ML19011A441

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Lecture 8-4 Risk Communication 2019-01-22
ML19011A441
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/16/2019
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
Nathan Siu 415-0744
Shared Package
ML19011A416 List:
References
Download: ML19011A441 (25)


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Risk CommunicationLecture 8-41 Key TopicsDefinitionChallenges2Overview Resourcesrisk-informed regulatory decision-Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)J. PersenskyNUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.3Overview Other ReferencesNational Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg(eds), National Academies Press, 1996.V.T. CovelloOPA-87-020, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1988.B. FischhoffRisk Analysis, 15, 137145, 1995.Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.4Overview Defining Risk CommunicationFor PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed asa means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)Note: educational approach Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needsneeds to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk5Communication, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.Definition Points of Communication BreakdownsDifferences in perception of informationRelevanceConsistency with prior beliefsLack of understanding of underlying scienceConflicting agendasFailure to listenTrustGiven breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns 6Challenges Different Perceptions of InformationPerception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of RelevanceDoes risk information address important issues?-Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?si, Ci, pi} 7-P.S. Dull, 1978Challenges Relevance: Example Stakeholder IssuesAppropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) Digital I&CSecurity-related applicationsCompleteness of scenariosRelevance of computed consequence metrics to valuesPersonal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)Environment (contamination)Scope of risk management actions8 Lack of UnderstandingSimplificationsCan be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processesCan be overdone => sound bites, memesEducation is only part of solutionEmphasize science/engineering, not mathIntended recipient needs to be receptiveMajor decision problems can last for years => educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes9ChallengesRisk information is broad, complex, and uncertain unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?

Conflicting AgendasNeutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisionsAdvocacyPersuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes) Rationalize past decisions10RiskInformationChallenges Failure to ListenFailure to hear underlying questions and concernsVarious driversSocial (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)Common behaviorsIgnoringTalking overLeads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication11Challenges TrustCritical to effective communicationIs a result of social processesCan be difficult to gain, easy to loseFor complex subjects, can be a substitute for understandingPast relationships (rapport) and credentials can be importantCan be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,Acceptance of new information12Challenges Communication ConsiderationsCommunications 101Why are we communicating?Who is our audience?What do our audiences want to know?How will we communicate?How will we respond?Who will carry out the plans? When?What problems or barriers have we planned for?Have we succeeded (in communicating)?Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance => multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)dynamic, interactive process13Social Aspect => No Easy Solution()Sympathetic Listening:Critical to trust by someViewed as sign of weakness by others Additional Cautions Be extremely careful when using PRA to Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) => (often including intended target audience)Can lead to bad behaviors14 WASH-1400 (1975)15 Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation16er 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).

Additional Cautions Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communicationMetricFrequency vs. probabilityRadiological vs. all effectsUnit of analysisSingle plantFleet17 Additional Cautions Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.Examples-Responses to different presentation modesBiasing from video18 StateTotalNumber%MA3169631MD51315931USA35,09210,26529On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast enough to avoid speed camera detection ("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had just left an underage drinking party and were drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.19Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015)-DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.

Video 9/11Fire and ExplosionsFlood20Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S. Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/OECD/NEA High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) Program Phase 1Project information: http://www.oecd-nea.org/jointproj/heaf.htmlHEAF VideoTsunami Video Others Require More Work (Story Telling + Viewer Processing)Human ErrorsSuccesses/Safety21Non-Event Video Additional CautionsBe cognizant of potential unintended consequencesMessage persistenceUnanticipated response to message22 Message PersistenceRecognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions23 Unanticipated Responses24IDIDI1Adequacy of fire events databaseP1Circuit interactionsI2Scenario frequenciesP2Availability of safe shutdown equipmentI3Effect of plant operations, including comp measuresP3Fire scenario cognitive impactI4Likelihood of severe firesP4Impact of fire induced environment on operatorsE1Source fire modelingP5Role of fire brigade in plant responseE2Compartment fire modelingR1Main control room firesE3Multi-compartment fire modelingR2Turbine building firesE4Smoke generation and transport modelingR3Containment firesH1Circuit failure mode and likelihoodR4Seismic/fire interactionsH2Thermal fragilitiesR5Multiple unit interactionsH3Smoke fragilitiesR6Non-power and degraded conditionsH4Suppressant-related fragilitiesR7Decommissioning and decontaminationB1Adequacy of data for active and passive barriersR8Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releasesB2Barrier performance analysis toolsR9Flammable gas linesB3Barrier qualificationR10Scenario dynamicsB4Penetration sealsR11Precursor analysis methodsS1Adequacy of detection time dataR12Uncertainty analysisS2Fire protection system reliability/availabilityO1Learning from experienceS3Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual)O2Learning from othersS4Effect of compensatory measures on suppressionO3Comparison of methodologiesS5Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysisO4Standardization of methodsFrom: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.42 Looking Ahead Beyond Paper?Many displays based on paper formsNot always easy to understandEffectiveness in message transmission? Retention?Technology can enable different ways to engage audienceVideoOthers?InteractionImmersionNon-visualNeed to consider biases, appropriate balancing25