ML18153A331

Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Testing Requirements for Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker

ML18153A331
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	09/24/1998
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18153A330	List: ML18153A329 ML18153A331
References
NUDOCS 9809280266
Download: ML18153A331 (5)

Text

ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2 9909200266 q90924 PDR ADOCK 05000280 p PDR,

TABLE 4.1-l(Continued)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CALIBRATIONS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Channel Description Check Calibrate Test Remarks

32. Auxiliary Feedwater

a. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low s R M(l) 1) The auto start of the turbine driven pump is not included in the monthly test, but is tested within 30 days prior to each startup.

b. RCP Undervoltage s R N.A.(l) 1) The actuation logic and relays are tested within 30 days prior to each startup.

C. S.I. (All Safety Injection surveillance requirements)

d. Station Blackout N.A. R N.A.

e. Main Feedwater Pump Trip N.A. N.A. R

33. Loss of Power

a. 4.16 KV Erriergency Bus Undervoltage N.A. R M (Loss of Voltage)

b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage N.A. R M (Degraded Voltage)

34. Deleted s 35. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the (t)

3 undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for the manual 0.. reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the s

(t) operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.

3 z

0

36. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. M(l), 1) Remote manual undervoltage trip immediately after

" R(2) placing the bypass breaker into service, but prior to commencing reactor trip system testing or required maintenance. ~

Cl)

2) Automatic undervoltage trip.

f'>-

......I

37. Safety Injection Input to RPS N.A. N.A. R 00 r:,:,

38. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip N.A. N.A. R

ATTACHMENT 3 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2

• SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 as they relate to the proposed changes for the Surry Units 1 and 2 and determined that a significant hazards consideration is not involved. The proposed changes will allow the bypass breakers to be tested in the racked-in position. This change will continue to ensure the operability of the breakers and eliminate unnecessary movement caused by racking the breakers, thus, reducing the wear and tear on the breakers and the possibility of a reactor trip.

The operation of the Reactor Protection System and the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers is not being changed. The proposed changes in the test sequence for the reactor trip bypass breakers continue to provide assurance that the reactor trip bypass breakers will operate as designed to mitigate the consequence of any unsafe or improper reactor operation during steady state or transient power operations when the bypass breakers are placed in service for reactor trip system testing or required maintenance. In support of this conclusion, the following analyses are provided.

a) Operation and testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers does not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

The testing sequence will continue to ensure that the reactor trip system will be operable to mitigate the consequences of any unsafe or improper reactor operation during steady state or transient power operations. During the short period of time the breaker is closed before the undervoltage trip device test, the operability of the breaker is established based on satisfactory breaker testing conducted during the previous surveillance interval. Although the breaker is placed in service before it is tested, the breaker is tested as soon as practicable to verify operability prior to performing testing of the reactor trip system or required maintenance. Therefore, the proposed test sequence does not significantly increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of any previously analyzed accident.

b) The proposed Technical Specifications do not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

The proposed test sequence change does not alter the actual test performed to establish operability of the reactor trip bypass breakers. The bypass breakers will be proven operable prior to reactor trip system testing or required maintenance. During the short period of time the breaker is closed before the undervoltage trip device test, the operability of the breaker is established based on satisfactory breaker testing conducted during the previous surveillance interval. Although the breaker is placed in service before it is tested, the Page 1 of 2

breaker is tested as soon as practicable to verify operability prior to performing testing of the reactor trip system or required maintenance. Therefore, it is concluded that no new or different kind of accident or malfunction from any previously evaluated has been created.

c) The proposed Technical Specifications change does not result in a significant reduction in margin of safety.

The proposed change in the reactor trip bypass breaker test sequence provides assurance that the reactor trip system remains operable during normal operations or during reactor trip system testing and required maintenance to mitigate the consequences of any unsafe or improper reacto~

operation. Therefore, the proposed change in the test sequence for the reactor trip bypass breaker does not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

This analysis demonstrates that the proposed amendment to the Surry Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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