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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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gccp~~TZD ISI'RIBU'IION DEMO?~'?ION SYFI'EM REGULATORY INFORMATXON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8910110146 DOC.DATE: 89/09/28 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET I FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHRIVER,T.D.,Arizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE,J.M.
Arizona Public'ervice Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 89-005-01:on 890628,plant vent low range effluent monitor alarm not properly investigated.
W/8.DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), ncident Rpt, etc.NOTES:Standardized plant.I.I DI Si I 05000530 A.: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA DAVIS,M.INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB SD NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10/DREE/PB 10 REG'ILE 02 G FILE 01 EXTERNAL: 'G&G WILLIAMS, S LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES COPXES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1"'1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DS P NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H'NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1~1 1'1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D'.D, R.D I NOZE TO ALL'KIDS" RB CFENIS: PZZASE HEXP US XQ REMCB%RITE!CXHZKCZ,'QK DXUMERl'GPZRDL DESK, RXM P1-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELBGNRI KXHt MME PKN DISTBIBQTXQN ZiZSTS XQR DOCUMENTS YOU!XHiT NEED!D I S i FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 40 ENCL'40 4i i>g,'l ji J(1 1 I' Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P O.8OX 52034~PHOENIX.ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00529-JML/TDS/DAJ September 28, 1989 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 3 Docket No.STN 50-530 (License NPF-41)Licensee Event Report 89-005-01 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Licensee Event Report (LER)No.89-005-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to the requirements of.10CFR 50.73.In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of this report to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.If you have any questions, please contact T'.'0: Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602)393-2521.Very truly yours, JGH/TOS/DAJ/kj Attachment
.H.Levine'ice President Nuclear Production CC: W.F.Conway E.E.Van Brunt, Jr.J.B.Hartin T,.J.Polich H'.J.Davis A.C.Gehr INPO Records Center (all w/a)89i0iioi46 8905'28 PDR ADOCK 05000530 PDC f)II gl I)
NRC FORM 355 P9)US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)APPROVEO OMB NO.31504))04 EXPIRES: 4I30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTt 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F530), V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13(504104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAMK (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA TITLE (4l Palo Verde Uni t 3 o 5 o o o 53 p>oF06 Plant Vent Low Range Effluent Monitor Alarm Not Properly Investigated AFPORT DATE (7)LER NUMBER (Sl KVENT DATE ISI OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR stQUNNTIAL:%>i, ttsvtsKnt NVMSEII (kC NVMSEA MONTH OAY YEAR N/A FACILITY NAMES DOCKFT NUMBER(s)0 5 0 0 0 0 6 2 89 89 0 0 5 0 1 0 9 2 8 8 9 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPKRATHIG MODE IS)POWER LEVEL p p p:,...',....L',;.a:I 20A02(b)20AOS(el(1)(B 20AOS(el(1)(NI 20.405(al(1)(Ni)20AOS(e I (I)I Iel 20AOS(a)(1)(e)20.405(cl SOW Ic)II I SOM(c)(2)50.73(e)l2)(I)50.73(e)l2)IN)50.73 le)(2)I Ni)LICENSEE CONTACT FOA THIS LER (12I 50.734)(2)(It)50.734 I (2)(e)50.73(a l(2)(rNI 50.734)l2)(rNII(A) 50.73(el(2)(riN)IS)S0.73(el(2)li)
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE RLDUIAEMKNTB oF 10 cFR (I: IciNck one ot mort of tnr folfornndl (11)73.71(N)73.7)(c)OTHER ISprcify in Apttrect Oriow rmf In Trit, HRC Form 3EEAI NAME Timothy D.Shriver, Compliance Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA COOS 60 23 93-2 52 1 COMPLFTK ONK LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TUAER EPOATABLE:
TO NPADS SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVREA EPOATABLE TO NPADS N>p!...n.~.SVPPLKMKNTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YKS Iif yrt.compirtr EXPECTED SVSMISSIOH OATEI X NO AssTRAcT ILimit to Icdd tpacrt, I r., rpptoelmetrly fifteen tfnrirrprcr typrwrtttrn Iinrtf 0 sl EXPECTFD SUBMISSION DATE D5)MONTH DAY YEAA At approximately 1115 MST on June 28, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in a refueling outage with the core off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool when a Unit 3 Technician discovered that the sample flow rate for the Plant Vent Low Range Radioactive Effluent Monitor (RU-143)was below the low flow alarm setpoint rendering the monitor inoperable.
Investigation determined that the low flow alarm had occurred at approximately 0531 MST on June 28, 1989;however, the alarm was not properly investigated.
This resulted in not meeting ACTION requirements 36 and 40 of Technical Specification (T.S.)3.3.3.8.The cause of the low flow condition on RU-143 was a loose set screw on the coupling between the monitor's sample pump and its drive motor.The cause of the improper follow-up action for the low flow alarm was inadequate communication between control room personnel and personnel responsible for investigating the cause of-th(;alarm condition.
As corrective action, the Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program was implemented by 1150 MST on June 28, 1989, fulfilling T.S.3.3.3.8 ACTION requirements.
The loose set screw was tightened and RU-143 was returned to service at approximately 1558 MST on June 24, 1989.A previous similar event was reported in Unit 1 LER 528/85-067.
NRC Form 355 (559)
I!!1 I NRC FOAM 3SSA (5 SS)ILS.NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO.3I50010i EXPI RESI 8/30/02 ESTIMATED SURDEN PER AESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION AEQUESTI 503)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT SRANCH IP430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150410i).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (l)DOCKET NUMSER (2)LER NUMBER (5)PAGE (3I Palo Verde Unit 3 TECT///more spece/8 rrrFr/rer/
eee eAN/Oone///RC
%%dmr 35SA'8/(lt)o 6 o o o 53 089 SEQUENTIAL NUMSSII 0 05 jan@IISVISION NUMSSII-0 1 0 2 OF 0 6 I.DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED: A.Initial Conditions:
B.At approximately 0631 HST on June 28, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in a refueling outage with the core (AC)off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool (ND).Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification:
Condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
At approximately 1115 HST on June 28, 1989, during the performance of Radiation Monitoring System (IL)daily surveillance testing, a Unit 3 Chemistry Technician (utility, non-licensed) discovered that the indicated sample flow rate for the Plant Vent Low Range Radioactive Effluent Monitor (RU-143)(VL)(RI)(IL).
was below the alarm setpoint.Investigation determined that a low flow alarm had occurred at approximately 0531.HST on June 28, 1989 and acknowledged in the Control Room;however, the alarm was not properly investigated.
Since an actual low flow condition existed, the monitor had been inoperable since approximatey 0531 HST and ACTION requirements 36 and 40 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 were not met within the allowable interval.With RU-143 inoperable, Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 ACTIONS 36 and 40 require that effluent releases via the Plant Vent may continue provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per four (4)hours and auxiliary sampling equipment is installed within one hour after the monitor is declared inoperable (i.e., implement Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program).Prior to event discovery, at approximately 0530 MST on June 28, 1989, Unit 3 Operations personnel (utility, licensed and non-licensed) were in the process of preparing for a planned maintenance outage on the Train RAH Class lE electrical power system (EB).During the process, several alarms were received as components were de-energized.
At approximately the same time (0531 HST, per computer logs)the low flow alarm for RU-143 occurred.Control Room personnel (utility, licensed)acknowledged the low flow alarm and contacted Radiation Protection personnel (utility, non-licensed) per procedural requirements.
No further followup action was taken.Pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 ACTIONS 36, 37, and 40, the Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program should have been implemented by 0631 MST on June 28, 1989.NRC Fomr 3SSA (SSS) lJ 0 II J NRC FORM 35BA (SBB)(LS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO 3(500104 EXPIRES: O)30/02 ESTIMATED BURDEN PFR RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION-COLLECTION REQUEST(500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO)ECT (31504(OO).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON.
DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (5)YEAR Iso sEGUSNTIAL
?%<NUMSSR REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)Palo Verde Unit 3 TEXT IJF more<<>>ce 1s)rrr)rNf.
1>>o adWabnal NRC Form 355ABI (17)o s o o o 53 089-0 05 0 1 03o"0 6 C.At approximately 1115 HST on June 28, 1989, Unit 3 Chemistry personnel were performing daily Radiation Monitoring System surveillance testing and noted the low flow condition for RU-143.Control Room personnel were contacted and the applicable ACTION requirements of Specification 3.3.3.8 were implemented by approximately 1150 HST on June 28, 1989 in accordance with the Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program.Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event: Except as described in Section I.B, no other structures, systems or components were inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to the event.0.E.Cause of each component or system failure, if known: Not'pplicable
-no component or system failures were involved.Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known: F.G.Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.for failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected: Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service: H.Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.However, the Plant Vent Low Range Radioactive Effluent Monitor (RU-143)became inoperable at approximately 0531 HST on June 28, 1989, due to the low flow conditions.
Following appropriate repairs, RU-143 was returned to service at approximately 1558 NST on June 29, 1989.RU-143 was inoperable for approximately'4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 27.minutes;Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error: There were no component or system failures.The procedural errors discussed in Section I.I were discovered during the post event investigation conducted in accordance, with the PVNGS Incident Investigation, Process.NRC Form 355A (BBO) 0 ,f)
~~NRC FORM SSSA (559)ILL NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROV ED 0 M 5 NO.31500104 EXPIRES: S/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A)HAS.FORWARD COMMENTS AEGARDINC BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPOATS MANACEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWOAK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET,WASHINGTON, OC 20503.fACILITY NAME ('I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (Sl'Qw.SEQUENTIAL
'NVMSSR REVISION NVMSSR PACE 13)Palo Verde Unit 3 TEXT//l'IIXPP SPSCP/S neireC VSP 5/S/PRs/I/RC FORR 35//AS/(17)Cause of Event: o s o o o 53 08 9 005 01 04 o"0 6 The cause of the low flow on the Plant Vent Low Range Monitor (RU-143)was a loose set screw on the coupl:ing between the monitor's air sample pump (P)and its drive motor (HO).The loose set screw resulted in a loose coupling and the motor would not adequately turn the sample pump.The cause of the inadequate followup for the RU-143 low flow alarm was that the appropriate on-shift personnel (utility, non-licensed) responsible for investigating problems occurring with the gaseous effluent monitors were not contacted by control room personnel (utility, licensed)and instructed to investigate the cause of the alarm.Responsibility for investigating Radiation Honitoring System (RHS)(IL)problems is shared by unit Chemistry and Radiation Protection (RP)Departments, depending upon the type of monitor involved.Chemistry is responsible for the operation of gaseous effluent radiation monitors which includes RU-143.In response to the alarm on RU-143, which occurred in the control room, control room personnel contacted an individual in the RP area.However, this individual was"n'of responsible"for effluent monitors,;
therefore, proper investigation of the alarm condition was not performed.
Also contributing to this event, PVNGS alarm response procedures for RHS alarms provide instruction that control room personnel are to contact RP for all RHS alarms.Therefore, the procedures utilized by control room personnel in response to the RU-143 alarm were incorrect in that.instruction should'ave been provided to contact Chemistry effluents personnel.
There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to this event.K.Safety System Response: There were no automatic or manual safety system responses and none were necessary.
Failed Component Information:
Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.II.ASSESSHENT OF THE SAFETY CONSE(UENCES AND IHPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT: Plant Vent gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor for radioactive materials released during normal plant operations or NRC form SSSA (559)
Il NRC FORMSSSA 1889)ILL NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO.31504104 E xpIR Es: SI30/92 ESTIMATEO'BUROEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS.FORWARO COMMENTS REGAROING BUROEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOROS ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP830), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REOUCTION PROJECT I3150010S).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUOGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME Il)Palo Verde Unit 3 TEXT (Il more TJNoe ls rerFdred.u Je edrddorNJ FVRC Form 35SABI 117)COCKET NUMBER I2)o s o o o 5 30 89 LER NUMBER (51 vip SEQUENTIAL NVMSSR 0 0 5 REVISION NVMSSR-01 PAGE (3)0 5 QF 0 6 postulated accident conditions.
There are two separate radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring channels for the Plant Vent: the low range effluent monitor (RU-143)for normal plant radioactive gaseous effluents and the high range effluent monitor (RU-144)for post-accident plant radioactive gaseous effluents.
The low range monitor continuously operates until the concentration of radioactivity in the effluent is above a pre-determined setpoint.At this setpoint, sample flow is re-directed to the high range monitor and the low range monitor is secured.The Plant Vent low and high range monitors measure particulate and gaseous gross beta activity as well as volatile I-131.The particulate beta channel uses a beta scintillator to count deposited activity on a fixed filter paper.A second beta scintillator counts the filtered gas for gaseous beta activity.The I-131 channel uses a single channel analyzer to discriminate and count volatile I-131 decay photon-.generated electrical pulses.The monitors sample isokinetically per ANSI 13.1-1969.This is, done through receiving either a manual or automatic input of Plant Vent flow rate to a microcomputer (CPU)which in turn sets the correct radiation monitor sample flow rate.With the incorrect sample flow rate described'n Sect%on I.8, the Plant Vent effluent was not being sampled isokinetically by the low range monitor (RU-143).At, the time of the event, Unit 3 was shut down during a refueling outage with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool.No fuel movement was in progress.Radioactive effluent levels before and after the period of monitor.inoperability were normal.There were no accidents or plant activities in progress which would have resulted in abnormal effluent radioactivity levels during the period of monitor inoperability.
Therefore, there were no safety consequences or implications resulting from this event.I I I.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A.Immediate:
The Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program was implemented to comply with the ACTION requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.8.The set screw on RU-143's sample pump was tightened and the monitor was returned to service as described in Section I.C.B.Action to Prevent Recurrence:
The Unit 1, 2, and 3 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS)alarm response procedures will be revised to require that the proper NRC Fo 3SSA 1889)
J'II ,l NACFORMSSSA (S4(R'e~~ILS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVED OMB NO.3(500(04 EXPIRES: 4)30R)2'STIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO (X)MPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HAS.FOAWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN FSTIMATE TO THE RECORDS ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430).U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK AEDUCTION PROJECT (3)504(04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.
OC 20503.ACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER l2)LER NUMBEA (5)gjIj SSQVCNZIAL NUMBER REVISION NVMSSR PAGE (3)Palo Verde Unit 3 (IP more Speoe ls erFekeeL oee aAWonel HRC Form 3554'4)((7)o s o o o 5 3 0 8 9-0 0 5-01 06 OF 0 6 personel be contacted for investigating problems occurring with the monitors.The procedure revisions are expected to be completed by November 1, 1989.Also, this event has been reviewed and discussed with Unit 1, 2, and 3 Chemistry personnel to ensure that they are aware of the importance of prompt RHS alarm response.The loose set screw has not been identified as a recurring problem at PVNGS.In accordance with an APS program, Engineering reviews work order trends.If the loose set screw were identified as a recurring occurrence, additional corrective action would be developed.
Additionally, the low flow alarm provides indication that a problem has occurred and enables prompt corrective action and/or compensatory measures.IV.PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: A previous similar event was reported in Unit 1 LER 528/85-067.
A low flow alarm for the Plant Vent low range monitor (RU-143)was received in the Control Room and acknowledged by Control Room personnel (utility, licensed).
However, Radiation Protection personnel were not notified contrary to procedural requirementf.
Previous corrective actions consisted of counseling control room personnel about the necessity to properly acknowledge and respond to alarms.As discussed in Section I.I of this LER (530/89-005), control room personnel acknowledged the alarm and contacted an individual in the RP area.Furthermore, the current procedures were not correct in providing instruction for contacting the proper department to have the alarm investigated.
Since the corrective actions taken for the previous event (530/85-067) addressed the problem of not contacting an individual to investigate the alarm, the corrective actions would not have prevented recurrence of, this event.Additionally, this is the first recurrence of this type of event in approximately three (3)years and the first occurrence of this problem in Unit 3.NRC Feem 35BA (5 SS)
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