ML14073A155

James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident

ML14073A155
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	04/01/2014
From:	Pickett D V Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Entergy Nuclear Operations
Pickett D V
References
TAC MF0125
Download: ML14073A155 (12)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 1, 2014 Vice President, Operations Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant P. 0. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT-STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION

2.3 RELATED

TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0125)

Dear:

Sir or Madam: On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.

By letter dated November 27, 2012, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. By letter dated December 2, 2013, Entergy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments.

The NRC staff acknowledges that the deferred walkdowns of the inaccessible Seismic Walkdown Equipment List items will be completed during the next refueling outage in September of 2014 and an updated submittal report incorporating the results of the deferred walkdowns will be provided within 90 days, consistent with the regulatory commitment.

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1364 or by e-mail at Douglas. Pickett@nrc.gov.

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosure:

Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Sincerely, Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION

2.3 RELATED

TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2012, 1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC. The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following:

a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process. c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them. d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.

f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review. 1 ADAMS Accession No. ML 12053A340.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML 12056A049 Enclosure In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012, 3 the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted Electric Power Research Institute document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," (walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement.

By letter dated May 31, 2012, 4 the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.

By letter dated November 27, 2012, 5 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF). The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the staff in completing its review. By letter dated November 1, 2013 6 , the staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys.

The licensee responded to the staff request by letter dated December 2, 2013.7 The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;" and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.

For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an SSC of a facility must perform, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design. The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.

3 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML 121640872.

4 ADAMS Accession No. ML 12145A529 5 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML 123420188 6 ADAMS Accession No. ML 133048418 7 ADAMS Accession No. ML 13337A450 The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license. 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Seismic

Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for JAF in Section 2.0 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes, standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

The staff reviewed Section 2.0 of the walkdown report, focusing on the summary of the SSE and the design codes used in the design. Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the previously referenced NEI walkdown guidance.

3.2 Seismic

Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations (LBEs), of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic walkdown methodology.

By letter dated July 9, 2012, 8 the licensee confirmed that it would utilize the walkdown guidance in the performance of the seismic walkdowns at JAF.

• The walkdown report dated November 27, 2012 did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance.

The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report:

• Personnel Qualifications

• Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)

• Implementation of the Walkdown Process

• Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 6 ADAMS Accession No. ML 12192A515 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 4.0, and Tables 4-1 and 4-2 of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications.

Specifically, the staff reviewed the summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the following personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities:

equipment selection personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team, and operations staff. Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate seismic background, knowledge and experience, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.

3.2.2 Development

of the SWELs Section 3, Selection of SSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed in the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.

The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the JAF base lists, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool related equipment).

The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance.

Based on Appendix B of the walkdown report, JAF SWEL 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance.

Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection:

• A variety of systems, equipment and environments

• IPEEE equipment

• Major new or replacement equipment

• Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate DC power using inverters and therefore do not have motor generators) or the equipment is being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance).

Based on the information provided, the NRC staff noted that a detailed explanation was provided justifying cases where specific classes of equipment were not included as part of the SWEL, and concludes that these exclusions are acceptable. The NRC staff noted that no rapid drain-down items were included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance.

In Section 6.2.2 of the walkdown report, the licensee stated that there are no penetrations below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Therefore, no items were identified that could rapidly drain-down the SFP. After reviewing the information provided in this section, the staff concludes that the licensee provided adequate justification for not including rapid drain-down items as part of the SWEL2. After reviewing SWELs 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance.

In addition, the NRC staff notes that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as described in the walkdown guidance.

3.2.3 Implementation

of the Walkdown Process Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site. The NRC staff reviewed Section 7.0 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by.

The walkdown report states that four Seismic Review teams (SRTs), each of which included two qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

According to the seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walk-by checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted over a span of about 6 weeks, starting in mid-September, 2012. The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations with a questioning attitude, and documented the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys on appropriate checklists.

Attachments C and D of the walkdown report provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on SWELs 1 and 2 and each area containing SWEL equipment.

The checklists were signed by both SWEs. The licensee used the checklists provided in Appendix C of the walkdown guidance report without modification.

The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation.

Attachment E of the walkdown report lists the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys.

The attachment describe how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP), its resolution and current status. Based on the initial review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all of the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in the walkdown report. By letter dated November 1, 2013, the staff issued two questions in a request for additional information (RAI) in order to obtain clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys.

Specifically, in RAI 1 the staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation was determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee indicated that the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in accordance with the walkdown guidance document.

The licensee confirmed that the SWEs actively discussed their observations and agreed on the PASCs. The SWEs used engineering judgment, based on their experience and training, to identify conditions that could be PASCs. Also, in response to RAI 1, the licensee clarified that unusual conditions that were not seismically significant were also reported to site personnel for further resolution through the CAP. These conditions, in some cases, were related to housekeeping procedures.

Each PASC was addressed either with an LBE to determine whether it required entry into the CAP, or by entering it into the CAP directly.

The licensee further stated that the decision to conduct an LBE or enter the condition directly into the CAP was made on a case-by-case basis, based on the perceived efficiency of each process for eventual resolution of each specific condition.

After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing Attachment E of the walkdown report, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1, PASCs were properly identified and documented, and summary Attachment E is considered complete.

In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50 percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance.

Section 7.1 of the walkdown report states that cabinets were opened to ensure that visibly accessible internal components mountings are adequate.

Based on a detailed review of SWCs and AWCs the NRC staff confirmed that cabinets were opened by the seismic walkdown team. Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.

3.2.4 Licensing

Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations (LBEs), of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of LBEs for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance.

The NRC staff reviewed Section 8.0 of the JAF Walkdown Report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

The licensee stated that each PASC is addressed either with an LBE to determine whether it requires entry into the CAP, or by entering it into the CAP directly.

Attachment E of the walkdown report lists the key licensee findings, and provides a complete list of the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

This attachment also describes the actions taken or planned to address these conditions, including the current status of each of the items entered into the CAP. The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken or planned to address potential deficiencies.

The staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. 3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations.

3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns.

Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:

• Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs

• Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys

• Review the licensing basis evaluations

• Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP

• Review the walkdown report

• Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 9.0 of the JAF Walkdown Report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities.

Specifically, the staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity.

In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 9.0 and Attachments G and I of the walkdown report. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's description of each of these activities in the walkdown report and RAI response, which included a discussion of the peer review team members' qualifications and level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments.

After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report. Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance. 3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and GL 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," licensees previously performed a systematic examination to identify plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.

The licensee discussed the IPEEE evaluation of JAF in Section 5.0 of the walkdown report. The seismic vulnerabilities identified in the JAF IPEEE program are listed in IPEEE Vulnerabilities Table in Attachment A of the walkdown report. The table includes a description of the action taken to reduce or eliminate the seismic vulnerability, resolution completion date, and status of configuration management program. Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 5.0 of the walkdown report, the staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance.

3.5 Planned

Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report. 3.6 NRC Oversight

3.6.1 Independent

Verification by Resident Inspectors On July 6, 2012, 9 the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation

2.3 Seismic

Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that the JAF licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance.

Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features.

The inspection report dated February 7, 2013, 10 documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were identified.

4.0 INACCESSIBLE

ITEMS The equipment and areas that were inaccessible during the 180-day period are listed in the table in Section 6.3 of the walkdown report. The list of inaccessible items also includes the condition which caused the delay of the walkdown.

A limited number of SWEL components (total of twenty-three) were inaccessible at the time of the initial walkdowns.

The licensee committed to complete the walkdowns for all of the remaining inaccessible items during Refueling Outage 21 (RFO 21), which is scheduled in September 2014. The licensee committed to provide an updated submittal with the results of these walkdown 90 days after the end of RFO 21. 9 ADAMS Accession No. ML 12156A052 10 ADAMS Accession No. ML 13038A174 The staff concludes that the inaccessible equipment list was developed consistent with the walkdown guidance.

The schedule for completion is consistent with the time to the next scheduled outage.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.

The staff concludes that, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, the licensee verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed seismic conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features.

Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified.

The staff acknowledges that a supplemental letter will be provided 90 days after the end of RFO 21, which is scheduled for September 2014, addressing the remaining inaccessible items, consistent with the regulatory commitment.

The staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1364 or by e-mail at Doug las. Pickett@nrc.

gov. Docket No. 50-333

Enclosure:

Sincerely, IRA/ Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

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