ML18152A523

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Rev 0 to Motor-Operated Valve Action Plan.
ML18152A523
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1989
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18152A524 List:
References
PROC-890419, NUDOCS 8904270059
Download: ML18152A523 (17)


Text

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE ACTION PLAN SURRY POWER STATION REVISION 0 APRIL 19, 1989 MAM06-PED-1

3'?04270059 :390419 F'DR ADOCr< 050002::::0 F' PDC

e TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF MOY ISSUES 1 3.0 APPLICATION ENGINEERING 3.1 Reconstitution of Design Requirements. 2 3.2 Control Switch Settings. 3 3.3 Hardware Modifications 3 4.0 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES 4.1 Deviation Report/Maintenance History Review. . . . 4 4.2 Review of Diagnostic Test Results Since Mid-1988 . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3 Inspection of Internal Components. 5 4.4 MOV Testing. . . . . . 5 4.5 Engineering Evaluations. 6 5.0 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM CONTROLS 5.1 Training Improvements. 6 5.2 Document Revisions . . 6 5.3 Transition into the MOV Program. 7

6.0 CONCLUSION

S 7 TABLE 1 FIGURE 1 MAM06-PED-l

MDV ACTION PLAN

1.0 INTRODUCTION

IE Bulletin 35:03 dated November 15, 1985 and Supplement 1 dated April 27, 1988 recommended the development and implementation of a program to verify that MDV switch settings in the high pressure safety injection and auxiliary feedwater systems are set and maintained to

'ensure that the MOV s will operate urider design basis conditions. An 1

internal review of station Deviation Reports written on safety-related MOVs in the last six months of 1988 identified several areas that warranted improvement.

Virginia Power has implemented an extensive review and corrective action project to assure through systematic analysis, comprehensive maintenance and testing activities that the safety-related MOVs are capable of performing their intended safety function. This review is being applied to valves and operators beyond those specified by IEB 85-03.

2.0 APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF MOV ISSUES The purpose of this action plan is to outline the principle activities of the project. The scope of work has been divided into three major categories: application engineering review, maintenance activities and component testing. Criteria have been developed as required for each task to guide the evaluation effort and to ensure consistency throughout the project. The process initiated to address each of these categories is discussed as follows and illustrated in Figure 1. Application

  • engineering issues are being evaluated through two.activities:
1. a reconstitution of the MDV design requirements; and
2. a review of operating history for evaluation of appropriate application/installation.

Issues associated with maintenance are being investigated through three activities:

1. field verification of MOV electrical and mechanical physical conditions;
2. a review of Deviation Reports and maintenance work history for adequacy of corrective actions; and
3. a review of previous diagnostic *test results for indications of potential performance problems.

MAM06-PED-1

e e A final verification of the capability of the MOV is provided by the post-maintenance testing. In those cases where there is an indication that adequate operating margin is not ~rovided, corrective actions will be implemented. The individual activities within the project are presented in greater detail in the following sections.

3.0 APPLICATION ENGtNEERING 3.1 Reconstitution of Design Requirements The purpose of this .task is to evaluate the design considerations associated with safety-related motor operated valves. The overall objectives of the effort are:

1. to determine the original design bases for the currently installed configuration to the degree allowed by existing design documentation;*
2. to establish the capability of the safety-related motor operatP.d valves to perform their designed safety function under both normal and postulated Design Basis conditions; and
3. to devel0p the corrective action for those instances where adequate operating margin does not exist.

The scope of the MOVs under this action plan was determined based on the MOVs' contribution to critical plant functions. Through a review of the Safety-Related Equipment List and EmergeAcy Operating Procedures, a list of safety-related valves has been compiled and provided in Table 1. The evaluation of safety~related MOVs that are required for design basis accident mitigation will be completed prior to start-up. The remaining safety-related MOVs will be evaluated in accordance with the MOV Program Plan.

The approach to be taken in this current evaluation is a function of valve type. Torque seated rising stem valves (gate, globe) will be evaluated separately fro~ position seated quarter-turn valves (butterfly, plug). The difference in approach is due to the information required for valve setup using diagnostic test equipment.

For quarter turn valves, the as-built configuration of the MOVs

. will be confirmed.* The control circuit wiring will be reviewed and standardized. The torque switch will be reset such that it is effectively removed from the circuit. This conservative policy was selected to avoid an inadv~rtent torque switch trip. Pertinent design information will be obtained from the valve manufacturer and recommended torque switch settings will be determined after start-up.

Design criteria have been developed and documented in Engineering Standard GN-0002 11 MOV Sizing and Calculation Standard" to ensure MAM06-PED-1

e e consistency in the mechanical evaluation of rising stem valves.

This evaluation includes consideration of .the fluid system pressures acting on the valve components, the safety function of the valve, the actuator interrials including gear ratios, frictio~

factors; and the overall thrust/torque rating of the actuator.

From an electrical standpoint, the minimum available motor torque output will be considered. Supporting electrical equipment will be reviewed to assure adequate sizing.

The control circuit wiring will be revi~wed and standardized to

~llow independently adjustable limit switches and separation of the control and indication switch functions. Control switches will be reset as required. Elementary diagrams have been redrawn for each MOV circuit for clarity and ease of use in the field.

The data developed from this review will be documented and retained as part of the final data package assembled for each valve. These packages will be filed in a manner wh{ch will ensure retrievability in the future to support further design questions or activities.

3.2 Control Switch Settings The philosophy for setting the MOV control switches, developed during the IEB 85-03 effort has been reviewed. The previous policy has been revised for rising stem MOVs in two respects. First, _the percentage of torque switch bypass has been increased from a typical 5-10% to 20-25% of the stroke in the direction that is not*

safety signal actuated.

It is recognized that under flow conditions, bypassing the torque switch for a longer percentage of the stroke is required to overcome the unseating forces. The advantage of this change will be realized for those valves whose non-automatic direction is to open. The existing policy to bypass the torque switch for 85% of valve travel in the automatic safety direction still applies.

The second change provides a more conservative approach to setting the torque switch. The previous policy set the torque switch trip within a calculated minimum and maximum thrust band without consideration of the actual running load. The current approach considers the thrust at torque switch trip and reduces it by the actual running load to determine the thrust available to overcome the maximum differential pressure. This available thrust is then s~t above the minimum thrust of the target band.

3.3 Hardware Modifications Hardware modifications required to increase operating margin will be identified during the review process and implemented this outage. The extent of these modifications could range from spring pack changes to operator replacements. The required modification for rising stem MOV limit switch adjustments and wiring changes, MAM06-PED-1

e e are provided in EWR 89-127 (Unit 1) and EWR-89-137 (Unit 2). The instructions for quarter turn MOV torque switch adjustments are provided in EWR-89-131 (Unit 1) and EWR-89-138 (Unit 2).

4.0 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES 4.1 Deviation Repo~t/Maintenance History Review The recent increase in the level of sensitivity to problems encountered in the field has resulted in an corresponding increase in the number of deviations filed. A three phase process has been established and applied since January, 1988 for reviewing the deviations on safety-related MOVs.

The purpose of the initial phase is to identify the root cause of the deviation and to recommend corrective action. Additionally, past deviations (1986 forward) are reviewed to identify repeat problems and review the adequacy of corrective action taken. Since there may be several deviations on any one MOV, this approach will ensure that the maintenance required to correct the problems are identified and performed at one time. In support of the root cause evaluation process, the maintenance history from the last five years wi11 be reviewed for each MOV. The review will fo~us on the description of corrective work performed and component repair or replacement to detect problems of a repetitive nature. The post 1983 maintenance* summaries were selected because they will give the most current and relevant information about the identified problems. In some cases, it may not be possible to identify the root cause of the deviation without additional information on the exact system condition that existed during the time of the reported malfunction.

The purpose of the second phase i~ to document the actual work performed in response to the recommendations made in phase one.

The final phase of the deviation review process involves those actions required to close out the deviation. This will include a formal response identifying the root cause and documenting the work performed. In addition to a review of deviations on individual MOV s the entire population of deviations is being evaluated to 1

identify any generic problems that require programmatic improvement. The deviations will be processed in accordance with the Station Administrative Procedures. Any corrective actions not completed prior to start-up will be tracked with long term recommendations through the appropriate Station Commitment Tracking System. -

4.2 Review of Diagnostic Testing Since Mid-1988 A significant amount of testing has been performed on MOVs over the last several years. Results from tests performed since mid 1988 have been reviewed with the objective of identifying any corrective actions that have not been addressed and that are required prior to MAM06-PED-1

e implementation of a final procedure to reset control switches and standardize the wiring.

Trained engineering resources have been dedicated to review the results of diagnostic testing. A procedure (NE-SSE0-009, 11 Review of Motor Operated Valve Test Data") has been implemented to assure a complete and consistent review of this test data prior to returning the component to operable status. Both immediate actions and long term trending recommendations are considered and documented. Station Maintenance procedures which govern the actual performance of the test have been reviewed and revised to ensure integration of the data acquisition and subsequent Engineering review of test results.

4.3 Inspection of Internal Components Based on review of NRC IE notices and bulletins, INPO SER's, SOER's, and maintenance history and deviations, several issues have surfaced both within Virginia Power and throughout the industry that have required inspection of electrical and mechanical components within the motor operator.

The operators were inspected for possible damage to wiring (pinched or bent wires and improper crimped wire lugs), lubricant problems (overgreasing, mixed greases, grease contamination and grease hardening) and component deficiencies (gear sets, spring packs, tripper fingers, melamine and SMA torque switches).

  • Inspection plans were developed and expanded based on the inspection results for specific attributes. The inspection and acceptance/repair criteria are documented in Engineering Work Requests88-485 and 89-061.

4.4 MOV Testing Safety-related valves reviewed prior to start-up will be retested using diagnostic equipment. This will provide the confidence that both the valve and operator will operate properly.

A representative sample of tested MOVs will under go differential pressure testing while instrumented with diagnostic equipment.

This testing will validate the methodology for determining the control switch settings and provide additional verification that the MOV is capable of performing as intended. The selection of MOVs for dynamic testing will be based on criteria pertaining to equivalency of MOV design and operating characteristics as well expected differential pressure requirements. The MOVs will be grouped with respect to similarities in the actuator, valve, and operating characteristics. For each group a feasibility evaluation will be performed to determine the plant conditions required for full or partial differential pressure test conditions. One MOV from each group of equivalent MOVs capable of being tested will be selected.

MAM06-PED-1

e e For non-IEB 85-03

  • MOVs, those that are less than 8 11 in size that will experience low pressure and differential pressure conditions (less than 100 psi) will be exempt from testing. The basis for this is that the calculated differential pressure-related thrust requirement will be relatively small and will be conservatively accommodated by the torque switch . settings verified through diagnostic testing under static conditions. For non-IEB 85-03 MOVs, tho.se that have a safety function to open only will be exempt from differential pressure testing since these will have a minimum of 20% open-disk bypass and the advantage of the piston effect.

4.5 Engineering Evaluations During the course of the review, some generic issues have been identified. Currently, the major issues are operator grease discrepancies and high motor current. The primary deficiency identified with the grease issue is that the inspection criteria are subjective and the acteptance criteria are not well defined.

Qualitative inspection criteria have been developed using industry data, manufacturer and engineering recommendations, and station experience. Station preventative maintenance procedures will be revised to intlude these criteria.

During diagnostic testing some MOVs have been noted as drawing high curr~nt. Several variables which could contribute to this condition are being investigated. MOVs noted as drawing high current during diagnostic testing will undergo engineering evaluation prior to start-ur.

Additional engineering evaluations include disposition of overthrusting conditions noted during diagnostic testing, These MOVs will be evaluated on a case by case basis.

5.0 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM CONTROLS 5.1 Training Improvements Training is recognized*as an ~s~en~i~l element to a successful MOV

. program. The Tra'ining Dep*artment. has reviewed the content of lesson plans against the recommendations in the INPO guideline published in the 11 Motor Operated Valve Performance Update 11 document. Necessary enhancements have been made to the training plans and the minimum level of tr~ining for personnel working on MOVs has been documented. The credentials and on-the-job performance of those currently working on MOVs have been reviewed and determined to be fully acceptable. Training of future personnel will be conducted in accordance with the MOV program requirements.

5.2 Document Revisions Virginia Power will establish a MOV program which assures continued regulatory compliance and consistency.

MAM06-PED-1 This program will be implemented in accordance with the current schedule provided in Attachment II. A governing station adm'inistrative procedure win be in place outlining the requirements for implementation at Surry Power Station.* Procedures will be in place for tracking and trending of performance, troubleshooting, and root cause analysis of MOV deficiencies. The trending program will review and trend motor operator data to identify equipment degradations before they become "significant.

Selected trend data will be included in a periodic report which will provide an indication of the program effectiveness.

5.3 Transition into the MOV Program The MOV Program Plan will ensure, through inspection/verification on a periodic basis, that the trending program and signature review process is effective. The program requires on a

  • refueling cycle basis, the teardown and inspection of certain Motor Operators. The candidates will be both those MOVs that have indicated acceptable performance, and t~ose suspected of degradations. The teardown process will validate the condition that the trending and signature review process predict. The number of MOVs, and the frequency of teardown will be based on plant specific experience and industry operating experience.

During the transition period between plant start-up and full MOV Program Plan implementation, additional periodic assessments will be provided by the Quality Assurance Department. These assessments will be presented periodically after unit start-up to the Virginia Power Management Safety Review Committee. The focus will be on the effectiveness of the program and the progress towards full implementation of the MOV Program Plan.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The actions* as outlined above will resolve, prior to start-up, the critical issues associated with MOVs to provide the necessary assurance they will function as required for safe plant operation. Specifically, these actions will document that the application of the safety-related MOVs is correct and will verify adequate margin exists to meet their design function. Additionally, actions to correct the root cause of MOV deviations and repetitive corrective maintenance activities will be implemented. Activities necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in this condition will be accomplished through implementation of the MOV Program Plan. This integrates engineering and maintenance activities with strong testing requirements and ensures ongoing management support.

MAM06-PED-l TABLE 1 The following is a list of safety-related MOVs that require review prior to start-up. This list has been compiled from controlled document sources.

Unit 1 Rising Stem CH-1267A,B FW-151A,B,C,D,E,F CH-1269A,B Hl-160A,B CH-1270A,B PG-107A,B,C CH-1275A,B,C RC-1535 CH-1286A,B,C RC-1536 CH-1287A,B,C SI-1842 CH-1289A,B SI-1860A,B CH-1350 SI-1863A,B CH-1370 SI -1864.A., B CH-1373 SI-1865A,B,C CH-1381 SI-1867C,D CH-LCV-1115B,C,D,E SI-1869A,B CS-lOOA,B SI-1885A,B,C,D CS-102A,B SI-1890A,B,C CS-103A,B,C,D Quarter Turn CS-lOlA,B,C,D CW-lOOA,B,C,D CW-106A,B,C,D RS-155A,B RS-156A,B SI-1862A,B SW-101A,B SW-102A,B SW-103A,B,C,D SW-104A,B,C,D SW-105A,B,C,D I

MAM06-PED-1 J

Unit 2 Rising Stein CH-2267A,B CH-2269A,B RC-2536 CH-2270A,B SI-2842 CH-2275A,B,C SI-2860A,B CH-2286A,B,C SI-2863A,B CH-2287A,B,C SI-2864A,B CH-2289A,B SI-2865A,B,C CH-2350 SI-2867C,D CH-2370 SI-2869A,B CH-2373 SI-2885A,B,C,D CH-2381 SI-2890A,B,C CH-LCV-2115B,C,D,E CS-200A,B CS-202A,B CS-203A,B,C,D FW-251A,B,C,D,E,F FW-260A,B RC-2535 Quarter Turn CS-201A,B,C,D Cv/-200A,B,C,D 0/-206A,B,C,D RS-255A,B RS-256A,B SI-2862A,B SW-201A,B SW-202A,B SW-203A,B,C,D SW-204A,B,C,D S\1-205A,B,C,D MAM06-PED-1

e e This list does not include the following safety-related valves for the reasons noted:

RC 1585/2585 Reactor Coolant Bypass Line Valves RC 1586/2586 Safety-Related for pressure boundary, locked RC 1587/2587 closed, not invoked by EOPs RC 1590/2590 Reactor Coolant Primary Loop Isolation Valves RC 1591/2591 Safety-Related for pressure boundary, locked RC 1592/2592 open, not invoked by EOPs RC 1593/2593 RC 1594/2594 RC 1595/2595 The Residual Heat Removal System is not required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. It is intended for long-term heat removal when the RCS temperatute and pressure are l*ess than 350°F/450 psig.

RH 100/200 RHR to RWST Isolation Safety-Related for pressure boundary, locked closed, backed by manual iso_lation valves RH 1700/2700 Inlet and Outlet Valves for the RH System RH 1701/2701 Safety-Related for pressur~ boundary, locked RH 1720A/2720A closed during normal plant operation RH 1720B/2720B SW 106A,B/206A,B Currently removed from service MAM06-PED-l

FIGURE 1

!Nl@W &©tJO@OO lPlb&OO I Safety Related MOVs I

I I I I __. . . I.____.,_-_-_-_-

. . .--::::::::~-'---------

.

Reconstitution

-

Operating Physical of History Condition* MOV Design Reqmts Review Review Testing I

1/4 Turn Rising Stem Maintenance HI story/ Inspections & Mid 1988 Test Configuration Configuration Deviation Report Evaluations Result Verification Verification Review Review Root Cause ...

Evaluation -

I Control Switch I I e

Hardware Corrective Adjustments Modifications Maintenance C As ReQulred )

I I I I

Differential. Pressure Test

( As Required)

I Test Result

... Deviation Closeout Evaluations

ATIACHMENT2 SURRY POWER STATION MOV PROGRAM & IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

e e VIRGINIA POWER NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE MANUAL MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . PURPOSE 2.0 ................... SCOPE

3.0 REFERENCES

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

5. 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
5. 0.1 ............. ORGANIZATION / MOV TEAM 5.1 ................... BASIS FOR PROGRAM 5.2 ................... INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS 5.3 ................... PROGRAM DEFINITIONS 5.3.1 ............ ; MAINTENANCE WORK FLOW PROCESS 5.3.2 ............. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
5. 3. 3 .. .. . .. . .. . .. TRENDING PROGRAM

. 5.3 .4 INSPECTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM 5 .3. 5* ............ . ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS PROGRAM 5.4 ................... MOV DIAGNOSTICS/ TESTING REQ.

5.5 ................... POST MAINTENANCE TESTING 5.6 ...................

  • SWITCH SETTING POLICIES 5.7 - .................... EQUIPMENT IN PROGRAM 6.0 ................... TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
  • 7.0 ................... EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW 8.0 ................... DOCUMENTATION ATTACHMENT 1 "IDEAL" SIGNATURE TRACE-TMD & SWITCH 0-C ATTACHMENT 2 "IDEAL" SIGNATURE TRACE-TMD &SWITCH C-0 ATTACHMENT 3 11 IDEAL 11 SIGNATURE TRACE-CURRENT & SW 0-C ATTACHMENT 4 "IDEAL". SIGNATURE TRACE-CURRENT &SW C-0

DRAFT MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE DRAFT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

1. DEVELOP MOTOR OPERATED VAVLE PROGRAM DRAFT 4-5-89
2. PRESENT DRAFT PROGRAM TO SURRY 4-6-89 3* PRESENT DRAFT PROGRAM TO NORTH ANNA 4-7-89
4. PROGRAM REVISIONS; COMMENTS & FORMAT .4-25-89 FINAL PROGRAM
1. NUCLEAR OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT MAmJAL MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM READY FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT SIGNATURES 4-28-89 PROCEDURES
1. DEVELOP STATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 5-15-89 2* DEVELOP STATION DEPT ADM MAINTENANCE 5-30-89 OPERATIONS 5-30-89 TRAINING 5-30-89
3. REVIEW AND REVISE IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL PM'S AND CM'S NORTH ANNA 7-1-89 SURRY 7-1-89 PERSONNEL
1. ASSIGN MOV COORDINATOR NORTH ANNA 5-1-89 SURRY 5-1-89
2. ASSIGN MOV ENGINEER NORTH ANNA 6-1-89 SURRY 6-1-89
3. ASSEMBLE TEMPORARY MOV TEAM 6-1-89 4
  • ASSIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANT NORTH ANNA ~ 7-1-89 SURRY 7-1,-89

TRAINING

1. COMPLETE MOV COORDINATOR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS NORTH ANNA 8-30-89 SURRY 8-30-89
2. COMPLETE MOV ENGINEER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS NORTH ANNA 8-30-89 SURRY 8-30-89
3. VIRGINIA POWER "TEAM" MEETS REQUIREMENTS NORTH ANNA 8-30-89 SURRY 8-30-89
4. ADDITIONAL STATION PERSONNEL PLANNING, OPERATIONS, CRAFTS, ETC ...

NORTH ANNA 7-1 TO 8-30-89 SURRY 7-1 TO 8-30-89 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

1. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED NORTH ANNA 9-1-89
2. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED SURRY 9-1-89 NEW POSITIONS APPROVED
1. SUPERVISOR MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING 6-1-89 2* MOV COORDINATOR 6-1-89
3. MOV ENGINEER 6-1-89
4. TECHNICAL ASSISTANT 6-1-89