : ..........C... ...... Curve based on use of PI-0104 narrow range .-: ................

... .. ... .. .... .U se highest operable T, ..: ............

..-....... ......Saturation.C.ve....

2 F ¶0 Co 0 CD (h 0 CO) CD 10 MI 0 M 0 M (D 50 100 150 200 250 300 Temperature (OF)Note: Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment condition is or has exceeded 175 0 F or3 psig.Cn 01 -&-S I -I -d --

I I Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves Degraded Containment Conditions

_ 2500 2500 ......:N n O. R..........

... ....... ...............

.. .. ... ...... .2Non Operating Reg .... Note 1:This curve applies whenever Containment

... .. .........:.. ........ .... ..... I.... M ~ has exceeded 75*For3psig.

4 , ........ ...........

..... ....... .. __ + ..'..... U Note 2:Add Containment pressure (pr og) toi... ....... ........:... .. .... .M M indicated pressure to correct to psia. ) M.K '. . C 1500 Note 3:VLTOP curve is more restrictive than M : Z C' calculated VLTOP setpoint.

Use lowest .... ....It... ........ ........ ... ...... operable T.......I.....................

/ .: ,. MO I ... ...... .-..-- ...... ' .-.-- .--......

-"' ' ................

...... I........

.. .... ....... .: " " ......... ... .""-"' ...........

21000 ~1~~ VLTOP .... > Minimum Pressure for mote 3 (Note 3) .. .. :...... 1 0 0 ...: : : : : : :..i ...i ....... ...........

.. .. ... .. P{rimary Coolant Pump V -SaturationCurve

-.... ... ... -...... :) [ .. .... .." .......' ..... ... ... .........

... ...... ..500..........

....... ...o... .... , .. .. . ..... ... .-.. ... ........... ..i "..' : :. . , .:=~ ~..... .:...i...t.....*......

... ..... .....= = ..... ,. -.-.... I ..-., ":.. ... .............

... ...........

F ,: : .....a....... : :n : : ! !(D 0 0 01 -p (10 1 n'I 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650

Curves based on the highest available temperature Tem perature (OF) reading in PCS including Avg. Qualified CETs Shutdown Cooling Entry Window For Degraded Containment Conditions 225 200 175 * -i u150 0-125 100 75 Note 1 This curve applies whenever Containment.............

has exceeded 175 *F or 3 psig. ...............

NON OPERATING REGION Note 2:Add Containment pressure (psig) to Maximum allowed Shutdown Cooling inlet pressure indicated pressure to correct to psia. [_ ______"_" _; "_;___'_._._

......_ ..... .-..... .-I ................ ....... ........... ...................... ... : ....,. .......;. ......

.... ..... ., ........ -................

........ ....i. ..I -........

.. ....... .. ... .. .. ..... . ............... ...i .......... ...i........

i........

...........

... .... ........

i ...............

mm " * ........ ........ i .... .........

...: .... .; ; :;.. ...... ".. ....." ................".. ..... ....!.. ......... .......I" ........ -. ..... ... ...I .u..oo....

...-. ..... ............

.... ...... C o l n T e m p e r a tu e -i ' : , ........e.O.4.n...

.. S " .. E.....R.......

.................

............

...........

..... i -" " l*m inimum Subcoohng...........

,.-... ....... .... ..... ....... i. ~ .............

--". ...... :. ..... .:.......

.........

.. ... ." ............ .............

i _ : : : : : : : Maximum Shutdown .. .. [.. -. .- ....: ... .... ... .. ... .... .. ... .C ooling Tem perature ..... i l Note: UsePI.0104 (narrow;range)

ORPR-O125

.... ............

.. ."-- ii ..........

... ............... ..... ...... ...... .............

E G O []ii[]]l~]ii]]i]].l~ii~ii~il]]~l]i~]ililil]iNE ON OPERATING R ..INIi .. ....... .... .. ... .. ... .........,, , I 00 IN 0 -I CD 0 m C m z 0 0 00 UI) z C I rn M0 0) 0 CD Cn C. V 0 C) z 0 m 0 o Co) 0 0.200 225 250 275 300

Curves based on the highest available Temperature (OF) temperature reading in PCS including Avg. Qualified CETs all --I I I 1 .. .-6

ML062650255

Text

References:

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