ML18153A176

Proposed Tech Specs Re Temporary Svc Water Supply Line to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers

ML18153A176
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	11/05/1997
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18152A077	List: ML18152A076 ML18153A176
References
NUDOCS 9711120264
Download: ML18153A176 (15)

Text

Attachment 2 Proposed License Condition and Technical Specifications Change

--~- ----- -

9711120264 971105 PDR ADOCK 05000280 p PDR

L. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program, including amendments and changes made pursuant to 10CFR50.54(p). The approved Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program consists of a document withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10CFR2.790(d) identified as "Surry Power Station Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program" dated September 15, 1980. The Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program shall be fully implemented in accordance with 10CFR73.55(b)(4), within 60 days of this approval by the Commission. All security personnel shall be qualified within two years of this approval.

M. The design of the reactor coolant pump and steam generator supports may be revised in accordance with the licensee's submittals dated November 5, 1985 (Serial No.85-136), December 3, 1985 (Serial No. 85-136A), and January 14, 1986 (Serial No.

85-136C) .

N. Deleted by Amendment 203

0. The use of a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected supply line to provide service water to the component cooling heat exchangers required by Technical Specification 3.13, to facilitate maintenance activities on the existing service water supply line and/or components, shall be in accordance with the basis and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in Virginia Electric and Power Company's letter 97-496 dated November 5, 1997. The NRC shall be notified prior to the use of the temporary service water supply line .

• Surry - Unit 1 Amendment No.

4. This license is effective as of the date of issuance, and shall expire at midnight on May 25, 2012.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Original signed by A. Giambusso A. Giambusso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing Enclosure Appendix A -

Technical Specifications Date oflssuance: May 25, 1972

• Surry - Unit 1 Amendment No.

L. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program, including amendments and changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program consists of a document withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2. 790( d) identified as "Surry Power Station Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program" dated September 15, 1980. The Nuclear Security Personnel Training and Qualifications Program shall be fully implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4), within 60 days of this approval by the Commission. All security personnel shall be qualified within two years of this approval.

M. The design of the reactor coolant pump and steam generator supports may be revised in accordance with the licensee's submittals dated November 5, 1985 (Serial No.85-136), December 3, 1985 (Serial No. 85-136A), and January 14, 1986 (Serial No.

85-136C).

N. Deleted in Amendment 203.

0. The use of a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected supply line to provide service water to the component cooling heat exchangers required by Technical Specification 3.13, to facilitate maintenance activities on the existing service water supply line and/or components, shall be in accordance with the basis and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in Virginia Electric and Power Company's letter 97-496 dated November 5, 1997. The NRC shall be notified prior to the use of the temporary service water supply line.

Surry - Unit 2 Amendment No.

4. This license is effective as of the date of issuance, and shall expire at midnight on January 29, 2013.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Original signed by Roger Boyd/for A Giambusso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing Enclosure Appendix A -

Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 29, 1973 Surry - Unit 2 Amendment No.

TABLE 3.7-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTION INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS Minimum Total Number OPERABLE Channels Permissible Operator Functional Unit Of Channels Channels To Trip Bypass Conditions Actions

3. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (continued)

e. Trip of main feedwater 2/MFW 1/MFWpump 2-1 each 21 pumps - start motor driven pumps pump MFWpump

f. Automatic actuation logic 2 2 1 22

4. LOSS OF POWER

a. 4.16 kv emergency bus 3/bus 2/bus 2/bus 20 undervoltage (loss of voltage)

b. 4.16 kv emergency bus 3/bus 2/bus 2/bus 20 undervoltage (degraded voltage)

5. NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ISOLATION

a. Low intake canal level

1. Normal 4 3 3 20

2. Under TS 3.14.E 4 2 1 20A (CCHX SW Jumper) - Note A

b. Automatic actuation logic 2 2 1 14 z

~ 6. ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION INTERLOCKS - Note B

a. Pressurizer pressure, P-11 3 2 2 23

b. Low-low Tavg, P-12 3 2 2 23

c. Reactor trip, P-4 2 2 1 24 Note A - Two channels are tnpped for the durat10n of the SW Jumper use. In this cond1t10n, only one add1t10nal channel 1s reqmred to actuate the isolation function.

Note B - Engineered Safeguards Actuation Interlocks are described in Table 4.1-A

• TABLE 3.7-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTION INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS Total Minimum Number OPERABLE Channels Permissible Operator Functional Unit Of Channels Channels To Trip Bypass Conditions Actions

7. RECIRCULATION MODE TRANSFER

a. RWST Level - Low 4 3 2 25

b. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 2 1 14 and Actuation Relays

§ t:l p..

8 (D

t:l z

0 >-j

" C/.l VJ

....i I

N 0

~

TS 3.7-23a TABLES 3.7-2 ANDS 3.7-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS ACTION 20A. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Total Number of Channels, REACTOR CRITICAL and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 21. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 22. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressure and temperature to less than 450 .psig and 350° within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 23. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, within one hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.7-24 TABLES 3.7-2 ANDS 3.7-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS ACTION 24. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or reduce pressure and temperature to less than 450 psig and 350°F within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 25. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.1 .

• Amendment Nos.

TS 3.14-3 the reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN. If the requirements of Specifications 3.14.A.5, 3.14.A.6, and 3.14.C are not met within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

E. For the purpose of performing periodic repairs (e.g., pipe cleaning, coating and repairs, valve/expansion joint repair or replacement) associated with the SW supply piping to the component cooling water heat exchangers (CCHXs), a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected SW supply line Uumper) may be provided to supply SW flow to the CCHXs required by TS 3.13.

1. The use of the temporary jumper is only permitted for a duration of up to 35 days during a refueling outage.

2. If the temporary jumper becomes inoperable during the 35 day period, the requirements of Specification 3.0.1 shall apply.

The Circulating and Service Water Systems are designed for the removal of heat resulting from the operation of various systems and components of either or both of the units.

Untreated water, supplied from the James River and stored in the high level intake canal is circulated by gravity through the recirculation spray coolers and the bearing cooling water heat exchangers and to the charging pumps lubricating oil cooler service water pumps which supply service water to the charging pump lube oil coolers.

In addition, the Circulating and Service Water Systems supply cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchangers and to the main control and emergency switchgear rooms air conditioning condensers. The Component Cooling heat exchangers are used during normal plant operations to cool various station components and when in shutdown to remove residual heat from the reactor. Component Cooling is not required on the accident unit during a loss-of-coolant accident. If the loss-of-coolant accident is coincident with a loss of off-site power, the nonaccident unit will be maintained at HOT SHUTDOWN with the ability to reach COLD SHUTDOWN .

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.14-4 The long term Service Water requirement for a loss-of-coolant accident in one unit with

• simultaneous loss-of-station power and the second unit being brought to HOT SHUTDOWN is greater than 15,000 gpm. Additional Service Water is necessary to bring the nonaccident unit to COLD SHUTDOWN. Three diesel driven Emergency Service Water pumps with a design capacity of 15,000 gpm each, are provided to supply water to the High Level Intake canal during a loss-of-station power incident. Thus, considering the single active failure of one pump, three Emergency Service Water pumps are required to be OPERABLE. The allowed outage time of 7 days provides operational flexibility to allow for repairs up to and including replacement of an Emergency Service Water pump without forcing dual unit outages, yet limits the amount of operating time without the specified number of pumps.

When one Unit is in Cold Shutdown and the heat load from the shutdown unit and spent fuel pool drops to less than 25 million BTU/HR, then one Emergency Service Water pump may be removed from service for the subsequent time that the unit remains in Cold Shutdown due to the reduced residual heat removal and hence component cooling requirements.

A minimum level of + 17 .2 feet in the High Level Intake canal is required to provide design flow of Service Water through the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers during a loss-of-coolant accident for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the water level falls below +23'6", signals are generated to trip both unit's turbines and to close the nonessential Circulating and Service Water valves. A High Level Intake canal level of +23'6" ensures actuation prior to canal level falling to elevation +23'. The Circulating Water and Service Water isolation valves which are required to close to conserve Intake Canal inventory are periodically verified to limit total leakage flow out of the Intake Canal. In addition, passive vacuum breakers are installed on the Circulating Water pump discharge lines to assure that a reverse siphon is not continued for canal levels less than +23 feet when Circulating Water pumps are de-energized. The remaining six feet of canal level is provided coincident with ESW pump operation as the required source of Service Water for heat loads following the Design Basis Accident.

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.14-5 I' Should repairs be required to the SW supply line to the CCHXs, a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected SW supply line Uumper) may be used. The temporary jumper is required since service water is supplied to the CCHXs by a single concrete-encased line.

To remove the SW supply line from service for extended maintenance (e.g., pipe cleaning, coating and repair, valve/expansion joint repair or replacement), an alternate temporary SW supply path is required to support the operation of the CCHXs during the maintenance activities. The basis for using.the temporary SW supply jumper to the CCHXs is provided in Virginia Electric and Power Company's letter 97-496 dated November 5, 1997. The use of the temporary jumper is only permitted for a duration of up to 35 days during a refueling outage and shall be operated in accordance with the compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in the letter referenced above and in the Operating License. The only automatic function in the normal supply line when Unit 1 is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided by the SW supply MOVs which close on low Intake Canal level. If non-essential SW isolation is required during the time the jumper is in service, it will be accomplished consistent with design and licensing bases requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by Station Abnormal Procedures.

References:

UFSAR Section 9.9 Service Water System UFSAR Section 10.3.4 Circulating Water System UFSAR Section 14.5 Loss-of-Coolant Accidents, Including the Design Basis Accident

• Amendment Nos.

I __

Attachment 3 Significant Hazards Consideration

Significant Hazards Consideration Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the proposed changes against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the changes do not pose a significant safety hazards consideration as defined therein. The proposed Operating License and Technical Specifications and Bases changes- are necessary to allow the use of a temporary, seismic, non-missile protected jumper to provide service water (SW) to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (CCHXs) while maintenance work is performed on the existing SW supply line to the CCHXs. Since there is only one SW supply line to the CCHXs, an alternate SW supply must be provided whenever the line is removed from service. The temporary jumper provides this function.

The use of the temporary jumper has been thoroughly evaluated, and appropriate constraints and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) have been developed to ensure that the temporary jumper is reliable, safe, and suitable for its intended purpose. A complete and immediate loss of SW supply to the operating CCHXs is not considered credible, given the project constraints and the unlikely probability of a generated missile. Existing station abnormal procedures already address a loss of component cooling, and the use of alternate cooling for a loss of decay heat removal, in the unlikely event that they are required. Furthermore, appropriate mitigative measures have been identified to address potential flooding concerns. The minor administrative changes merely correct a table format inconsistency and update Basis section references.

Consequently, the operation of Surry Power Station with the proposed amendment and license condition will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The SW and CC Systems will function as designed under the Unit operating constraints specified by this project (i.e., Unit 2 in operation and Unit 1 in a refueling outage), and the potential for a loss of component cooling is already addressed by Station Abnormal Procedures. Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The possibility of flooding due to failure of the temporary SW supply jumper in the Turbine Building basement has been evaluated and dispositioned by the implementation of appropriate precautions and compensatory measures to preclude damage to the temporary jumper and to respond to a postulated flooding event. A flood watch will be present around-the-clock with authority and procedural guidance to isolate the jumper, if required. Furthermore, the CCHXs serve no design basis accident mitigating function. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased.

1 of 2

[--

I I

- ~-

,\.\ 1 * * ... ,

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The SW and CC Systems' design functions and basic configurations are not being altered as a result of using a temporary SW supply jumper. The temporary jumper is designed to be safety-related and seismic with all of the design attributes of the normal SW supply line, except for the automatic isolation function and complete missile protection. The design functions of the SW and CC systems are unchanged as a result of the proposed changes due to 1) required plant conditions, 2) compensatory measures, 3) a Contingency Action Plan for restoration of the normal SW supply if required, and 4) strict administrative control of the temporary SW isolation valve to preclude flooding or to isolate non-essential SW within the design basis assumed time limits. Unit 1 will be in a plant condition which will provide adequate time to restore the normal SW supply, if required. Therefore, since the SW and CC systems will basically function as designed and will be operated in their basic configuration, the possibility of a new or different type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced since an operable SW flowpath to the required number of CCHXs is provided, and Unit operating constraints, compensatory measures and contingencies will be implemented as required to ensure the integrity and the capability of the SW flowpath. The use of the temporary jumper will be limited to the time period when missile producing weather is not expected, and Unit 1 meets specified unit conditions. Therefore, the temporary SW jumper, under the imposed project constraints and compensatory measures, provides the same reliability as the normal SW supply line. Furthermore, the Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Surry Power Station has been reviewed relative to potential flooding when the temporary SW jumper is in use. It has been determined that due to the SW restoration project's compensatory and contingency measures, as well as the constraints imposed by the Maintenance Rule online risk matrix, the impact on core damage frequency due to flooding is negligible.

2 of 2