ML20215B179
| ML20215B179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | Miller H VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215B065 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-20 2-ST-191, NUDOCS 8706170247 | |
| Download: ML20215B179 (33) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:'
.: . I
, .t
. e (1)
PROCED_URE
- 2-ST-191 SURRY POWER STATION (2)
DATE: DEC 1-2 1986 - (3) (4) TYPE PROCEDURE: SPECIAL TEST PROCEDURE UNIT: 2 (5) TITLE: SPECIAL TEST TO INSPECT THE OPERATION OF MAINSTEAM TRIP VALVE TV-MS-201C (6) CONTENTS
- SECTIOf4
- 1. PURPOSE
- 2. REFERENCES
- 3. INITIA1, CONDITIONS
- 4. PRECAUTIONS
- 5. INSTRUCTIONS
- 6. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ATTACHMENTS 1 & 2 Think ALARA RECOMMEND APPROVAL: (7) (8)
A DATE: L2. t2. % ( 3- ' f C REVIEW: QUALITY A (9) (10) i dAJ DAr I?A240 l l APPROVED STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERA ING COMMITTEE: (11) (12) wm ' DATE: J1f/2fVis j // /' APPROVED (MANAGER) (If Acquired): (13) (14) DATE: 45/2ST191 /C~cTA f 7 .30 l 8706170247 870611 PDR FOIA E/5 I I ZWELLINGB7-20 PDR {
)
.: ..- I
*5 2-ST 191 1
Paga,1 of 11 j
- DEC 12 1996 SURRY POWER STATION
.1 UNIT NO. 2 ,
SPECIAL TEST TO INSPECT THE OPERATION OF MAINSTEAM j l
. l TRIP VALVE TV-MS-201C 1.0 Purpose l
1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to provide ' detailed - instructions',for testing "ard. inspection of TV-MS-201s, inclusive of r.ain valve, actuating cylinders, linkages and instrument air piping to the trip valve. Information gather will be used to evaluate proper trip valve operation. 1 l I i l' 1 I
e*; , 2-ST-191
Page 2 of 11 DEC 1 8 H66 2.0 References 2.1- Schuttle & Koerting Drsvings for Main Steam Isolation Valve (Tig. 828 AA DC) 2.1.1 Assembly Dwg of 30 x 24 x 30 Main Steam Isolation Valve Dwg. No. 73-XC-51 Rev. 5 2.1.2 Parts List for Main Steam Isolation Valve, Assembly Dwg 73-XC-52, Rev". 5 and 73-XS-48. Rev. 5.
2.2 Surry Controlled Drawings 2.2.1 Valve Operating Numbers - Comnressed Air System SH. 2 Dwg No. 11548-FM-75B Rev. 16 Valve Operating Numbers Main Steam Dwg. No. 2.2.2 11548-FM-64A, Rev. 27 Instrument Piping Misc. SH. 1 Dwg:. No. 11548-FK-8A,
'2.2.3 Rev. 9 __
e t I i l l l l
L~.: ..
*a-- ,
2-ST-191 Page 3 of 11 DEC 13 1986 - l INITIALS /DATE I
- 3.0 - Initial Conditforis .
~ j
//*(/ / u 'c '
.(, 3.1 Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown Mode. j M f 7 //s/,,fc. 3.2 Assigned Test Engineer (SES) is present for test. ;
i
. /b9 /gtc 3.3 Operations Shift Supervisor has been notified that !
Special Test is to commence. l l
,4h I / y/ nf 3.4 NRV-MS-201C is closed.
/f-4 / '/n?/- ,
3.5 Station Instrument Air system is at normal operating 1 pressure.
'\
i i f I J i t 0 9
. s 2-ST-191 1
- Page 4 of 11 CEC 12 1986 INITIAIS/DATE 4.0 Precautions and Limitations -
/.<vf/h,,5 4.1 Verify mechanical and electrical isolation of equipment j and presence of safety tags as required in applicable portions of this procedure.
- I
, i i
2
*=
6
. I l
J 4 l l l 1
. i
y - - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ ,j et
, ,. A 2-ST-191
* ~
Page 5 of 11 DEC 1 1 1986 INITIAI,S/DATE 5.0 instructions _ G <P //./ohc 5.1 Do not enter N/A for any steps in this section without preparing a Procedure. Deviation unless specifically permitted by note or cicp. Test Engineer (SES) is to initial and date all N/A entries. . f7d 7 /p/s r/*C. 5.2 Isolate.and Tag instrument air to TV-MS-201C, IA valve i 2-IA-1044 Tag Report ( 5.0-779D
~
j I8h / j.o//, 5. 3' Remove rupture disk lower flange and rupture disk for. wesi~ both .ees+:=end-wt- TV-MS-201CAactuating cylindery.oab/ . Mark rupture disk # to indication which cyli.. der they
+
were installed in. Save rupture disl # for engineering fv
\
evaluation. Nt[/afft, 5.5 Bolt test flanges' to rupture disk upper flanges per Attachment 1. MT / G/,,[sc. 5.5 Ensure Control Switch for TV-MS-201C in control room is l
~
in the closed position. h4P ,_/ 5c 5.6 Clear Tag on valve 2-IA-1044 and open valve. Record IA pressure as read in Control Room. IA Pressure 7b psig. 0E //jl t, 5.7 As instructed by the Test Engineer, while opening TV-MS-201C from the Control Room.
//;'6 /dfc. 5.7.1 Measure rotation of TV-MS-201C rock shaft and record
.t/J es t G ,2 A. Degrees Rotation 6m4 63
, 0.
' ? ?, /4 ic/fC 5.7.2 Measure vertical stroke of actuator shaft and record.
,3 41 h a - 9 . :
ui (, Ts Stroke inches
.)
Lt l'
~
fMT st 5?Q l# $
2-ST-191 '. Page 6 of 11 DEC 1 1 1986
///<fT / n /qd 5 5.7.3 Time operation of the trip valve locally at the trip valve, and ret.or'd. - .
Time to open 7 , D b sec. 5.7.4 Record 1A pressure as read in control room and at test gauges TA Press. C.R. 7C, te, <) TestCauge(E[M (W) d~f(,
/XJ / /3[r e ,
5.7.5 Verify limit switch operation. Record anyl failure to operate properly on Attachment 2. e
//s[t;/ / j.d,hc 5.7.6 Snoop test all connections in IA line between
/
2-IA-1044 and TV-MS-201C actuators. List any leaks on Attachment 2. NOTE: At the. discretion of the Test EnF', oce r , TV-MS-201C maybe cycled more than once to get the necerary opening stroke i:est s data, s
//v/ / /MdkL 5.8 Manually isolate air to TV-MS-201C 2-IA-1044. Observe and record any drop in air pressure by shutting til (?
on the installed test praissure gauge. s Drop in pressure (, c. psi gL-Observe if trip valve drifts from its open posit ".on. . Record amount of time of' drift. Degree drifted closed % li 4:6k Time period I/ (.* M. e *i . n ;,
//WI _/ 4 /qd C 5.9 Open air isolation valve to trip valve (2-IA-1044).
Ensure tripvalve is open.
,#dt f / /d:/,c 5.10 As instructed b/ the Test Engineer, while closing I
TV-MS-210C from the control room, ;
'2 /s/ c 5.10.1 , Measure rotation of TV-MS-2010 rock shaft and record.
WW Degree Rotation f r c.~ l
l
, ,, 2-ST-191
.Page 7 of 11 DEC 12 1986 5.10.2 Messure vertical stroke of actuator shaft sad
- f fe f / h e c.
*****0' y [l'(j_ Q Na = G YL Stroke inches. ,
c i /u 4 Ta - Gh ' I<[ /gi L 5.10.3 Time closing of valve locally at the trip l valve and record. Time t<s close 7.W sec.
/G F /p4-/w - 5.10.4
- Verify proper limit switch actuation. Record {
~
any failure to operate properly on Attachment 2, cf.sr f...t c0,(ed 4 ocla Y re JiOTE: At the discretion of the Test Engineer. TV-MS-201C may be j cycled more than once to get the necessary closing stroke test data. I
,ohb/
-(' 5.11 Isolate and tag IA to TV-MS-201C 1
1 l I I
.A k
I
. i
. 2-ST-191 !
. Page 8 of 11 !
- DEC 12 1986 CAUTION:
PISTON COMPRESSIOP SPRING HAS RESIDUAL TENSION AND MUST BE ! SUPPORTED WHILE REMOVING PIN. (ITEM 40 S&K DWG 73-XC-52 REV. 5.) IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO APPLY A SMALL AMOUNT OF AIR TO' ! PNEUMATIC CYLINDERS TO EASE PIN REMOVAL. g f % L oi4 Lt.n ios.m G . A w.4 ekn (4) A F e;< wy.,,4 es 4 Ae c s cN.4 -
,k/f /]a/t/c. 12 Remove pins (Item 0) from each of two air actuator j rigid links (Item 39). Measure and record any movement
- of air actuator shafts. =
f 4 h. - a
- e/c- = A Yq 4 East Acutator Shaft Movement inches West Acutator Shaf t Movement 4$$ ~1Minches : I h
,[. ff /g/L 5.13 Clear tag on valve 2-IA-1044. DO NOT OPEN 2-IA-1044 at this time. // W ( / M /4 / c 5.14 Stroke both actuators open by holding the control switch in the control room for TV-MS-201C to open and slowly opening 2-IA-1044. Measure and-record vertical .
opening stroke of actuator. g Ig /u M 3e-'h a :. 9%2 j E l a 75J - 4 a W = f o, /g.. Opening Stroke inches
, .Md / /,1/g 5.15 Close TV-MS-201C by closing 2-IA-1044 and slowly opening test flange vent valves. Measure and record vertical closing stroke of actuation. .
, fia% -0%a - to h a Closing Stroke inches sunso h . 3 "lsa; 9 9n.
N. 7 /M/GC 5.16 Go to close on switch for TV-MS-201C in control room. { hl.f$4hg.9 hb h Y f 5 sL M d .ut p.1.... ,,
-sa A y
' 64.,,'$
% As ur g p.s6 %J4 typ aA a. cup a Vo
- 7. s . .
f l
r
.' '2-ST-191
.Page 9 of 11 GE 51030 A*[ /gn. 5.17 Tag 2-IA-1044 closed.
/Y/7 /d/d C 5.18 R91nstall pins (Ite 40) to connect rigid links-(Item k e+/M 39) to rock shaft. Ar<J A D /* ~ d 5 ' d el'n la *h
,.w. ".[ .
,hWII /@c 5.18A Hol.D Notify H. L. Miller that valve is ready for disassembly. Do not proceed without authorization.
f'928 /A/gc 5.19 Remove cover (Item 45) from trip valve in accordance with. applicable steps of MMP-C-MS-002. Corrective Maintenance Procedure for inspection of Main Steam Trip Valve. j
, h& 7 / ,v-[/ec 5.20 Engineering to inspect internals of valve. Record '
(Test Eng. Signoff only) findings on Attachment 2.
/4N' / nd 7/g,. 5.21 Clear tag on 2-IA-1044 and cycle trip valve from control. room with cover removed as instructed by Test Engineers. Measure and record valve movement as directed by Test Engineer.
PARAMETERS MEASURE VALUES cp4 of..,<a $.s. r (ulA sk s / + tote. k (l.,ge.y d.cive f g. es.
~
E m w
;- noe., +..
C y .%<l4.- I 4 y A<4(( $ tso H e opt .$ W lik
. v.n i .A g ,, % t,,,s f at 'li C.losul to 49e *
- f 4 % ..
O y ,%- 1 4 a,,, M A 4 < , is 2 2 w.k 6-k y J..c......ackd
. ,H , ..
t' l 1. pg C l&#l W 1 { .) Y/k
./
2-ST-191 Page 10 of.11 DEC1 3 1936 On Attachment 2 record SQC Numbers for all measuring
,f/E # / w 5.22 equipment used. , , ,h, # /MG 5.23 Remove test flanges and pressure gauges, j 5.24 Notify Operations shift supervisor that test is ,#h # / g complete. -)
O e 6 e d 5
c-2-ST-191 Page 11 of-11 _ DEC 12.1986 INITIALS /DATE 6.0 Acceptance criteria - (/ /gfygc, 6.1 There is no acceptance criteria for this Special Test. This test only gathers information to be used by Engineering to. determine proper operation of TV-MS-201C. TV-MS-201C will be repaired / reassembled et a later' time in accordance with approved stati<,A procedures after information collected in this procedure has been evaluated.
~~
Completed by: [4' l/ ,y -r, s Date: />l/ clfC.
+
s
'., ,1 5, p .6 . i . te t 7 V- MS- B o t C TEST F L' A NC. E RT G 5 ( 2 M Qc ) A % cLn,#.d Qs. s,\ ek k Die MS to be'cNethfd do ag"f /go " gM [g,
, O.gAc t w. R ver(' w Lbas gashed Wh. DEC 12 Di6 9" die.Staa$c
./
/ o N e - ,iu a;.. usn.sn oA t'/s
- de wow wase tiec i
i
.O O <- m . i+ ,
O O O
\ )
x., o o-O - i, P dr.sg ..<4 ++ p f r % % .g M k 4.el $s =M O I i l. r
'/1 "%k w ; . , 4'al . In.>. , tS, M u..m i.
1 [. - . - o - 300 psig 4ed $ag< .. N.T S .
'-)
1
%+ s, G .v.hp- ,E
. . p.i e. ---
)
.. ~Tm 1
[. k1
* ' 2-ST-191
$ ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 4 ;
RECORD OF INSPECTION AND TEST FINDINGS DEC 1 I 006 j ~
" '/f G ad cut. . r e 4 uis on a . . . ,1 sk n,s
(.- cL A -c L l. I > t L n ,. e yo.- c.a i . ,nVu. ~t s. . c.at t r . . mT (% l.y.s&L 4-g/gygiff, ${ c i-e k,, s ~ j R &n ,1. fe. l/t $le e,s n.r l,1< / o
% i. sll ln1A na ni r rIt u
?.,.k L, kw il L.h k,sl,.h w O %c. .e let !! n< r-/ ('fd e t A {, J
/
; <- s k ud k-r- 7W ft/k i i Q\ ~
L.a a - a J '
)
~ u .+ cu .n T a~ta.
6 ( Y' IU Ll fr n 0l1 *,s. TV-W%-3alf ,' st.k ensh 9 -.ff N - b-i n Y Twon f
\
s vtl lr el ch $nI n . , \ is a s
- e.
l<o) k wnudbW 'c M '*r < K/ #4 f*
- b Yft$
D
$h d'b g* N/ Yf b % { (
4clVG. p c w . g. g.t SG C *' 4S8 I
i c 2-ST-191 ATTAC1DiENT 2 Page 2 of 4 DEC 12 1$33
%k RECORD OF INSPECTION AND TEST FINDINGS 0
11 W $f nnA O f Ll W Y / >1 F
\, v eh , cov,< mshtLJ <.u cu l,. . ,1 r,,,, L,14 L o f c fis ~l O kunLf LA1 h f DD CMn Of O f6 $4 SI sBfda O R O 6
$f,g L i b, [> j T b 4 bePbh %#ts.es y._....# 4 e ,, K t
t*n !!! % A a d s' ,, e E .ss o c r b sn , n j Y e, u kn;l l te W
- 1 Rsu &k ;
I ~~~ l I 6 Y~] f 'j N ts. ( lin4 [ vi A avai .
. 9ee.4a #rb O e
i 6_ tumen a s hv udellol
;e 4 un\ m th 4 0.a 4n ., d<ud g, 4 v. secs im L H<
ee ,r. ... . h, e, u- ., , a <- ,
> l s' .A Y( A Ibf
- r $4 Cf J fe.o %
b Id4 f.Yz .I FL /] s [ U P\ [Af gPi jh _ /
,.f l { , (4 f+&
- 9f n .. / as a, f L n u < 4a lled _
i . L
^ .' ! - D< , .I w
- SC G u z., s l< <. r,., hediu< [e~2e1 4 /t>c h'r c ks 6 .A M -p.
, s ' ' " 9 . ';. 'r - m l 1
. l 1
DEC 12 1986 ,, 1 SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NO. A SAFETY EVALUATION FOR q _UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION
- 1. UFSAR Section(s) 9.O 10 3 Tech Spec Section(s)_ 3.C.'
- 2. ,The probability of occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety and previously evaluated in the UFSAR is _not increased because:
TAlc 9w e o ei l
+rs4 mere / / nu',> uars m,) i eterds-
/
A. le i, il, , l< s h ,h; ,n 7 tr- in s - a t, i e t,;4A 4/r ,uln W { o u r.., ble) _ ' H,,,, m,, W , & n<,, k e, d v W/eane. Ale / w/,% Me no c.% e ' possibikity of a%differentcold
.c a.,
- 3. The shoff b'awa u a od c ***
type accident or madunction 'than was previously evaluated in the UFSAR has not been created because Tba'; +,~ 4 resu H s En no ,nc r. o n >> <a, -l a i c>rO C c.,4;i. , 4e, 4h <;yde.a Ce, , d, h a - s J rv. is, s- av e e <<., d' w, c h , . , ek, tinea $l;% Sf s k me *3 em r lo r Ao h u /r $.e..< s e.b.r,% n nu.o d ,, t e.,a ., r < Is, Me va /ve . 0
- 4. The margiY,o,f safety as described in the BASIS of section of .any 4 l
part of the Technical Specifications is not reduced because: Alor de.r ts ou re_, led cli d d>w a s n o e>r/c tin fb (+sirlellt&T brl.aa irme,ord $i /bs Ah a Q sie k e i L M?s m ce l-r i rv- m s- De> r c un. ara ho /> 'l/ i n s, < ,4 r, li>>. , la w (c .sdr 0;s s ne,r is s - in a a, , ' 5 ,. Evaluation)By:TaL,,ual .ff m, e r,SweificAim 9 7f,.4. mbasi < 1 . ,o uf a c.
- 6. Reviewed and Approv 1 By: M.'
Cha'irstan, SNSOC n bz/n
% Date
~
b a
ir i
'. - e t e
t .nse e 9 u l. wnt r v s heoonw i s 0 s st e A 5 ssdt eo ot 4cn t nm6h*l n a a1 c ae d o.oa l 4 tl u.Ds3 e u f re n o.a r 0 i s.a is
*t ic cs nett r r ah it t ech
.Qs b H e e sd a
.ht ept mv Sf0tf e t n.ul t e n ol i n b sair m. h e t waect n aamP o0sfH emeu rat s 5. eot d e.deCe mmen n n n -
eo p i a tJs.s0 y we caa l .e in ee. r a. r. a h t nt e0hm s ir3wt nt sonsic wa bkino a wOac a odn : n t s. tl us3ro u a er oerl chol dseeat s
- n .. s r r e .
os t ueh C;nt rt r s oewvdr t h ad t Cch l ne . eait rrn ei u L t ret a evw ot a e. t v ol w . r neok avt eti vl dtl l aeil fl ue l t ae%at 5 nio l ak samca avenes t , n
.t.pont uo t nl _
a en v f Uweha ./ioa f derrwrs d htt ereboia kndrmcis we rbw raw canaunw s m.1 4atadeti e ome e alt imi re e/l a on 2oismi t mcuce2 hn eei nu uah ciesn0n8 r 61 sdi t h I eut c tt etii6i 0 i a nu caat i e : n Hdoo 2a vann oes a s m 3. nuh ure 5oh t eat niR ve iU rsnea0iot Ad t l ee il i h ns. . aneh hidtdsn eioat tt h tdot anBael a l cud a. nl hTia5e chn 6 uice e" Uew l w1 u s ofl c i w w i scoae sw Ld 4 . cvrr n r r o dn iiT vlee sn s
/ edirii 0 rvde y. oeel i id 2t et eca 1 at rsep 3dra kbl rs Uea t e p i dk amo ast rvecv eul
/l aa re 2ol ef r p .
oa ceef vin
'l so os t t p earc emn.sesdo 0,
2 sra embber Do da e UDal nnv hbeon os i st n i nt eutt i r o edot mV.acci u 1' .e ssm.t au c e f er eol wi s mmmofi
. een en 2
v t 9 1 h . b eh w ucm. P tt2aas " a o n.t v n Aedicah 0I ' vet l f sml nul e e T a r a rttidl o essae wyyt rs oSsnaae m evsre c 7 F aC . a. nh: ie0 t 2roeed o. n 7. n ol wh oon c cem t 1 R Q o S eUt8n 0dhfd e t i
.mtt krcw e ace i ryd 0iieder 0tth t e O na 1 aat ns E
P t r h (oj# nt oi
- v. a i
. . wse s UenneuPdl reoem idmiau. i l ocr tti ne= u o evt E g b sm AR ebesfi sTne ba ns iw atteb nn V5 C - h E
5 ne t e rnie o seessed D a $ et .. esti mn.el tVvea* e kht r r e S ]g ,bsdr fl aI m hntl coio ai sf i nmmi ae Uooprie oosot m t .t ft . s ayr hRR tt u at sro i rt t oll une sinJ i t 4 w . .at oc booooVe c
- sSe rrtM b e
1 s* a. e e htt r m J rs= .ves cnhn i t nnueon eoehoa b m eee .
.itI I CCsTRc J -
u e S
/
n C t I br mse eon cri I Cv o Pn eel i o D t Ii nn T a Rt nio t c Sa o C du r 3 i m se E nh o f 5r .ib J aS E i 1 o B t G t /f m. o o U rt e c p A o 2n ant S ei' n P N 1I Otd i / cnt N iUr p se g/f eo ei93 Ose O f/ a1 nr ct09 s et I ftt9 I u c T Ons1 t ia11 6 't tp f u77 i A ydR0 ee7 nu ft00 tsd C Oc aee I ti eR f ysP t r F I usd Dent d ie y A s ty T RaN sr tFN ihs O D E ei uSE lPi N H R RP
- D E R.
T a I W cre C ien P t wi iob E f rPr 4 y c u Y O t 2 wt T 2 t i r N i l t do ele I. . i I i i v h t i 1 o c n C 01 P
% a U ie.T A y99 1
" F hs cy .
F
/ h3 2% r22 r- -
y5 e2
/ e6 k - .
~ e n3 aay E C - u00 r0 e o3 da E t0 S55 s t - 2 w S a5 / u5 D T n s0 t 7r N H/ C2 /
e i 5 n t8e E
- c l e i d C CS P3 I v PN N PN i iN L MD E Uou nf n
- i. GD l WD L F1 1 IflL
w 8 et 8 O
.:- .te v 1
4 0 4
*N
- t. I.
Fih :. 4wtl NI WhH U 4_ e 1 I 1 1~AyH - I D s t ts. AI J I 4 A. 9 W ,1 4 8 _ 8 e N(8 t L t . dNP WD .EI 4 1
- .F NX1 =
. ) YCI )( aHU t I I H L 4 -
FO R I t s HI P SDD 8. I{ss lt WU 9 x ( ENN t CihL W( .T H I Ht le. Wr t l' Was 1 - SS.WIF.i AAn mk I e C M t l tc. I 'F D I e I
'E Gs i Ph FAkt WAhe t
s 4 w f'- W*s t . Uil W N U I t
- l. e
'l WN F H. E L-s lYF f s p V. - s s,
i '* l A ! I e n RteT l N a. w Ebe 4n. GHNtSl Ue MU 1
+I Al a t 4
. l.
Fw4 I .
- d. A a s
m s1 4l s ETS UH 2 mob t CHMl t t. - Y 1 t A. . Y Sii
' 1' TAS Afe l .
E
- a A F. tG1LL wS N. I ES 2r b~ F' Nbbe NTA . *-U A O l i TH E M. US IENl .
W KVt SE H Z 'B E A T t I
.' NLlAk -
D1 G HU N'lT lu T" CIRVF A
)
E . E. 2, - L R EOLEfI F I.E C HNAESR EESN H OftPN . H S H O M. A - E l NNU FUE TEIA A - DSLR . DTE7 l IGI NTHNT OFE t .EEI A A N M. I OLt Ak2O
- T -
P TOS2 EA.I3AFFS 1 f LO T L SP D 1ESIUTE N1SI 0 LI A1 NAtEI N 2VR AD NI : E.A M D A Al . AOU I T .I C 7LEAE 4 e N ) HI .4 fV E PEN .s. n v I E TEf N8E 8eft YHPT UAr e a a m I V SH' s e H t LEASI Ft t - e FI t OE H - 5' s H% i i l ell tN1 As t l - ( Nfs N. I IHEI
. t e
. 6
.s
- n. s L v H t $ nWt I (
S A a
. on - 1 ov S" u. E R . I uf U UL ti VA EW I.
AL t.. H e . t t f M. s.SYi 4t
- LA lt. es l s3 1 s t I E. M m
.- t ? t 4 s . ,Y t 9e E< . M l 8 l' Nt %L ed en
- e. 4 e itont u lw* Vi2n al eI t*" e.
3e s 9 l 9 1 E l 7I I Fe t sH
- f. He b?Us1e 4Ir so e
e R l 1 Lke s t i I N t FH AU4 ",tEl E M. m s a uc c e-gf
- t e*dVc sI eSi uPn l T E F RB OM O 6%bf 5 UlMl M t YA tkG1 la k. bU NN1 lAL'FPI O ELP l
*r es PE N T<bLAI I 1 AR E O2 -
a r a i,B .f
*uw. EC RE O
A.S f G MTS RAU . EWHHE4 N O.T L NP 2 T k a*tl n D I
. bNN.EOP I OEt s eai 1 .
- e. r t o Pr vw G P 9tEEE1 IG FI L -
N I /te MVCET / EU AT t o- t e e ,S *
* .nl t
I S R 2RI t I DSfM 2MH 8RA s J e eol NE C 1 UArV EM 1 ATT1E _
> s p eio RI S EuRSVN E U VD N WI FHNEN . -e a mr tu n a
at tf UA MD DE WsX ( O1toSWIR s.EANO ( SOSAdA es S ha b a. s e. n n / n h
. s
. p, g i m c
t o t._
- s i
t o C Pt n t n no ei Y , a
. e a I e dt 3 . . e c Rm na er a *( f _
g i Se t a t s s f i 9a w t e np je og b 9 )/
/ . -
t.= re l ' T / iO ,
/n t t
o 2a 1M r ef e t N o
,g p C 21 E
D N44 t e N poy + J AC ah mT u
- V g B u R RCNR TDY /
s Srd C FEAO e ee b E ' nsm / CN CP J I SEN et wn se oaa i nn t e gy M[ N O I IO FI7 FT4 FNRI FI U Ll .
*Y t v aMn / T OA1 O _
A U7 TI E ae r ee t Sre > ol e h C I YT0 TC YNAN l EFN sh 3i F UA ' s UD O ns e I D DI ES e t n 2 eea s T FN SPR en d nSh o n O QSE QEI E s.
.t o n o t t ae N HER HRPP
- s. t. a tft - et h 4at son a=1 adeT sa
. t ,
1 l l nm e rt t l ed nuod a 3 s a oe ? osnm.e
. si . t2 Ha c Y.
w wt r i e s. V 2
- e. eu.t 5 e i 3 t a i t e. e t.
l.
~. .
esnl lt ..t eteh*.. aev 1 t in4- eil t i s
- l. .
.e v. t a t r
e hse t ot pa I t t een 8 an e e .e t n 1
&. . i . t c e . . n
- r. nn a- n r. w v *. n A#
nreic*.t 8 a i I 2 t 1 o 4 < a % +y '#. ". t.. s. F t 4 t eN t e i r rt t 9
--e t
s - s... / e- at eh / t t e .e e - fs ..e **d 9' l nca e t s v- n o4** V Y. r t s r a . A l. F
- e. t.
T m s. I. ee r. . it6 < r - e F.- s
* .A - . t e t
- Y
. .- l
- a. t .#. n n.. or Y*
. . a a b d e *a t.e n. t . . . e
. s 8
F t t - gi e.
._ . l ' v. n i.
e.
- t. . e. . a. i d.. i .:
. t e e . s e ?
e l e Maaw v t I ,. v e . . .- 4 n, e. t e 4ee en8+
. "t
.
- HI l I
- t. - s. e I' e Wl r1 t e -
i e 4 f ' =
i l!{i!;I
- 9 U' .
e 6 2 D
. M. T 2 Q E Ri PNDUt. k okE p
E E I t et d E 3 4E1 1 N UR t T A .
. Y. e 21 Nt EDN D t .H 1MI H4NN t
UF CAANWP L 0 AL d) HE kC el IF 1 I E S CNNN - lSFNtA1Fa4Dl 3WENII E _ I E D.f E 4 AI D tNbWM4 T J i H 4. l itrH
,t F G f- YE t 1 l f Nts E-1 e HTN 1T (W MUA N 2 i 4EtNF F X
- mFAI 1 ef d %401AI V N (P E HDI T f (Ni 9 i t . E _ ~ - t sh l_ (MI Mff T I t tN %S NALIT IS _ tbDCH
. t. P G E A E E N II V U. (^*Uk H Nt A WE C .
pttY SR0FTHTH6LDTO TUHtsA SI F F 4NJ1Os 1 AF! t I f
/f rEOt
.E .
t rOOANkH t P
=8ITNEE L f
-. E/ .AtTEENRLU TT NLW
.b I tP O MA SO W R M.1 2ASNA t IO yAMU EI FP 1 I r L tWURSLN 1 H YOOL
. f AFAEED31D WRVE0 .TABRNO TTII F F NHr t ETt NSIWDD EET1R H D1AYO N5OEE tBETNLU I( HYMNR1O I AOTG NL IEW1 nFWISVS01' kD I A3C AE .ELDWXDE RAN P C uHEGTWLAD NNC N F
R M. H C A EOP f EEAAI 3 I S
.i I 1 8 AEUEI H R RA1 3 FTD*RRN f
. .MLEGFDEV I I EI EEI tNESHNWI . OSRIWfMF 2 ECF 1 I _
.. nA9 f I 4 'f A .f ./ E I 4EN
. e- N i DSR .ETEo6A*TOi S
C6 AOTsHHI 14 E N R
% N Eur.H N t / t sEs
. 3
. t FNL0 MEf b LO 1 S t a EAl J E
.F4 x4D d V F. Ak42 S 3 / A 0I 0tkEAm b 6 v hA5 L* .
NEtVEEEu1 I Ef4F1T HHF 2RW E ETWADEA h_ N I 6NSSS OA
. 8 t .
f . D' WE E 1 A 8A LNDR NTE M. / H E A O N H P
. I. ,
T S _ .. t i AHtE.ANA9TVIPATA E1ELTLE / ICS E I B1RBNPL02SFIEYR1 f fW AE SE DTP LE: I 31S.FROE E F RWE
- I sECNLs2NLDOCUOS L hl6TN' 'e ATR T AOAtr .O E RLPN REINPI 0t .TRLNLA AJA 7.OP
_ -. -0L*FWNHEW.DNOHE9E AGEDVESTM JCET0S
. 1 F T C s. E W H L P S I LTN1R -
ltI(, , lltl!llIlll1 l l ll!
P
. i MEMORANDUM l
IU Richmond, Virginia Mr. John Lewis, Surry P.S.
" G. W. Mietus, EB-8 December 15, 1986 ENGINEERIl!G REPORT I
l HALON AHD CO, SYSTEM ACTUATION AND DISCHARGE TONDENSATE LINE BREAK
~
SURRY POWER STATION I Per your request on December 11, 1986 please find the attached l Engineering Report. ] l If there are any Questions please call J. ,i, .t at extension 1 l l 6305, t l l [ _ j
' . ,4 l l
G. W. Mietus
'i JMH:cag:3181 cc: tir. L. Farinholt, Surry P.S. l i
Mr. J. M. Hunt , EB-6 Mr. W. L. Thompson, EB-8 Mr. L. T. Wa rnick , EB-6 g gLV Mr. R. W. Calder, EB-3 o{
- 9 n-1 F y ge l
potA Ec7.-ao F/ 7
L i 1
..; . l V . .
ENG1tiEERING REPORT HALON AND CO, SYSTEM ACTUATION AND DISCHARGE CONDENSATFTIRE BREAK SURRY FOWER STATICH 1.0 Scope of Work - 1.1 - Investigate the. actuation and discharge of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 I Emergency Switchgear Room (ESR) Halon S 2 Cable Tray Room Carbon Dioxide (CO,) ystems and the Unit 1 Systems. 1.2 . Identify possible actuation scenaries for the Halon and CO, Systems. < i 1.3 Identify drawings, specifications and related information on the location of equipment, system operation, wiring diagrams and power l supply location for the Halon and CO, Systems. 1.4 ldentify possible generic and specific modifications to prevent these l types cf discharges in the future. ! 2.0 Site Visit Observation 1 On December 11,'1986 J. M. Hunt and G. W. Mietus walked dan the ESR Halon Systems and the Cable Tray Room C0 Systems. Ir addition, interviews were held with control roon cperators, Loss Prevention De:artment personnel and , local fire protection contractors that were workino en the two systems. 2.1 Halon System Walk Down ; Both the Unit I and Unit 2 ESR Halon Systems actuated shortly after the line break. The Halen cylinders are located aperoximately 50 feet from the line break. One cylinder head was slightly danaged and one manual discharge pull leaver was bent back. All the main cylinders I had discharged with the 3 reserve cylinders remainine full, and. in good cendition. All the cylinders are equipped with high pressure burst discs, which will actuate at 800 to 1000 PSIG and provide for the centro 11ed release of Halon into the turbine building. These discs were found to be in place. The ESR was inspected along with all isolation dampers, signalino devices, and fire doors. The followirg dancers were confirmed closed, fire dampers #4, B,15, 21, and 22 with fire daeper !14 not inspected because it was not accessible (Duct work needs to be removed to insoect danper). Damper 814 should be confirined closed when reset by operations (Damper locations are shown on drawings 11448-FB-25D and 25E). Af ter discussions with loss Prevention personnel, the operation of all alarm devices and the fire door (18 between Unit 1 and 2 were conh rned. All local pull stations and control, room manual discharge push buttons for the Halon Systems had not been actuated. la-JMS 3173-1
The Halon control panel (1-FPH-CPI) meanted on the 9 line wall in the
. Unit I turbine buiiding had been reset with the follexir.g modules i jumpered out by the fire protection ccr. tractor brought in after the ' .i incident.
ZN-30 Module Unit 1 Push Button l Unit 2 Pressure Switch ZN-30 Module Unit 2 Push Button Unit 2 Pressure Switch + TL-30 Podule Time Limit Unit 2 A.113 modules along with BC-31, module (battery charger r.odule) had failed. All bad modules were marked and piven to the Task Force ; investigating the incident. (The wiring drawing for the Halon control ! panel 1-FPH-CPI is 11448-FE-515). In addition to these r.odule, 50 to ; 75% of the remaining modules shewed signs cf cerrosion as a result of water cascading down through the insice of the panel. During discussions with the Station less Prevention Group it was determined that water was ruening down the Unit I sids cf the 9 line wall and l across the top of the Halon parel. Water was also seen flowirg under ; fire door 30 leading from the walk way en the 27' elevatien of the turbine building. The followirg addit'enal observations were made. I
- 1. The gasket on the lef t hand side at the tep o.f the d or was found !
to be deformed and cut near the center of the docr where screws from a nameplate were screwed thr:uch the door and gasket. l
- 2. It appeared conduits were not seeled where they er.tered through the top of the panel.
NOTE: While water r.ay have entered because of items 1 and 2 above it diu not appear that this was the main source of , water enteric , the Halon panel. 3.- The ma.iority of the water damage and corrosion'was noticed on the left side of the panel. Cables leaving the 2" conduit second to the lef t showed white residue and dried water droplets. The top of the sub panel directly under this conduit showed signs of corrosion and a white residue. DJring a walk down of this 2" ; conduit two Condulets were found to be missing covers. The first Condulet was located directly uncer the grating leading from fire door 30 into Unit 1. It was determined that water running under fire door 30 entered the 2" conduit through this open Condulet I and eventually accumulated on the botton of the Halon panel. I In sumary the Halon System inadverter.tly cperated with all eouipmer.: performing its intended function. The inadvertent operation was caused because water entered the penei through an open Condulet and j shorted out the Unit 1 and Unit 2 pust button circuits actuating both ! systems. l l 14-JMH-3173-2 ,' e
< , 2.2 CO, System Walk Down I The Unit I and 2 Ceble Tray Room CO, Systens actuated shortly after the line break. The bulk storage tank, located between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 transformers, was completely errptied (the piping errangement for both Units is shown on Cardox Vend:r drawing FLH-16207). The selectcr valves for each hazard area are 1ccated in the turbine building at column line C-8. According to the loss Prevention departnent, the Unit 1 Cable Tray Roem centained a large amount of snow 10 minutes after the incident. This was a direct result of into the rcen. In addition, there discharging was a large a ligt.: mist in theamount Unit 2 Ca of CO,ble Tray Roem and the floor was slightly wet indicating that a much sraller amount of CO, had been discharged into this room (no snow was visible). All Dampers (Fire Dampers #27A, 27, 28 and 29) were inspected and found in their closed position (The Damper locations are shown on drawing 11448-FB-25B). panels are located on the Unit 2 side of the 9 line wall on The the 45CO,ft. elevation. The conduits leave the tco of the panel and run to the edce of a Carle Tray directly abovs the cabinets. These conduits are not sealed and water from both the sprinkler systers and/or the line break was allowed to enter the panels. The panels were first opened by station electricians under the direction of Bnbby Lang. (tir. Lang was not interviewed). The Micro Switch used to initiate the timed discharge of CO, was removed from the Unit 2 CO, panel and has been turr.ed over to the Task Force investigating the incident. (See the list of references fer the electrical drawings associated with these control panels) l systems were actuated It is apparent because thatentering of water the Unit theI and 2 UnitInCO,ition,rhe panels. add Unit 1 panel malfunctioned and discharged the majority of the CO, stored in the bulk storage tank into the Unit 1 Cable Tray Room. No seo.uence of events or exact mode of failure was determined for the CO, system during the site visit. 3.0 Review of Desfon Documents (CO, Svstem) , The original specification for the carbon dicxide fire protection system (NUS-288) provided data sheets for each area to be protected. The Cable Trey Rooms require 5,260 lbs, of CO, each with a discharge time of 146 sec. The specification also calls for the installation of a 15 ton low pressure l storage tank. l If Unit I discharged dumping 5,260 lbs, of CO, and repeated dumping until the tank emptied, it would have discharoed a total of 6 times. This apparently may have happened because as nuch as a foot of snow hed drif ted ' into some areas of the room. 1 14 -JMH - 317 3-3
i i 1 1 ,f , L'.0 EliGil:EERING REC 0!'ME!!DATIONS PRIOR TO PLACit;", SYSTEMS EACK !!! SERVICE j 4.1 Have all discharged bottles inspected including discharge cylinder heads, and have 0-Rings replaced at all connection points. 4.2 Have the 3 reserve Halon cylinders preser.tly in the Unit 2 rack installed in the Unit I rack as shcwn en drawing 11445-FS-27K. , eveoTeowe.s 4.3 Replace all Pyr:t#M: modules showing signs of corresion in the ESR Halon control panel 4.4 Have all Condulets and junction boxes checked and ccnfirm that all i covers are in place. f 4.5 Have all portions of the CO, panels showing visible signs of corrosion replaced. 4.6 Have all open conduits entering the CO, pareis sealed. 1 i 4.7 Functionally test all 4 systems to confirm proper operation (No CO, or Halon sheuld be discharged) 5.0 Fossible l'.edifications
.The Fire Protection electrical panels throucheut the clant ere located in areas where water lire breaks (stean, sprinEler systens, etc) could spray !
water. in and around the panels. For this reason electrical eovipment is ! usually mounted in NEMA 12 or NEMA a enclosures. These enclosures are effective only if the panels are closed correctly and the conduits entering the panels are installed correctly.. Inere are severai esdifications that could be made, that would prevent future failures of the fire protection panels. These are as follows:
- 1. Have all conduit enter panels from tht botton.
- 2. Seal all conduit as it enters the panels. .
- 3. Seal conduit connections to panels.
4 Have Periodic Test Procedures developed to inspect fire protectier . control panels on a monthly basis to verify doors are closed correctly l and that seals are in good shape.
- 5. Make all tray to conduit transiticns such that any open ended ennduit is facing the ground and sealed, l
s 14-N'F-3173-4 .
. . i l
e , 6.0 References , j 1 6.1 NUS-288 Specification for Carbcn Dicxide Fire Protection ! Equipment for Surry Power S'.ation, j { 6.2 114:8-F2-258 Ventilation and Air Corditiening Service Building S'8-2. 6.3 115d8-FE-10A Wiring Diagram 125VDC - l 6.4 11518-FE-510 Cardox Fire Extinguishi,g System Elementary Line l Connection Diagram. l 6.5 11EL8-FE-51P Cardox Fire Extinguishing System Ele .entary Line
- Connection Diagram l
6.6 11448-FE-10A Wiring Diagram 125VDC 6.7 11448-FE-51C Wiring Diagram Fire Protection System Sheet 3 6.8 11448-FE-51Q Cardox Fire Extinguishing Systen Elenentary Line Connection Diagram 6.9 11448-FE-51P Cardox Fira Extinguish 9.g S/ sten Elenertary Line Connection Diagrac 6.10 FLH-16207 Vendor Drawing Cardox CO, F're Extinguishing System 5.11 11448-FE-51T Wiring Diagram E .er. Sugr. F.m. Halen System Sheet 2 5.12 11cL8-FE-515 Wiring Diagram Emer. Swgr. Fen. Helen System Sheet 1 ( 5.13 11448-FB-25E Ventilation and Air Corditiening Service Building SH-5. 5.14 11448- FB-27 K Plunbing and Fire Protection Service Building Sheet 10 5.15 11448-FB-25D Ventilation and Air Cerditioning Service Building SH-4 5.16 11448-FB-27A Plumbing and Fire Frctectio. Service Eviiding SH-1 5.17 11442-FB-27F Plumbing Service Building SH-6 5.18 OCP 84-01 Design Change Package 'or the Installation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESR Falen System i 14-y.H-3173-5
' +. gygm.Agn=3P a e a
~.
..6,. .. e . . .i ' . um. ,
Paocteunt Dtvatto"
,, tunni powin nauw A,TTAca, ,tu,t,D ,,
i . q.,,,, .... ,ec . . . e i .. . . . . . . a -s r- m c em ...i a a ... g .. -
. i .. " . . . T. ,th K, . . m, . . . " '
..u , u/,cr ,. .
,.m..............
$7)fg[//s_,< ,
,,n,p .isf i;~a:G '"""'
u .e . . . ... .. . s, . ..m a/ 9M / Q& d
>.n,is.nr/d
) .
S T E P .0. .se. .
, .tv4.T . . ,
w - ,
=\ $ h n. , e / k'L' Mn
/e Les O st@ Usa O 4f4 lb o WAS -
A e i <,,h <a *iv- A S -Ju f., Ac& Ar & wie > d e fu -{. w cvl% A
/' J '
8.4 tl ( . s o
't A50m FC. DCvie TION' edch , l u lc r VTAf.,>> Wl4 ')- Ydor1 L>a $
Is., k Jn A./ / n +ls & c. L .J er A . '
\
l l 1 i ~\' t , i, I
\
*EVattvCD SY STATION NUCLEA. SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE / APPROVED BY
- ECOMMENDAf tDN1/ COMMENT $i potA tNo
, A**m OVE D Dv ST ATeON M AN A c e st.
. ' . . ' . . G j. 8'
1 I J
^
s) A. en.He
, defy S BUAbM*ADM tIUl' pH-w PRottDURI DIYlATION
,. ATTACHMENT D '.
SURRY POWiR STAf t0N p ,,,g ,g 3 s (' 4
.,,(' , , Dait ; oft (rf9C- .
8
)
-, paett Dunt ht., ,,9 */ U (r/ Wal, WD.
Q llPthuttlest thahtt tieventDt C 988
. C he "
.>i.... A r/ 4 ,.., " '
.s. , , , ,, P . . Y , l . . ..
O ' U "I ' T
..,t, nA/es.
r 7 D&f ts . [ // Si4NATW4Et A C(SChl f 40es OF ttys& TION; ' gaggi ,g
, S TE P NO. wei
, Dt via t t0W S* $ A *
. 's f n i f r rl L4 w h. , I 4 4hr /c . . a? ln u,,4 %> S t"$f2 l r
h) . , ~\ Lu k m . jf a 4- c.., 4kr d*s1 A C v h,% dsi~ Af s s v e'd bo' et
- _ . . _
[e Y e .. e,s 'A 9 J L(o ' [< l f'* _ _ _ _ ({> r. .r $r /t'a I ) J
$1 a m s $s ll n o.s % (7&.l38040\
t wu (*+,, en$ r '< > el l n r lf t' ff% u e' % C \ ~). $4 Tbe ' _Apske h /e.a.- 3 /, ... 4- %, selo s,. 4, 4As:e %roo/0
*E ASON FO. Dtyl& TION.
4 < k, uk,'lf b t <<> , , s e $Cel . , t \ 4 , l
\ '
s ,,, i
)
I
. l
- 1 7
r l a h i . I i
'VitWED tv STATS 0N NUCLEAR SAFETY ANDE/OPERATING
' COMMITTE APP ADVED OY STAtsON M ANAGE A OMME ND ATIONS/COMM ENT&
I F-0TA % *?-D D
-*m c'vC D B Y S T A v ena* ha a h' * * * * .' 7/9 I
l l Ns,9702C20 MEMORANDUM . TO Bill Holland Surry Power Station FROM H. L. Miller December 17, 1986 j j MARKEY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF REQUEST
- 1. A total of nine (9) persons have died as a result of accidents at Surry Power Station since 1972. !
July 26, 1972. Two (2) 'p'ersons died as a result of a steam relieving
, into the Unit I safeguards.
~
October 15, 1983. One (1) individual died as a result of the failure of an expansion joint in the Unit I high pressure heater drain pump l suction. l August 9, 1984. Two (2) persons were electrocuted in the Unit I j turbine building area during construction activities. December 9, 1986. Four (4) individuals have died as a result of l the failure of the suction piping to the "A" main feed pump in Unit : 2.
- 2. The most number of people to die in a single accident at Surry was four (4) as of 12/17/86. (One individual remains in critical i condition). '
- 3. 'Mid 1970's - Unit 2 "A" low pressure heater drain pump recirculation line rupture.
*Early 1980's -
6 inch extraction steam elbow in turbine building i erosion caused through wall steam leak.
*1984 - Unit 1 moisture separater reheater drain line elbow rupture.
*1986 - Accident at Surry involved a pipe wall rupture (the feedwater suction piping).
" Failures of high pressure heater drain pump expansion joints have been proviously reported with failure mechanism of a different type than being considered.
A Harry L. Miller l HLM/ sat , P0ZA V7-ac 6~//0 e
T0: 8/Lc Enromc. FROM: 6.c ,deffew 1
]
ACTIVITY
SUMMARY
STATION: Stee,/ SYSTEM: Cuao v PERIOD COVERED: ' <.7,4a - ahr rz ) SPECIA1.IST: A / At d,u l 4 1 ACTIVITIES /0BSER,VATIONS/EVALVATIONS/RECOMMEt DATIONS Acri ay Zw&rns.sre tsuse a CMD *x Daus, w tinr i s'so,7 2 Cosa .rAersm Anor. Cesnwor/ws : 1. O*!M UNir / # ll4s t e2 (*eu rso s ha two w ds*4 WNb+a tsu busrs is,w -e esstes enrae my s yrrem. ( *?-u / s-d f, -a.r) 2 C>soor /%veu me Atend -/.2 c:vecesves ner snrro .or
' t.is trae / Aro r au7 wuon ousrre r ,suo up rs/w r wrr,vav->
.3, rex peracrroa e soviene m. , os.vr rmwos sw e:r una,e-UAlor / 6 474*L h et A%f A ll*
- hksf Av.sg 4 / *pg p- ,
c./enswn N A9mr .1'ser Sc/4u. AirAt A* rice c.~= s#A vei. 4 Ho w us fcu r O H) p>s Disecry Braw er/oreb cswrars sua n 4kneb c*ewboir eAirs/cr Tu Asscc Top S. 7?nss4 /7bM & mir hare m pavc or,4sto rer!, war ev0 /1 coenrers netou esvoon es, rsies , (
/. 1 russwa eeseDwe- enewnw n rem sss s nrisw w we.no & ou res MMsxi.norer y 7 4 + /w,,, ds Amets.
? \
(twforrr' OAJ AffW h)?ll M Yr Nu?*D l'e t-msA/& t E4wo riws .
.TMwcuest rrrrrm r/ssics sors M ecue ca rn e m.in g. tr iresse:re.:
wrer entreen Ametr ramew enauirs /xo viss-e ers
/.21' / O. C. (* v r s e 71 0f /H frt A y Avp 7/syg srrcroM b,.ersy stas re m,
CLS:7069 1 FOTA 87'20 E/u
gs qs . n o e. oe ie. Nk t k O O6 et m s t 5 es t t 0 0 t e t at m n9 eaed1 esmrt n 4 e %. r e.nea.e m 8 0' odeet a mb ei t U t. mieet at nf cei a. st w 1 n sa S i aend e ent sed
. . ael t h er i esm caa - ovm rt e os i arnd nl eo.awt cpru" m ehhae P e c
t fdl er1 e auf s3oe 4a r t t e s
.vnl e i1 eoirtt h dddey s n A e.
i e r 9l ia i eeevl s b ac t netf snt l k c eor .t n iiri aUa i cumtf ueri aidea t ne nt dvw f rermd ice Uawne r r ieEc r eool v.e t s 0xt Dneu - ehl l cea) w f as0os abt h rl To awa2 riel a . t rao ESP h - nerE sd w 6 ceTL e x h a.ll r nvoih ( t arsa ip e. iottt i he.ecn eoeawwt e v.dwmp nl n eu
- ydtm) anuiT T m. r i o hr bepe aaeaet wn o re ry uoisl le ahlS s E .eo e ut ruaol nltl r9 ni250 t aol wtiipio airo new .de 35 wti y anu f 2 n7y edcaedfioe dR wte d m. a l meafke uee hcce eu ue ye rfc nn pf rt eaoaeii rbsh 1l t fhe mvst
. e( es0 ea redat re e u v v 2st m ehnh esredo ol lt: t ai tTasnmuol eR ciao 6imx a i afst if savh yUxr nio w se t c t d nol oe d .enda ) ee.
oot enrp e r mi e h e n h e e eti ti pa eauwl t noT sr e f enoi it nu k t ra p p l anms e e t i st aumnat nul oii a B" eeo rl f iendea ore.il i f n eoohxat " intftt t uebf 8 1 e w u T cbs oras . a f aeTt tt f s a 8 9 6 1h 1t e h ee h e N i ai2rt E V l sm ct a uwv thrdehi 1 e l ae e n w d uecsdoppia a c di cl t elf -
.tht se 3
i 1 s T I E eaeaanm2o t ee nt oxwh hC eaee n e I hwt er l . f sei he s sR . s snt e n 6 R t snt motl 9e .h ss s N 2 asuiec e N9 O9 O tyiatnio 1 n -T nn sne d 2 tearet i t n I1 l r 6as 8h 1 reoU a nf /2b"i C"i n aaeiih ed svcumI s i G E 9t s ert r l n rt . t a R r d e t 1 r b .t piya nc E ied os E. T 1 nttT do udrma hres e T s R2 I miif dnt nt nup B tseetn e ccebn me M l t m i l T 2 F
. ernaseac o 9t oU ar e at reiav i .
se E uoti ew a e O 1 st eDoep e nrmiew C n o msetco n l Te yidr tes
.h m0it u0l caeul l no E l c il o a Rb N rsneeyswn m. t A" D aaxevl m0ee dPl -
i t emro i t n o Om O Ie Pe bnmatdrp othbeoI ae"i3vl dsx o o . ii r r us t c j c e n st iaess hh ttt yni oef s t c F c n u i t c n Ec Re P G D T I R mo t eit evastn 5siMo ct c i t mne : tt eauhtSeed n t 3inaf c oEtkrf l dets eaewaewe ee e dn sd i J I e yu r n e.sb l i r J e t F u N I s C S Dl dcr ooioesrs t ci 1 1 ua.dvre or eeerrdr e%eeniues b ncimeo b o NE E nsrhhnyee rn oe t p S u tl ei oi ef esac ert S u H t o. RT 0A D OiewSeseR A 3" o9ssGsffd t p8 pl ehoee
/ xf a mirs e / xf He 11D ,.
c n aaF ocuase n ao t ed o FS cal es o F ds 8 re i t Piemn i n ee sv t I df s anui t 1 o t e ne a Raa iyfi r a Ri e0 T r i n - k l c Seh hb t t c St 0 C do e 2 i HS T t asn i e l p4 E ni r- r b
- d. f
.dfteaoid ne 1 1 .
f 1l m J aC 2 m E i t2he i 2e od B e o u ,. nae ecs G /gn . rhcsi t /m cn U re t c
,T e
e A o 2iu dus rs o 2o a S es e er , . ies P N 1HP et eae N 1C e < cbe l CArhr eF
/ cnn N
p s mu ~ c e r i 4 ic s O iI o ul ' = rve . af e ns f ftt5 i 3 n Pi n dsn i f u.tnlh T. ee I T Ona2 I eF a i nue eam n p e e o ce A - eu7 t g i r C ydt0 n9tt t.r a e t, l mmuev. u chf l s I ti c e1 af e t ve ep tiO ed e F usa De d/ wa d ner mn rC h I T RFN s i2dh a _ err ouottL t0 O b SE s1 eS e e s deo nciun 4 N H ER # i c T i t oen 1 R F H s4 R sl c co . O raes i e e. rt n P asJnet 2 m.ut * * *
- e E huniea p o -
"tr.uv p w R y cfishc i nti y t
i 0a b Y t r G t Bryaof t n 3 T s ra
- N i 1 1tth i i i
- t I ea I l necoc l L
1 a L 2 r t aSt e. N i v R c el eef hcanTp we i v 1 I O a c e r C .1 6 r I s e t so s a l te A 1 26 e5 t N F l l F l at F 33 .
/ a4 . ads .l / a2 n m9 r I e V3 4t e
/ h- - m3 e 3 1 an2a.
nea2c e V1 1 e E c00 u- e n N s r- 4 2r E t55 S4 5
+ .. O n e0
/ ehl / in 2t s r- /r S a /5 t e2no n e0 t 2u N H O
/
- e. I e v5 n 1i t e 1 hi e v5 n 1 c E /t e vv O c a e raC ct c a e C CS
& O' oe F i eN v r i eN 'v ns PN E: P te. c r CN I
R L BD E nh1. e i. OLf ot ec a L BD E ni L GD SD f { - k
!ll ! li I)f1fl{IjI !Il\]i{jII I. li ! i ,l ll
= e. se t l se -
n y et -. i e. b e mrs a e a n e t G t e e wvs t l e am.
=o t we ah tt sc n a l
- t. t
$ n eoeeu 84 e.
1 n e ht e w eoo seof ahco w we. t ss e s e m t r a swtl ee nenenn e i l nehonee f h Y r so aht i ecs a s C eeef iw ti at S NC eu a
. .'e e h s t nt ic.nasf ol a t e FI1 OT0
- e. eca ain n5 oneo h s t.
s ft1 hhwte nd h1 esohm c kiiT e t s RF0 E t hhN e eai eMn t s u c M'1 EE1 hts t o s s t t I .t e esal e +i a . n u i E! VA t eN ae oei c d Pa 9re nst e oeasd t aar scs f ia u s . H) Y. TCL S mvhnn rnd
.i va it o EL dn t Pemlt ea eoederc s oa c wmsehe ol a
e FFm OEf 1ety- cvniT e utTsm tP c DR il I enal o i n P O k.enak A IAN i St hc2e i
%i 0tses ocu.tfor s er e ce r R TSG Cs wt.htT e h. 0airmds nw ef eo AN Itifti e 1ih eee , rP n AWI ah o( dTst rk e T tt J tn.it ta isol f e c o DEA i
decvnt ee ss ar.thytessse na ERR CIJE nceli nn oe t NLP n _ g ira i o rt v9s trd.nrt iol nt e2o n cl t u m c e EI O IA RFS eennr ree m s uci1i ee nN e eh t rv e c E I t h woeea eJ sRaee Pft sT y oibs dtmeT he t era - l wr mee rfo XOT ETN S n IA eehI el ot n
. tl ctA hibt o. e TNL resoe NOF el usDt e i thJi ah t sai wr o cn~ ( n a
AN L- C PEH 4 a n t el mm a wwsten dorn of
. sa o
.nnno # g ET H
H1 . el eedio egorn el t met m.d i i o TF . f aenrcs eiuer anstli o
' ,OLA ,
1 unteib mrat re 3 2crieal odtl e aete ( REM ESR
% mgnvdm t et anid t WUO 1 l eae e 1hcrot OAN .
na c tinm Uim 1t e ts cne.emp e #. PC O .
%ET n ea d T w m(hhen ha ttt ca o
teeudwiu andon t w 8 h l
0H 0TT N
E n .i eae o E V faa.
.oehei 9sdemna 6ohett 9otsn t es hal l o l
h b , 1 T .E ARH S E e usearcn /h edlf S . shda dp 1 eet nat e r io GTS O I H n
&[ h[h ttieeii /l dai sn . NIA 4 T ,
l vrhp p 2bn at ni o O IN6 . usitt a 1 uutt eit C TO N n ssds eenro rl iutat ce h oonns u nrreoeoo Ot emcrtR N i: NE RT p
"8 e R E
4 AMM R EET E O P e g o 0A 6 s PNS U n. nD
- f OI Y .
RS [h W .O e c EO O E
. S LLE L
, I HH L N-
, ' HCT O O W F S n ED I w Y.s
,HN L D o
+
v 6TA L E R t
% [ n e
m o~ 9 9FD 1OE I W o O D T C O f e S b , ro ei1 ct3 C en d T R
.ES 9RA S
O T R E O L E P S t s r N t ia2 O 1UP C T N l f u7 ea M
- LY E / I F
u w / . RI B P s ft0 os O EA S E r e Oc Pd
- L BFS S T p N
H y A n ab L M A S N P E tFN s kd ei a E C EOW I. D D E U T W I uSE un l CT T I R R J DER 1 E N S S A ( Di f A T DEO E I E T A f e N N UT D V R S e, O O NDI V hn h N I A A t o I D N S D.R E D i t s r T n #O. E Q S 4 BN .R S ft oc ob f e E S N rTi :* t N I E t t e b N E E E P N n sp su E E C ONH : E S r i es en S A O I I T 4
- S S I a N T A N vn vs E S f I T e
o P 1 iI t i tt C t N N t M PR IT . I T T. r N A V n P I N r *L al an I. r F O R T r I O D N 2R f e2 t a t e t
/
T X. CNE A L I r k - r0 nn nm Y A s A SO I rF. .
/
Y T A
- TO e
L eo en T C N t a pe T u5 A ri mi I I T C MT<iA< . N T I C I C N r
/ R et ea L F IC T TR R O L F E r c -
E T i s LS N rn rn e t I C V N NTPE I l I J N n e b a PN t e. e ca A T E I ELNW G t s T B F r FD re U V VI O 4 A O f 8 S FV v t i <
' hF f c F N N I- FFt A. P F F N i
t
*e i\l l(!!jifl l!lj
g . DECEMBER 29, 1986. THE HALON FOLLOWING ECUIPMENT CHANGES ARE REQUIRFD TO PUT THE MAIN CONTROL PANEL (TURBINE BUILDING) BACK INTO SERVICE. THESE CHANGES ARE NECESSITATED DUE TO THE. FACT THAT OF AS JULY 1984 THE PYROTRONICS SYSTEM 3 - CP-31 AND ASSOCIATED MODULES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. PYdOTRONICS HAS UPDATED THE SYSTEM 3 TO CP-35 AND COMPONENTS WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE TO THE CP-31 WITH SOME WIRING FIELD CHANGES. DUE TO THE LACK OF AVAILABLE COMPONENTS, THIS SYSTEM MUST BE UPDATED TO CP-35 MODULES.
- NOTE
- THIS WILL NOT CHANGE THE SYSTEMS DESIGN NOR OPERATION, JUST UPDATE THE SYSTEM TO NEW EQUIPMENT.
EXISTING: CHANGE 70: FIELD CHANGES: CP-31 CP-35 CONTROL PANEL COMPATIBLE WITH FIELD WIRING - FACTORY WIRING WILL BE CHANGED TO ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT TERMINAL LOCATIONS. 4 PS-31 PS-35 POWER SUPPLY FOR CP-35. BC-31 BC-35 BATTERY CHARGER FOR CP-35, NEW LOCATION MUST BE FOUND IN 2ND CABINET. 2N-31 2U-35 DETECTOR INPUT MODULE - MUST CHANGE END OF LINE' DEVICE. ZA-30 ZU-35 SAME AS 20-31. TL-30 TL-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. SM-30 SM-30 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. RM-30 RM-30U MUST ADD ADDITIONAL CONTROL WIRE FROM CP-35. AE-30 AE-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. SR-32 SR-32 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANCE. PM 31 PM-31 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANGE. TC-30 TC-300 COMPATIBLE - NO CHANCE. Fora 17 =2' 69/ /25s , - - - - J
T y./. j. 4 e +s . MEIPORANDUM g To Dr. J. T. Rhodes. OJRP 21 Richmond, Virginia s i png R. W. Calder, EB 3 Dececber 29, 1986 1 RECEIVED l 1 DEC 30 886 ! INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL IPlVESTIGATION COMITTEE REPORT MANAGER'S OFFICF. AiURRY Attached is the " Main Feedwater Pump Suction Pipe Incident - Interim Report
#1" prepared by the independent technical investigation comittee. j e
s q
' i .'5 R. W. Calder cc: Mr. W. L. Stewart, OJRP 5 Mr. R. F. Saunders, Surry Comittee Members 81-RWC-215 i
[ /4 t7-D FQlTd
- c. ,
c ..:..}}