ML20215B179

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Special Test Procedure 2-ST-191, Special Test to Inspect Operation of Mainsteam Trip Valve TV-MS-201C
ML20215B179
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/12/1986
From: Miller H
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215B065 List:
References
FOIA-87-20 2-ST-191, NUDOCS 8706170247
Download: ML20215B179 (33)
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{{#Wiki_filter:' I .t e (1) PROCED_URE 2-ST-191 SURRY POWER STATION (2) DATE: DEC 1-2 1986 - (3) (4) TYPE PROCEDURE: SPECIAL TEST PROCEDURE UNIT: 2 (5) TITLE: SPECIAL TEST TO INSPECT THE OPERATION OF MAINSTEAM TRIP VALVE TV-MS-201C (6) CONTENTS SECTIOf4 1. PURPOSE 2. REFERENCES 3. INITIA1, CONDITIONS 4. PRECAUTIONS 5. INSTRUCTIONS 6. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ATTACHMENTS 1 & 2 Think ALARA RECOMMEND APPROVAL: (7) (8) A DATE: L2. t2. % ( 3-QUALITY A f C REVIEW: (9) (10) i dAJ DAr I?A240 l l APPROVED STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERA ING COMMITTEE: (11) (12) J1f/2fVis wm DATE: j // /' APPROVED (MANAGER) (If Acquired): (13) (14) DATE: 45/2ST191 /C~cTA f 7.30 l 8706170247 870611 E/5 PDR FOIA I ZWELLINGB7-20 PDR { )

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Paga,1 of 11 j DEC 12 1996 SURRY POWER STATION .1 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL TEST TO INSPECT THE OPERATION OF MAINSTEAM j l TRIP VALVE TV-MS-201C 1.0 Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to provide ' detailed instructions',for testing "ard. inspection of TV-MS-201s, inclusive of r.ain valve, actuating cylinders, linkages and instrument air piping to the trip valve. Information gather will be used to evaluate proper trip valve operation. 1 l I i l 1 I

e*; 2-ST-191 Page 2 of 11 DEC 1 8 H66 2.0 References 2.1-Schuttle & Koerting Drsvings for Main Steam Isolation Valve (Tig. 828 AA DC) 2.1.1 Assembly Dwg of 30 x 24 x 30 Main Steam Isolation Valve Dwg. No. 73-XC-51 Rev. 5 2.1.2 Parts List for Main Steam Isolation Valve, Assembly Dwg 73-XC-52, Rev". 5 and 73-XS-48. Rev. 5. 2.2 Surry Controlled Drawings 2.2.1 Valve Operating Numbers - Comnressed Air System SH. 2 Dwg No. 11548-FM-75B Rev. 16 Main Steam Dwg. No. 2.2.2 Valve Operating Numbers 11548-FM-64A, Rev. 27 '2.2.3 Instrument Piping Misc. SH. 1 Dwg:. No. 11548-FK-8A, Rev. 9 e t I i

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2-ST-191 Page 3 of 11 DEC 13 1986 - l INITIALS /DATE I - 3.0 - Initial Conditforis j ~ //*(/ / u 'c.(, 3.1 Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown Mode. j M f 7 //s/,,fc. 3.2 Assigned Test Engineer (SES) is present for test. i . /b9 /gtc 3.3 Operations Shift Supervisor has been notified that Special Test is to commence. l l I / y/ nf 3.4 NRV-MS-201C is closed. ,4h /f-4 / '/n?/- 3.5 Station Instrument Air system is at normal operating 1 pressure. '\\ i i f J i t 0 9

s 1 2-ST-191 Page 4 of 11 CEC 12 1986 INITIAIS/DATE 4.0 Precautions and Limitations /.<vf/h,,5 4.1 Verify mechanical and electrical isolation of equipment j and presence of safety tags as required in applicable portions of this procedure. I i i 2

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y ,j et ,. A 2-ST-191 ~ Page 5 of 11 DEC 1 1 1986 INITIAI,S/DATE 5.0 instructions G <P //./ohc 5.1 Do not enter N/A for any steps in this section without preparing a Procedure. Deviation unless specifically permitted by note or cicp. Test Engineer (SES) is to initial and date all N/A entries. f7d 7 /p/s r/*C. 5.2 Isolate.and Tag instrument air to TV-MS-201C, IA valve i ~ 2-IA-1044 Tag Report ( 5.0-779D j I8h / j.o//,

5. 3' Remove rupture disk lower flange and rupture disk for.

wesi~ both.ees+:=end-wt-TV-MS-201CAactuating cylindery.oab. / Mark rupture disk # to indication which cyli.. der they fv + were installed in. Save rupture disl # for engineering \\ evaluation. Nt[/afft, 5.5 Bolt test flanges' to rupture disk upper flanges per. MT / G/,,[sc. 5.5 Ensure Control Switch for TV-MS-201C in control room is l ~ in the closed position. h4P,_/ 5c 5.6 Clear Tag on valve 2-IA-1044 and open valve. Record IA pressure as read in Control Room. IA Pressure 7b psig. 0E //jl t, 5.7 As instructed by the Test Engineer, while opening TV-MS-201C from the Control Room. //;'6 /dfc. 5.7.1 Measure rotation of TV-MS-201C rock shaft and record .t/J es t G,2 A. Degrees Rotation 6m4 63 , ' ? ?, /4 ic/fC 5.7.2 Measure vertical stroke of actuator shaft and 0. record. ,3 ui 41 h a - 9 . : (, Ts Stroke inches .) 5?Q Lt l' ~ l# $ fMT st

2-ST-191 Page 6 of 11 DEC 1 1 1986 ///<fT / n /qd 5 5.7.3 Time operation of the trip valve locally at the trip valve, and ret.or'd. Time to open 7, D b sec. 5.7.4 Record 1A pressure as read in control room and at test gauges TA Press. C.R. 7C, te, <) TestCauge(E[M (W) d~f(, /XJ / /3[r e 5.7.5 Verify limit switch operation. Record anyl failure to operate properly on Attachment 2. e //s[t;/ / j.d,hc 5.7.6 Snoop test all connections in IA line between / 2-IA-1044 and TV-MS-201C actuators. List any leaks on Attachment 2. NOTE: At the. discretion of the Test EnF', oce r, TV-MS-201C maybe cycled more than once to get the necerary opening stroke i:est s

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//v/ / /MdkL 5.8 Manually isolate air to TV-MS-201C by shutting s 2-IA-1044. Observe and record any drop in air pressure til (? on the installed test praissure gauge. s Drop in pressure (, c. psi gL-Observe if trip valve drifts from its open posit ".on. Record amount of time of' drift. % i :6k l Degree drifted closed 4 Time period I/ (.* M. e *i. n ;, //WI _/ 4 qd C 5.9 Open air isolation valve to trip valve (2-IA-1044). / Ensure tripvalve is open. ,#dt f / /d:/,c 5.10 As instructed b/ the Test Engineer, while closing I TV-MS-210C from the control room, '2 /s/ c 5.10.1 Measure rotation of TV-MS-2010 rock shaft and record. f Degree Rotation W W r c.~ l

l 2-ST-191 .Page 7 of 11 DEC 12 1986 - f fe f / h e c. 5.10.2 Messure vertical stroke of actuator shaft sad G YL

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[l'(j_ Q Na = Stroke inches. c i /u 4 Ta - Gh I<[ /gi L 5.10.3 Time closing of valve locally at the trip l valve and record. Time t<s close 7.W sec. /G F /p4-/w 5.10.4

  • Verify proper limit switch actuation. Record

{ ~ any failure to operate properly on Attachment cf.sr f...t c0,(ed 4 ocla Y re 2, JiOTE: At the discretion of the Test Engineer. TV-MS-201C may be j cycled more than once to get the necessary closing stroke test data. I ,ohb/ -(' 5.11 Isolate and tag IA to TV-MS-201C 1 1 l I I .A k I i

2-ST-191 Page 8 of 11 DEC 12 1986 CAUTION: PISTON COMPRESSIOP SPRING HAS RESIDUAL TENSION AND MUST BE SUPPORTED WHILE REMOVING PIN. (ITEM 40 S&K DWG 73-XC-52 REV. 5.) IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO APPLY A SMALL AMOUNT OF AIR TO' PNEUMATIC CYLINDERS TO EASE PIN REMOVAL. G. A w.4 ekn (4) A F e;< wy.,,4 es 4 Ae c s f % L oi4 Lt.n ios.m g cN.4 - ,k/f /]a/t/c. 12 Remove pins (Item

0) from each of two air actuator j

rigid links (Item 39). Measure and record any movement of air actuator shafts. = f 4 h. - a

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= A Yq 4 / East Acutator Shaft Movement inches West Acutator Shaf t Movement 4$$ ~1Minches : I h ,[. ff /g/L 5.13 Clear tag on valve 2-IA-1044. DO NOT OPEN 2-IA-1044 at this time. // W ( / M /4 / c 5.14 Stroke both actuators open by holding the control switch in the control room for TV-MS-201C to open and slowly opening 2-IA-1044. Measure and-record vertical opening stroke of actuator. g Ig /u M 3 'h a :. 9%2 j e-l a 75J - 4 a W = f o, /g.. E Opening Stroke inches ,.Md / /,1/g 5.15 Close TV-MS-201C by closing 2-IA-1044 and slowly opening test flange vent valves. Measure and record vertical closing stroke of actuation. fia% -0%a - to h a Closing Stroke inches sunso h. 3 "lsa; 9 9n. N. 7 /M/GC 5.16 Go to close on switch for TV-MS-201C in control room. { hl.f$4hg.9 hb h Y f 5 sL M d.ut p.1.... -sa A y 64.,,'$ typ As u g p.s6 %J4

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r '2-ST-191 .Page 9 of 11 GE 51030 A*[ /gn. 5.17 Tag 2-IA-1044 closed. /Y/7 /d/d C 5.18 R91nstall pins (Ite 40) to connect rigid links-(Item k e+/M

39) to rock shaft. Ar<J ".[

A D /* ~ d 5 ' d el'n la *h ,.w. ,hWII /@c 5.18A Hol.D Notify H. L. Miller that valve is ready for disassembly. Do not proceed without authorization. 5.19 Remove cover (Item 45) from trip valve in accordance f'928 /A/gc with. applicable steps of MMP-C-MS-002. Corrective Maintenance Procedure for inspection of Main Steam Trip Valve. j , h& 7 /,v-[/ec 5.20 Engineering to inspect internals of valve. Record (Test Eng. Signoff only) findings on Attachment 2. /4N' / nd 7/g,. 5.21 Clear tag on 2-IA-1044 and cycle trip valve from control. room with cover removed as instructed by Test Engineers. Measure and record valve movement as directed by Test Engineer. PARAMETERS MEASURE VALUES (ulA sk s / + tote. k (l.,ge.y d.cive f cp4 of..,<a $.s. r es. g. m

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2-ST-191 ./ Page 10 of.11 DEC1 3 1936 ,f/E # / w 5.22 On Attachment 2 record SQC Numbers for all measuring equipment used. 5.23 Remove test flanges and pressure gauges, j ,,h, # /MG 5.24 Notify Operations shift supervisor that test is ,#h # / g complete. - ) O e 6 e d 5

c-2-ST-191 Page 11 of-11 _ DEC 12.1986 INITIALS /DATE 6.0 Acceptance criteria (/ /gfygc, 6.1 There is no acceptance criteria for this Special Test. This test only gathers information to be used by Engineering to. determine proper operation of TV-MS-201C. TV-MS-201C will be repaired / reassembled et a later' time in accordance with approved stati<,A procedures after information collected in this procedure has been evaluated. ~~ Completed by: [4' l/ ,y -r, s Date: />l/ clfC. + s

,1 5 p.6 i. te t 7 V-MS-B o t C TEST F L' A NC. E RT G 5 ( 2 M Qc ) A % cLn,#.d Qs. s,\\ ek k Die MS to be'cNethfd do ag"f /go " gM [g, O.gAc t w. R ver(' w Lbas gashed Wh. DEC 12 Di6 9" die.Staa$c ./ o N e -,iu a;.. usn.sn / oA t'/s

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[. k1 2-ST-191 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 4 DEC 1 I 006 RECORD OF INSPECTION AND TEST FINDINGS j '/f G ad cut.. r e 4 uis a...,1 ~ on sk n,s (.- cL A L l. I L -c t yo.- n u t. c.at mT (% l.y.s&L 4-g/gygiff, ${ c.a i., V. ~ s. t r.. e k,, n,. e c i- ~ j s R &n ,1. fe. l/t $le l,1< / e,s n.r o % i. sll ln1A ni r rIt ?.,.k L, kw il L.h k,sl,.h w na u s k ud k-r-7W ft/k t A {, J O %c..e let !! r-/ ('fd e / n< i i Q\\ ~ u.+ cu.n T a~ta. L.a a - a ~ ( ) 6 J st.k ensh 9 -.ff N b-i n Y Twon f TV-W%-3alf Y' IU Ll fr n 0l1 *,s. s \\ vtl lr el ch $nI n., \\ l<o) k wnudbW 'c is a e. s f*

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s 9. '; 'r - m l 1 l 1 DEC 12 1986 1 SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NO. A SAFETY EVALUATION FOR q _UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION 1. UFSAR Section(s) 9.O 10 3 Tech Spec Section(s)_ 3.C.' 2. ,The probability of occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety and previously evaluated in the UFSAR is _not increased because: TAlc 9w e o ei l +rs4 mere / / nu',> uars m,) i eterds- / A. le i, il,, l< s h,h; ,n 7 tr-in s - a t, i e t,;4A 4/r,uln W { o u r.., ble) _ H,,,, m,, W, & n<,, k e, d v W/eane. Ale / w/,% Me no c.% e 3. The possibikity of a differentcold sh f b'awa u a od c a., %.c type of accident or madunction 'than was previously evaluated in the UFSAR has not been created because Tba'; +,~ 4 resu H s En , c r. o n >> <a, -l a i c>rO C c.,4;i., 4e, n no 4h <;yde.a Ce,, d, h a - s J rv. is, s-av e e <<., d' w, c h,. ek, tinea $l;% Sf s k me

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,, t e.,a., r < Is, Me va /ve. 0 The margiY,o,f safety as described in the BASIS of section of.any 4 4. l part of the Technical Specifications is not reduced because: Alor de.r re_, led cli d d>w a s n o e>r/c tin fb (+sirlellt&T ts ou brl.a irme,ord $i /bs Ah a Q sie k e L M?s m ce l-r i a i rv-m s-De> r c un. ara ho /> 'l/ i n s, <,4 r, li>>., la w (c.sdr 0;s s ne,r is s in a a,, Evaluation)By:TaL,,ual SweificAim basi 1 5,. .ff m, e r, 9 7f,.4. m < .,o uf a c. 6. Reviewed and Approv 1 By: M.' Cha'irstan, SNSOC n bz/n Date ~ b a

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P i MEMORANDUM l IU Mr. John Lewis, Surry P.S. Richmond, Virginia G. W. Mietus, EB-8 December 15, 1986 ENGINEERIl!G REPORT I l HALON AHD CO, SYSTEM ACTUATION AND DISCHARGE TONDENSATE LINE BREAK ~ SURRY POWER STATION I Per your request on December 11, 1986 please find the attached l Engineering Report. ] l l If there are any Questions please call J.,i, .t at extension 1 l

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l l [ j ,4 l l G. W. Mietus 'i JMH:cag:3181 cc: tir. L. Farinholt, Surry P.S. l i Mr. J. M. Hunt, EB-6 Mr. W. L. Thompson, EB-8 Mr. L. T. Wa rnick, EB-6 gLV o{ g Mr. R. W. Calder, EB-3 9 n-y ge F 1 l potA Ec7.-ao F/ 7

L i 1 l V ENG1tiEERING REPORT HALON AND CO, SYSTEM ACTUATION AND DISCHARGE CONDENSATFTIRE BREAK SURRY FOWER STATICH 1.0 Scope of Work 1.1 - Investigate the. actuation and discharge of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 I 2 Cable Tray Room Carbon Dioxide (CO,) ystems and the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room (ESR) Halon S Systems. 1.2. Identify possible actuation scenaries for the Halon and CO, Systems. i 1.3 Identify drawings, specifications and related information on the location of equipment, system operation, wiring diagrams and power l supply location for the Halon and CO, Systems. l 1.4 ldentify possible generic and specific modifications to prevent these types cf discharges in the future. 2.0 Site Visit Observation 1 On December 11,'1986 J. M. Hunt and G. W. Mietus walked dan the ESR Halon Systems and the Cable Tray Room C0 Systems. Ir addition, interviews were held with control roon cperators, Loss Prevention De:artment personnel and local fire protection contractors that were workino en the two systems. 2.1 Halon System Walk Down Both the Unit I and Unit 2 ESR Halon Systems actuated shortly after the line break. The Halen cylinders are located aperoximately 50 feet from the line break. One cylinder head was slightly danaged and one manual discharge pull leaver was bent back. All the main cylinders I had discharged with the 3 reserve cylinders remainine full, and. in good cendition. All the cylinders are equipped with high pressure burst discs, which will actuate at 800 to 1000 PSIG and provide for the centro 11ed release of Halon into the turbine building. These discs were found to be in place. The ESR was inspected along with all isolation dampers, signalino devices, and fire doors. The followirg dancers were confirmed closed, fire dampers #4, B,15, 21, and 22 with fire daeper !14 not inspected because it was not accessible (Duct work needs to be removed to insoect danper). Damper 814 should be confirined closed when reset by operations (Damper locations are shown on drawings 11448-FB-25D and 25E). Af ter discussions with loss Prevention personnel, the operation of all alarm devices and the fire door (18 between Unit 1 and 2 were conh rned. All local pull stations and control, room manual discharge push buttons for the Halon Systems had not been actuated. la-JMS 3173-1

The Halon control panel (1-FPH-CPI) meanted on the 9 line wall in the . Unit I turbine buiiding had been reset with the follexir.g modules i jumpered out by the fire protection ccr. tractor brought in after the ' .i incident. ZN-30 Module Unit 1 Push Button l Unit 2 Pressure Switch ZN-30 Module Unit 2 Push Button Unit 2 Pressure Switch TL-30 Podule Time Limit Unit 2 + A.113 modules along with BC-31, module (battery charger r.odule) had failed. All bad modules were marked and piven to the Task Force investigating the incident. (The wiring drawing for the Halon control panel 1-FPH-CPI is 11448-FE-515). In addition to these r.odule, 50 to 75% of the remaining modules shewed signs cf cerrosion as a result of water cascading down through the insice of the panel. During discussions with the Station less Prevention Group it was determined that water was ruening down the Unit I sids cf the 9 line wall and l across the top of the Halon parel. Water was also seen flowirg under fire door 30 leading from the walk way en the 27' elevatien of the turbine building. The followirg addit'enal observations were made. I 1. The gasket on the lef t hand side at the tep o.f the d or was found to be deformed and cut near the center of the docr where screws from a nameplate were screwed thr:uch the door and gasket. l 2. It appeared conduits were not seeled where they er.tered through the top of the panel. NOTE: While water r.ay have entered because of items 1 and 2 above it diu not appear that this was the main source of water enteric, the Halon panel. 3.- The ma.iority of the water damage and corrosion'was noticed on the left side of the panel. Cables leaving the 2" conduit second to the lef t showed white residue and dried water droplets. The top of the sub panel directly under this conduit showed signs of corrosion and a white residue. DJring a walk down of this 2" conduit two Condulets were found to be missing covers. The first Condulet was located directly uncer the grating leading from fire door 30 into Unit 1. It was determined that water running under I fire door 30 entered the 2" conduit through this open Condulet and eventually accumulated on the botton of the Halon panel. In sumary the Halon System inadverter.tly cperated with all eouipmer.: performing its intended function. The inadvertent operation was caused because water entered the penei through an open Condulet and j shorted out the Unit 1 and Unit 2 pust button circuits actuating both systems. 14-JMH-3173-2 e

I 2.2 CO, System Walk Down The Unit I and 2 Ceble Tray Room CO, Systens actuated shortly after the line break. The bulk storage tank, located between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 transformers, was completely errptied (the piping errangement for both Units is shown on Cardox Vend:r drawing FLH-16207). The selectcr valves for each hazard area are 1ccated in the turbine building at column line C-8. According to the loss Prevention departnent, the Unit 1 Cable Tray Roem centained a large amount of snow 10 minutes after the incident. This was a direct result of discharging a large amount of CO,ble Tray Roem and the floor was into the rcen. In addition, there was a ligt.: mist in the Unit 2 Ca slightly wet indicating that a much sraller amount of CO, had been discharged into this room (no snow was visible). All Dampers (Fire Dampers #27A, 27, 28 and 29) were inspected and found in their closed position (The Damper locations are shown on drawing 11448-FB-25B). panels are located on the Unit 2 side of the 9 line wall on The CO,ft. elevation. The conduits leave the tco of the panel and run the 45 to the edce of a Carle Tray directly abovs the cabinets. These conduits are not sealed and water from both the sprinkler systers and/or the line break was allowed to enter the panels. The panels were first opened by station electricians under the direction of Bnbby Lang. (tir. Lang was not interviewed). The Micro Switch used to initiate the timed discharge of CO, was removed from the Unit 2 CO, panel and has been turr.ed over to the Task Force investigating the incident. (See the list of references fer the electrical drawings associated with these control panels) It is apparent that the Unit I and 2 Unit CO,ition,rhe Unit 1 panel systems were actuated because of water entering the panels. In add malfunctioned and discharged the majority of the CO, stored in the bulk storage tank into the Unit 1 Cable Tray Room. No seo.uence of events or exact mode of failure was determined for the CO, system during the site visit. 3.0 Review of Desfon Documents (CO, Svstem) The original specification for the carbon dicxide fire protection system (NUS-288) provided data sheets for each area to be protected. The Cable Trey Rooms require 5,260 lbs, of CO, each with a discharge time of 146 sec. The specification also calls for the installation of a 15 ton low pressure storage tank. If Unit I discharged dumping 5,260 lbs, of CO, and repeated dumping until the tank emptied, it would have discharoed a total of 6 times. This apparently may have happened because as nuch as a foot of snow hed drif ted into some areas of the room. 14 -JMH - 317 3-3

i i L'.0 EliGil:EERING REC 0!'ME!!DATIONS PRIOR TO PLACit;", SYSTEMS EACK !!! SERVICE j ,f 4.1 Have all discharged bottles inspected including discharge cylinder heads, and have 0-Rings replaced at all connection points. 4.2 Have the 3 reserve Halon cylinders preser.tly in the Unit 2 rack installed in the Unit I rack as shcwn en drawing 11445-FS-27K. eveoTeowe.s 4.3 Replace all Pyr:t#M: modules showing signs of corresion in the ESR Halon control panel 4.4 Have all Condulets and junction boxes checked and ccnfirm that all i covers are in place. f 4.5 Have all portions of the CO, panels showing visible signs of corrosion replaced. 4.6 Have all open conduits entering the CO, pareis sealed. 1 i 4.7 Functionally test all 4 systems to confirm proper operation (No CO, or Halon sheuld be discharged) 5.0 Fossible l'.edifications .The Fire Protection electrical panels throucheut the clant ere located in areas where water lire breaks (stean, sprinEler systens, etc) could spray water. in and around the panels. For this reason electrical eovipment is usually mounted in NEMA 12 or NEMA a enclosures. These enclosures are effective only if the panels are closed correctly and the conduits entering the panels are installed correctly.. Inere are severai esdifications that could be made, that would prevent future failures of the fire protection panels. These are as follows: 1. Have all conduit enter panels from tht botton. 2. Seal all conduit as it enters the panels. 3. Seal conduit connections to panels. 4 Have Periodic Test Procedures developed to inspect fire protectier control panels on a monthly basis to verify doors are closed correctly l and that seals are in good shape. 5. Make all tray to conduit transiticns such that any open ended ennduit is facing the ground and sealed, l s 14-N'F-3173-4

i l 6.0 References j e 1 6.1 NUS-288 Specification for Carbcn Dicxide Fire Protection Equipment for Surry Power S'.ation, j { 6.2 114:8-F2-258 Ventilation and Air Corditiening Service Building S'8-2. 6.3 115d8-FE-10A Wiring Diagram 125VDC - l 6.4 11518-FE-510 Cardox Fire Extinguishi,g System Elementary Line l Connection Diagram. l 6.5 11EL8-FE-51P Cardox Fire Extinguishing System Ele.entary Line Connection Diagram l 6.6 11448-FE-10A Wiring Diagram 125VDC 6.7 11448-FE-51C Wiring Diagram Fire Protection System Sheet 3 6.8 11448-FE-51Q Cardox Fire Extinguishing Systen Elenentary Line Connection Diagram 6.9 11448-FE-51P Cardox Fira Extinguish 9.g S sten Elenertary Line / Connection Diagrac 6.10 FLH-16207 Vendor Drawing Cardox CO, F're Extinguishing System 5.11 11448-FE-51T Wiring Diagram E.er. Sugr. F.m. Halen System Sheet 2 5.12 11cL8-FE-515 Wiring Diagram Emer. Swgr. Fen. Helen System Sheet 1 ( 5.13 11448-FB-25E Ventilation and Air Corditiening Service Building SH-5. 5.14 11448-FB-27 K Plunbing and Fire Protection Service Building Sheet 10 5.15 11448-FB-25D Ventilation and Air Cerditioning Service Building SH-4 5.16 11448-FB-27A Plumbing and Fire Frctectio. Service Eviiding SH-1 5.17 11442-FB-27F Plumbing Service Building SH-6 5.18 OCP 84-01 Design Change Package 'or the Installation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESR Falen System i 14-y.H-3173-5

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Ns,9702C20 MEMORANDUM TO Bill Holland Surry Power Station FROM H. L. Miller December 17, 1986 j j MARKEY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF REQUEST 1. A total of nine (9) persons have died as a result of accidents at Surry Power Station since 1972. July 26, 1972. Two (2) 'p'ersons died as a result of a steam relieving into the Unit I safeguards. ~ October 15, 1983. One (1) individual died as a result of the failure of an expansion joint in the Unit I high pressure heater drain pump l suction. l August 9, 1984. Two (2) persons were electrocuted in the Unit I j turbine building area during construction activities. December 9, 1986. Four (4) individuals have died as a result of l the failure of the suction piping to the "A" main feed pump in Unit 2. 2. The most number of people to die in a single accident at Surry was four (4) as of 12/17/86. (One individual remains in critical i condition). 3. 'Mid 1970's - Unit 2 "A" low pressure heater drain pump recirculation line rupture.

  • Early 1980's 6 inch extraction steam elbow in turbine building i

erosion caused through wall steam leak.

  • 1984 - Unit 1 moisture separater reheater drain line elbow rupture.
  • 1986 - Accident at Surry involved a pipe wall rupture (the feedwater suction piping).

" Failures of high pressure heater drain pump expansion joints have been proviously reported with failure mechanism of a different type than being considered. A Harry L. Miller l HLM/ sat P0ZA V7-ac 6~//0 e

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E Q S i r n 4 ft f e S r BN .R I S i N E t oc ob E N T N E E E P N t t e b E E C ONH n sp su S A O I I T 4 r E S S S i es en N I t M PR T A N a vn vs E t S f I T e P T. V P I iI i C N N IT. T r N A o 1 n t tt f I I. r F O R T r I O D N R N r *L al an X. CNE A L I e2 t 2 t a t e / T r S O F. k - nn nm Y A s A / T e MT<i r0 L eo en T C T N I r t Y A

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g DECEMBER 29, 1986. THE FOLLOWING ECUIPMENT CHANGES ARE REQUIRFD TO PUT THE MAIN HALON CONTROL PANEL (TURBINE BUILDING) BACK INTO SERVICE. THESE CHANGES ARE NECESSITATED DUE TO THE. FACT THAT AS OF JULY 1984 THE PYROTRONICS SYSTEM 3 - CP-31 AND ASSOCIATED MODULES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. PYdOTRONICS HAS UPDATED THE SYSTEM 3 TO CP-35 AND COMPONENTS WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE TO THE CP-31 WITH SOME WIRING FIELD CHANGES. DUE TO THE LACK OF AVAILABLE COMPONENTS, THIS SYSTEM MUST BE UPDATED TO CP-35 MODULES.

  • NOTE THIS WILL NOT CHANGE THE SYSTEMS DESIGN NOR OPERATION, JUST UPDATE THE SYSTEM TO NEW EQUIPMENT.

EXISTING: CHANGE 70: FIELD CHANGES: CP-31 CP-35 CONTROL PANEL COMPATIBLE WITH FIELD WIRING - FACTORY WIRING WILL BE CHANGED TO ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT TERMINAL LOCATIONS. 4 PS-31 PS-35 POWER SUPPLY FOR CP-35. BC-31 BC-35 BATTERY CHARGER FOR CP-35, NEW LOCATION MUST BE FOUND IN 2ND CABINET. 2N-31 2U-35 DETECTOR INPUT MODULE - MUST CHANGE END OF LINE' DEVICE. ZA-30 ZU-35 SAME AS 20-31. TL-30 TL-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. SM-30 SM-30 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. RM-30 RM-30U MUST ADD ADDITIONAL CONTROL WIRE FROM CP-35. AE-30 AE-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. SR-32 SR-32 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANCE. PM 31 PM-31 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. TC-30 TC-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANCE. Fora 17 =2' 69/ /25s J

T y./. j. 4 e +s. MEIPORANDUM g Dr. J. T. Rhodes. OJRP 21 Richmond, Virginia To s i png R. W. Calder, EB 3 Dececber 29, 1986 1 RECEIVED DEC 30 886 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL IPlVESTIGATION COMITTEE REPORT MANAGER'S OFFICF. AiURRY Attached is the " Main Feedwater Pump Suction Pipe Incident - Interim Report

  1. 1" prepared by the independent technical investigation comittee.

j e s q i .'5 R. W. Calder cc: Mr. W. L. Stewart, OJRP 5 Mr. R. F. Saunders, Surry Comittee Members 81-RWC-215 i FQlTd t7-D [ /4

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