Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR FacilitiesML031130259 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 03000306, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Issue date: |
03/14/1990 |
---|
From: |
Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-90-019, NUDOCS 9003080213 |
Download: ML031130259 (8) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 03000306, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:03000306]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:03000306]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
I UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 14, 1990 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 90-19: POTENTIAL
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE
VOLUME FOR CONTAINMENT
RECIRCULATION
SPRAY AT PWR FACILITIES
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for pressurized
water 1 reactors (PWRs).
Purpose
- This information
notice is intended to alert addressees
to the possible loss of effective
volume for containment
recirculation
spray caused by the entrapment
of water in the refueling
canal of PWRs. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice do not constitute
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
This infor-mation notice resolves and completes
action on Generic Safety Issue 95,*Loss of Effective
Volume for Containment
Recirculation
Spray." Description
of Circumstances:
In 1983, the NRC staff resident inspector
at H. B. Robinson Unit 2 questioned
the licensee's
practice of leaving the refueling
canal drain valve in the closed position during plant operation.
The specific concern was that if the refueling
canal drain valve tina PWR dry containment
Is closed during plant operation
and the plant experiences
a loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA), that fraction of the containment
spray which falls into the refueling
canal would be prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump. Eventu-ally the entire volume of the refueling
canal could be filled with water, preventing
that amount of water from being available
for the post-LOCA
re-circulation
mode for containment
and reactor cooling.A subsequent
investigation
by the H. B. Robinson licensee revealed that Westinghouse
had intended the refueling
canal drain valve to be open during operation.
However, operation
with the valve closed was found to have negligible
safety significance
because the maximum volume of water that could be entrapped
in the refueling
canal was small relative to the large volume of water available
from the refueling
water storage tank. Never-theless, the licensee decided to operate the plant with the valve open and revise plant procedures
accordingly.
9003080213 b
I C IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's
response and corrective
action (operation
with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.
Further, the staff considered
the potential
generic implications
of this issue. Of particular
concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation
water and whether this water can be adequately
drained to the containment
sump.The staff addresses
this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, 'Containment
Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine
if the entrapment
of containment
recirculation
water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures
may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated
for this safety matter.Safety Significance:
The principal
concern is the potential
for the entrapment
of containment
spray water in operating
PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient
volume of spray water is prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump, adequate flow in the containment
spray recirculation
and emergency
core coolant recirculation
mode may not be provided.
Insufficient
flow to the sump can result in inadequate
net positive suction head to the containment
spray and low pressure safety injection
pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA
contain-ment cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation
of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance
of this issue depends primarily
upon whether en-trapment of an unacceptable
volume of containment
spray water could occur during the recirculation
phase. Licensees
may wish to review the adequacy of their procedures
for ensuring proper water drainage to the containment
emergency
sump.Requiring
that the refueling
canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating
or other comparable
provisions
may be appropriate.
In this con-nection, we note that the current plant technical
specifications
for PWRs with ice-condenser
containments
include operability
and surveillance
require-ments for the refueling
canal drain valve during power operation.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Chang-Yang
Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
.,, I i Attachment
IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date ot Notice No. Subject -Issuance Issued-to 90-18 90-17 Potential
Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies
for Copes-Vulcan
Valves 3/9/90 3/8/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-59, ..Supp. 2 Suppliers
of Potentially
Misrepresented
Fasteners 3/7/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.90-16 Compliance
with New Decommissioning
Rule 90-15 Reciprocity:
Notification
of Agreement
State Radiation Control Directors
Be ore Beginning
Work in Agreement States 90-14 Accidental
Disposal of Radioactive
Materials 90-13 Importance
of Review and Analysis of Safeguards
Event Logs 90-12^ Monitoring
or Interruption
of Plant Communications
90-11 Maintenance
Deficiency
Associated
with Solenoid-Operated Valves 90-10 Primary Water Stress Corrosion
Cracking (PWSCC)of Inconel 600 3/7/90 3/7/90 3/6/90 3/5/90 2/28/90 2/28/90 2/23/90 All materials
licensees.
All holders of NRC materials
licenses _._which authorize
use of radioactive
material at temporary, Job sites.All U.S. NRC byproduct material licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
- ~ IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's
response and corrective
action (operation
with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.
Further, the staff considered
the potential
generic implications
of this issue. Of particular
concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation
water and whether this water can be adequately
drained to the containment
sump.The staff addresses
this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, *Containment
Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine
if the entrapment
of containment
recirculation
water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures
may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated
for this safety matter.Safety Significance:
The principal
concern is the potential
for the entrapment
of containment
spray water in operating
PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient
volume of spray water is prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump, adequate flow in the containment
spray recirculation
and emergency
core coolant recirculation
mode may not be provided.
Insufficient
flow to the sump can result in inadequate
net positive suction head to the containment
spray and low pressure safety injection
pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA
contain-ment cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation
of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance
of this issue depends primarily
upon whether en-trapment of an unacceptable
volume of containment
spray water could occur during the recirculation
phase. Licensees
may wish to review the adequacy of their procedures
for ensuring proper water drainage to the containment
emergency
sump.Requiring
that the refueling
canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating
or other comparable
provisions
may be appropriate.
In this con-nection, we note that the current plant technical
specifications
for PWRs with ice-condenser
containments
include operability
and surveillance
require-ments for the refueling
canal drain valve during power operation.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Chang-Yang
Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 $ % \Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
NoticesW:2
0-t_ -6 Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
h W -*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
l NPKadambi
CYLi TechEd H ?3CBerlinger
AThadani ,^02/26/90
03/07/90 03/02/90 03/7/90 03/7/90 03/4 /90I I kv 3 (* V
IN 90-XX March xx, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's
response and corrective
action (operation
with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.
Further, the staff considered
the potential
generic implications
of this issue. Of particular
concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation
water and whether this water can be adequately
drained to the containment
sump. The staff addresses
this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, Containment
Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine if the entrapment
of containment
recirculation
water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was Issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures
may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated
for this safety matter.Safety Significance:
The principal
concern is the potential
for the entrapment
of containment
spray water in operating
PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient
volume of spray water is prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump, adequate flow in the containment
spray recirculation
and emergency
core coolant recirculation
mode may not be provided.
Insufficient
flow to the sump can result in inadequate
net positive suction head to the containment
spray and low pressure safety injection
pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA
containment
cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation
of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance
of this issue depends primarily
upon whether entrapment
of an unacceptable
volume of containment
spray water could occur during the recirculation
phase. In order to resolve this potential
safety problem, licensees
may wish to incorporate
procedures
to ensure proper water drainage to the containment
emergency
sump, such as requiring
that the refuel-ing canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating
or consider other comparable
provisions.
In this connection, we note that the current plant technical
specifications
for PWRs with ice-condenser
containments
include operability
and surveillance
requirements
for the refueling
canal drain valve during power operation.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Chang-Yang
Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI Jel\"SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
I*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
D/D'T:NRR
D/DOEA:NRR ,gNPKadambi
CYLi TechEd CHBerlinger
AThadani CERossi 02/26/90 03/07/90 03/02/90 03/7/90 0317 /90 03/ /90
IN 90-XX March xx, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's
response and corrective
action (operation
with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.
Further, the staff considered
the potential
generic implications
of this issue. Of particular
concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation
water and whether these spaces can be adequately
drained to the containment
sump. The staff addresses
this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, "Containment
Heat Removal System." Those PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 may need to be reviewed carefully
to determine
if the entrapment
of containment
recirculation
water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures
may not have been explicitly
evaluated
for this safety matter.Safety Significance:
The principal
concern is the potential
for the entrapment
of containment
spray water in operating
PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient
volume of spray water is prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump, adequate flow in the containment
spray recirculation
and emergency
core coolant recirculation
mode may not be provided.
Insufficient
flow to the sump can result in inadequate
net positive suction head to the containment
spray and low pressure safety injection
pumps. Subsequently
proper post-LOCA
containment
cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation
of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance
of this issue depends primarily
upon whether entrapment
of an unacceptable
volume of containment
spray water could occur during the recirculation
phase. In order to resolve this potential
safety problem, licensees
may wish to incorporate
procedures
to ensure proper water drainage to the containment
emergency
sump, such as requiring
that the refuel-ing canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating
or consider other comparable
provisions.
In this connection, we note that the current plant technical
specifications
for PWRs with ice-condenser
containments
include operability
and surveillance
requirements
for the refueling
canal drain valve during power operation.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Chang-Yang
Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices gfK Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
SPLB: 51 NRR *RPB:ADM C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
D/DOEA:NRR
NPKadambi
CYLi* TechEd CHBerlinger
CERossi 02/26/90 03/7 /90 03/02/90 03/ /90 03/ /90
-IN 90-XX February xx, 1990 The licensee's
response and corrective
action (operation
with the drain valve open) were reviewed and found acceptable
by the staff. Further, the staff considered
the potential
generic implications
of this issue. Of particular
concern was whether there are large volumes that might entrap the recirculation
water and whether these volumes can be adequately
drained to the containment
sump. Because of the lack of specific guidance, those PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 L "Containment
Heat Removal System," may need to be reviewed carefully
to determine
if entrapment
of containment
recircula- tion water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 but plant procedures
may not have been explicitly
evaluated
for this safety matter.Safety Significance:
The principal
concern is the potential
for containment
spray water entrapment
in operating
PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient
volume of spray water is prevented
from returning
to the containment
emergency
sump, adequate flow in the containment
spray recirculation
and emergency
core coolant recircu-lation mode may not be provided.
This can result in inadequate
net positive suction head to the containment
spray and low pressure safety injection
pumps and subsequent
inability
to provide proper post-LOCA
containment
and reactor core cooling.In the NRC staff's evaluation
of Generic Safety Issue 95 the staff concluded that the safety significance
of this issue depends primarily
upon whether entrapment
of an unacceptable
volume of containment
spray water could occur during the recirculation
phase. In order to ameliorate
this potential
safety problem, licensees
may wish to incorporate
procedures
to ensure proper water drainage to the containment
emergency
sump, such as requiring
that the refuel-ing canal drain valve(s) be open while the reactor is operating
or consider other comparable
provisions.
It is noted that the current plant technical specifications
for PWRs with ice-condenser
containments
include operability
and surveillance
requirements
for the refueling
canal drain valve during power operation.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Chang-Yang
Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI OGCB mOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR
R d4;6/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
D/DOEA:NRR
NPKadambi
CYLi chEd CHBerlinger
CERossi 0 2/1.b/9 0 02/ /90 f 2-/c2 /90 02/ /90 02/ /90 3
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list | - Information Notice 1990-01, Importance of Proper Response to Self-Identified Violations by Licensees (12 January 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-02, Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment (22 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-03, Malfunction of Borg-Warner Bolted Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Failure of the Swing Arm (23 January 1990, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-04, Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators, (26 January 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1990-05, Inter-System Discharge of Reactor Coolant (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-07, New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps (30 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards From Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-09, Extended Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste by Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees (5 February 1990, Topic: Decommissioning Funding Plan)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-11, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid-Operated Valves (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-13, Importance of Review and Analysis of Safeguards Event Logs (5 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-14, Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials (6 March 1990, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1990-15, Reciprocity Notification of Agreement State Radiation Control Directors Before Beginning Work in Agreement States (17 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-16, Compliance with New Decommissioning Rule (7 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-17, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Valves (8 March 1990, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems With Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities (14 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-20, Personnel Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation of Radwaste Incinerators (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-22, Unanticipated Equipment Actuations Following Restoration of Power to Rosemount Transmitter Trip Units (23 March 1990, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1990-23, Improper Installation of Patel Conduit Seals (4 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power With Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems (24 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-27, Clarification of the Recent Revisions to the Regulatory Requirements for Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) for Transportation (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error In High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error in High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-29, Cracking of Cladding and Its Heat-Affected Zone in the Base Metal of a Reactor Vessel Head (30 April 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-30, Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds (1 May 1999, Topic: Dissimilar Metal Weld)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste Form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-32, Surface Crack and Subsurface Indications in the Weld of a Reactor Vessel Head (3 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (9 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-34, Response to False Siren Activations (10 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-35, Transportation of Type a Quantities of Non-Fissile Radioactive Materials (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-38, License and Fee Requirements for Processing Financial Assurance Submittals for Decommissioning (6 November 1990, Topic: Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1990-39, Recent Problems with Service Water Systems (1 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-40, Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of Motor-Operated Valves (5 June 1990, Topic: Weak link)
- Information Notice 1990-41, Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and Ak Circuit Breakers (12 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-42, Failure of Electrical Power Equipment Due to Solar Magnetic Disturbances (19 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-43, Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (29 June 1990)
... further results |
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