ML20215B135

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Administrative Procedure ADM-89.13, Secondary Piping Insps
ML20215B135
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1986
From: Miller H
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215B065 List:
References
FOIA-87-20 ADM-89.13, SUADM-M-33, NUDOCS 8706170232
Download: ML20215B135 (40)
v • d • e


Text

)

o.

i

., r (1)

PROCEDURE SUADM->'-3 3 NUMBER:

ADM-89.13 SURRY POWER STATION (2)

DATE:

OCT 2 8 1996 (3)

(4)

TYPE PROCEDURE:

ADM LISTRATIVE PROCEDURE UNIT:

182 (5)

TITLE:

SECONDAhY PIPING INSPECTIONS (6)

I CONTENTS SECTION 1.

PURPOSE 2.

REFERENCES 3.

AREAS OF INSPECTION 4.

PRESERVICE INSPECTION 5.

REFUELING INSERVICE INSPECTIONS 6.

REPORTS TABLES 1 THROUGH 3 FIGURES 1 THROUGH 4 Think ALARA RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

~

(7)

(8)

, CA 8 DATE:

/6/2V[g e

//

(9)

(10)

QU ITY ASSURANCE REVI DATE: /O ld WAG >

d (A

w

/

I p

APPROVED STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY'AND OPERATING COMMITTEE:

(11)

(12)

Jo b?'f9*6 DATE:

c:esn 7

APPROVED (MANAGER) (if Required):

(13)

(141 DATE:

i 8706170232 870611 PDR FDIA W g j.(, -

2WELLI NG87-20 POR ADM5 t

/

P...

SUAng_y_33 ADM-89.13 Page 1 of 10 I

SURRY POWER STATION OCT 2 8 1985 UNIT 1 & 2 SECONDARY PIPING INSPECTIONS 1.0 Purpose 1.1 To delineate a program for inspecting secondary piping which has a high probability for erosion - corrosion in ' carbon steel lines.

1.2 To delineate a program for inspection of - high energy pipe welds in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.15.

1.3 To delineate a program for eddy current inspection of heat exchangers at Surry Power Station, and steam generator tubes as defined in Technical Specification 4.19 and ASME Section XI.

l OPR: TECHNICAL SERVICES

i

-'.; x SUADM.. *1 ADM-89.la i

Page 2 of 10

",,w.

References-OCT 2 81986

~

2.0 2.1 Evaluation of Surry. Extraction ~ Steam Lines,. Noveiber 1983 report from Power Station Engineers.

~

1 2.2 Significant Operating Experience Report 82-11 i

2.3' SUADM-ADM-21 1

2 '. 4 ' -State Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

]

i I

2.5 Technical Specifications 4.15.

2.6 Technical Specifications 4.19.

'2.7 ASME Section XI'1980 Edition, Winter.1980 Addenda D

i SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 Page 3 of 10 3.0 Areas of Ins'pection OCT 2 8 1986 l

3.1 Secondary Piping 3.1.1

' The following areas are required to have random i

1 inspection from refueling to refueling:

a.

Turbine Exhaust Cross Under Piping l

b.

let and 2nd Point Extraction System c.

3rd and 4th Point Extraction System d.

iloisture Separator Drain lines e.

MSR Inlet Piping l

3.1.2 Any other secondary areas which have a low probabil-ity of erosion - corrosion will meet the preservice requirements of thic procedure but vill be exempt from random inspection. Preservice examinations are only for repairs,.replacecents or modifications of systems.

3.2 High Energy Pipe Welds 3.2.1 Applies to welds in the main steam and feed water 31ces in the main st.eam valve house where protection from the consequences of postulated ruptures is not provided by a system of pipe whip restraints, jet impingement barriers, protective enclosures and/or other measures designed specifically to cope with such ruptures.

3.3 Eddy Current 3.3.1 Applies to tubes in stesm generators, feed water heaters and condensers.

SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 l.

Page 4 of 10 4.0 Preservice Inspections.

OCT 2 8 1H 4.1 Post maintenance work or new installations, which involve l

piping [ components covered under the inservice portion of this l

procedure, shall receive following work a preservice base line inspection.

This would only be required, when the work j

i affects the original baseline, or no original baseline l

existed as in new installations.

4.2 Post maintenance work or new installations involving velding on piping / components of greater than 4 inches nominal to 8 inches shall receive following work a visual and surface examination.

1 4.3 Post maintLaance work or new installations involving walding l

on piping / components of greater than 8 inches require examinations and testing.a s directed by the Authorized i

i Inspector.

This shall meet as a minimum the examination f

(

requirements of step 4.2.

l l

4.4 Post maintenance work or new installations involving velding

)

I on state registered pressure vessels or state registered 1

boilers to the second stop valve require examinations and testing as directed by the Authorized Inspector.

This shall I

meet as a minimum the examination requirements of step 4.2.

l 4.5 All examinations required for preservice inspection shall meet as a minimum the acceptance criteria established for the pir ing/ components' original construction code.

The UT thickness measurement program shall meet minimum i

{

vall/ remaining thickness criteria established by the construction code plus the safety margin required to allow operation until the next inspection.

T SUADM-M-33~

li,

AEM-89.13 l

i Page 5 of 10 4.6 Eddy Current 007.2 8 1986 l

4. 6.1 '

As specified in Technical Specification ' 4.19 for.

-l steam generators.

4.6.2

. Heat exchangers shall be inspected for tube base f

line data for a minimum of 8% of the total.

This j

inspection is limited.to heat exchangers within the scope of this procedure, as directed by the Supt. of Technical Services. ' The examination is to be based -

1 I

upon ASME Section V. 1980 edition, Winter 1980 addenda, with acceptance based upon the Construction Code.

l

->s, I

r 5

N

SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 Page 6 of 10

-n OCT 2 8 1935 5.0 Refueling Inservice Inspections 5.1 secondary Inspections

\\

5.1.1 All components listed in Table 1

will have I

ultrasonic testing as shown on attached figures:

Figure One:

ELBOWS Figure Two:

TEES Figure Four: REDUCERS 5.1.2 Components to be examined will be selected by Supervisor of Surveillance and Test Engineering from Table 1.

A minimum of 10% will be inspected each refueling interval.

I 5.1.3 If a component is found below the minimum wall thickness for continued safe operation, more inspec-tions will be performed.

Superintendent of Technical Services will be informed of all compon-ents not deemed safe.

Suparvisor of Surveillance and Test Engineering will select the components to be inspected by type of component, pressure and L

temperature requirements and 11ne..ze.

l l

l

SUADM-M-33

['

ADM-89.13 7

f 0 PE 2 8 1385 -

5.0 Refueling Inservice ' Inspections (Continued)

. 5.1 Secondary Inspections (Continued)

\\

5.1.4 MSR 30" Inlet Piping and Turbine Cross under 33.5" and 47.5" piping will have internal visual examina-

.]

tion on a minimum of one train every refueling. See i

F'.gure 3 for possible affected areas.

l l

5.1.5 Acceptance criteria shall be based upon the applicable construction code.

Results unacceptable L

to inspection criteria must be either found f

I -

acceptable by engineering analysis (EWR),

or repaired or replaced prior to return to service.

I

(

I l

l

__ _ ___ __-_ - ___ --_ 2 - __-_____--_ - _-_-_-_-_____- - - _ _

l SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13.

Page 8 of 10 n:

OCT 2 8 1925 5.0 Refueling Inservice Inspections-(continued) 5.2 High Energy Welds 5.2.1 Every 10 years (or nearest refueling outage) 100% of i

all welds will be inspected by volumetric means.

One-third of the welds will. be inspected each one-third of the 10 year interval to the nearest refueling outage.

Table 2 list velds by periods (1/3 of a 10 year interval) to be inspected. Welds marked with a asterisk (*) mark shall meet the 1972 ASME Code which is less restrictive.

Therefore no period requirements are necessary, only interval (10 years).

5.2.2 Examinations that reveal unacceptable structural' defects in a weld during an inspection shall be extended to require an additional inspection of another 1/3 of the welds.

If further unacceptable e

defects are detected in second sampling, all remain-der welds shall be inspected.

Other velds on main steam and feed water will also be inspected unless engineering analysis licits the inspection area.

5.2.3 Volumetric examinations shall be conducted to the rules of ASME Section XI as referenced.

1 l

l l

1 i

l

1 SUADM-M '

ADM-69.;3 l

Page 9 cf 10 00T 2 i 1935 i

5.0 Refueling Inservice Inspections (centinued) j 5.3 Eddy Current 5.3.1 A minimum of 3% of the tubes on two steam generators will be performed each refueling outage in accor-dance with Table 3.

One Steam Generator can be inspected only with Station Manager's approval and a review of Technical Specifications 4.19.

All tubes inspected will have a double verification of each tube analysis.

7 5.3.2 Feedwater Heater and Condensor exa inations may vary in quantity at the discretion of the Supt. of f

Technical Services.

5.3.3 The acceptance criteria shall be to the requirements

-of technical specification 4.19 for steam genere-tors..

Procedural guidance may be taken fron ASME Section XI as referenced.

5.3.4 Eddy current examination of other heet exchangers shall use ASME Section V, 1980 edition, Winter 1980 Addenda with accep:ance based upon the applicable f

l construction code.

l

i

.SUADM-M '

ADM-8 9. '. 3 '

Aw Page.10 of 10 OCT 2 815!6 6.0' Reports 6.1 Coordinator of NDE will sub:10 all inspections to' Supervisor of Surveillance and Test Engineering.

6.2 Supervisor.of Surveillance. and ~est. Engineering will review

' i all reports and submit the :o the Station Nuclear Safety and-Operating Committee for approval.

6.3 - A wall thickness report do:u=enting thickness measurements will be prepared within 90 days following a refueling outage. -

6.4 A heat ' exchanger report docucenting-. heat exchanger eddy I

current inspections will be prepared within 90 days following i

a refueling outage.

6.5

-The steam generator eddy-current inspection report will' meet the requirements required by Surry Technical Specifications.

L 1

I l-I

.I I

i i.

SUADX-M-33 ADM-E9.13

? age 1.of 6 TABLE I CCI 2 8 1996 i

Required Inspection Components.

ID Futbers recorded en prints controlled by Supervisor of Suve111a:ce and Test Engineering.

NOTE: Unit 2 line numbers are included i: parentheses.

Component 1.D. numbers.and component types a:e the same for both units.

i A.

Ist Point and 2nd Point Extraction Steem l

FP-29A I.D.

I LINE NUMBER NUMBER TYPE Cross Under Pipe A

Pipe I

Cross'Under, Pipe B

Pipe

+

16"-S2E-2-301 1

Elbow L(16"-S2E-102-301) 2 Elbow-3 Reducer.

20"-S2E-3-301 1

Tee (20"-S2E-103-301) 2 Elbow 1

3 Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow 6

Tee 18"-S2E-4-301 1

Reducer (18"-S2E-104-301) 2A Elbow 2B Elbow 3

Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow l

i

SUADM-M-33 T'

ADM-89.13 Page 2 cf 6'

' 007 2 8 p~:~

I.D.

.LINE NUMBER NUMBER TYPE-18"-S2E-5-301 1

Reducer (18"-S2E-105-301) 2A Elbow 2B Elbow 1

)

3 Elbow 4

Elbow

.5 Elbow

'l 14"-S1E-4-301 1

Elbow

.l (14"-SIE-104-301).

2 Elbow

]

1 3

Elbow 14"-S1E-5-301-1 Reducer (14"-SIE-105-301)

'i 2

Elbow 3

Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow 16"-S2E-1-301 1

Elbow (16"-S2E-101-301) i 2

Elbow 12"-SIE-1-301' 1

Elbow (12"-S1E-101-301) 2 Elbow 3

Elbow 4

Reducer 12"-S1E-2-301 1

Elbow (12"-S1E-102-301) 2 Elbow I

3 Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Reducer

SUADM-M-33 l

ADM-89.13 Page 3lof 6.

?"

-1.D.

LINE NUMBER

. NUMBER

. TYPE-18"-51E-3-301 1

Tee l

(18"-S1E-103-301) 2 Elbow

]

e 3

Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow i

6 Elbow l

7 Tee j

3 B.

3rd and 4th Point Extraction Steam FP-30A l

I.D.

LINE NUMBER-NUMBER' TYPE.

l

'24"-S4E-3-151 2-Elbow l

(24"-S4E-103-151)

,u 3

Elbow 4

Elbow i

5 Tee 20'-S4E-5-151 1

Elbow

.(20"-S4E-105-151) 2 Elbow 20"-S4E-4-151 1

Reducer (20"-S4E-104-151) 2 Elbow 3

Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow

]

[j '

S"ADM-M-33 A3M-89.13 Page 4 of 6

~

I.D.

007 2 8 ' peg

'LINE N1'MBER E*MBER TYPE 18"-S3E-1-151 2

Elbow i

(18"-S3E-101-151)'

j 3

Elbow 4

Elbow 5

-Elbow 6

Elbow 7

Elbow j

\\

24"-S4E-8-151 2

Elbow (24"-S4E-108-151)

)

3 Elbow 4

Elbow l

5 Tee 1

20"-S4E-10-1511.

1 Elbow (20"-S4E-110-151) 2 Elbow m;

20"-S4E-9-151 1

Reducer

.; [

(20"-S4E-109-151) 2 Elbew i

3 Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow

SUADM-M..

't.

i ADM-89.13 Page 5 of 6

.54 00728 133, LINE NUMBER NUMBER TYPE g _

18"-S3E-2-151 2

Elbow l

(18"-S3E-102-151) 3' Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow-1 6

Elbow 7

Elbow C.

MSR Drain Lines j

FP-39 I.D.

1 LINE' NUMBER KUMBER TYPE i

-6"-WSD-3-301 1

Elbow 1

(6"-WSD-103-301) 2 Elbow

.i 3

Elbov 4

Elbow l

5 Elbov i

6 Elbow f

7 Elbow 8

Elbow i

9 Elbow

-l 6"-WSD-1-301 1

Elbow

-(6"-WSD-101-301) 2 Elbow i

3 Elbow 4

Elbow 5

Elbow 6

Elbow 7

Elbow

l

)

i e iCM-M-33 E M-Ei,13 Fage 6 of 6

)

..,7 2 8 n35

' LINE NUMBER Kl.H3ER TYPE 1,p, 6"-WSD-4-301 1

Elbow

- (6"-WSD-104-301) 2-Elbow 3

Elbow 1

'4 Elbow 5

Elbow 6

Elb'ow 7

Elbow l

8 Elbow iI

.- J 9

Elbow 6"-WSD-2-301 1

Elbow

. (6"-WSD-102-301).

2-Elbow

..nu 3

Elbow

.3 4

Elbov 5

Elbow 6

Elbow 7

Elbow 8

Elbow 9

Elbow I

l

..... ~

' S*CADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 Page'1 of 2 TABI.E 2 HIGH ENERGY ISSPECTIONS UNIT 1 l

FIRST PERIOD Mainsteam Weld 12.

VPA-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 13 VPA-2-2100

'Mainstees Weld 12 VPA-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 28 '

VPA-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 25 VPA-2-2300 Mainsteam Weld:26 VPA-2-2300 Feed Water Weld 20 VPA-2-2101 N

Feed Water Weld 14 VPA-2-2201

  • Feed Water Weld 23' VPA-2-2101'

'* Feed Water Weld 17 VPA-2-2201

  • Feed Water Weld 20 VPA-2-2301
  • Feed Water Weld 21 VPA-2-2301-

.SECOND PERIOD

-Mainsteam Weld 11-VPA-2-2100

~ Mainsteam Weld 29 VPA-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 10 VPA-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 11 VPA-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 7 VPA-2-2300 9

Mainsteam Weld 8 VPA-2-2300 Feedwater Weld 16 VPA-2-2201 Feedwater Weld 23 VPA-2-2301

  • Feed Water Weld 24 VPA-2-2101
  • Teed Water Weld 20 VPA-2-2201
  • Teed Water. Weld 22 VPA-2-2301 Feed Water Weld 25 VPA-2-2301 THIRD PERIOD i

l Mainsteam Weld 28 VPA-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 30 VPA-2-2100 Mainsteam Wald 29 VPA-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 30 VPA-2-2200 1.~

Mainsteam Weld 9 VPA-2-2300-Mainsteam Weld 27 VFA-2-2300 Feed Water Weld 2:

VPA-2-2101 Feed Water Veld 24 VFA-2-2301

  • Feed Water Weld 25 VFA-2-2101
  • Feed Water Weld 26 VPA-2-2101
  • Feed Water Weld 21 VPA-2-2201 VPA-2-2301 i
  • Feed Water Weld 27 VPA-2-2301
  • Feed' Water Weld 28 VPA-2-2301 l

VPA-2-2201 Feed Water Wald 18 VPA-2-2201 Feed Water Weld 19 (ISO REV 1 Used)

SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 Page 2 of 2 TABLE 2, 007 2 8 E!$'

HIGH ENERGY INS?ECTIONS UNIT 2 FIRST. PERIOD.

Mainsteam Weld 15 VIR-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 16 VIR-2-2100

'Mainsteam Weld'13 VIR-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld'28 VIR-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 29 VIR-2-2300

'Mainsteam Weld 31 VIR-2-2300 Feed Water Weld 21 VIR-2-2101 Feed Water Weld 23 VIR-2-2101 Feed Water Weld 25 VIR-2-2201

  • Feed Water Weld 24 VIR-2-2101
  • Feed Water. Weld 22 VIR-2-2201
  • Feed Water Weld 23 VIR-2-2201
  • " Teed' Water Weld 22 VIR-2-2301
  • Feed Water Weld 23 VIR-2-2301 SECOND PERIOD Mainsteam Weld 17 VIR-2-2100-Mainsteam Weld 32 VIR-2-2100

" ' Mainsteam Weld 27 VIR-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 29 VIR-2-2200-Mainsteam Weld 13 VIR-2-2300 Mainsteam Weld 14 VIR-2-2 300 1

Feed Water Weld 26 -

VIR-2-2101 Feed Water Weld 21 VIR-2-2301 L

VIR 2-2101 f

i

  • Feed Water Weld 24 VIR-2-2201
  • Feed Wrter Weld 27 VIR-2-2201
  • Feed Water Weld 28 VIR-2-2201 j
  • Feed Water Weld 24 VIR-2-2300 THIRD PERIOD Mainsteam Wald 31 VIR-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 33 VIR-2-2100 Mainsteam Weld 11 VIR-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 12 VIR-2-2200 Mainsteam Weld 15 VIR-2-2300 Mainsteam Weld 30 VIR-2-2300 Feed Water Weld 27 VIR-2-2101 Feed Water Weld 26' VIR-2-2201 Feed Water Weld 19 VIR-2-2301
  • Feed Water !; eld 28 VIR-2-2101 L
  • Feed Water Weld 29 VIR-2-2101
  • Feed Water Weld 29 VIR-2-2201

-* Feed Water Weld 30 VIR-2-2201 j

  • Feed Water Weld 25 VIR-2-2301 1

l l

h'

' j.*

EUADM-M-33' TADM-89,13

-i

'Page 1'of 1 5:

TABLE 3

\\,- \\

Steam Generator Eddy Current for Refueling Cycle N.d

\\,

Surry 1:

Cycle 7 - S/G B & C (1983 Refueling)

Cycle 8 - S/G A & B' (198/. Refueling)

Cycle 9 - S/G A & C (1986 Refueling) i Surry 2:

Cycle 7 - S/G A & C (1983 Refueling) 1 Cycle 8 - S/G A & B (1985 Refueling)

'.[

Cycle 9 - S/G B & C (1986~ Refueling)

\\

l l

N j

.3 Subsequert inspection will be repeated in the-same sequence, i.'e.,

cycle 10 etil i

l be the same' as cycle 7, and so on.-

The year in parenthesis. is-for referecce

'f '?c only.

- j, \\ h j

g 7

q u.

2'/

' Jl, 1

, ', Y.

l>* O,

9,,

" Yn.

'l 3.,

@k

,(l

[ (,

-- N usi ll-

' i

\\

~

\\

N i'

l' 1,

-l i

n

>lf:. \\~

a 5

n'

[' ? w f

' %a {

t 3

, i i

4

'I

%g. h

~-

y

?

N c'

f,

~

vC aj, $y i

f. C

~!

.e

.b

.' g, ' _~

wD

~ U *' w T

i<

,.iJ I-J 6

/, ~5 M

c

    • g mQ O

_/

R

}

F

}* _

D ML AE.

EW 1

R

~

T

~

I p

'?-

S S f

PH

~

UT

,c~

~.

/

~

5r T

pc -

p 4.

~

~

r1 F

=

1 g*

...Y 1

~

e,,, -

'.M u _. - _ g r a., s

~

' _,. -Q;

?.-

^

y,&,

Y

,aJV

. ~

s r

7

. /

A

. ' ^

i_

=,/p'-

.u n, _(T > g

'=

,s M',7

~

w.

3

?

' z_:

^'

.[f,

.-[-

~ ~ ^

J.

,n4~. gy_&/*

}

e: -

/- - j :-

f O

pQ -

(

<y ~,

(y.

./

=

,L

/3

,/

=/.

~

~

y7g*

,1

- y

'A.

~f

+ :

+

Y:

.~

e z

n i

'~

, +

~-

g

,~.

f x-p7

\\-

'/

a, o'.

\\

/

lJ j$f,

.,. ~

Cqm_y x>o__CU j

4' '

~-

d

)

f 1:,,

I

+

f u'

s 4

+' ^f

,f

$ 'iy' #

,I;2

~

,- [ ' _ n -

a

9.

W

,m

[

^j

~

=

~

+g

SUADM-M-32 ADM-89013 Figure 2 i

Page 1 of 1 OCT 2 5 :;is j

a g

)

({

k 5

1 s

_p-a l

g ywl

., n.~

w l--4 )r' 1

1

)

(

L INSPECT INSPECT

^Q O

c

,i 8

lg %

O l

gm i

V1 u~g iHSPECf INSPECT.

h O

'd o

s i

h.

}

s V'

y s

s N

'x o x.

1 s

i i

T SUA6M-M-33 ADM-89.13

^ *'

Figurs'3 Page 1 of 1 OCT 2 81;:6

,i; DW** 0M Posa.cle Af octed Area y

---( )

)

l i

.f 7.

a

.e i

)

Possible Affacted hea i

g,

. a...

4.. e. 4

. ~

r

..~.

'w A

O

~

UM Dir.phragm-Hinge Type Expansion Joint l

l W

1 y

v SUADM-M-33 ADM-89.13 Figure 4 Page 1 of 1 OCT,2 8 pet REDUCER INSPECTION

~

INSPECT O*.~ 0 90*

90' 4

i 1

A 8

jg* ~

L w

WIDE END

_ NARROW END A. APPROL1FIUPSTREAM A.> 11N. UPSTRE AM B.>11N. DOWNSTRE AM B. APPROX 1FT DowxSase i

l i

4

.W~

q i*

%n s.

lii

  • i I

=

e E

c.

ee

.l 3 8 e x?

^~

a;;

,g E

a Es 6 2 Es fora m f/2

e, t

~

s a

y e

,y ir

~ o l

av 4}

,p "f

\\

y g'

0 9

3-G

. a 4

________2_

\\ll 4l e

~

e.

~,

g_.','.

s

. j 3

/ -

~

m AQ.

A s

j-

?

. ;y

/

9 3

' /

g e

(

ru

',o i

~

~

F

~

,g 9

g W

i lg

+

7 J

5

>~

g-w i_

1_

~

?

4 g

~

9

)

~

~

t y

.cR i -

gNWtpA

. i g s >.u f.

ee L ls, a

  • g

~

t.-

g,.

s}

is } < 9e,)1c$q g

, 4j':

iaa l

m

'R l

,lll1,l1lI l!

lIi

-...-,.,..--...r.--

..--y,-.

g j

r-

.s

\\. ;s,

r

.,f. '

t v.

l ny s

v y

y g.

g g

4..
g. :

4.,

. n

., e.

?-

~~?'

.p'.

c 9 *'*.. p g %,g.- [

j 4

r.

m

,, s..,I ' ' ~ g v,

' % - y ? h.r. ;,.$[*'

j,,{

^J N

't 4

m* t,. s /r f.

a g }',e.

7 y

,' l

  • e,

\\

4. ;.

.,W w

.,.,.4-g.'

s/.

b-

+

s

/

, d, *., E

';d

[%.

iQ

~

~

x a

2.

k D

'A i

y..,' u,.s

.,.n i

  • [,f.3'.p, M.fk,

.* y.?

.,y L A

4,, ' #

.e*

. y e.

g y

W

'*' g s ' " '.

+

e, 'O

~s.Gt,-

/-

)

7..

t -

o s

r m

,(

4.

.,. 4' 'O-

,v ry

,% s

,6 8

g.

t

'p*9 p;~

,4.'.

  • r.

a.

r J

$,i,..

s. W h $..

,', ' $.k

7.,,t 4

$ *e-a nd$ **.

.o e...

N,

\\

)

..........,.........A

//Zlf 7 /Z,-

n.

O P

A F

T

.s.

C[N1900 RXM IRBITP2ILITY ISSWS SURRY [ NIT 2 "A" MAIN FH! DOL'IER RNP PIPE RFIURE IEONElR 9,1986 1.

Effects of Feedwater Piping incident on Control Room habitability and function.

A)

Carbon Dioxide (00 ) in Main Control Room (PCR) & MCR Annex 2

B)

Halon in PCR & PCR Annex C) Water dripping behind the Unit 2 vertical control board j

j f

2.

(bnsequences 1

i No operational difficultier were experienced as a result of a degradation in the MCR environment or the water behind the Unit 2 vertical board.

3.

Innediate Action Taken Y

e A.

The Dnergency Supply Fans (1-VS-F-41 and 2-VS-F-fiPJ vere started clearing the PCR and PCR Annex.

B.

Plastic sheeting was installed to protect the wiring and instruments behind the vertical board.

j C.

Fire watches were posted in all areas where autanatic fire protection systra.; were inoperable.

4.

Sumary of Findings j

Incident with or imediately following the feedwater piping rupture, the Halon fire protection systs for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Dnergency switchgear roms (El. 9.5 ft.) discharged. The Halon discharge was followed shortly by a discharge of the Cardox fire protection systs for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tray Rocms r/ 3

~

Control Rom Habitability Issues 3

Page 2.

e (E1.45 ft), releasing carbon dioxide (00 ) into these areas. In addition, 2

50 Unit 2 Turbine Building' fire protection sprinkler heads discharged as a result of the hot water spray and. steam conditions fra the feedwater pipe rupture. One of these sprinkler heads was in the overhead inmadiately outside the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rom. 'Ihe Cardcec control stations for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tray rooms are located on the west wall in line with the spray pattern of_ the sprinkler head. Within approxhnately ten minutes of the event, Operations and Ioss Prevention personnel had searched the Cable Tray roms and Bnergency Switchgear roms to verify that all personnel had been evacuated prior to the discharget.

At approrimately 1600, operations Department personnel on duty during the 1

accident were interviewed to determine the affects of the Halon and 00

  • 2

'Ihe Unit 1 operator and Shift Supervisor indicated that the Halon seemed i

) -

heaviest on the Unit i side of the rom and that they could hear the discharge under the P-250 ccuputer console. The Unit 2 operator and the third licensed operator indicated some shortness of breath' near the MCR cbor.

'Ihe Superintendent of Operations indicated that he became faint while observing the activities in the Turbine Building frm the M2 Annex door.

Interviews with personnel in the new Instrument Shop indicated that the co 2

also apparently penetrated their areas. Personnel interviewed reported shortness of breath. 'Ihey also indicated that an Oxygen meter was reading below normal oxygen concentration. 'Ihere were also reports from personnel-who experienced shortness of breath using the corridor frm the 27 ft.

elevation of the turbine building (near the lunchrom) to the Unit I alleyway.

('1he Technical Support Center power supplies and the Appendix R lockers are located in this corridor.)

It was about an hour before the bad air conditions cleared.

In one other CO related incident, a shift Supervisor experienced dizziness 2

and shortness of breath when becoming trapped in the backstairwell

0ontrol Room Habitability Issues ~

Page 3 i,

f connecting the MCR with Cable Tray and Bnergency Switchgear rooms. He became trapped when the vital area security doors were locked by the security ocmputer due to card raadar problems.

5.

Analysis of Findings j

4),lk u u w.) 4 6 u hb 16MF 1he doors to the Unit 2 Cable Way Rom have a gap of approximately 3/4 e einch at the botte,which wnld allow water fran the sprinkler discharge and pipe rupture spray to flow under the door.

It is also possible that see of the CO would escape under the door. However, following the search of 2

the' area, 'the doors were opened to ventilate the Unit 2 Cable Tray rom.

%e CO, which is heavier than air, probably sank down into : the Turbine 2

Building hallway near the MCR Annex door directly below. Wis door was l

blocked open to permit easier personnel access between the ACR Annex area

.and Unit 2 Turbine Building following the incident.

People entering the MCR Annex coupled with a negative pressure in the ER and MCR Annex created by the Control Area exhaust fan (1-VS-F-15), caused the 00 to be drawn into the MCR Annex. The MCR door was also open with a 2

security. watch posted-(normal procedure following a trip) allowing the 002 to be pulled into tie MCR.

Based on the intarviews with the ER personnel, it is believed the Halen concentration was heaviest on the Unit 1 side. %e primary effects of the 00 were at the MCR Annex doorway, however, some 00 appears to have gotten 2

2 into the parts of the M2 near the door to the Annex. The ER Annex door fran the Turbine Building is part of the ER pressure boundary and is usually closed. %erefore, the CO w uld not normally have flowed into the 2

MCR Annex. Within apprLximately an hour of the incident, water was observed in the carpet in front of the Unit 2 Vertical Control board. An inspection of the area behind the vertical board revealed water dripping fran the ceiling around electrical and instruent cable penetrations from the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rocrn.

Control Rom Habitability I? sues Page 4 s

It is believed that the Halon entered the MCR via two paths. One path was the 21/2 inch discharge piping of the Control Rom Bottled Air Systan (Re:

Drawing No. 11448 FB 41-B).

This systan has discharges into the areas immediately adjacent to the suction of the air recirculation and cooling units for both the MCR and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Dnergency Switchgear roms. 'Ihe supply piping is ccanon to both discharges and provides a I

pathway for the Halon.

'Ihe Halon was distributed into the K'R by the 1

overhead ducting of the MCR air recirculation units.

Following the accident, a slight air flow fra the Emergency Switchgear Room to the Control Roam outlets was observed. A Station Deviation has been filed.

Another pathway for the Halon was through cable and conduit penetrations fra the Dnergency Switchgear Rom into the MCR and Unit 1 Conputer Rom.

i Following the incident, Daniels was reqwsted to verify that all penetrations tetween the two areas were sealed.

'Ihis investigation revealed air flowing up through conduit into Vital Bus Distribution Panels q

1-1 and 1-3 in the Unit 1 Caputer Room. 'Ita n Unit 1 air recirculation i

units -are located in a rom adjr nt to the Conputer Rom. 'Ihe air g

j recirculation units would draw the Halon in and distribute it on the Unit 1 side of the MCR. Daniels sealed the open penetrations identified by their i

t investigation.

]

I

'Ihe Cardcx and Halon were ventilated fra the D and n Annex by starting the Control Pocan Dnergency Air Supply Fans (1-VSF-41 & 2-VSF-41). Starting t.hese fans placed the MCR at a higher pressure than the Turbine Building exhausting the CO and Halon into the Turbine Building air volume via the 2

K'R Annex door.

I The nest probable source of 00 in the Instrument Shop and corridor between 2

the Turbine Building ard Unit 1 alleyway is frm the ventilation of the Unit 1 Cable Tray rom into Mechanical Equipnen which permitted the 002 to flow down into these areas. 'Ihe ventilation ductwork ru: ming frm MER Ces

  1. 1 to the Administrative Building and parts of the Service Building

Control Rocm Habitability Isrues

(

Page 5 penetrate the floor over the Instrument Shop providing a possible pathway for the CO '

2 l

'Ihe co concentration in the MCR backstairwell was only high enough to 2

cause minor disocmfort and shortness of breath.

The door to the back stairwell frun the Unit 2 Cable Tray rom is sealed at all four surfaces as zoneT'gtgig part of the MCR pressure boundary. 'Ihis sealing appears to have Ihe water 5 cr.-W '

r:ost but not all of the CO in the fire protected 2

discharge frtu the sprinkler head outside the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rom 4tR coupled with spray frce the feedwater pipe flowed under the door into the ggI Unit 2 Cable Tray Room. An operator reported approximately one (1) inch of Pwhc l WA i water standing on the fic.or. mst of the electrical penetrations carrying L@.

wiring through the floor of the Cable Tray Roca into the area behind Unit 2's vertical boaztl are filled with fire protection foam. 'Ihe edges of the foam filled penetrations could have allowed water to seep down between the penetration wall and the foam seal. 'Ihe result was water dripping behind the vertical board. 'Ihe foam may also have absorbed sme water such that the dripping continued for approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the water was cleaned up.

6.

Malfunction Investigation A.

Cardox and Halon Systems Based on information presented in this report, the Cardox and Halen systems discharged spuriously as a result of elect-ical shorts caused by water, from the break and fir protection sprinkler discharges.

One fire sprinkler head which discharged is located in the overhead just outside the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rom door (El. 42 ft).

'Ihe Cardax l

control boxes for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tray Booms are located on the wall in this area. Several pieces of electrical conduit fra the Cardox control boxes run up along the wall and are open (unsealed) where the wire enters the cable tray in the overhead.

The enclosures

' control Ro m Habitability Issues Page 6 I

j 1

are NDR 12 enclosures which provide splash protection but are not waterproof.

The Halon systm control boxes for the Dnergency Switchgear roms are located on the Unit 1 side of the wall separating the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building on the 9 foot, 6 inch level..A top cover plate was found removed fra a condulet fitting in a piece of conduit to the Halon systan contiol panel enclosure. The'condulet is located below grating on the Unit 1 side of the fire door on the 27 ft. elevation j

separating Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine b.tildings (outside the PCR Annex door). E & C found an additional condulet with a cover' plate missing.

During the accident water was flowing under the fire door and c-mAing

.5m the Unit 1 side of the wall. Therefore, water was flowing over the condulet with the missing top cover.

Once in the condulet,the water could flow along the conduit into the enclosure, i

Based on a review of the Cardax electrical drawings, Halon control system, and condition of the boxes following the incident, the water, once inside the boxes, shorted out the controls activating the Cardax and Halon systems. The inside of the boxes were soaked and t'wre was evidence of electrical shorts, and instrment and relay failure.- Two reports provided by E & C are attached to provi6e additional information. The Halon system A==A its contents ( 5200 lbs).

The autmatic fire danpers in the normal air supply and exhaust ducting ccmnon to both the MCR and Bnergency Switchgear Dom closed automatically as designed.

There are also danpers in the ductwork released by fusible links which were still in place. The Cardox systan Am=A its entire contents (16 tons were estimated to be in the tank at the time of the incident),

the system is desigred for s timed autmatic release into the Cable Tray Ro ms. However, it is believed that the timing mechanism or the holding relay for the controls for the Unit I rom may have shorted out and continued to dtup until the tank

Control

  • ban Habitabi?.ity Issues Page 7 enptied. As a result, it is estimated ten (10) tons dtmped into the Unit I rom and a nomal release of approximately six (6) tons dunped into the Unit 2 rcan.

Following the incident, the two magnahelic l

differential pressure gauges, which measure the pressure difference between the MCR and the Turbine Building (PDI-VS-100+PD.-VS-200), were readg%W 2 and 3 inches of water. The two magnahelic gauges (PDI-VS-101 j

& 201) measuring differential pressure between the Dnergency Switchgear rooms and the Turbine Building were reading 0Ainches of water. These readings indicated that the PCR was at positive pressure with respect to the Turbine Building.

After checking the ventilation lineup for the ICR, it appeared that the l

l PCR gauge should also have been reading zero. Specifically, there was l

no supply air into the PCR (VS-F-4 was shut down), and the exhaust fan (VS-F-15) was in operation.

As previously discussed, the automatic fire danpers in the ductwork to the Dnergency switchgear Roan closed when the Halon system activated.

Based on these observations, the PCR differential pressure gauge calibration should be checked.

If they are indicating correctly, then a ventilation study should be undertaken to determine if another source of supply air exists within the MCR control area that may not be isolated.YWith the normal air supply and exhaust depers to Dnergency Switchgear closed, the circulation of air to the Emergency Switchgear Roan was significantly reduced.

In order to assure adequate air flow through the Battery Rx2ns, these danpers were reopa63 on 12/11/86.

B.

PCR Electrical Penetration Water Ie.aks Many of the thiit 2 Cable Tray Roan electrical floor penetrations are filled with f ver, sane penetrations were sealed with a hard coating which em A provide a tight seal.

The foam filledc penetrations appeared to be the source of the water behind the MCR Unit

Control Rom Habitability Issues Page 8 2 vertical board. Tne foam is spongy and may not tightly seal the sides of the penetration. On the day following the accident, (Mr 10, 1986), the foam was still smewhat saturated, and a small enount of water was still dripping in the MCR.

The foam is designed to expand under fire conditions tightly sealing the penetrations.

Likewise, the foam contracts when subjected to colder tarperatures. 'Ihe release of the 00 could cool down the foam 2

causing it to contract opening up a flow path along the side wall of the penetration. This is believed to be the flow path for the water down into' the MCR fra the Cable Tray rom. E & C has indicated that i

in order to provide a proper fire seal that the foam seal should have a j

fiberboard backing in the ceiling where the wire cmes through the penetration. 'Ibe foam sealed penetrations behind the vertical boards in the E R ceiling did not appear to have this backing.

7.

Reccmtendations A.

ER Functionality & Habitability

1) Cable Tray Rom electrical floor penetrations into ER - evaluate providing a hard, waterproof seal over the soft (spongy) sealing material 7 used in same electrical penetrations to prevent water f

fra leaking onto Control Roam instrumentation.

2) Evaluate the best method to protect the Urtit 2 Cable Tray Room frm flooding due to a Turbine Building event. Potential solutions are the placanent of a dike cutside the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rottn door, rearrangenent of the sprinkler heads in the area outside the door, and sealing the bottm of the door.
3) Evaluate the best method to seal the doors fr m the Unit 2 Cable Tray Rom to ensure that the 00 stays in the ream.

2

p

.j

)

1.

- Control Room Habitability Issues Page 9 2

l

4) Evaluate the design of the Control Room bottled air discharge i

piping between the Dnergency Switchgear rooms and Main Control' Rtxan air recirculation units to provide isolation of the Lepcy Switchgear discharge in the event of a Halon discharge. A Station d

i Deviation has been subnitted to cover this design deficiency.

3 i

5) Develop gucedures to provide.for use of the control Rocan Dnergency supply fans to clear the Control Roczn envirornent in the event of a

.Halon discharge.

i 6)

Place an air bottle (s) in the backstairwell to the MCR.

7) Evaluate the normal ventilation supply to the MCR to detennine the sources of supply air and effectiveness of emergency isolation systems.

B.

Cardox & Halon System Malfunction 4

1) Seal the electical condulet into the Cardox control boxes and' the holes in the bottan of the boxes.-
2) Evaluate the need to limit a total discharge of the Cardox tank by a

placement of sane mechanism at the main tank.

3) Seal the electrical condulet into the Halon control station and walk down all condulet to ensure junction covers are tightly secured.

4)

Provide a warning light for Cardox system discharges to alert personnel using the MCR backstairs that these systems have activated.

)

(L '

Control Rcxzn Habitability Issues Page 10 5)

Determine if waterproof rela'ys and timing mechanians should be used in the Cardox systran controls.

6)

Determine if any penetrations fran the Unit 1 Cable Tray Roan anE l

Mechanical Equipment Roan #1 to the new Instrument Shop and nearby areas require sealing. 'this survey should include all electrical and mechanical penetrations.

7) Determine if a water shield above the control hewan for the Halon and Cardox system control stations is rwabwi.

d). Develop annunciator procedures to direct operators to monitor the atmosphere in and evacuate personnel fran areas potentially.

affected by a Cardox system discharge, e.g. the Instrunent Shop.

9) Determine if the foam seals between the Cable Tray roan and CR are

\\_

properly installed. Correct any deficiencies.

i l

ODER q

l' 1.

Check the operability of the Unit 2 Bnergency switchgear anergency Supply Fan (2VS-F-42) which may. have been affected by water spray fran the feedwater suction pipe rupture.

2.

'the Security frequency repeater located in Unit 1 Cable Tray Roan was frozen as a result of the 00 discharge. Investigate relocating repeaters 2

or other possible changes to insure repeater operability throughout a CO 2 l

discharge in Unit 1 Cable Tray Room.

l l

l

3 Yf

.y FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION PIPE RUPTURE INCIDENT SURRY POWER STATION

{

The following. list of concerns and modifications was generated from the reports'.

listed below.

'l Independent Technical Investigation Comittee, Main Feedwater Pump

(

Suction Pipe Rupture Incident, Interim Report #1, Surry Power Station Unit 2, issued December 29, 1986.

(.2 Engineering Report, Halon and CO, System Actuation and Discharge, y Condensate Line Break, Surry Power Station.

3.4 Control Room Habitability Issues, Surry Unit 2 "A" Main Feedwater Pump Pipe Rupture, December 9, 1986.

4.

Memorandum from Mr. Cal Pletcher to Mr. Bill Benthall entitled

" Activity Summary, Cardox System," December 17 and 16,'1986.

The list is intended to be used as a tool for the systematic evaluation of the l

fire protection systems in question to minimize the possibility of overlooking a j

major area of concern. The items marked with an asterisk are hsues relevant to

'both fire protection and Control Room habitability.

I.

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CABLE TRAY ROOM CO, SYSTEMS A.

Concerns 1.

The repeaters for the plant communication system froze during the in the Unit 1 Cable Tray Room. What implications discharge of CO, his raise? Should the repeaters be moved?

or concerns did t (Hand-held devices did function.)

2.

Did the extended discharge of CO, into the Unit 1 Cable Tray Room affect cable or equipment in that room?

i 3.

Individuals ran into Cable Tray Rooms to escape steam.

Should visual indicators be placed outside each door to CO, protected areas warning of CO, discharge?

4 Should the Unit 1 CO, panel, presently located in Unit 2, be moved into Unit 1 to prevent one event from affecting both panels?

5.

Can the doors to the Turbine Building from the Cable Tray Room be sealed better to prevent CO, from leaking out of the enclosure?

]

6.

An individual was trapped in the back stairwell to the Control Room because of failure of the security system.

Should an air bottle be placed in this stairwell to provide an emergency air supply?

7.

Should an interlock be placed at the CO, tank to prevent the complete discharge of the tank in the event of ancther malfunction?

FDTA 87-Ao '

M -.1MH-?3018-1

b 8.

Determine if a waterproof timing mechanism can be used in the Cardox System for the timed discharge of CO,.

9.

Should water shields be placed above the CO, control panels?

10. Should the oxygen level in the Control Room be monitored at several locations to warn operators of possible oxygen depletion within the Control Room?

B.

Modifications i

1.

Seal the open ends of all conduits leading to the CO, system control panels throughout the plant.

2.

Replace all components within both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tray Room CO, control panels that show visible signs of corrosion.

3.

Fully test both systems to confirm proper system operation.

4 Seal the Unit 1 control panel.

A 11" hole and a 1" hole exist in the right side wall near the bottom of the panel.

.q f

at qu t

ev r

II.

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEMS A.

Concerns

  • 1.

Are the penetrations between the Control Room and the Emergency Switchgear Room adequately maintained?

  • 2.

The bottled air system piping is open between the Control Room and the Emergency Switt.hgear Room. Should this pipe be sealed to prevent Halon and ponibly products of ' combustion from entering the Control Room?

3.

Are the Emergency Switchgear Room Halon system isolatior Jampers adequate to p *? vent Halon from leaving (or air from entering) the Emergency Switchgear Room?

4.

Should the controls for the Unit I and Unit 2 Halon systems be placed in separate enclosures to prevent one event from activating both systems?

t 5.

Is it necessary to redesi n the control logic and configuration of the Halon control pane in lieu of the two recent inadvertent discharges?

B.

Modifications / Recovery Tasks 1.

Replace missing 2" conduit cover under platform and walk down all other conduits to ensure that covers to conduit, pull boxes, and junction boxes are in place and properly sealed, n.w.onnw.?

p%((

s

-2.

Repair door seal on the Halon control panel and relocate identification sign.

3.. Replace all existing modules and ' upgrade modules to CP35 Series.

4.

Perform functional tests of both units to ensure proper operation.

I 5.

Replace check valves in discharge lines or replace rubber. seals'.

6.

Have all cylinder heads replaced or reworked to ensure bottles will not leak and that seals are in good udition.

7..Have bottles filled and placed in discharge header.

8.-

Have pressure switch covers and solenoid covers removed and-inspect for corrosion or water damage.

III.-' PENETRATION. SEALS A.

Concerns

  • 1.

During the event, standing water was on~ the floor of the Unit 2 Cable Tray Room.

The water evidently saturated several cable penetrations and ran into' the Control Room behind the Unit 2 vertical boards.

  • 2.

Were penetration seals in the Unit 1 Cable Tray Room cooled to the point that the seals are no longer rated seals?

IV.

PROCEDURES i

  • A.-

During the event, the door to the Control Room and the Control Room Annex were placed in access. These procedures should be reviewed for Appendix R and Control Room habitability concerns.

  • B.- Is there.a need for annunciator procedures to direct operators to monitor the atmosphere in, and evacuate personnel from, areas that are potentially affected by a C0; system discharge?
  • C.

A procedure should be developed to instruct Operations personnel not to smoke during or after the discharge of the Emergency Switchgear Room Halon system.

  • D.

Should a procedure be developed that would direct the operators to use the Emergency Ventilation System emergency supply fans to clear the Control Room environment in the event that Halon enters the Control Room?

  • E.

Should a periodic test procedure be developed that would require fire protection control panels to be inspected periodically to ensure panels are closed properly and seals are in good condition.

at iuu 91n10.1

-

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20215B135&oldid=3980162"