Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Consolidating AFW cross-connect Requirements by Relocation of Electrical Power Requirements from TS 3.16 to TS 3.6
	ML18152A213
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	02/16/1999
From:	; VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18152A215	List: ML18152A213; ML18152B550;
References
	NUDOCS 9902250138
	Download: ML18152A213 (27)
	v • d • e

ATTACHMENT 2 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 9902250138 990216 PDR ADOCK 05000280 P PDR .:J

TS 3.6-1 I 3.6 JURBlNE CYCLE - 0 i ~2-,0--

Applicability Applies to the operating status cf the Main Steam and Auxiliary Feed Systems.

Objectives To define the conditions required in the Main Steam System and Auxiliary Feed System for protection of the steam generator and to assure the capability to tf..

remove residual heat from the core during a loss of station power/er accident (

situations.

Specification A. A unit's Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure shall net exceed 350°F or 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall net be critical unless the five main steam line code safety valves associated with each steam generator in unisolated reactor coolant loops are Jf,/1'/JI with lift ~

settings as specified in Table 3.6-1A and 3.6-1 B.

B. To assure residual heat removal capabilities, the following conditions shall be met prior to the commencement of any unit operation that would establish reactor coolant system conditions of 350°F or 450 psig which would preclude operation of the Residual Heat Removal System. <:;-

a ppl \J :*

The fellowing shalllaa :e,,miDl&i Two of the three auxiliary feedwater pumps on the opposite unit (automatic initiation instrumentation need hot be

§,,#1,tJ(apable of being used with the opening of the cross-connect.

-A,;,eiidiilen i NOS

143 and Hg

TS 3.6-2 Oi Oi 95

2. A minimum of 96,000 gallons of water shall be available in the protected f condensate storage tank to supply emergency water to the auxiliary

/' Mo\JE-to' .....

feedwater ump suctions. A minimum of 60,000 gallons of water eRsll available in the protected condensate storage tank of the opposite unit to supply emergency water to the auxiliary feedwater pump suction of that se

.:t+ev.v I unit.-------------------------

I ~*h

.\ -

- - 3.

(be.low) J

/

All main steam line code safety valves, associated with steam generators in unisolated reactor coolant loops, shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.6-1A and 3.6-1 B.

Prior to reactor power exceeding 10%, the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump shall be OPERABLE.

D. System piping, valves, and control board i ication required for operation of the components enumerated in Specifications and 3.6.C shall be OPERABLE {automatic initiation instrumentation associated with the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps need not be OPERABLE).

E. The specific activity of the secondary coolant system shall be ~ 0. 1O µCi/cc DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131: If the specific activity of the secondary coolant system exceeds 0.10 µCi/cc DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, the reactor shall be shut down and cooled to 500°F or less within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after detection and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

4. 'The. au.~a'f iav-y .fe~d w~fer cross- c.onll\e.d ca.pabi t;t::)

shall be a\l~ dab)(., <<'- +:,, II oCA.:JS : .

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a.., I ~seRT B. j,,b ~ pre.u ,*0145 p~ije. ~

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b. ,,~seR.T' seUY-)d s~+tM.Ce. ~ B. 2 abo'1t:..)

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c. ~l~SEeT A {;tra.~ed)')

- -. J A~8RQFR8Rt Pth,e. 289 SPIB ~03..

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c. Emergency power supplied to the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps and to the AFW cross-connect valves, as follows:

1. Two diesel generators (the opposite unit's diesel generator and the shared backup diesel generator) JJJI/M with each generators day tank having at least 290 gallons of fuel and with a minimum on-site supply of 35,000 gallons of fuel available.

2. Two 4160V emergency buses energized.

3. Two JJJ/jfjf/ flow paths for providing fuel to the opposite unit's diese(generator and the shared backup diesel generator.

4. Two sta~~n batteries, two chargers and the DC distribution systems /J}#M(!,

5. Emergencl diesel generator battery, charger and the DC control circuitry ,1),. for the opposite unit's diesel generator and for the shared back-up diesel generator.

6. The 480V emergency buses energized which supply power to the auxiliary feedwater cross-connect valves:

a: For AFW from Unit 1 to Unit 2: Buses 1H1 and 1J1.

b: For AFW from Unit 2 to Unit 1: Buses 2H1 and 2J1.

7. One of the two physically independent circuits from the offsite transmission network energizing the opposite unit's emergency buses.

TS 3.6-3 F. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore at least three auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor driven feedwater pumps and one steam driven feedwater pump) to >>Mstatus within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in* cE--

JYr'mf} within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . ~

G. The requirements of Specifications 3.6.B.: ? C 8 a and 3.6.D above concerning the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps; associated piping, valves and control board indication; an~he protected condensate storage tank may be modified to allow the following components to be inoperable, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs.

1.

One train of the opposite unit's piping, valves, and control board, indications or two of the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 14 days.

2.

Both trains of the opposite unit's piping, valves, and control board indications; the opposite unit's protected condensate storage tank; the cross-connect piping from the opposite unit; or three of the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps may be inoperable for a

,. ~riog_nouo e~ed Ii hour!:._ - - - - '\

3. 11~SER, B ~rom p~ TS 3.l~-3) ~

If the ~bOVe niquire'iiienis ar8 noTme!, b8inal iffltmi',M/ within ( "

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in.~_#,,twithin the_nex130 hours. ~

H. The requirements of Specification 3.6.B.2 above may be modified to allow utilization cf protected condensate storage tank water with the auxiliary steam generator feed pumps provided the water level is maintained above 60,000 gallons, sufficient replenishment water is available in the 300,000 gallon condensate storage tank, and replenishment cf the protected condensate storage tank is commenced within two hours after the cessation of protected condensate storage tank water consumption.

..Anleadmeat Nos. 143 and 14&

TS 3.6-3a

..QB 8l! ~8 A reactor which has been shutdown from power requires removal of core residual heat. While reactor coolant temperature~or pressure is> 350°F or 450 psig, respectively, residual heat removal requirements are normally satisfied by steam bypass to the condenser. If the condenser is unavailable, steam can be released to the atmosphere through the safety valves., power operated relief valves. ;r tRe 4 iAefll eeeey flleet ,eleaee liAa O'r ~

,tauendmen e Nos. 1u and 140

e TS 3.6-4

./Ji Q8 95 The capability to supply feedwater to the generators is normally provided by the operation of the Condensate and Feedwater Systems. In the event of complete loss of electrical power to the station, residual heat removal would continue to be assured by the availability of either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the 110,000-gallon protected condensate f storage tank~n the event of a fire or high energy line break which would render the auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable on the affected unit, residual heat removal would continue to be assured by the availability of either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps from the opposite unit. A minimum of two auxiliary feedwater pumps are required to be operable* on the opposite unit to ensure compliance with the design basis accident analysis assumptions, in that auxiliary feedwater can be delivered via the cross-connect, even if a singLe active failure results in the loss of one of the two pumps. Ir\ ~

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The specified minimum water volume in the 110,000-gallon protected condensate storage tank is sufficient for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of residual heat removal following a reactor trip and loss of all offsite electrical power. It is also sufficient to maintain one unit at hot shutdown for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , followed by a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months cooldown from 547°F to 350°F (i.e., RHR operating conditions). If the protected condensate storage tank level is reduced to 60,000 gallons, the immediately available replenishment water in the 300,000-gallon condensate tank can be gravity-fed to the protected tank if required for residual heat removal. An alternate supply of feedwater to the auxiliary feedwater pump suctions is also available from the Fire Protection System Main in the auxiliary feedwater pump cubicle.

The five main steam code safety valves associated with each steam generator have a total combined capacity of 3,842,454 pounds per hour* at their individual relieving ~

pressure; the total combined capacity of all fifteen main steam code safety valves is 11,527,362 pounds per hour. The nominal power rating steam flow is 11,260,000 ;

pounds per hour. The combined capacity of the safety valves required by Specification 3.6 always exceeds the total steam flow corresponding to the maximum steady state power than can be obtained during three reactor coolant loop operation.

.. excluding automatic initiation instrumentation A.s:RaReFRertt Nos. 289 aRd 203

_I

TS 3.9-2

... 7. Two emergency diesel generators /J!~Hff 1lrJ'M' -8 B '"* ' r, as explained in ~

Section 3.16

4!./. The requirements of Specifications 3.9*A items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 may be IJ:::-

modified as provided in Section 3.16-8.

During startup of a unit, the station's 4, 160V and 480V normal and emergency buses are energized from the station's 34.SKV buses. At reactor power levels greater than 5 percent of rated power the 34.SKV buses are required to energize only the emergency buses because at this power level the station generator can supply sufficient power to the normal 4, 160V and 480V lines to operate the unit. ~

Three reactor coolant loop operation with all 4, 160V and 480V buses energized is the normal mode of operation for a unit. i~wi~i:RaRt ir:ait1ft!IP19)' ai=ii 11:11 ~

accangemecis, tiawavai::, all;w 1afe blftit eta.tap and ope1atio11 with 011i 4,168V ~

R&Fi:Ral Iii:.& aRd tbt twa 489V P1e,,,.a1 buses feei t,e,.. ttiiia 4,1&9¥ _aw&. ~

t:Jl"lar,ailable er iftepai::atale ~

TS '3. 16-1

..Q8 82 9Q

3. 16 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM App!icability Applies to the availability of electrical power for safe operation of the station during an emergency.

Objective To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to shutdown the reactor safely, and provide for the continuing availability of Engineered Safeguards when riormal power is not available.

Specification A. A reactor shall not be made critical nor shall a unit be operated such that the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature exceed 450 psig and 350°F, respectively, without:

1. Two diesel generators (the unit diesel generator and the shared backup diesel generator) 1/1/J.l//with each generator's day tank~

having at least 290 gallons of fuel and with a minimum on-site supply of 35,000 gal of fuel available.

2. Two 4, 160V emergency buses energized.

3. Four 480V emergency buses energized.

.ldfte .. dmeri'e tin, 34; 1sd

"* 140

t*

-.J TS 3.16-2 r

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83 a2°,!

4. Two physically independent c, uits from the offsite transmission network to energize the 4,, 60 and 480V emergency buses. One ~

of these sources must be immediately available,Q.e. primary source\ and the other must be capable of being made available I:- ~,.

~

t within Ahour~e. dependable alternate sourc~

I r.

5. Two ///11;/1 flow paths for providing fuel to each diesel ~ t 6.

generafor.

Two station batteries, two chargers, and the DC distribution systems 'HfPlilf t::-

7. Emergen.iesel generator battery, charger and the DC control circuitry for the unit diesel generator and for the shared k back-up ies generator.

8.

i.a. With either unit's dedicated diesel generator or shared backup diesel generator unavailable or inoperable:

i. Verify the operability of two physically independent ottsite AC circuits within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter.

2. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintena~e,.o2r testing, demonstrate the operability of the remaining lf';g.1/,ff diesel generator daily. For the purpose of operability testing, the second diesel generator may be inoperable for a total of two hours per ,~E:.!!J>JOVided the two off site AC circuits have been verified 1'1!1¥1'Y prior to testing.

3. If this diesel generator is not returned to an A - t a t u s within 7 days, the reactor shall be broyiht to f. ~

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and JI!? ~ I ' " within the fo lowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . :W'

, .b.

provided the other flow/is.. proven m*

One diesel fuel oil floJpl: may be "inoperable" for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months If after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the inoperable flow path cannot be returned to service, the. diesel shall be considered "inoperable." When the emergency diesel generator battery, charger or DC control circuitry is inoperable, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable."

AmendrnaA\ Ne9. li? am! lii-

TS 3.iS-3

2. If a primary source is not available, the unit may be operated for seven

(~) ~ays provided the_ ~e~endabl~ alternat_e ~source _can be JHM +.

w1th1n 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . If spec1f1cat1on A-4 ,s not sat1sf1ed within seven (7) days, the unit shall be brought to-tM ;J;; ~#~-ee"elitie". <.-

3. One battery may be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the other battery and battery chargers remain J,JJJ;;I with one battery charger carrying ~

the DC load of the failed battery's supply system. If the battery is not I returned to l.ll(!#f. status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months penoo,the reactor shall be ~

placed in ~ )Wf'-,1~.Jf.*ActitiM. If the battery is not restored to ~

~ status within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed ~

/ ' in ~ .ee .. aitilfl. ~

B -

I

( Mo\/'E ,o') ~

3./ A train \f*~*}?/~osite unit's emergency power system as required by Section . . . atove may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 14 I p. TS 3."-3, days; During this 14 day period, the following limitations apply:

'-' - -w-- a) If the offsite power source becomes unable to energize the opposite unit's J///#!train, operation may continue provided its associated emergency diesel generator is energizing the J/J/f.J!!f train.

,~ +nis b) If the opposite unit's J/11~/ train's emergency diesel generator becomes unavailable, operation may continue for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

~'s

'~ op~i 1,*.,_.~ provided the offsite power source is energizing the opposite unit's is ~lA.+c.Dl." ~~~~train.

Cl c}.,'ts.e.( ~~, c) Return of the originally inoperable train to JJJl/lll' status allows the second inoperable train to raven to the 14 day limitation.

oil ~ ' on.e.-

oli£sel ~ I oil pA..th

~~ be. "iV\ope-ra.ble

+rr- 2.4 nou.Jl'S

~~~!'~- The continuous running electrical load supplied by an emergency diesel

..-. .. generator shall be limited to 2750 KW.

pca..+<t\ \ s ?~V\

o?eRA'BLE. j if Qf,f....-, .2 The Emergency Power System is an on-site, independent, automatically ho1>-V'S, ~e.. starting power source. It supplies power to vital unit auxiliaries if a normal 1 V°'opwo..ble- power source is not available. The Emergency Power System consists of three

..fiow p~ diesel generators for two units. One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the

( ~ o f ' be.. second generator for Unit 2 and the third generator functf ons as a backup 1

'(CS.+w°e.eJ -tt> --for either Unit 1 or 2. The diesel generators hav~ a contf nuous 2,000 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months SQ,(\)\c.e,'the.. rating of 2750 KW and a two hour rating of 2850 KW. The actual loads using diese.f shA.LA conservative

_J Affle1Hflften~ Pies. 143 &ild 118 bA, c.ons, de-tt!Gt

\V'O~le:

e TS 3.i6-6

_.0.8,-&-~-9 I

.... The day tanks are filled by transferring fuel from any one of two buried tornado missile protected fuel oil storage tanks, each of 20,000 gal capacity. Two of 100 percent capacity fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel generator are powered from the emergency buses to assure that an operating diesel generator has a continuous supply of fuel.

The buried fuel oil storage tanks contain a seven (7) day supply of fuel, 35,000 gal minimum, for the ful 1 load operation of one diesel generator; in addition, there is an above ground fuel oil storage tank on-site with a* capacity of 210,000 gal which is used .

for transferring fuel to the buried tanks.

If a loss of normal power is not accompanied by a loss-of-coolant accident, the safeguards equipment will not be required. Under this condition the following additional auxiliary equipment may be operated from each emergency bus:

A. One component cooling pump

8. One residual heat removal pump C. One motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pump The emergency buses in each unit are capable of being interconnected under strict administrative procedures so that the equipment which would normally be operated by one of the diesels could be operated by the other diesel, if required.

.1 ' ,, C ~ The requirement for operability of the opposite unit's emergency power system is to M o\lE TO I ensure that auxiliary feedwater from the opposite unit can be suppli!:!d via the cross-P* TS 3.1,-+.., connect in the event of a common-mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps in the

"--- ~ - _...., affected unit due to a high energy line break in the main steam valve house. Without this requirement, a single failure (such as loss of the shared backup diesel generator)

.. could resutt in loss of power to the opposite unit's emergency buses in the event of a loss of offsite power, thereby rendering the cross-connect inoperable. The longer allowed outage time for the opposite unit's emergency power system is based on the low probability of a high energy line break in the marn steam valve house coincident with a loss of offsite power.

and 140

e ATTACHMENT 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES CHANGE VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2

TS 3.6-1 3.6 TURBINE CYCLE Applicability Applies to the operating status of the Main Steam and Auxiliary Feed Systems.

Objectives To define the conditions required in the Main Steam System and Auxiliary Feed System for protection of the steam generator and to assure the capability to remove residual heat from the core during a loss of station power/or accident situations.

Specification A. A unit's Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure shall not exceed 350°F or 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall not be critical unless the five main steam line code safety valves associated with each steam generator in unisolated reactor coolant loops are OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.6-lA and 3.6-lB.

B. To assure residual heat removal capabilities, the following conditions shall be met prior to the commencement of any unit operation that would establish reactor coolant system conditions of 350°F and 450 psig which would preclude operation of the Residual Heat Removal System. The following shall apply:

1. Two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps shall be OPERABLE.

2. A minimum of 96,000 gallons of water shall be available in the protected condensate storage tank to supply emergency water to the auxiliary feedwater pump suctions.

3. All main steam line code safety valves, associated with steam generators m unisolated reactor coolant loops, shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.6-lA and 3.6-lB.

Amendment Nos.

e TS 3.6-2

4. The auxiliary feedwater cross-connect capability shall be available, as follows:

a. Two of the three auxiliary feedwater pumps on the opposite unit (automatic initiation instrumentation need not be OPERABLE) capable of being used with the opening of the cross-connect.

b. A minimum of 60,000 gallons of water available in the protected condensate storage tank of the opposite unit to supply emergency water to the auxiliary feedwater pump suction of that unit.

c. Emergency power supplied to the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps and to the AFW cross-connect valves, as follows:

1. Two diesel generators (the opposite unit's diesel generator and the shared backup diesel generator) OPERABLE with each generator's day tank having at least 290 gallons of fuel and with a minimum on-site supply of 35,000 gallons of fuel available.

2. Two 4160V emergency buses energized.

3. Two OPERABLE flow paths for providing fuel to the opposite unit's diesel generator and the shared backup diesel generator.

4. Two station batteries, two chargers and the DC distribution systems OPERABLE.

5. Emergency diesel generator battery, charger and the DC control circuitry OPERABLE for the opposite unit's diesel generator and for the shared back-up diesel generator.

6. The 480V emergency buses energized which supply power to the auxiliary feedwater cross-connect valves:

a. For AFW from Unit 1 to Unit 2: Buses lHl and lJl.

b. For AFW from Unit 2 to Unit 1: Buses 2Hl and 211.

Amendment Nos.

e e TS 3.6-3

7. One of the two physically independent circuits from the offsite transmission network energizing the opposite unit's emergency buses.

C. Prior to reactor power exceeding 10%, the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump shall be OPERABLE.

D. System piping, valves, and control board indication required for operation of the components enumerated in Specifications 3.6.B and 3.6.C shall be OPERABLE (automatic initiation instrumentation associated with the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps need not be OPERABLE).

E. The specific activity of the secondary coolant system shall be ~ 0.10 µCi/cc DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131. If the specific activity of the secondary coolant system exceeds 0.10 µCi/cc DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, the reactor shall be shut down and cooled to 500°F or less within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after detection and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

F. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore at least three auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor driven feedwater pumps and one steam driven feedwater pump) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

G. The requirements of Specifications 3.6.B and 3.6.D above concerning the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps; associated piping, valves, and control board indication; and the protected condensate storage tank may be modified to allow the following components to be inoperable, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs.

1. One train of the opposite unit's piping, valves, and control board indications or two of the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater pumps may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 14 days.

Amendment Nos.

e e TS 3.6-4

2. Both trains of the opposite unit's piping, valves, and control board indications; the opposite unit's protected condensate storage tank; the cross-connect piping from the opposite unit; or three of the opposite unit's auxiliary feed water pumps may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

3. A train of the opposite unit's emergency power system as required by Section 3.6.B.4.c above may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 14 days; if this train' s in operability is related to a diesel fuel oil path, one diesel fuel oil path may be "inoperable" for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the other flow path is proven OPERABLE; if after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the inoperable flow path cannot be restored to service, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable". During this 14 day period, the following limitations apply:

a. If the offsite power source becomes unable to energize the opposite unit's OPERABLE train, operation may continue provided its associated emergency diesel generator is energizing the OPERABLE train.

b. If the opposite unit's OPERABLE train's emergency diesel generator becomes unavailable, operation may continue for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months provided the offsite power source is energizing the opposite unit's OPERABLE train.

c. Return of the originally inoperable train to OPERABLE status allows the second inoperable train to revert to the 14 day limitation.

If the above requirements are not met, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

H. The requirements of Specification 3.6.B.2 above may be modified to allow utilization of protected condensate storage tank water with the auxiliary steam generator feed pumps provided the water level is maintained above 60,000 gallons, sufficient replenishment water is available in the 300,000 gallon condensate storage tank, and replenishment of the protected condensate storage tank is commenced within two hours after the cessation of protected condensate storage tank water consumption.

Amendment Nos.

Basis

e TS 3.6-5 A reactor which has been shutdown from power requires removal of core residual heat. While reactor coolant temperature or pressure is> 350°F or 450 psig, respectively, residual heat removal requirements are normally satisfied by steam bypass to the condenser. If the condenser is unavailable, steam can be released to the atmosphere through the safety valves or power operated relief valves.

The capability to supply feedwater to the generators is normally provided by the operation of the Condensate and Feedwater Systems. In the event of complete loss of electrical power to the station, residual heat removal would continue to be assured by the availability of either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the 110,000-gallon protected condensate storage tank.

In the event of a fire or high energy line break which would render the auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable on the affected unit, residual heat removal would continue to be assured by the availability of either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the motor-driven auxiliary feed water pumps from the opposite unit. A minimum of two auxiliary feedwater pumps are required to be operable* on the opposite unit to ensure compliance with the design basis accident analysis assumptions, in that auxiliary feedwater can be delivered via the cross-connect, even if a single active failure results in the loss of one of the two pumps. In addition, the requirement for operability of the opposite unit's emergency power system is to ensure that auxiliary feedwater from the opposite unit can be supplied via the cross-connect in the event of a common-mode failure of all auxiliary feedwater pumps in the affected unit due to a high energy line break in the main steam valve house. Without this requirement, a single failure (such as loss of the shared backup diesel generator) could result in loss of power to the opposite unit's emergency buses in the event of a loss of offsite power, thereby rendering the cross-connect inoperable. The longer allowed outage time for the opposite unit's emergency power system is based on the low probability of a high energy line break in the main steam valve house coincident with a loss of offsite power.

excluding automatic initiation instrumentation Amendment Nos.

e TS 3.6-5a The specified minimum water volume in the 110,000-gallon protected condensate storage tank is sufficient for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of residual heat removal following a reactor trip and loss of all offsite electrical power. It is also sufficient to maintain one unit at hot shutdown for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , followed by a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months cooldown from 547°F to 350°F (i.e., RHR operating conditions). If the protected condensate storage tank level is reduced to 60,000 gallons, the immediately available replenishment water in the 300,000-gallon condensate tank can be gravity-fed to the protected tank if required for residual heat removal. An alternate supply of feedwater to the auxiliary feedwater pump suctions is also available from the Fire Protection System Main in the auxiliary feedwater pump cubicle.

The five main steam code safety valves associated with each steam generator have a total combined capacity of 3,842,454 pounds per hour at their individual relieving pressure; the total combined capacity of all fifteen main steam code safety valves is 11,527,362 pounds per hour.

The nominal power rating steam flow is 11,260,000 pounds per hour. The combined capacity of the safety valves required by Specification 3.6 always exceeds the total steam flow corresponding to the maximum steady state power than can be obtained during three reactor coolant loop operation.

The availability of the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the protected condensate storage tank, and the main steam line safety valves adequately assures that sufficient residual heat removal capability will be available when required.

The limit on steam generator secondary side iodine - 131 activity is based on limiting the inhalation dose at the site boundary following a postulated steam line break accident to a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limits. The accident analysis, which is performed based on the guidance of NUREG-0800 Section 15 .1-5, assumes the release of the entire contents of the faulted steam generator to the atmosphere.

Amendment Nos.

7.

e Two emergency diesel generators OPERABLE as explained in Section 3 .16.

TS 3.9-2 B. The requirements of Specification 3.9-A items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 may be modified as provided in Section 3.16-B.

Basis During startup of a unit, the station's 4,160V and 480V normal and emergency buses are energized from the station's 34.5KV buses. At reactor power levels greater than 5 percent of rated power the 34.5KV buses are required to energize only the emergency buses because at this power level the station generator can supply sufficient power to the normal 4, 160V and 480V lines to operate the unit. Three reactor coolant loop operation with all 4, 160V and 480V buses energized is the normal mode of operation for a unit.

The electrical power requirements and the emergency power testing requirements for the auxiliary feedwater cross-connect are contained in TS 3.6.B.4.c and TS 4.6, respectively.

References FSAR Section 8.4 Station Service Systems FSAR Section 8.5 Emergency Power Systems Amendment Nos.

e e TS 3.16-1 3.16 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the availability of electrical power for safe operation of the station during an emergency.

Objective To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to shutdown the reactor safely, and provide for the continuing availability of Engineered Safeguards when normal power is not available.

Specification A. A reactor shall not be made critical nor shall a unit be operated such that the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature exceed 450 psig and 350°F, respectively, without:

1. Two diesel generators (the unit diesel generator and the shared backup diesel generator) OPERABLE with each generator's day tank having at least 290 gallons of fuel with a minimum on-site supply of 35,000 gal of fuel available.

2. Two 4, 160V emergency buses energized.

3. Four 480V emergency buses energized.

Amendment Nos.

4. Two physically independent circuits from the offsite transmission network to TS 3.16-2 energize the 4, 160V and 480V emergency buses. One of these sources must be immediately available (i.e. primary source) and the other must be capable of being made available within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months (i.e. dependable alternate source).

5. Two OPERABLE flow paths for providing fuel to each diesel generator.

6. Two station batteries, two chargers, and the DC distribution systems OPERABLE.

7. Emergency diesel generator battery, charger and the DC control circuitry OPERABLE for the unit diesel generator and for the shared back-up diesel generator.

B. During power operation or the return to power from HOT SHUTDOWN, the requirements of specification 3.16-A may be modified by one of the following:

l .a. With either unit's dedicated diesel generator or shared backup diesel generator

unavailable or inoperable:

1. Verify the operability of two physically independent offsite AC circuits within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter.

2. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the operability of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator daily. For the purpose of operability testing, the second diesel generator may be inoperable for a total of two hours per test provided the two offsite AC circuits have been verified OPERABLE prior to testing.

3. If this diesel generator is not returned to an OPERABLE status within 7 days, the reactor shall be brought to HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

l .b. One diesel fuel oil flow path may be "inoperable" for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the other flow path is proven OPERABLE. If after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the inoperable flow path cannot be returned to service, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable."

When the emergency diesel generator battery, charger or DC control circuitry is inoperable, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable."

Amendment Nos.

e TS 3.16-3

2. If a primary source is not available, the unit may be operated for seven (7) days provided the dependable alternate source can be OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . If specification A-4 is not satisfied within seven (7) days, the unit shall be brought to COLD SHUTDOWN.

3. One battery may be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the other battery and battery chargers remain OPERABLE with one battery charger carrying the DC load of the failed battery's supply system. If the battery is not returned to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, the reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN. If the battery is not restored to OPERABLE status within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

C. The continuous running electrical load supplied by an emergency diesel generator shall be limited to 2750 KW.

Basis The Emergency Power System is an on-site, independent, automatically starting power source. It supplies power to vital unit auxiliaries if a normal power source is not available. The Emergency Power System consists of three diesel generators for two units. One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the second generator for Unit 2, and the third generator functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or 2. The diesel generators have a continuous 2,000 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months rating of 2750 KW and a two hour rating of 2850 KW. The actual loads using conservative Amendment Nos.

e TS 3.16-6 The day tanks are filled by transferring fuel from any one of two buried tornado missile protected fuel oil storage tanks, each of 20,000 gal capacity. Two of 100 percent capacity fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel generator are powered from the emergency buses to assure that an operating diesel generator has a continuous supply of fuel. The buried fuel oil storage tanks contain a seven (7) day supply of fuel, 35,000 gal minimum, for the full load operation of one diesel generator; in addition, there is an above ground fuel oil storage tank on-site with a capacity of 210,000 gal which is used for transferring fuel to the buried tanks.

If a loss of normal power is not accompanied by a loss-of-coolant accident, the safeguards equipment will not be required. Under this condition the following additional auxiliary equipment may be operated from each emergency bus:

A. One component cooling pump B. One residual heat removal pump C. One motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pump The emergency buses in each unit are capable of being interconnected under strict administrative procedures so that the equipment which would normally be operated by one of the diesels could be operated by the other diesel, if required.

The electrical power requirements and the emergency power testing requirements for the auxiliary feedwater cross-connect are contained in TS 3.6.B.4.c and TS 4.6 respectively.

Amendment Nos.

e ATTACHMENT 4 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION e

Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the requirements of 10CFRS0.92 as they relate to the proposed administrative TS change to clarify the requirements (limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and action statements) for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) cross-connect by relocating (without revision) the emergency power source requirements. We have determined that a significant hazards consideration is not involved as discussed in the following paragraphs.

The proposed change is an administrative change. In the Federal Register, Vol. 51, No. 44, dated March 6, 1986, "Rules and Regulations," the NRC provided guidance for the determination of significant hazards considerations. Under item (e) regarding examples of Technical Specifications amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration, the following example was listed:

(i) A purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

The. proposed administrative change to Surry Technical Specifications clarifies the requirements (limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and action statements) relating to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) cross-connect by relocating the emergency power source requirements of TSs 3.16.A.8 and 3.16.B.4 to TS 3.6. The proposed TS change does not alter the current TS .requirements and maintains the Surry licensing *and design basis.

Criterion 1 - Operation of Surry Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed TS change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change is administrative in nature, and station operations are not being affected. The accidents considered relative to this proposed TS change are Rupture of Main Steam Pipe, Loss of All AC Power, and Loss of Feedwater. The probability of occurrence of these accidents has been previously evaluated to support Surry TS Amendment 143/140. The NRC reviewed the PSA basis during issuance of TS Amendment 143/140 and found it acceptable. The probability of occurrence of these accidents has been recently reviewed relative to this proposed TS change. It has been concluded that the proposed TS change is consistent with the existing analyses and evaluations and, therefore, will not increase the probability of occurrence of the identified accidents.

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'/J The consequences of the accidents identified above were also previously evaluated to support Surry TS Amendment 143/140. The PSA considerations included the AFW cross-connect capability, diesel generator dependencies, various LCO time periods, and a HELB in the vicinity of the AFW Pumps. The previous evaluation was recently reviewed relative to this proposed TS change. This review determined that the proposed TS change. is consistent with the design and licensing bases supporting the existing Technical Specifications. The proposed TS change is also consistent with the existing analyses and evaluations, the consequences of which bound any potential consequences of the proposed TS change. Therefore, the proposed TS change will not increase the consequences of the identified accidents.

Criterion 2 - The proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The possibility for a new or different type of accident than any previously evaluated is not created since the considerations in the PSA and evaluations performed to support TS Amendment 143/140 are not changed by the proposed administrative TS change ..

The proposed TS change is consistent with the design and licensing bases supporting the existing Technical Specifications. Furthermore, station operations and plant equipment are not being affected and, therefore, the proposed TS change does not create any new failure modes or accident precursors .

.Criterion 3 - The proposed TS change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed *administrative change to Surry Technical Specifications clarifies the requirements (limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and action statements) relating to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) cross-connect by. relocating the emergency power source requirements of TSs 3.16.A.8 and 3.16.B.4 to TS 3.6. The proposed TS change does not alter the current TS requirements or bases, as well as maintains the Surry licensing and design basis. The proposed change does not affect either station operations or plant equipment, hence the availability of equipment for the mitigation of accidents is not decreased. Furthermore, the assumptions governing the accident analyses remain unchanged, and the consequences of the existing analyses and evaluations remain bounding. This is an administrative change and as such does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.*

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ML18152A213

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