ML17326A575
| ML17326A575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1980 |
| From: | BEGOR R D, SHALLER D V, SVENSON B A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326A574 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003130424 | |
| Download: ML17326A575 (29) | |
Text
DONALDC.,COOKNUCLEARPLANTANNUALOPERATINGREPORT1979CompiledBy:R.D.BegorStaffAs'sistantReviewedBy:B.A.SvenssonAssistantPlantManagerApprovedBy:D.V.ShallerPlantManager TABLEOFCONTENTSTITLEPAGENUMBERINTRODUCTIONPERSONNELEXPOSURESUMMARYINSERVICEINSPECTIONCHANGESTOFACILITY INTRODUCTIONTheD.C.CookNuclearPlant,ownedbytheIndiana&MichiganElectricCompanyandlocatedfivemilesnorthofBridgman,Michiganconsistsoftwo1100MWepressurizedwaterreactors.ThenuclearsteamsupplysystemsforbothunitsaresuppliedbyWestinghousewithaGeneralElectricturbine-generatoronUnit1andaBrown-Boveriturbine-generatoronUnit2.Thecondensercoolingmethodisopencycle,usingLakeMichiganwaterasthecondensercoolingsource.TheD.C.CookNuclearPlantisthefirstnuclearfacilitytousetheicecondenserreactorcontainmentsystem,whichutilizesaheatsinkofboratediceinacoldstoragecompartmentlocatedinsidethecontainment.Thearchitect/engineerandconstructorwastheAmericanElectricPowerServiceCorporation.ThisreportwascompiledbyMr.R.D.Begor,withinformationcontributedbythefollowingindividuals:D.C.PalmerPersonnelExposureSummaryH.BolingerInserviceInspectionR.S.KeithandE.A.AbshagenChangestoFacility PERSONNELEXPOSURESUMMARYThefollowingtablerepresentsatabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofplant,utilityandotherpersonnelreceivingexposuregreaterthan100Mrem/yearandtheirassociatedman-remexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions.Assignmentofpersonneltovariousgroupingsisbasedonwhattypeofworktheyaieusuallyinvolvedwith.Specifically,assignmentsaremadeasfollows:MaintenancePersonnel--Includesnon-exempt(non-supervisory)personnelfromtheMaintenanceDepartmentandfromtheControl6InstrumentSectionoftheTechnicalDepartment.OperatingPersonnel-Includesnon-exemptpersonnelfromtheOperationsDepartment,fromtheChemicalSectionoftheTechnicalDepartment,fromtheQualityAssuranceDepartmentandSecurityPersonnel.HealthPhysicsPersonnel-Includesnon-exemptpersonnelfromtheRadiationProtectionSectionoftheTechnicalDepartment.SupervisoryPersonnel--Includesexempt(supervisory)personnelfromalldepartmentswhofunctionprimarilyassupervisorsofnon-exemptpersonnel.EngineeringPersonnel-Includespersonnelnotprimarilyfunctioningassupervisorsofnon-exemptpersonnel.Thisincludessuchpersonnelasmaintenanceengineers,nuclearengineers,performanceengineersandstationmanagement.
REPORTOFHUIIDEROFPERSQllllELAIIDINI-REMBYI!ORKAf!DJOBFUHCTIOtl1979UORK&JOBFUHCTIOHtatonEmloeesUttyEmloeesontractorersandOthersI!UMBEROFPERSONNEL>00mRemStatonEmloeesTOTALMAN-REMtty.ContractordersEmloeesandOthersREACTOROPERATIONS&SURVEILLANCEMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelROUTINEIIAIHTEHAHCEMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelIHSERVICEINSPECTIONMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelSPECIALMAINTENANCEMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelIIASTEPROCESSIHGMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelREFUELINGMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelTOTALMaintenancePersonnelOperatingPersonnelHealthPhysicsPersonnelSupervisoryPersonnelEngineeringPersonnelGPAHOTOTAL596510126987138689588842106553412847016106986514231621600016140.00100001717390511171017102320137044801818513101580112026616420342267043.16833.171l.1612.2320.97191.2980.5214.2962.0320.22815.8411.2440.5593.0250.58528.6260.0634.1310.5760.46912.0090.3626.4230.7951.19613.7160.0590.4382.3402.061138.65835.42017.00811.0005.510207.5960000.10600000.1540.1380001.0010.10700012.8025.6090000.15900000.107000014.3295.85420.1832.15900.5230.0150.10525.00202.5920.100078.86306.2544.4930171.74306.2485.3790.96057.08402.6733.043053.157012.8723.8230.121388.008031.16213.5531.186433.909 INSERVICEINSPECTIONInDecember1979aninserviceexaminationoftubingcontainedwithintheUnit2SteamGenerators(No.2andNo.3)wasconductedbyWestinghouseCorporationduringRefuelingCycleI-II.ThisexaminationwasperformedtosatisfythesurveillancerequirementsidentifiedinSection4.5.5oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theresultsofthisinspectionrevealedthefollowing:1)Atotalof644SteamGeneratortubeswereexaminedthroughthe"U"bendarea.Thisnumberisinexcessofthe3percentrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationandASMECodeSectionXI.2)Thisexaminationrevealednotubingdefectshavingapenetrationgreater.than20percentofwallthickness.3)TherewerenotubespluggedinanyoftheSteamGenerators.EvaluationoftheinserviceeddycurrentexaminationdatawasaccomplishedbyaZetec,Inc.datainterpretercertifiedtoLevelIIAusingZetecequip-mentcalibratedinaccordancewithZetecprocedure.
CHANGESTOFACILITYBriefdescriptionsandsummarysafetyevaluationsfordesignchanges(RFC's)madetothefacilityasdescribedintheDonald-C.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)arepresented'inthissection.ThesechangeswerecompletedwithoutpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalpursuanttotheprovisionsofTitle10,CodeofFederalRegu-lationssubsection50.59(a).DC-12-958InfrareddetectorswereinstalledincertainC02protectedareasoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Additionalalarmunitsforthenew'etectorswereinstalledineachControlRoom.ThecontrolcircuitrylogicwasmodifiedsothatboththeionizationandtheinfrareddetectorsmustseeafireconditioninorderforC02actuationtooccur.ThischangewillminimizefalsedumpsofC02fromdustorwindcon-ditionswhichmayexistintheseareas.ThisRFCisnotconsideredsafetyrelatedbecausethechangesarebeingmadetoSeismicClassIIIequipmentandwhileapplicablearenotrequiredbytheNRCfireprotectionrecommendations.ThisRFCwilleliminatepotentialspuriousactuationsoftheC02suppressionsystemandwasaccountedforinthefirehazardsanalysisforCookPlant.ThisRFCprovidesanadditionallevelofdefenseindepthforfireprotectionattheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.DC-12-1521RFC-DC-12-1521changedthefiresystemactuationmethodfromincreasingwaterpressuretolossofaironthefollowingsprinkl.ersystemsservedbytheAuxiliaryBuildingfireheader:1,Drummingarea(yreactiontype)2.Newfuelreceivingarea(@reactiontype).3.Aux.Bldg.H2tubes(dry.pilot').TheAuxiliaryBuildingfireheaderisnormallyfilledwithastaticheadofwater.ValvesZMO-10820isolatetheheaderfromtherestoftheplantfiresuppressionwaterheaderwhichisnormallypressurized.Thesystemisdesignedsothatuponactuationofanyauxiliarybuildingsprinklersystem(intheeventofafire)thestaticheadofwaterintheheaderwouldbesufficienttocreatea25psiincreasingpressuresignaltotrip
.thedelugevalvepressureswitchwhich,throughthefiresystemlogic,opensZNO-10&20andstartsafirepump.Thefire:systemlogicwouldthenkickinadditionalpumpsasneededdependingonthewaterdemandtoextinguishafire.Theresultsofsurveillancetestingofthissystemhaveshownthatthestaticheaddoesnotprovidesufficientpressureincreasetoactuatethedelugevalvepressureswitches.Sincetheauxiliarybuildingsprinklersystemsareeitherthedrypilotorpreactiontype,airmustbeventedfromthedrypilotactuatorinordertoopenthedelugevalvessothatawaterflowpathtothesprinklerheadsisestablished.Theairsupplyisnormalplantair.ThesubjectRFCallowsthelossofair(decreasingairpressure)toprovidethefiresystemlogicinputtoopenZMO-10820andstartthefirepump.Thefiresystemlogicwouldthenfunctionaspreviouslyindicated.ThefireprotectionsystemisSeismicClassIII,howeveritprovidesprotectiontosafetyrelatedareasandequipmentintheauxiliarybuildingandhencethisRFCisconsideredtobesafetyrelated.Additionally,thesubjectRFCclosesoutanopenitemoftheNRCreviews.TheNuclearSafety8LicensingSectionhasreviewedthesubjectRFCinlightoftherequirementsofNRCBranchTechnicalPositionAPCSB9.5-1andtheAEPSCdefenseindepthphilosophy.TheresultsofthisreviewindicatethatthisRFCwillfurtherenhancetheabilityofthefiresup-pressionwatersystemtoperformitsintendeddesignfunctionwhileinnowaydegradingtheremainderofthefireprotectionsystemsattheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant.RFC-DC-12-1521doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.ThisRFCwillinnowayadverselyaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2111AsecondoxygenanalyzerhasbeeninstalledtocontinuouslysamplethedischargelinefromtheWasteGasCompressors.Uponasignalofhighoxygenconcentration,automaticcontrolfeatureswillisolatetheGasDecayTankbeingfilledandswitchtheflowautomaticallytothe"standby"tank.Theaffectedcomponentisthenpurgedwithnitrogentodilutetheoxygenconcen-tration:Additionaloxygensamplingiscompletedtoverifythattheoxygenconcentrationhasdecreasedtoasafelevel.ThisRFCisconsideredsafety-relatedsinceitinvolvestheadditionofasecondoxygenanalyzertoaClassIsystemandbecausecertainsectionsofthepipeandvalvesbeingaddedaretobedesignedandinstalledasClassItomeetisolationcriteriaforsuchsystems.Thesecondoxygenanalyzerservesthepurposeofsamplingcontinuouslythedischargelinefromthe wastegascompressors.Itservestostartcontroloperationstoavoidthedevelopmentofexplosivemixturesinthegaseouswastedisposalsystem.Theinstallationofthesecondanalyzerwasrequestedinquestion320.2oftheFSAR(Appendixg)withadditionalprovisionsbeingmentionedinquestion320.6.Becausethenatureofthemodificationitself,andbecauseofitspurpose,thisRFCdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59norwillitendangerthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2115ThethermocouplemeterreadoutfortemperatureindicatorITI-900ontheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)wasreplacedwithamoreaccurateOmegadigitalreadoutunitforobtainingRWSTtemperature,ThelowtemperaturealarmsetpointforITA-900ontheRWSTwaschangedfrom40'F.to80'F.ThisnewalarmsetpointwillbringthealarminbeforeTechnicalSpecificationsvaluesareexceeded.Thesechangeswere.recommendedforcompatibilitywiththeEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)analysisreportedinAppendixItotheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Thenewtemperaturealarmsetpointistheminimumtem-=peraturespecifiedintheUnit2TechnicalSpecifications.Thesechangesaresafety-relatedbecausetheRWSTandassociatedcomponentsareSeismicClassIandarepartoftheECCS.ThisRFCdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-02-2121ThefollowingmodificationsweremadetotheUnit<2ContainmentPurgeandExhaustSysteminaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheNRC'sBranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-5:1.Installedorificeplatesanddebrisscreensontheinboardisolationvalves(VCR-101throughVCR-107)atthesevencontainmentpurgeventilationpenetrations.2.Providedatiedownsystemwithblowoutpanelsonthepurgesystemductwork(exteriortothecontainment)whichcouldbecomemissilesanddamageClassIsafetyequipmentintheareaifsuchductworkweresubjectedtoLOCApressures.3.Modifiedthe14isolationvalves(VCR-101throughVCR-107andVCR-201throughVCR-207)toprovidevalveclosuretimesoflessthan5seconds.
ThesubjectRFChasbeeninitiatedtomeetthecommitmentsinAppendixgoftheFSAR(guestions022.4and022.13)andrequirementsofBranchTechnicalPositionCSB-6-4,"ContainmentPurgingDuringNormalPlantOperation."Thechangesenhancethereliabilityoftheinvolvedsystemsanddonotpreventthesystemsfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunction.Thechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2158RFC-DC-12-2158installedanautomaticcompositesamplerontheturbineroomsumpdischargeline.Installationofthiscompositesamplerallowsforthecollectionandanalysisofsumpdischargesamplesduringperiodsofprimary-to-secondarysteamgeneratortubeleakage.Thisrequestforchange(RFC)revisesaSeismicClassIIIsystemwhichisnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheunit,andthusisconsideredtobeanon-safetyrelatedchange.ThesubjectsamplerisbeinginstalledinaccordancewithNRCquestion320.8totheFSAR.RFC-DC-12-2158doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.ThisRFCprovidesfordesignchangeswhicharewithinthelimitsofoursafetyanalysisandhencewillhavenoadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2166Unit82OnlBlockanddrainvalveswereaddedtothefollowingsystemsonUnit82oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant:l.2.3.4.5.EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem.PrimaryWaterSystemComponentCoolingWaterSystem.IceCondenserRefrigerationSystem.Demineralized(Makeup)WaterSystem.Thesevalveswereaddedtofacilitatepneumatictestingofseatleakageonthecontainmentisolationvalvesinthesesystems.ThistestingisrequiredbyUnit2license'condition3,1inaccordancewiththecommittmentmadeinresponsetoguestions022.7and022,15containedinAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecauseitrequiresmodificationstobemadetosomecontainmentpenetrationswhichareSeismicClassIandarerequiredtobeisolatedundercertaindesignbasisaccidentconditions.Themodificationsarebeingmadeinaccordancewiththedesignbasisforcontainmentisolationaspresentedin'.theFSAR.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.
DC-02-2181AllUnit82PressurizerLevel,SteamGeneratorLevel(narrowrange)andReactorCoolantPressure(widerange)transmitterswerereplacedwithITTBartonrequalifiedtransmitterstofulfillthecommitmentmadeinresponsetoguestion022.8inAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThechangerequiredbythisRFCinvolvesthereplacementof17ClassIEsignaltransmitters.Thereplacementisthe.resultoftheSeismicandEnvironmentalRequalificationprogramconductedbyMestinghouseElectricCorporation.Althoughthischangeissafetyrelated,therequiredseismicanalyseshavebeencompletedonthenewreplacementsensors,theirsupportsandtubing.ThisRFCisnotconsideredtobeanunreviewedsafetyquestioninaccordancewith10CFR50.59(2)(a),andwillnotadverselyaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-01-2193OntheUnitPlEmergencyDieselGenerators,thecontrolcircuitryandthefeedbreakercontrolcircuitryweremodifiedtoelectricallyremovethe"non-essential"tripcircuitsfromservicewheneverthedieselgeneratorisrequiredforaccidentconditions(SafetyInjectionorblackout).The"non-essential"tripcircuitsremainoperableduringSurveillanceTestinguntilanemergencysignalisreceived.Duringtheaccidentmodethe"essential"tripcircuits(EngineOver-speedandGeneratorDifferential)willremaininservicetotripthedieselshouldanyessentialtripconditionarise.ThechangesincorporatedbythisRFCaresafetyrelatedinthattheDieselGeneratorsareSeismicClassIequipmentandareservedbyClassIEcable.Thesechangesdonotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestioninaccordancewith10CFR50.59a(.2)andfurther,theyrepresentanupgradeinsafetyinthatadditionalprotectionisaffordedbytheenhancementofDieselGeneratoravailabilityduringaSafetyInjectionSignal,Hence,thesechangesshallnotaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-02-2202Backupmoldedcasecircuitbreakersand/orfuseswereaddedfor600VESSandNon-ESSelectricalequipmentinsidetheUnit82ContainmentoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Theadditionofredundantcircuitbreakerswillreducetheprobabilityofpenetrationdamageduringafault.RFC-DC-02-2202proposestheinstallationofabackuporredundantsetofbreakersand/orfusestoprotectthe600voltESSandNon-ESSelectricalequipmentinthecontainmentbuildingbecausefailureofasinglecircuit 10'breakertoopenduringafaultmaycausetheelectricalpenetrationtobedamaged.ThisRFCisincompliancewith"additionalcondition(m)"toUnit82OperatingLicense.Sincetheinstallationofthisequipmentaddsaredundancyforpro-tectionofsafetyrelatedequipment,itdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFRSection50.59.DC-01-2207AllUnit81reactorcoolantwiderangepressure,pressurizerpressureandSteamGeneratorwaterleveltransmitterswerereplacedwithrequalifiedtransmittersmanufacturedbyITTBartontoprovideupgradedenvironmentalqualification.ThismodificationinvolvesSiesmicClassIcomponents.Thechangeissafetyrelatedbecausetheservicesinvolvedaretoberelieduponforlongtermmonitoringfollowingadesignbasisaccident.Inaddition,thesteamgeneratorleveltransmitterprovidesoneofseveralredundantsignalstoinitiatereactortripandstart-upoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemuponalossofnormalfeedwaterorfeedlinebreak.TheNRCwasinformedofthischangeinaletterdatedMay4,1979fromMr.G.P.MaloneytoMr.HaroldR.Denton(AEP:NRC:00142).ThisisthesamechangeinUnit1aswasmadeinUnit2underRFC-DC-02-2181.ThisRFCdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2222Unit82OnlThesourceofpowertotheTurbine.DriyenAuxi,ltaryFeedwaterpumps(TDAFP)dischargevalvesandtripandthrottlevalveswaschangedfromACtoDCpower.Thiswasaccomplishedbytheadditionofan"N"trainbatteryasthenewpowersupplyforthesevalves.The250VDC"N"trainbatterysystemconsistsofonebattery(onesetof120leadacidcells);twobatterychargers,eachsuppliedfromaseparatesafetytrain.a-cbus;andtwostandbycircuitsfromtheexistingABandCDplantbatteries.This"N"batteryisphysicallyandelectricallyisolatedfromtheotherplantbatteries.Liketheotherplantbatteries,itwillhaveitsownactivenormalchargerandawiredstandbycharger.Theauxiliaryfeedwatertosteamgeneratorvalvesarenormallyopen;therefore,inmostcases,theywillnotbealoadonthebattery,butifthey(oranyamongthem)happentobeclosedthebatteryhasadequatecapacity
'todrivethemopen.Theremainingloadconsistsoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterturbinecontrolbus.TheAFWturbinecontrolbusencompassestheAFWturbinestartandtripcircuits,theoverspeedmonitor,thetestvalve,andtheemergencyleak-offvalve.Thebatteryissizedtoallowanticipatedoperationofthevalvesandtheircontrolcircuitswiththebatterychargersandbackupfeedcircuitopen.Thebatterywillbecapableofservingtheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedpumpforaslongasthesteamsupplytotheturbineisavail-able.The"N"trainbatteryisfurtherdescribedinSection8.3.5onpage8.3.8oftheFSAR.TheNRCrequiredthatthechangefromACtoDCpowerbemadesincetheirgenericstudiesshowthattheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemistoodependentonACpower(offsite&emergencydiesel).ThereliabilityofthesystemwillbeincreasedbyaddingdiversitytothepowersupplysuchaschangingtoDCpower.ThisrequirementhadbeenimposedbytheNRCduringtheOperatingLicensereviewforD.C.CookUnit2andlicensecondition3.KrequiresthatthischangebecompletedpriortostartupfromthefirstrefuelingonUnit2.ThisRFCisconsideredsafetyrelatedbecausetheAuxiliaryFeed-waterSystemisSeismicClassIandtheassociatedelectricalhardwareisClassIE.Also,theAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemisrequiredtofunctionduringadesignbaseaccident.TheNuclearSafety&LicensingSectionhasreviewedtheengineeringanddesignworkrequiredtoaffectthischangeonbothUnits1&2,andfindsitacceptableforinstallation.RFC-DC-12-2222doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59.Thischangewillnotadverselyaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2230AdditionalionizationtypefiredetectorswereinstalledinthefollowinglocationsintheAuxiliaryBuildingandinboththeUnitPlandUnit>2ControlRooms:1.Sprayadditivetankroom.2.NuclearSamplingRoom.3.Reciprocatingandcentrifugalchargingpumprooms.4.Safetyinjectionpumprooms.5.HVACmezzanineaboveaccesscontrolarea.6.Laundryroom.7.HVACvestibuleson633'levation.8.HVACroomsabovethecontrolrooms.9.Abovecontrolroomceilings.10.Incontrolroomsupply/returnairducts,11.Unit1and2hotshutdownpanels.
12Thisadditionaldetectioncapabilitywasrequiredduetothefirehazardsandfireloadinginthesesafety-relatedareasoftheCookNuclearPlant.Theionizationdetectorswillprovideearlywarningofthesignsofafiretherebyallowingthefirebrigadesufficienttimetoproceedtotheaffectedareawhilethefireisinitsincipientstage.ThisRFCisconsideredsafetyrelatedbecausethefirehazardsintheseareasinvolveClassIEcablingand/orSeismicClassIequipment.TheNuclearSafety8LicensingSectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightoftheNRCB.T;P.9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalyses.TheresultsofthisreviewindicatethatthisRFCwillincreasethefiredetectioncapabilityandisconsistentwithourcommitmentstotheNRC.RFC-DC-12-2230does'notcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2225Unit¹2OnlAReactorCoolantPumpMotoroilspillageprotectionandcontrolsystemwasinstalledonall4reactorcoolantpumpmotorsofUnit¹2.Theoilspillageprotectionandcontrolsystemconsistsofapackageofsplashguards,catchbasins,andenclosuresassembledasattachmentstotheRCPmotoratstrategiclocationstoprecludethepossibilityofoilmakingcontactwithhotRCScomponentsandpiping.Theoilspillageprotectionandcontrolsystemincludesanoil-tightenclosurearoundthehigh-pressureoilliftsystemandasetofdrippans,splash*guards,andcatchbasinsaroundthemotorlowerbracketandbearing,externalheatexchanger,andtheupperbearingoilreservoiralarmhousing.Thissystemisdesignedtocontrolbothpressureandgravitytypeoilleaksthusminimizingthepossibilityofoilignitionfromhotreactorcoolantpipingandothersources.EachReactorCoolantPump(.RCP)motorcontainsa265gallonlubricatingoilreservoircoupledtotheRCPoilliftsystemwhichisnecessaryfortheproperoperationofthepump.TheRCP'sareSeismicClassI.WhilenotrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantnoranyECCSfunctions,theRCP'sarepartoftheReactorCoolantSystempressureboundary.Thus,thisRFCisconsideredtobesafetyrelated.Thefirehazardsanalysisshowedthatthequantityoflubeoilrepre-sentedasignificantfirehazard.ThepotentialforafireisfurtherincreasedsincethehotRCSpipingcouldignitetheoilshouldaleakoccur.The'gnitiontemperatureoftheoilisinthesamerangeastheRCSpipingtemper-atures.Theexistingdrippanswereshowntobesufficienttocontain ordinarydripoilhowever,theoilliftsystemispressurizedandapres-'surizedoilleakcouldnotbehandled,Alsoinlightof,thefactthataheavyaccumulationofelectricalcabletraysareinthevicinityofeachpump,afireinvolvingapressurizedoilleakcouldpotentiallyhavesafetysignificance.TheNuclearSafety5LicensingSectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightofNRCBranchTechnicalpositionAPCSB9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalysis.ThisreviewindicatesthatthischangeincreasesthefireprotectioncapabilityintheCookNuclearPlantwhilenot,inanyway,degradinganysafetyrelatedsystem.TheWestinghousescopeincludestheappropriateseismic,missileandhighenergylinebreak(LOCAandoiljet)analyses.RFC-DC-12-2225doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewdsafetyquestionasdefinedinthe10CFR50,59,ThisRFCfurtherenhancesthefireprotectionsystemsintheCookNuclearPlant.13DC-12-2231AutomaticfireprotectionwatersprinklersystemswereinstalledinthefollowingareasoftheD,C,CookNuclearPlant:a)Dieselenginedrivenfirepumprooms,b)ChargingandSafetyInjectionpumprooms.c)AuxiliaryBuildingElev,587'astEnd.d)AuxiliaryBuildingElev.587'estEnd.e)AuxiliaryBuildingElev.609'aundryRoom'area.f)ReactorCoolantPumpsinbothUnit>1andUnit~2Containments.Thesesprinklersystemsarenecessarytoprotectsafetyrelatedequip-ment/cablingfromtheeffectsofapostulatedfireeitherduetotheperman-entlyinstalledcombustiblematerialsortransientfireloadsintheaboveareas.Thus,thisRFCisconsideredtobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafety8LicensingsectionhasreviewedthesubjectRFCinlightoftherequirementsofNRCB.T.P.9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalysis.ThisreviewindicatesthatthesesprinklersystemswillimprovetheautomaticfireextinguishingcapabilityintheCookNuclearPlantandmeetcommitmentstotheNRC.Inaddition,thesprinklersystemattheReactorCoolantPumps(RCP)wereinstalledinconjunctionwithRFCDC-12-2225,whichprovidestheRCPMotorOilSpillageControl/ProtectionSystem,andinthismannerweareincreasingourcapabilitytoextinuishafireinvolvinglubeoilshouldoneoccur.Thisisanaddedleveofprotectionforfightingin-containmentfires.RFCDC-12-2231doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.ThisRFCwillnotadverselyaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.
.DC-12-2276Unit82OnlLocalControlcapabilitieswereprovidedfortheUnit82EmergencyDieselGeneratorsoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Thismodificationprovidesfor:1)Starting,stopping,controllingspeedandvoltage,andstartingrequiredauxiliariesfromalocationotherthantheControlRoom;2)IsolatingtheexistingDieselGeneratorcontrolsintheControlRoom;and3)ClosingtheDieselGener'atorbreakerslocally.Anewsub-panelDGABX(DGCDX)wasinstalledineachDieselGeneratorroom,withsimilarcontrolsandinstrumentationasthecontrolroom.Nostart-stopcapabilitywasbuiltintothenewpanelbecausethedieselcanbestartedandstoppedfromtheexistingsub-panelDGAB(DGCD)locatedintheDieselGeneratorroom.Thespeedandvoltagecontrolsaswell~asmonitoringinstrumentationarelocatedonthenewsub-panelDGABX(DGCDX).Also,onthenewsub-panelthereisaLOCAL/REMOTEtransferswitch,totransferthevoltageandspeedcontrolfromthecontrolroomtothenewsub-panel.AnannunciatorwillinformtheoperatorinthecontrolroomthattheDiesel.Generatoriscontrolledlocally.Theinstrumentationisnotaffectedbythetransferswitchandisoperationalanytimethedieselisrunning.DuringplantnormaloperationthisLOC/REMtransferswitchisplacedintheremotepositionandtheannunciatoriscleared.EThisRFCisconsideredsafety-relatedbecauseelectricalcircuitsbeingmodifiedareClassIEequipmentandthedieselgeneratorsarerequ',red-tofunctionfollowingalossofoffsitepower.OneoftheassumptionsmadebyAEPSCinthedesignofthelocalshut-downsystemwasthatoffsitepowerwasavailabletoenergizethesafetybuses.Aconcurrentlossoffunctionabilityfromthecontrolroom(cablevaultfire)andlossofoffsitepowerwasnotpartofthelocalshutdowndesignbasis.ThuslocalcontroloftheDiesel.Generatorswasnotrequired.TheNRCinLicenseConditionC.3.0.CoftheUnit82OperatingLicenserequiredthatlossofoffsitepowerbeincludedinthedesignbasiswhichrequiresprovisionsforlocalcontroloftheDieselGenerators.RFC-DC-12-2276doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2352AllUnit81andUnit82MainSteamFlowandPressurizerPressurenarrowrangetransmitterswerereplacedwithrequalifiedITTBartonTransmitters.Condition4.A.totheUnitNo.2OperatingLicense,asamendedonJune16,1978(AmendmentNo.6),requiredthereplacementofallelectronic
15.Foxborotransmitters(EllGMandE13DM)usedinsafety-relatedcircuitsinsidecontainmentwithtransmittersqualifiedbysequentialenvironmentaltestinginaccordancewithIEEE323-1971.ByletterdatedJune1,1978,AEP:NRC:00021,AEPcommittedtoreplacingtheFoxborotransmittersusedinthe"SteamFlow"and"PressurizerPressure"functiononUnitNo.1withqualifiedtransmitters.ThereplacementtransmittersareBartonModelNo.763pressuretransmitters(foruseinthe"PressurizerPressure"functionalcircuits)andBartonModelNo.764differentialpressuretransmitters(forusein"SteamFlow"functionalcircuits).TheseBartontransmitterModelshavebeentestedinaccordancewithIEEE323-1971andtheresultsofthetestingdocumentedinWestinghouseletterNS-TMA-1950.(SeeAEP:NRC:00095submittalfordetailsofthetestsandtestresults.)The"PressurizerPressure"and"SteamFlow"functionsarenotpartoftheLongTerm-PostAccidentMonitoring(LT-PAM)Systems(asdefinedinTechnicalSpecificationTable3.3-10(.UnitNo.2.TheBartonModelNos.763and764transmittersarefullyqualifiedfortheirrespectivereactortripand/orESFactuationfunctions(shorttermqualification.)Basedontheabove,NS&LhasnoreasontoobjecttotheinstallationoftheBartontransmitters.ThesubjectRFCdoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59andimplementationofthischangewillhavenoadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.DC-01-2353Theeightpart-lengthcontrolrodswereremovedfromtheUnitPlreactor.Ananti-rotationaldevicewasinstalledoneachpart-lengthcontrolroddrivemechanism(.CROM)topreventtheCRDMleadscrewsfromrotatinginthedirectionwhichwouldlowerthemduetogravityorvibration.=Thimbleplugswereinstalledinplaceofeachpart-lengthcontrolrodtopreventanythermalorhydraulicproblemsassociatedwiththepart-lengthremoval.ThePartLengthRodsonDonaldC.CookUnitNo,1willberemovedbasedonthefollowing:1.NocreditistakenintheSafetyAnalysisperformedbyExxonandWestinghousefortheirpresence.2.Thereactor'sOperatingLicenseandTechnicalSpecificationspre-empttheiruse,3.Unit1hassuccessfullyload-followedandcontrolledartificiallylargeXenonoscillationswithouttheuseofthePartLengthRodsinCycles1and2.4.ThePart.LengthRodshavebeenremovedfromUnitNo.2.5.The.rodswillbestoredin'.thespentfuelpoolshouldfuturechangesinlicensingrequirementsoroperatingconsiderationspermittheiruse.
16TheFSARwillbeamendedtoeliminatereferencestotheuseofpart-lengthcontrolrodsinUnit1,aswasdoneforUnit2inAmendment78.ATechnicalSpecificationchangerequestwillbesubmittedtotheNRCtoeliminateTechnicalSpecification3/4.1.3.6whichrequiresthatallthepart-lengthcontrolrodsbefullywithdrawninModes1and2.ThisRFCdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-01-2354ThefollowingmodificationsweremadetotheUnit81ContainmentPurge.andExhaustSystem:2.3.Installeddebrisscreensontheinboardisolationvalvesatthesevencontainmentpurgeventilationpenetrations.ProvidedatiedownsystemwithblowoutpanelsonthepurgesystemductworkexteriortothecontainmentwhichcouldbecomemissilesanddamageClassIsafetyequipmentintheareaifsuchductworkweresubjectedtoLOCApressures.Installedquickreleasevalvesintheairlinesatthosecontainmentpurgeisolationvalveswhichdonotmeeta5-secondclosuretimefollowingacontainmentisolationsignal.RFCDC-01-2354callsformodificationstotheUnit1ContainmentPurgeSupplyandExhaustSystemtocomplywiththeNRC'sBranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-4.ThesemodificationsweremadetoUnit2asindicatedinourresponsetoguestion022.4and022.13inAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThegenericNRCletterofNovember28,1978requiredthatalloperatingplantswhodesiretocontinuepurgingbemodifiedtocomplywithB.T.P.CSB6-4orjustifyotherwise.TheNRCisconcernedabouttheabilityofthePurgeSystemisolationvalves=tocloseunderthedynamicforcesassociatedwithaLOCA.ThePurgeSystemisolationvalvesareSeismicClassIandarerequiredtofunctionduringadesignbasisaccident.Assuch,thisRFCisconsideredtobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafety8LicensingSectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightofourpastNRCcorrespondenceandmeetingsonthismatter,.Thi,sRFCis,consistentwiththecommitmentsmadeinourJanuary4,1979lettertotheNRC(AEP:NRC:00114).RFCDC-01-2354doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.
17DC-02-2355Thetemporaryanti-rotationaIdevicesonthepartlengthcontrolroddevicemechanism(CRDM)leadscrewswerereplacedwithpermanentdevicesonUnit~2oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.PlanstoinstallthepermanentdeviceswerereportedtotheNRCinlettersAEP:NRC:00117andAEP:NRC:00190concerningFSARAmendmentNo.83.Theinstallationofthepermanentdevicesisexpectedtosaveconsiderableoutagetimeandhumanradiationexposureduetoeliminationoftheneedforperiodicinspections.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausecontrolrodassembliesareSeismicClassI,havethepotentialforinterferingwithotherSiesmicClassIsystems,andaredescribedintheFSAR.ThestressanalysisistobeprovidedbyWestinghouse.ThisRFCdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2361ThefollowingmodificationsweremadetotheContainmentRecirculationSumpinbothUnitsoftheD.C.CookNuclearplant;1.Removaloftheperforatedplatebelowthesumpoutletpipes.(8lockageofthisplatewasshowntoproduceswirlwhichmaybeundesirable.)2.Extensionoftheexistingventpipetoanelevationabovethemaximumlevelpossibleinthecontainmentduringanaccident,3.Modificationofthesecondarysumprooftoincorporateaslopedrooftoallowmoreeffectiveventingoftheprimarysump.'.8oringventholesinthetopcoveroftheprimarysumpupstreamofthecranewalltoallowairtoescapefrombeneaththiscover.5.Modificationofthesumpinlettoincorporatebothcoarseandfinescreens.ThesemodificationsareaddressedinanAldenResearchLaboratory(ARL)report,"HydraulicModelInvestigationofVortexingandSwirllljthinaReactorContainmentRecirculationSump."Inaddition,acommitmentwasmadetoperformthesemodificationsduringthefirstandfourthRefuelingOutageonUnit82andUnit41respectively(AEP:NRC:00110)..
ThisRFCcallsforvariousstructuralmodificationsandadditionstothecontainmentrecirculationsump.SincethesumpisanintegralcomponentoftheEmergencyCoreCoolantSystem(ECCS)andassuchisSeismicClassI,theRFCwasdeemedtobesafetyrelated.Evenwithouttheproposedmodifications,thesumpwasshowntoperformacceptablyasdemon-stratedbymodeltestingperformedbyAldenResearchLaboratory(ARL).However,ARLdidsuggestcertainchangeswhichwouldfurtherimprovethesumpperformanceandthoserecommendationsarethebasisfortheRFC.ThesechangeswillimprovethealreadysatisfactoryperformanceofasafetyfunctionandassuchdonotconstititeanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59.DC-12-2385A"unittrip"uponlossofbothmainfeedwaterpumpswasinstalledonbothUnitsoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Asignalderivedfromthefeedpumpturbinestopvalveclosuretripcircuit(lossoffeedpump)wasprovidedtotriptheMainTurbinedirectly,ATurbineTripabove105power(reactorandturbinepower)willalsoresultinatripoftheReactor.ThisnewtripsignalwasaddedtoprovideadditionalmarginintheSteamGeneratorsecondarysidewaterinventoryintheeventofalossofthemainfeedwaterpumps.ThecircuitinvolvedisnotClassIEandthemechanicalequipmentinvolvedisSeismicClassIII.TheReactorTripcircuit(above10Ãpower)derivedfromaTurbineTrip,andviceversa,alreadyexists.TgedirectReactorTripsignalswhichcanbederivedfromalossofsecondaryheatsinktransientsare:1.Low-LowSteamGeneratorwaterlevel.2.LowSteamGeneratorwaterlevelincoincidencewithsteamflow/feedflowmismatch.3.PressurizerPressure-high.4.OvertemperatureAT.5.LowSteamlinepressure.6.ContainmentPressure-high.Theloss(orpartialloss)ofsecondaryheatsinktransientswhichareanalyzedintheFSARarethelossofnormalfeedwater,lossofload,loadrejection,turbinetrip,mainsteamisolationvalveclosure,feed-watersystemmalfunction,mainfeedwaterlinebreakaccident,andmainsteamlinebreakaccident.Anyoneoftheabovereactortripsignalsmeetstherequirementsofthesafetyanalysisandarerequiredtobeoperable'yourTechnicalSpecifications.Thesafetyanalysisshowsthatforalossofnormalfeedwater(mainfeedpumptrip)thereisadequate 19.secondarysidewaterinventorytopreventunacceptablesafetyrelatedconsequencesandthattheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemprovidesthenecessaryheatsinktoremovedecayheat.Theadditionofthisnewtripsignalshouldprovideaddedmargintothealreadyadequatesecondarywaterinventoryduringamainfeedpumptriptransientandassuchthereisnosafetyanalysisrequirementforthistriptooccur(nocreditistakenforit).Low-lowsteamgeneratorwaterlevelorlowsteamgeneratorwaterlevelcoincidentwithsteamflow/feedflowmismatchtypicallyindicatethelossofmainfeedpumpsandprovideadequatetripsignalsaspartoftheReactorPro-tectionSystem.ThisnewtripcircuitbeinginstalledunderRFC-OC-12-2385isnotpartoftheReactorProtectionSystem,however,itdoes,ineffect,provideanadditionalReactorTripSignalwhenthereactorandturbinepowerareabove10KandassuchRFC-DC-12-2385isconsideredtobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafetyandLicensingSectionhasalsoreviewedRFC-OC-12-2385inlightoftherecentanalysisperformedasaresultoftheTHI-2accident.Thisanalysisshowsthatintheunlikelyeventofalossofmainfeedwaterandthesimultaneouslossofauxiliaryfeedwaterwiththereactorinitiallyat100Kpower,thesecondarysidewaterinventorywouldboiloffinapproximately42to45minutes.Areactortripwouldoccurinapproximately11to13secondsonSF/FFmismatchcoincidentwithlowS/Gwaterlevel.Thislongperiodoftimeforboiloff'isattributedtothelargesecondarysidewaterinventorywhichexistsinthesteamgenerator.RFC-DC-12-2385hasnosignificanteffectonmitigatingtheconsequencesofsuchatransientatCookPlantandatbestwillresultinanearlierTurbine/Reactortrip.Ifthisnewtripcircuitdidnotfunction,thesafetyanalysisrequirementsaremetwiththeReactorProtectiontripcircuitsdescribedabove.Assuch,theeffectofRFC-DC-12-2385ontheconsequencesoflossofnormalfeedwatertransientsisintheconservativedirection.TheNuclearSafetyandLicensingSectionhasnoreasontoobjecttotheinstallationofthisnewtripcircuit,underRFC-DC-12-2385.Trippingthereactorsoonerforalossoffeedpumpeventisintheconservativedirectionbypreservingsomeadditionalsecondarysidewaterinventoryforthisparticulartransient.ThispositiveaspectleadsustoconcludethatRFC-OC-12-2385hasnonegativeeffectonplantsafety.RFC-OC-12-2385doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnoritconstitutesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.ThisRFCwillnot,inanyway,adverselyeffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.OC-12-2387TheSafetyInjectionactuationlogicwas'odifiedtoremove"lowpressurizerwaterlevel"asacoincidentparameterwith"lowpressurizerpressure."SafetyInjectionwillnowbeactuatedbya2outof3signalfrompressurizerpressureonly.
20ThismodificationassuressafetyinjectionactuationforPressurizersteamspacebreaksandothersmallbreakLOCA's.ThenewactuationmethodisboundedbythecurrentaccidentanalysescontainedintheFSAR.Atwooutofthreelogicisnecessarytoavoidspuriousactuationsofsafetyinjectioninaccordancewithapplicablecriteria.TheabovemodificationstothelogicwererequiredbytheNRCinactionitem3ofIE8ulletin79-06A,Revision1followingtheTNI-2accident.LicenseAmendmentNo.29forUnit1,andAmendmentNo.11forUnit2wereissuedbytheNRCandincorporatedthelogicchangesmadeunderthisRFCintotheCookPlantTechnicalSpecifications.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausethelogicmodificationsarebeingperformedontheRPS/ESFAS(ReactorProtectionSystem/EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem)circuits'whichareClassIE.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2392TheEmergencyDieselGeneratorbreakercontrolcircuitrywasmodifiedtoassurebreakerclosing.IfalossofnormalpoweroccurswhileoneDieselGeneratoroutputbreakerislockedout,theDieselGeneratorEnginewillautomaticallystart.Aftersensingthe4KVlossofvoltageontheoppositebus,thebreakerwhichwaslockedoutwillcloseintothedeadbusautomaticallyafterthecontrolswitchisremovedfromlock-outandplacedintothe"aftertrip"orneutralposition.Intheeventthatthebreakercontrolswitchisinthelock-outposition(thisconditionisalarmed),thesecircuitmodificationswillallowtheoperatortoclosethebreaker,therebyenergizingtheESFbuseswiththedieselgeneratorrunning.Thismodificationeliminatestheneedfortheoperatortostopthediesel,closethebreakerandrestartthedieselunderthiscondition.ThisRFCaddsanadditionallevelofdefenseformanualcontrolofthedieselgeneratorcircuitsandisnotrequiredbytheNRC.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausemodificationsaretobemadetothedieselgeneratorcircuitswhichareClassIE.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstititeanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2395RFC-DC-12-2395modifiedtheReactorprotectionSystemSafeguardsactuationandresetcircuit.ThesubjectRFCincludes:1.Providingsealedcoverswhichblockoperatoraccesstotheresetswitch.2.Alarmingtheresetconditionofanysafeguardsoutputsignalwhetherornotautomaticsafetyactuationsignalsareblockedbythisaction.3.HardwireatripclosesignalfromContainmentisolation-PhaseAdirectlytoeachContainmentpurgesupplyandexhaustisolationvalvesuchthataContainmentVentilationIsolationsignalcanbeover-ridden,thepurgevalvesre-opened,andasubsequentPhaseAsignalwillautomaticallytripthevalvesclosed.
A ThismodificationwasinstalledattheNRC'srequesttopreventmanuallyoverridingcontainmentisolationsignalstoallowcontinuedpurgingwithanisolationsignalpresent.21ThisRFCisconsideredtobesafetyrelatedbecausethesafeguardactuationcircuitsareClassIEEquipmentandarerequiredtofunctionunderadesignbasisaccident.ThesemodificationsareconsistentwiththedesignbasisofthesafeguardsactuationcircuitsfortheCookPlant.Assuch,theNS8LSectionhasnoreasontoobjectthemodificationsbeinginstalledunderthesubjectRFC.RFC-DC-12-2395doesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.ThisRFCwill,infact,preventinadvertantover-ridingofsafetyactuationsignalsandwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2406TheSteamGeneratorLo-LoLevelReactorTrip/AuxiliaryFeedwater.pump..;startsetpointswererevisedfrom115to15/inUnit>1andfrom17!to21%inUnit82.ReviewoftheFSARSteamLineBreakAnalysisfortheD.C.CookPlant,whichboundsthemainfeedlinebreak,showsthecontainmenttemperatureincreasestolessthan330'F,However,thecontainmenttemperatureneverexceeds200'FpriortoreceivingacontainmentRegion1highpressuretripwhichproducesareactortripandauxiliaryfeedwateractuation.Acontainmenttemperatureof200'Fcorrespondstoacorrectionof45inSteamGeneratorLevel.ThisRFCcallsforchangingthesetpointsforareactortripfromthesteamgeneratorwaterlevellow-lowlogicchannels.Thismodificationisnecessaryinordertoproperlyaccountfortemperatureeffectsinthereferencelegduringadesignbasisaccident.Thenon-conservativeaspectofthewaterlevelsettingswerereportedgenericallytotheNRCbyWesting-houseinaccordancewith10CFR21.ACookspecificreviewhasdeterminedthatthewaterlevelbiasindicatedbyWestinghouse,althoughapplicable,didnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordiditconstituteanun-reviewedsafetyquestion.CorrespondinglythisRFCaddssafetymargintotheCookPlantsetpointsanddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59, 22DC-12-2440Anacousticalmonitoringsystemwas.installed..onbothUni.tsof'heD.C.CookNuclearPlanttoprovidedirectandreliableindicationofthepositionofthePressurizerPORV'sandsafetyvalves.ThesystemconsistsoffouraccelerometersassensingelementsandanLEDdisplayasanoutputmonitor.TheLEDdisplayismountedintherodcontrolpanelintheControlRoom.Eachpressurizerreliefvalve(SV-45A,B,C)hasanaccelerometerstrappedtoitsdischargepipe.ThefourthaccelerometerisstrappedtothecommonheaderatthedischargeofthePORV's.TheControlRoomdisplayhasfourseparatechannels,oneforeachaccelerometer.Eachoutputchannelhasaseriesof10LEDdisplaylights.Thisverticaldisplayoflightsissequencedtocomeoninstepsindicatingrelativevalveflow.Thismodificationisrequiredforcompliancewithrecommendation2.1.3.aofNUREG-0578entitled,"TNI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShort-TermRecommendations."TheNRC'sletterSeptember.13,.1979assupplemented,requiredimplementedofthis"LessonsLearned"recommen-dation.Theacousticmonitoringsystemwillindicatewhetherornotthereisanyflowthroughthesevalvestherebygivingtheoperatoranearlyindi-cationofapossiblestuckopenvalve.Sincethesevalvesarepartofthereactorcoolantsystempressureboundary,astuckopenvalveisequivalenttoasmallloss-of-coolantaccident.NUREG-0578requiresthattheoperatortakeappropriateactionstoisolatethereliefpath,ifpossible,andterminateRCSdepressurization.Henceareliableanddirectindicationisneeded.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausetheNRCrequiresittobeasafetygrade,ClassIE,SeismicClassIacousticmonitoringsystem.ThisRFCisbeinginstalledinaccordancewithandsimi1'artotheapplicablecriteriaaspresentedintheFSAR.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.DC-12-2450Theexistingcontainmentpressure.transmitterswererespannedtoincreasetherangeformonitoringofcontainmentpressures.ThelowercontainmentpressuretransmittersPPP-300,301,302and303wererespannedto-5to+12psig,(previouslyspanhadbeen-1to+15psig).Thelowercontainmentpressuretripsetpointsremainthesameonlythetransmitterspanandindicatorscaleswerechanged.Alsorespannedweretheuppercontainmentwiderangepressuretransmitters,PPA-310and312,to-5to+36psig(fromprevious-1to+12Psig).
v~lThismodificationwasimplementedinaccordancewiththerequirements-'bfNURE6-0578,"LessonsLearned"(ACRSItem"ContainmentPressureIndication")whichrequiredthatthesensinginstrumentationbecapableofmonitoringapressurerangeof-5psigto3Xcontainmentdesignpressure.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecauseitinvolvesClassIequipmentwhosecircuitsareClassIEandistheNRCrequirementthattheseindicationsbesafetydoesnotcreateasubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.changestoSeismicincompliancewithgrade.ThisRFCitconstituteanDC-12-2452AnadditionalalarmwasinstalledtoindicateLow-LowwaterlevelintheCondensateStorageTank.Thisalarmwillannunciatewhentheremaininglevelinthetankcanonlysupplyenoughwaterfor20minutesoperationoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.ThisinstallationfulfillsacommitmentmadetotheNRC(AEP:NRC:00300)toimplementtheLow-LowlevelalarmbyJanuary1,1980asrequiredbyNUREG-0578.ThisRFCisnotsafetyrelatedsinceitonlyservestoalerttheoperatortothiscon'dition.ThisRFCaddsanadditionallevelofdefense-in-depthtotheengineeredsafetyfeaturesintheCookPlant.ThisRFCdoesnotcreatesubstantialsafetyhazardnordoesitconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.