ML17262A292

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LER 90-017-00:on 901212,reactor Trip Relay de-energized & Reactor Tripped When Dc Switches in Distribution Panel Opened.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Change Process Being evaluated.W/910111 Ltr
ML17262A292
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/11/1991
From: BACKUS W H, MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-017, LER-90-17, NUDOCS 9101160181
Download: ML17262A292 (20)


Text

ACCELERAI I=DD!S~RIBUtIONDEMONSTP4.TIONSYSTEMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9101160181 DOC.DATE:

91/01/11NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmet'GinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION

'BACKUSjW.H.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

.DOCKET05000244R

SUBJECT:

LER'90-017-00:on 901212,reactor triprelayde-energized

&reactortrippedwhendcswitchesindistribution panelopened.Causedbyprocedural inadequacy.

Procedure changeprocessbeingevaluated,W/910111 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.~NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

D05000244ARECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LA.JOHNSON,A INTERNAL:

ACNWAEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9HNRR/DLPQ/LHFBll NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB SDNRR/DST/SPLBSDl REGFRGN101EXTERNALEG&GBRYCEIJ~HNRCPDRNSICMURPHY,G.A COPIES.LTTRENCL.1.111221111111111111111331111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3PDAEOD/DOAAEOD/ROAB/DS PNRR/DET/EMEB.7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7ENRR/DST/SRXB SERES/DSIR/EIB LSTLOBBYWARDNSICMAYS,,GNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL111'221~11..-12211111'11.111'RjVt/!IYg~jl'i 9Xr~NOTETOAI.I"RIBS"RECIPIENTS:

DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCElVASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOXIP!-37(EXT.20079!TOELlbIINATEYOURNAil!EFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSIORDOCUb'IENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQU1RED:

LTTR31ENCL31 ROCHESTER 8ASAN'iEf.L'RICORPORATION 89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER N.Y.14649.0001 yola$1k1CROBfRlf.s"cV<<ef're<dt"Cit,Tf.EPjtQN.AREAcGiJf'7't6 546270January11,1991U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555

Subject:

LER90-017,OpeningofDCSwitches(Procedural Inadequacy)

DisablesManualandAutoActuation ofSafeguards SequenceInitiation CausingaCondition OutsidetheDesignBasisofthePlantR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),

whichrequiresareportof,"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinthecondition ofthenuclearpowerplant,including itsprincipal safetybarriers, beingseriously

degraded, orresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeinginacondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER90-017isherebysubmitted.

I'hiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Veryixuglyyouk.8,xc:RobertC.Meredy/U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector gPup(g.Z(pP9101160181 5101iiPPFyA"tAIYn~rirt,r"~.i&DR 0

HACArw500($441LICENSEEEVENTREPORTtLER)VLNUCLCAAAIOULATOAQ COAWI~AAYAOVIOOU!HO.SIN0<OVCIS<ACSI/SQI55ACILITYHAUC111OOCAITNUMSCAOl060o0)24410Fl R'nnaNuc1earPowerPlant1ITLC14IQponmq,ofDCSwitchesDz.sables ManualandAutoActuation oSaegusSeenceI'nitiation CausinaCondition Outside.theDesi'asisofthePlantUOHTHOAYYCAAYIAAIVCHTOATSINLIANVMICAIN~IOUIAYIAL>>UUYIAMY'>>>>UUSI1AtMATO*TIITIUOHTHOAYYCAN~ACILIYY>>AMIAOOCKCTHUll~CA(ll06,000OTHCAIACILITICI INVOLVCOOI121290900,170001119106000OACAATINOUOOCI~I~OYIC1LCVILpp10.405III50.5004(I(III50A004IIIIIIITOPIC4(lII(WI50AOS4I(11(HI50.50S41(1llrlTOAOII~INM(alIll~OMIAIOIN.T54(OIIIN.T54((5(ISI

~IIC4(QIIWIN,T54)QIIHIN.T54(OIIVI~O.T54(QI(vt(

l0254IOIIYWIIAI N.154l(5llvWII~IIO.TSNIQI(A(

0THIAtOVI1CMtNTI 0>ISCSA$!ICMYArvrrrrAlIMYA>>rr>>51111THISACKIATIlSUIMIIICO TUASVAHT'ITSJIWI51514(OTHI1(5Ar>>r4AAvvrr~>>orAAIMTAAL>>AClrrJICAIHAUCLICINCCICONTACTSOATHISLCA(illWesleyH.BackusTechnical Assistant totheOperations ManaerTCLCTHOHC HUMSIAAAIACOOI31524-446COM5LCTCOHCLIHCSOACACHCOMM>>tNTSAILUACOIICAIIIO INTHI~ACMAT(illCAU5CSYSTSUCOMMHCHTUANUYACTVACAC~"ILC"'">'.>~~:.-,1 CUlllrSICM~'jPi44~+'v+(+Ir rj(QCAJ,.IA,IV5lO.UVIOL 1+cvwCOMMHCHTMANVSACTVACACMATAILTOHtAOSgg>~$~(5(ÃrPA~SUYYLCMCHTAL ACMATItrtCTCOII4lCX~CCICOSVIMI55IOHOATCIIIIMONTHCAY'YCAAIllIIIrr.Y>>vU>>HCIIPTCTEO 5UCU(55(O>>

OATCIHOAJCTAACTIL>>A>>NI500Mecr,II,AArvsrvswrrtrvA~YAAUYnpvrrw>>AAANI(IN)OnDecember12,1990,at2310EST,withthereactoratapproximately 3%fullpower,theControlRoomForemanopenedtwo'='tc)'e,cdbyaMainte>>.rce procedure, cav~inL)disabling ofmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic actuation ofthesafeguards sequenceinitiation.

ThetwoDCswitcheswereclosed,asdirectedbytheMaintenance procedure, approximately twenty(20)minuteslater,restoring manual(pushbutton) andautomatic actuation initiation.'he underlying causeoftheeventwasprocedure inadequacy duetoinsufficient attention todetail.AExtensive corrective actionsarebeingtakentopreventrecurrence, including communication ofmanagement expectations, HPESevalua-tions,identifying procedural'nadequacies, andacomprehensive upgradeoftheprocedure changeprocess.>>AC/rs50C.la

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IIACSIUtttSSSA19451LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATION V.S.IIVCLKAAASOVLATOAT COUUISSIOII ASSAOV50OU9AO515OMIOS5IISIA55'9/SII95SACILITYIIASICillOOCKSTIIVUSSAITILTAAVSSICAICISSOVSIITIAL U1IISUISIOItlIU~AOSISIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTTXTIII'IIOIS AUSStIISSIUSS.USsNASOSIUSArACIItttltWS'llIITIIOl2449IQQ1700Qi5oFli5TheControlRoomoperators immediately

.performed theapplicable actionsofE-0(ReactorTriporSafetyInjection) andES-0.1(ReactorTripResponse) andstabilized theplantinhotshutdown.

IAftercompleting theapplicable stepsofE-0andES-0.1,theControlRoomoperators completed theirpartofM-48.14,byclosingthetwoDCswitchesthathadbeenopenedinstep5.5.1ofM-48.14.Thiswasaccomplished atapproximately 2330EST,December12,1990.TheoncomingSS,whohadbeenintheControlRoomduringthisevent,resumedtheevaluation oftheconsequences ofalarmL-31after'plant conditions hadstabilized.

(Thecauseofthealarmhadalreadybeendetermined.

)Heperformed anotherreviewofM-48.14andcalledotherknowledgeable membersoftheplantstaffattheirhomes(atapproximately 0100EST,December13,1990)todiscusshisconcernsabouttheeffectofopeningthesetwoDCswitches.

Afterreceiving confirmation that'hisconcernswerelegiti-mate,hemadethepropernotifications tohighersupervision andtheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC).3.NOPERABLL'TRUCTURAL&

sCOMPONEN'1'6 sOKSYSTEI'sh THA'J.CONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:D.None.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED-None..E.METHODOFDISCOVERY:

TheeventwasmadeapparentduringtheoncomingSSreviewoftheconsequences ofControlBoardAlarmL-31(Safeguards DCFailure)andsubsequent discussions withknowledgeable plantstaff.~IACSOASSSOSAl9451 MAClotm9$$AI943ILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATION

.II.9.HIICLTAII 1$4ULATOIIY CO>>AII9$IOHA9PIIOVlO OM9HO$I$0WIOaXXPIA$$9/$I4$SACILITYNA>>lIIIOOCrlTeu>>9$ALTIvtAAL$1HII>>9$IIICI9IQVlNTIAL~tVuATVISIOHVTAAAOlITIR.E.GinnaNuclearPolarPlantTTXTI~~>>eccl~.

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~'IIIITIoIoI24490-017-000'6oF15F.OPERATORACTXON:Factorsthatinfluenced operatoractions,duringtheeventwereasfollows:vTheControlRoomoperators questioned step5.5.1inprocedure M-48.14,butinformation inM-48.14,theDCswitchlabels,andAlarmResponseprocedure AR-L-31didnotprovidesufficient operational information todetermine theconsequences ofopeningthesetwoswitches.

oTheControlRoomoperators hadconfidence inaPlantOperating ReviewCommittee (PORC)approvedprocedure thathadalsobeenreviewedbytheElectrical Planner.Astheeventwasoverpriortodiscovery, nooperatoractionsotherthannormalwereperformed.

G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:

None.XXI.CAUSEOFEVENTA.IMHEDlATE CAUSE:Acondition outsidethedesignbasisoftheplantwascausedbythedisabling ofmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic actuation ofthesafeguards sequenceinitiation (i.e.autoandmanualSI).B.INTERMEDXATE CAUSE:Thedisabling ofmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic

-actuation ofthesafeguards sequenceinitiation was-causedbyswitchgl2inthe1ADCDistribution Panelandswitchg9inthe1BDCDistribution Panelbeingopenatthesametime.BothofthesepanelsareonthebackoftheMainControlBoard.MAC>414999A(9WI

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,0HRC>wiASAEAIE4SIAACILITYIIAME(IILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATION COCKETiIUMEERIEIV.t.IIVCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION i'ttROYEO OMEHOSISO&I04EIItIRES'EPICSLERHVMEERItiSEQVERTiAL MEAAtVitiOHHQIJEAtAOEISIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIA'i>>itA>>i>>e~.v>>AiAAOCrWNACAiiiii~'elIITIo5Io(oIogI4490-OI1i7-0090F15Theeffectofthepotential delayinactuating safeguards equipment uponthoseeventsanalyzedintheUFSARwasevaluated.

Theaccidents effectedbythisactionarethoseaccidents whichresultindepressurization oftheprimarysystemcausingSI.Theseareprimarily thefollowing:

000FeedLineBreak(FLB)SteamGenerator TubeRupture(SGTR)SmallBreakLossofCoolantAccident(SBLOCA)oLargeBreakLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)oSmallSteamLineBreak(SmallSLB)oLargeSteamLineBreak(SLB)Ananalysisoftheseaccidents wasperformed todetermine theeffectofthedisabling ofmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic actuation ofthesafeguards sequenceinitiation withthefollowing results:FeedLineBreaktThisaccidentwasanalyzedbytheGinnaUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)asaheatupeventwithauxiliary feedwater available inten(10)minutes.Asaheatupevent,RCSpressureneverdecreased belowtheSIsetpoint, butrapidlyincreased abovetheSIpumpshutoffhead.Therefore, SIwasnotnecessary andauxiliary feedwater, whenavailable withinten(10)minutes,issufficient tomitigatetheevent.Operatoractionstostartauxiliary feedwater withinten(10)minutesisconsistent withtheGinnalicensing basis.IftheFLBwasre-evaluated asacooldowneventfrom34powertheresultswouldbeboundedbyaSLB.RRCAORMSEEAitASI IIAClaew494AI941ILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATION V.4.IIUCLSAAASCUL*TOAY COMMI44IOII A99AOYSOOM4IIOSISO&104/4)e+IIIK$

4ISI'4$9ACILITYIIAM4(IlOOCIISTIIVM44A(1ILSAMVM44III~IS~QUSHTIAL4UMAASVIQl08~iQ9A~AQ4ISIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTlll~CWCeM~,~AAAIMAMWICAtWAM'llIIll0500IO24490-017-00,10oFl5SteamGenerator TubeRutureSGTRisboundedbySBLOCAfromtheRCSdepressurization standpoint.

TheleakratefromaSGTRissmallcomparedtobreakflowforaSBLOCA.Thereisnosignificant effectduetolackofmanual(pushbutton) orautomatic SIsincethemainstepsintheprocedure dealwithisolation oftherupturedSG,depressurization oftheRCS,andtermination ofSI.SmallBreakLossofCoolantAccidentWhenmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic SIwasde-activated, thereactorwasoperating at34power.Thereactorhadbeenat3%powerforapproximately ten(10)hours.Priortothat,the'eactor hadbeensubcritical fortwenty-two (22)hoursfollowing atrip.Westinghouse Owner'sGroupletterWOG90-113,datedJuly2,1990,"Shutdown LOCAProgram-Draf<Report",evaluated amode4LOCAusingagenerictwo(2)loopplantwithasix(6)inchbreakassumedtooccurtwoandahalf(2.5)hoursaftershutdown.

Acceptable resultswereobtainedprovidedSIwasstartedten(10)minutesafterthebreak.Assumptions ofthemode4LOCAanalysisarecomparedwiththeGinnaEventconditions below:WOGMODE4GINNAEVENTDecayHeat1.34Noaccumulators available RCSpressure.1000 psigRCStemperature 425FDecayHeat0.864Accumulators available RCSpressure2235psigRCStemperature 547FTheavailability ofaccumulators andthelowerdecayheatoffsetthehigherRCStemperature andpressure.

Sufficient time~savailable tomanuallystartthe.SIandRHRpumpsandopenappropriate valvesfromtheControlRoom,andtorecoverfromtheSBLOCA.Inanycase,SBLOCAisboundedbyLOCAbecauselesstimeisavailable foroperatoractionduringaLargeBreakLOCA.4AC90AM994A<9A01 MACeOrmSSSA114SILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATION V.S.HVCLSAAASOuLATOAv COMMiSSIOle AeeAovsoOMsHoslso&IcerSee>ASSSISI4SI'ACILITY eIAMSIIIOOCIISTHUMOSII(11LSAMuMSSIIISISSCMSHTIAL M1ASQ4104U~AOSISIR.E.'GinnaNuclearPower'Plant TSxrnreeeeMeeee~.weeeeMeew'AC

~Xa4TvIITI05I00io24490-0170IO1)1os'I5LareBreakLossofCoolantAccidentAnassessment ofdisabling manual(pushbutton) andautomatic SIat3%powerwasperformed byWestinghouse withrespecttotheLOCAanalysis.

Theassessment assumedtheRCSwasat547F,2235psig.Thefuelrodswereassumedtobeat600Fwhichwouldbetheapproximate pelletandcladtemperature attheend-of-blowdown phase.Thevessellowerplenumandthelowerportionofthecorewouldbecoveredwithaccumulator water.Further,itwasassumedthatSImustbeinitiated whenthefuelrodsareat1800Ftoturnaroundthecladdingtemperature beforeitreaches2200F.Decayheatisbasedonanapproximation ofpowerhistorypriortotheevent,usingthe1971ANSModel.Anadiabatic heatupcalculation wasperformed usingproperties fora14x14arrayOptimumFuelAssembly(OFA).Thecalculation indicated SXwasnecessary in5.5to6minutes.Simulations ontheGinnaspecificsimulator indicatea5to6minuteoperatorresponseduringaLOCAisachievable.

SmallSteamLineBreakThisaccidentisboundedbytheLargeSLBbecauselongertimesareavailable foroperatorresponse.

LareSteamLi:neBreakWestinghouse assessedtheeffectofnomanual(pushbutton) orautomatic SXontheSteamLineBreakanalysis.

Basedontheirexperiences withSteamLineBreakanalysisaswellasareviewoftheavailable margintotheacceptance

criteria, itwasjudgedthatiftheaccidentwerere-analyzedat34powerwithnomanual(pushbutton) orautomatic SI,acceptable resultswouldbeobtained.

~ACeo14sssAIS4SI

0MACSarw$SEA104$1LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATION U,LMIJCLEAII AEOULATOAV COMMITEIOII IAPPROVEDOMEIIO$1$0&IOJEJTPiAE$8JTI4$SACILITYIIAMEIIIDOCKETIIU4HEAITILEIIIILNNEIIIEISEOVSJJTJALIvIJU11PEV>SICUUVUSAPACE1$IR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTJJJeOrPJPPPPAnewer.UPSPJ>>1>>MJJTACMJa4'Illltl0500024490-'017-0012OFRochester GasandElectricCorporation (RG&E)performed acomputeranalysisoftheSLBusingtheWestinghouse LOFTRANCode.AbasecasewascomparedtoacasewhereSIwasdelayedforten(10)minutes.Thecomparison indicated negligible changein,minimumDNBR.Therewasaninsigni-ficantchangeinmassreleasedtocontainment becausemassreleaseisdominated byinitialsteamgenerator levelandauxiliary feedwater flow,neitherofwhichareaffectedbydelayedSI.Comparing energyoutthebreakforbothcases,showednegligible differences.

Therefore, delayingSIhasnegligible effectonminimumDNBRandmass/energy outthebreak.Inconclusion, delayofmanual(pushbutton) andautomatic SIwiththereactorat34powerwouldnotcauseNon-LOCAeventsto'xceedtheacceptance criteria.

Adelayof5.5to6minutesintheLOCAcanbetolerated withoutunacceptable results.Basedonoperatortraining, thisissufficient timeforoperatorresponse.

Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTIONA.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:Theaffectedsystemwasrestoredtonormalwhenthetwo(2)DCswitcheswereclosedtwenty(20)minutesaftertheywereopened.%ACSCAMSSAAI$431

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