ML16308A295

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...

ML16308A295
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/03/2016
From:	Kaegi G T Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-16-174
Download: ML16308A295 (77)

Text

Exelon RS-16-174 November 3, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 10 CFR 50.54(f) Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML 12053A340)

2. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML 12333A 168 and ML 12333A 170) 4. NRC Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic", dated February 15, 2013(ML12319A074)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC letter to NRC, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 -Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (RS-14-064) (ML14091A005 and ML14091A006)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 3, 2016 Page2 6. NRG Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML 14111A147)

7. NRG Memorandum, Support Document tor Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML 14136A 126} 8. NEI Letter, Request tor NRG Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance tor Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396), dated July 30, 2015 (ML 15223A 100/ML 15223A 102) 9. NRG Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance tor Functional Confirmation and Fragility", dated September 17, 2015(ML15218A569}

1 o. NRG Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request tor Information Pursuant to Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML 15194A015}

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a Request tor Information per 1 O CFR 50.54(f) (Reference

1) to all power reactor licensees.

The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRG letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014. By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRG transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination tor External Events (IPEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (IHS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation.

As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRG (Reference

6) on page 4 of Enclosure 2, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6), the NRG acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) tor NRG review and endorsement.

NRG endorsement was provided by Reference

9. Reference 1 O provided the NRG final seismic hazard evaluation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 3, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable.

Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This transmittal completes the scope of work described in Section 4.2 of Enclosure 1 of Reference 5, for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter closes the associated regulatory commitment contained in Enclosure 2 of Reference 5 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 3rd day of November 2016. Respectfully submitted, Glen T. Kaegi Director -Licensing

& Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 -Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Report cc: NRC Regional Administrator

-Region Ill NRC Project Manager, NRR -Braidwood Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector

-Braidwood Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRC Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency-Division of Nuclear Safety Enclosure Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Report (73 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION 35100 South Route 53, Braceville, Illinois 60407 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF*72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-458 and STN 50-457 Correspondence No.: RS-16*174 Reviewer:

Exelon Gttnaradon Company, LLC (Exelon) PO Box 805398 Chlcqo, IL eo&llM398 Prepared by: Stevenson

& Aslaclates 1661 Feehanvflla Drive, Suite 150 Maunt Prospect, IL &0056 Report Number: 15COJ47-RPT .om. Rev. 1 Printed Nam* F. G1natra M.Delaney S!snatyre Approver:

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Document ID: 15C0347-RPT-002 Title: High Frequency Confirmation Report for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station in Response to Near Term Task Force (NTIF) 2.1 Recommendation Document Type: Criteria D Interface D Report f8I Specification D Other D Drawing D Project Name: Braidwood High Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C0347 Client: This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

Initial Issue (Rev. 0) Originated by: F. Ganatra Checked by: M. Delaney Approved by: M. Delaney Revision Record: Revision Originated by/ No. Date 1 F. Ganatra 10/03/2016 Stevenson

& A ss ociates Checked by/ Approved by/ Date Date M. Delaney M. Delaney 10/04/2016 10/05/2016 DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET Figure 2.8 Date: 8/25/2016 Date: 9/01/2016 Date: 9/01/2016 Description of Revision Updated revision level of Ref. 200 and Ref. 201 to Rev. 2. Updated Ref. 13. Added Section 1.5 and revised minor wording for Section 1.2, 2, 2.6, and 5.1. PROJECT NO. 15C0347 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1]. Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTIF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTIF developed a set of recommendations

[15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.

Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety." EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3]. Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2]. This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (BRW). The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396

[8] is used for the BRW evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference

[8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Page 3 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4 of73 1 Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the N RC in its March 12, 2012 50.54{f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54{f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54{f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.

Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety." EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details {SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8) and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3]. Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2]. On March 31, 2014, BRW submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for BRW using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3]. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the conclusions made as a result of the evaluations. 1.3 APPROACH EPRI 3002004396

[8] is used for the BRW evaluations described in this report. Section 4.1 of Reference

[8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation.

Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• BRW SSE and GMRS Information

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

• Summary of Results 1.4 PLANT SCREENING BRW submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 31, 2014 [4]. In a letter dated January 22, 2016, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the BRW site [14]. The NRC final screening determination letter concluded

[2] that the BRW GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [6]. 1.5 REPORT DOCUMENTATION Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference

[200] for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed in Section 5. Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4. Page 6 of73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening T he fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary.

An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference (8), this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout circuits.

Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference (8) is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR

TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference

[8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation.

The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary." 2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves. The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all P&ID's attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic).

A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report. Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure. The Letdown and Purification System on PWRs is a normally in service system with the flowpath open and in operation.

If an event isolated a downstream valve, there are pressure relief valves that would flow water out of the RC System. Letdown has auto isolation and abnormal operating procedure which isolate the flow. There are no auto open valves in this flowpath. Page 7 of73 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Active Function:

A function that requires mechanical motion or a change of state (e.g., the closing of a valve or relay or the change in state of a transistor)

Simple Check Valve: A valve which closes upon reverse fluid flow only. Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected which are also identified in the section below. Based on the analysis detailed below, there are no moving contact control devices which could create a LOCA due to chatter-induced sustained valve misalignment, and thus no devices were selected for this category.

Reactor Coolant Loop Valves Drain Line Valves 1RC8037A/B/C/D, 2RC8037A/B/C/D, Reactor Head Vent Valves 1RC014A/B/C/D,2RC014A/B/C/D Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch. There are no chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [21, 22, 23, 24). Pressurizer Power Relief Valves 1RY455A, 1RY456, 2RY455A, 2RY456, Blocking Valves 1RY8000A/B,2RY8000A/B Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays which are energized from process control signals. There are no devices which could seal-in and cause a sustained undesirable opening of the Pressurizer Power Relief Valves [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. For this reason, these valve controls can be credited in a high frequency event, and analysis of the Blocking Valve controls is unnecessary.

Residual Heat Removal Valves Reactor Coolant Loop to Residual Heat Removal Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8701A-1/1B-2/2A-1/2B-2, 2RH8701A-1/1B-2/2A-1/2B-2 Both the P&ID and control schematic diagrams indicate 1RH8701B-2, 1RH8702A-l, 2RH8701B-2, and 2RH8702A-1 are closed and depowered during normal operation

[31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Lacking electrical power, any SILO devices in the control for these valves would have no effect on valve position.

Since these valves can be credited for remaining closed following a seismic event, analysis ofthe valve controls for 1RH8701A-l, 1RH8702B-2, 2RH8701A-l, and 2RH8702B-2 is unnecessary.

Process Sampling Valves Hot Leg Loop 1&3 Sample Line Selector Valves 1PS9351A/B, 2PS9351A/B, Pressurizer Steam Sample Selector Valves 1PS9350A, 2PS9350A, Pressurizer Liquid Sample Selector Valves 1PS9350B, 2PS9350B, Cold Leg Loop 1/2/3/4 Sample Line Selector Valves 1PS9358A/B/C/D, 2PS9358A/B/C/D Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch and permissive relay. These valves are normally closed at the time of the event [37, 38, 39, 40), and in this position the (rugged) hand control switch is normally open and blocks the effect of chatter in the series permissive relay. There are no other chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [41, 42, 43, 44). Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9356A, 2PS9356A, Pressurizer Steam Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9354A, 2PS9354A, Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9355A, 2PS9355A Page 8 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch and permissive relay. These valves are normally closed at the time of the event [37, 38, 39, 40). The only chatter sensitive device in the control circuit is the containment isolation permissive relay. When the valve is closed the valve position switch contacts are open and block the effect of chatter in the relay. There are no other chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [45, 46, 47, 48). 2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference

[8) to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation.

The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function." 2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

For BRW, the credited decay heat removal system is the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (DDAFW) Pump. The selection of contact devices for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (DDAFW) Pump was based on the premise that DDAFW operation is desired, thus any SILO devices which would lead to DDAFW operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection

[17, 18). Only contact devices which could render the DDAFW system inoperable were considered.

Any chatter which could de-energize the normally-energized Engine Failure Lockout Relay K12 would prevent engine start [19, 20). The lockout relay itself does not seal in, however the relays with contacts in K12's coil circuit do. The Overcrank Relay K7, High Water Temperature Relay KS, Overspeed Relay K9, and Low Lube Oil Pressure Relay KlO are normally energized and sealed-in.

Chatter in the seal-in contacts of K7, KS, K9, KlO, or in the contacts of the Overcrank Timer Relay K4 (input to K7), High Water Temperature Switch 1TSH-AF147 (input to KB), Speed Switch 1SS-AF8002 (input to K9), Low Oil Pressure Time Delay Relay Kll (input to KlO), could trip the lockout relay and prevent engine start. The time delay associated with K4 and Kll prevents chatter in their coil circuits from affecting engine start. It is presumed that pump suction pressure is above the reset pressure setting of lPSL-AFOSS and therefore chatter in this pressure switch and the Low Suction Pressure Timer Relay K6 have only a temporary effect on engine start and thus do not meet selection criteria.

2.5 AC/DC POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generators,

• Battery Chargers and Inverters,

• EOG Ancillary Systems, and

• Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs. Page 9 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries.

The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip resulted from a fault condition and could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power. In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EOG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EOG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from the BRW UFSAR. BRW has four (4) EOGs which provide emergency power for their two units. Each unit has two (2) divisions of Class lE loads with one EOG for each division (49, pp. 8.3-8]. The overall power distribution, both AC and DC, is shown on the Station One-Line Diagram [SO]. The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available.

The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM. In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class lE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EOGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed.

Ancillary systems required for EOG operation as well as Class lE battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP. The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions. Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators, DGlA, DGlB, DG2A, DG2B, is divided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [49, pp. 8.3-8]. Generator Protective Relaying The control circuits for the DGlA circuit breaker [51] include ESF Bus Lockout Relays 486-1412 (Normal Feed), 486-1413 (EOG Feed), and 486-1414X (Reserve Feed). If any of these lockout relays are tripped the EOG breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP. Bus Lockout Relay 486-1412 may be tripped by chatter in Phase Overcurrent Relays PR30A-451 and PR30C-451 and Ground Overcurrent Protective Relay PR31-451N

[52). Bus Lockout Relay 486-1413 is tripped by a solid-state differential relay (non-vulnerable) on the EOG breaker [51). Bus Lockout Relay 486-1414X may be tripped by chatter in Phase Overcurrent Relays PR27A-451 and PR27C-451 and Ground Overcurrent Protective Relay PR28-451N

[53). Page 10 of 73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 The control circuits for the other three EDG circuit breakers are identical in design and sensitive to chatter in their equivalent devices: DGlB: 486-1422, 486-1423, 486-1424X, PR33A-4Sl, PR33C-4Sl, PR34-4SlN, PR30A-4Sl PR30C-4Sl and PR31-4S1N

[S4, SS, S6]; DG2A: 486-2412, 486-2413, 486-2414, PR9A-4Sl, PR9C-4Sl, PR10-4SlN, PR13A-4Sl PR13C-4Sl and PR14-4S1N

[S7, S8, S9]; DG2B: 486-2422, 486-2423, 486-2424, PR7A-4Sl, PR7C-4Sl, PR8-4SlN, PR3A-4Sl PR3C-4Sl and PR4-4S1N [60, 61, 62). Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of each EDG [63, 64, 6S, 66, 67, 68) (DGlA), [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74) (DGlB), [7S, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80) (DG2A), [81, 82, 83, 84, 8S, 86) (DG2B) using the description of operation

[87, 88, 89, 90), legends [91, 92, 93, 94), and switch development documents

[9S, 96, 97, 98) as necessary.

Two conditions were considered for EDG Start, Emergency Start in response to a true LOOP, and Manual Start as a defense-in-depth response to situations where a bus undervoltage trip has not occurred but offsite power may be considered unreliable after a seismic event (e.g. brownout).

SILO devices that only affect Manual Start availability are being considered based on the discussion below. It is conservatively considered that manual start of the EDGs may be desired in the absence of a LOOP-induced emergency start. Seal-in and lockout devices which may block manual start have been identified herein. This requires verification only as necessary to remove conservatism for any devices which do not screen out seismically but screen out functionally due to their impacting manual EDG start only and not emergency start The SILO devices which may block EDG Emergency Start in response to a LOOP are the Generator Differential Shutdown Repeater Relays 87G1X and 87G2X, and Engine Overspeed Relays 12Xl and 12X2. 87G1X and 87G2X are both controlled by 486-1413 (already covered).

12Xl and 12X2 are controlled by 1PS-DG2SlA, 1PS-DG2S2A, and 1PS-DG108A.

Chatter in any of these devices could prevent EDG Emergency Start. In addition to the devices which could prevent Emergency Start, Manual Start may be blocked by the normally-energized Unit Shutdown Relay 86S2. Chatter of the seal-in contact of 86S2, or of the contacts of relays within the coil circuits of this relay, may prevent EDG manual start. Chatter in any other device in the start control circuit would only have a transient effect, delaying start by, at most, the period of strong shaking. The Unit Shutdown Relay is normally energized and sealed-in.

This relay is controlled by the Engine Shutdown Relay 86E, Generator Shutdown Relay 86G, Generator Differential Shutdown Repeater Relays 87G1X and 87G2X, Engine Overspeed Shutdown Relays 12Xl and 12X2, and Incomplete Starting Sequence Relay 48. Chatter in the contacts of these auxiliary relays may cause tripping of the engine shutdown relay. Once tripped this relay would need to be manually reset. The Engine Shutdown Relay 86E is controlled by the Engine Lube Oil Low Pressure Shutdown Repeater Relay 63QELX, Turbo Low Lube Oil Pressure Shutdown Repeater Relay 63QTLX, Main and Connecting Rod High Bearing Temperature Shutdown Repeater Relay 26MBHTX, Turbo Thrust Bearing Failure Shutdown Repeater Relay 38TBFX, Jacket Water High Temperature Shutdown Repeater Relay 26JWSX, and Crankcase High Pressure Repeater Relay 63CX. Engine trips (other than overspeed) are blocked when the diesel engine is not running by powering the associated auxiliary relay coil circuits via steering diodes. This design feature acts on the coils of Page 11 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 these auxiliary relays, however the contacts of these relays are active in the engine fault circuits; and thus chatter in these auxiliary relays could prevent EOG manual start. Generator Shutdown Relay 86G is controlled by Generator Overcurrent Relay 51X, Generator Neutral Ground Voltage Auxiliary Relay 59GX, Loss of Field Auxiliary Relay 40X, Reverse Power Auxiliary Relay 32X, and Under Frequency Auxiliary Relay 81UX. Generator faults are blocked when the EOG circuit breaker is open (the normal condition at the time of the seismic event) by depowering the coil circuits of these auxiliary relays. For this reason, chatter of the protection relays in these coil circuits would have no effect. The Incomplete Starting Sequence Relay 48 is normally energized and sealed-in.

Chatter in the Cranking Limit Time Delay Relay 62CL could break the seal-in and prevent EOG manual start. Other devices in the coil circuit of relay 48 are closed and arranged in parallel.

This arrangement blocks the effect of chatter in any one of these other devices. Note the device identifiers mentioned here are identical on all EDGs with the exception of the EOG Bus Lockout Relay: 486-1413 for DGlA; 486-1423 for DGlB; 486-2413 for DG2A; and 486-2423 for DG2B; and overspeed switches: 1PS-DG251A, 1PS-DG252A, and 1PS-DG108A for DGlA; 1PS-DG251B, 1PS-DG252B, and 1PS-DG108B for DGlB; 2PS-DG251A, 2PS-DG252A, and 2PS-DG108A for DG2A; and 2PS-DG251B, 2PS-DG252B, and 2PS-DG108B for DG2B. Batterv Chargers Chatter analysis on the battery chargers was performed using information from the UFSAR [49] as well as plant schematic diagrams [99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104]. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit [49, pp. 8.3-46] which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. The high voltage shutdown circuit has an output relay 1DC03E-DSH-Kl or 1DC04E-DSH-Kl (2DC03E-DSH-Kl or 2DC04E-DSH-Kl), which shunt-trips the AC input circuit breaker, shutting the charger down. Chatter in the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

The battery chargers for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump also have an overvoltage relay, lAFOlEA-1-DSH-Kl or lAFOlEB-1-DSH-Kl (2AF01EA-1-DSH-Kl or 2AF01EB-1-DSH-Kl), that may shutdown these chargers [17, 19, 105, 18, 20, 106]. Inverters Analysis of schematics for the Instrument Bus 111, 112, 113, and 114 (211, 212, 213, and 214) Static Inverters

[107, 108, 109, 110] (111), [111, 112, 113, 114] (112), (115, 116, 117, 118] {113), [119, 120, 121, 122]

{114), [123, 124, 125, 126] (211), [127, 128, 129, 130] {212), (131, 132, 133, 134] (213), [135, 136, 137, 138] (214) revealed no vulnerable contact devices in the control circuits and thus chatter analysis is unnecessary.

EDG Ancillary Svstems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators require a number of components and systems. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed.

Information in the UFSAR [49] was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Page 12 of 73 Starting Air 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids

[49, pp. 9.5-21], which are covered under the EDG engine control analysis in section above. Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [49, pp. 9.5-29, 139, 140, 141, 142] which do not rely on electrical control. Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [49, pp. 9.5-23] which do not rely on electrical control. Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks [49, pp. 9.5-6]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps [139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144]. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered transfer pumps [145, 146, 147, 148] concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is described in the UFSAR [49, pp. 9.5-15]. This system consists of two cooling loops, jacket water and Essential Service Water (ESW). Engine driven pumps are credited for jacket water when the engine is operating.

These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. The electric jacket water pump is only used during shutdown periods and is thus not included in this analysis.

Four ESW pumps, lA, lB, 2A, and 2B, provide cooling water to the heat exchangers associated with the four EDGs [149, 150, 151, 152, 153]. In automatic mode these pumps are started via a sequencing signal following EDG start. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included in Emergency Diesel Generator section above. A chatter analysis of the ESW pump circuit breaker control circuits [154, 155, 156, 157] indicates the Low Suction Pressure Relays SXlAX or SXlBX; the Phase Overcurrent Relays PR3A-450/451, PR3C-450/451, PR4A-450/451, or PR4C-450/451 (U2: PR36A-450/451, PR36C-450/451, PR13A-450/451, or PR13C-450/451);

and the Ground Fault Relays PR4-450N or PR5-450N (U2: PR37-450N or PR14-450N) all could prevent automatic (sequential) breaker closure following the seismic event. ESW valves necessary for EDG cooling are either locked out, depowered, or, in the case of valves 1SX169A and 1SX169B (2SX169A and 2SX169B), do not contain SILO devices [158, 159]. Ventilation The Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation System is described in Section 9.4.5.2 the UFSAR [49, pp. 9.4-25]. Ventilation for each Diesel Generator Enclosure is provided via intake and exhaust fans [160, 161]. In automatic mode the intake fans are started via the EDG Start Signal or high room temperature.

Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included in section above. Apart from SILO devices identified for the EDG start signal, chatter analysis of the control circuits for the intake fans [162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169] concluded they do not include SILO Page 13 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 devices. Contact chatter on pressure switch 1PDS-VD044 (2PDS-VD044) may set the latching relay VDOlCAX and interrupt fan operation, however a timing circuit would automatically reset this relay after 58 seconds. Since this effect is transient only, it does not meet the selection criteria.

Contact chatter on pressure switches 1PDS-VD103or1PDS-VD105 (2PDS-VD103 or 2PDS-VD105) may set latching relays VD03CAX or VD03CBX, respectively, which would lock out the exhaust fans and require a manual reset [170, 171]. Switchgear.

Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EOG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded control circuits for the EOG circuit breakers, which are covered in section above, and the ESW Pump breakers which are covered in section above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above. Those medium-and voltage circuit breakers in 4160V ESF Susses and 480V AC Load Centers [172, 173, 174, 175] supplying power to loads identified in this section (battery chargers, EOG ancillary systems, etc.) have been identified for evaluation:

52@ 1AP05EF/ACB 1413, 52@ 1AP05EU/ACB 1415X, 52@ 1AP05EB, 52@ lAPlOEF, 52@ lAPlOEJ, 52@ lAPlOEL, 52@ lAPlOEQ, 52@ 1AP06EF/ACB 1423, 52@ 1AP06EP/ACB 1425X, 52@ 1AP06EB, 52@ 1AP12EC, 52@ 1AP12EF, 52@ 1AP12EG, 52@ 1AP12EJ, and 52@ 1AP12EL (U2: 52@ 2AP05ES/ACB 2413, 52@ 2AP05ED/ACB 2415X, 52 @ 2AP05EW, 52 @ 2AP10EF, 52 @ 2AP10EJ, 52 @ 2AP10EL, 52 @ 2AP10EQ, 52 @ 2AP06ER/ACB 2423, 52@ 2AP06EH/ACB 2425X, 52@ 2AP06EJ, 52@ 2AP12EC, 52@ 2AP12EF, 52 @ 2AP12EG, 52 @ 2AP12EJ, and 52 @ 2AP12EL).

Per the UFSAR [52, pp. 8.3-44], DC Distribution

[176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183] uses Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) which are seismically rugged [4, pp. 2-11]. MCCBs in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets [184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189] (Ul), [190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195] (U2) were considered rugged as well. The only circuit breakers affected by external contact devices not already mentioned were those that distribute power from the 4160V ESF Susses to the 4160/480V step-down transformers.

A chatter analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers [196, 197, 198, 199] indicates the transformer primary phase overcurrent relays PR37A-450/451, PR37B-450/451, PR37C-450/451, PR28A-450/451, PR28B-450/451, or PR28C-450/451 (U2: PR3A-450/451, PR3B-450/451, PR3C-450/451, PRllA-450/451, PRllB-450/451, or PRllC-450/451);

primary and secondary ground fault relays PR38-450N, PR29-450N, or PR1-351N (U2: PR4-450N, PR12-450N, or PR1-351N);

and lockout relays 486-1415X or 486-1425X (U2: 486-2415X or 486-2425X) all could trip the transformer primary circuit breaker following the seismic event. 2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref. [201]. A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [200] per the methodology/description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B-1. Page 14 of 73 3 Seismic Evaluation

3.1 HORIZONTAL

SEISMIC DEMAND 1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Per Reference (8), Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the BRW horizontal ground motion response spectrum {GMRS), which was generated as part of the BRW Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (4) submitted to the NRC on March 31, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on January 22, 2016 (14). It is noted in Reference (8) that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum {FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. (8), "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort." For sites founded on soil, the soil layers will shift the frequency range of seismic input towards the lower frequency range of the response spectrum by engineering judgment.

Therefore, for purposes of high-frequency evaluations in this report, the GMRS is an adequate substitute for the FIRS for sites founded on soil. The applicable buildings at BRW are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2. 3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference.

[8], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VG MRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference.

(4), Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1. Page 15 of 73 Layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Depth Depth Thickness, Vs1 Vs30 (ft) (m) d1 (ft) (ft/sec) d1/Vs1 I [ d1/ Vsi] (ft/s) 10.0 3.048 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0031 20.0 6.096 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0063 30.0 9.144 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0094 40.0 12.192 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0125 so.a 15.240 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0156 3150 60.0 18.288 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0188 70.0 21.336 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0219 80.0 24.384 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0250 90.0 27.432 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0281 100.0 30.480 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0313 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m {98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference

[8], Section 3.5.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d1) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs1).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (I[d1/Vs1]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/I[d1/Vs1].

• Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 30.4m {99.8ft) instead of 30m (98.43ft).

This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type. The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference

[8], Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.208g and the shear wave velocity of 3150ft/s, the site soil class is B-Hard. Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2. The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency.

It is noted that Reference

[8], Table 3-2 values are constant between O.lHz and lSHz. The V /H ratios and VG MRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report. Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for BRW. Page 16 of73 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz) HGMRS (g) V/H Ratio VGMRS(g) 100 0.208 0.8 0.166 90 0.210 0.82 0.172 80 0.212 0.87 0.184 70 0.216 0.91 0.197 60 0.223 0.92 0.205 50 0.237 0.9 0.213 45 0.251 0.89 0.223 40 0.264 0.86 0.227 35 0.285 0.81 0.231 30 0.309 0.75 0.232 25 0.341 0.7 0.239 20 0.362 0.68 0.246 15 0.409 0.68 0.278 12.5 0.432 0.68 0.294 10 0.447 0.68 0.304 9 0.442 0.68 0.301 8 0.430 0.68 0.292 7 0.413 0.68 0.281 6 0.401 0.68 0.273 5 0.386 0.68 0.262 4 0.344 0.68 0.234 3.5 0.310 0.68 0.211 3 0.253 0.68 0.172 2.5 0.191 0.68 0.130 2 0.153 0.68 0.104 1.5 0.117 0.68 0.080 1.25 0.104 0.68 0.071 1 0.086 0.68 0.058 0.9 0.083 0.68 0.056 0.8 0.079 0.68 0.054 0.7 0.071 0.68 0.048 0.6 0.062 0.68 0.042 0.5 0.054 0.68 0.037 0.4 0.043 0.68 0.030 0.35 0.038 0.68 0.026 0.3 0.033 0.68 0.022 0.25 0.027 0.68 0.018 0.2 0.022 0.68 0.015 0.15 0.016 0.68 0.011 0.125 0.014 0.68 0.009 Page 17 of73 0.5 0 I -VGMRS -HG MRS 0.40 r---*V/H Ratio (B-Hard) ----

c 0 '.t:i I! QJ Qi 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 , .. , __ , \ , \ I \ I \ I \ I \ I \ I \ I 1, 1.00 0.90 0.80 0 '.t:i ta a: :::c "."-.. 0.70 > 0.20 < -____________

0.10 0.00 1-1 0.1 1 10 Frequency

[Hz] 0.60 0.50 100 Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios Page 18 of 7 3

3.3 COMPONENT

HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Per Reference

[8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.) The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference

[8]. The cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction.

The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference

[8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [13] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers. All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference

[8] as follows:

• BRW Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections.

Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the back direction.

This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response.

In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications.

These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

• BRW Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category.

Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response.

Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

• BRW Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 COMPONENT

VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VG MRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor AF s v to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation Page 19 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.) The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference

[8]. The cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference

[8] and is 4. 7 for all cabinet types. Page 20 of73 4 Contact Device Evaluations 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Per Reference

[8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7], then the component seismic capacity from this program is used. (2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used: (a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program. (b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [10], [11], and [12]. (c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference

[8] A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report. Page 21 of73 5 Conclusions

5.1 GENERAL

CONCLUSIONS 1SC0347-RPT-002

, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 BRW has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396

[8]. The evaluation identified a total of 226 components that required evaluation.

As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, all of the devices have adequate seismic capacity for the reevaluated seismic hazard [4]. 5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS No follow-up actions were identified.

Page 22 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 6 References 1 NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations S0.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations S0.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." October 27, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility."'

September 17, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic for BRW dated March 31, 2014, ADAMS Access i on Number ML14091AOOS 5 EPRI 1015109. "Program on Technology Innovation:

Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to High-Frequency Vibratory Motions." October 2007 6 EPRI 1025287. "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7 EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary." September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015 9 EPRI NP-7147-SL. "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." August 1991 10 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 1, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", September 1993 11 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", April 1995 12 EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004-02. "Relay GERS Corrections." September 10, 2004 13 EPRI NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", 1990 14 NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (B. Hanson). "Braidwood Station, Unit 1 and 2 -Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Page 23 of73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Recommendation

2.1 ofthe

Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (CAC NOS. MF3886 and MF3887)." January 22, 2016, ADAMS Accession Number ML16014A188 15 Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 51 Century, "The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident" July 12, 2011, ADAMS Accession Number ML111861807 16 NEI 12-06, Rev. 2. "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 17 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF02 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel Driven) lAFOlPB 18 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF02 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Feedwater Pump 2B (Diesel Driven) 2AF01PB 19 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF12 Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel-Driven)

Engine Startup Panel lAFOlJ 20 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF12 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Pump 2B (Diesel-Driven)

Engine Startup Panel 2AF01J 21 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RC14 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram-Loop lA, lB, lC and 1D Drain Line Valves 1RC8037A, B, C, and D (AOV) 22 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RC32 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Reactor Head Vent Valves 1Rc014A,B,C,D 23 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RC14 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram Loop 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D Drain Valves 2RC8037 A, B, C, and D (AOV) 24 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RC32 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Reactor Head Vent Valves 2RC014A,B,C,D 25 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RY17 Rev. W, Pressurizer Power Relief Valves 1RY455A and 1RY456; Pressurizer Relief Tank Primary Water Supply Isolation Valve 1RY8030; Pressurizer Relief Tank Drain Valve 1RY8031 26 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY17 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Valves 2RY4SSA & 2RY456,2RY80 27 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RY13 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Non-Safety Related (Division

11) 28 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RY14 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Non-Safety Related (Division

12) 29 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY13 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Safety Related and Non-Safety Related (Division

21) 30 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY14 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Safety Related and Non-Safety Related (Division

22) 31 Braidwood Drawing M-62 Rev. BR, Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Unit 1 32 Braidwood Drawing M-137 Rev. BH, Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Unit 2 Page 24 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 33 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RH04 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram RC Loop lA to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8701A and 1RH8701B 34 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RH05 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram RC Loop lC to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8702A and 1RH8702B 35 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RH04 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram RC Loop 2A to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 2RH8701A and 2RH8701B 36 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RH05 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram RC Loop 2C to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B 37 Braidwood Drawing M-68 Sheet lA Rev. C, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary)

Unit 1 38 Braidwood Drawing M-68 Sheet lB Rev. H, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) 39 Braidwood Drawing M-140 Sheet lA Rev. E, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary)

Unit 2 40 Braidwood Drawing M-140 Sheet lB Rev. G, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) 41 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030PS03 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Press Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9350A and 1PS9350B; 1PS9351 42 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030PS06 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram-Cold Legs Loop 1, 2, 3 and 4 Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9358A, B, C and D (ADV) 43 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS03 Rev. G, Schematic Diagram Press Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 2PS9350A, 2PS9350B, 2PS9351A and 2PS9351B 44 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS06 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Cold Leg Loops 1, 2, 3 and 4 Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9358A, B, C, and D 45 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030PS01 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9354A and B, 1PS9355A and B 46 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030PS02 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves -1PS9356A and B Accumulator Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9357A and B 47 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS01 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram-Pressurizer Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 2PS9354A and B, 2PS9355A and B 48 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS02 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram-Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9356A and B Accumulator Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9357A and B 49 Braidwood Report, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)," Revision 15, January 2015 50 Braidwood Drawing 20E-0-4001 Rev. AD, Station One Line Diagram 51 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG01 Rev. AB, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 -ACB 1413 Page 25 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 52 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP23 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 142-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141-ACB 1412 53 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP25 Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 -ACB 1414 54 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG02 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Feed TO 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 -ACB 1423 55 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP32 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 142-2 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 -ACB 1422 56 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP34 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Reserved Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 -ACB 1424 57 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG01 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241-ACB 2413 58 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP23 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 242-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 -ACB 2412 59 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP25 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141to4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241-ACB 2414 60 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG02 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 -ACB 2423 61 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP32 Rev. U, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 242-2 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 -ACB 2422 62 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP34 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV Switchgear Bus 142 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 -ACB 2424 63 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG31 Rev. AP, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA Part 1 -CCRD 64 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG32 Rev. AJ, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA Part 2 -CCRD 65 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG33 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA (Part 3) 66 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG35 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Generator Control lDGOlKA 67 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG36 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Generator and Engine Governor Control lDGOlKA 68 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG40 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Shutdown and Alarm System lDGOlKA 69 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DGS1 Rev. AP, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB Part 1 -CCRD 70 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG52 Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 18 Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB Part 2 -CCRD Page 26 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 71 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG53 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB (Part 3) 72 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DGSS Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Generator Control lDGOlKB 73 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG56 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Generator and Engine Governor Control lDGOlKB 74 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG60 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Shutdown and Alarm System lDGOlKB 75 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG31 Rev. AM, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA Part 1 76 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG32 Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA Part 2 77 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG33 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA (Part 3. 78 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG35 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator Control 2DG01KA 79 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG36 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator and Engine Governor Control 2DG01KA 80 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG40 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Shutdown and Alarm System 2DG01KA 81 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG51 Rev. AL, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 1 82 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG52 Rev. AH, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 2 83 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG53 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB (Part 3) 84 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DGSS Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Generator Control 2DG01KB 85 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG56 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Generator and Engine Governor Control 2DG01KB 86 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG60 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Shutdown and Alarm System 2DG01KB (Part 2) 87 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG34 Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) lDGOlKA Part 4 88 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG54 Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) lDGOlKB Part 4 89 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG34 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) 2DG01KA Part 4 Page 27 of73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 90 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG54 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 4 91 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG41 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Legends lDGOlKA 92 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG61 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Legends lDGOlKB 93 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG41 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Legends 2DG01KA 94 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG61 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Legends 2DG01KB 95 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG44 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Control Cabinet Switches Development lDGOlKA 96 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG64 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Control Cabinet Switches Development lDGOlKB 97 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG44 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Control Cabinet Switches Development 2DG01KA 98 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG64 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Control Cabinet Switches Development 2D01KB 99 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC01 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 1111DC03E 100 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC02 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 1121DC04E 101 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC04 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Firing Amplifier and Miscellaneous Alarm Modules 125V DC and 2SOV DC Battery Chargers 102 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC01 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 2112DC03E 103 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC02 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram 12SV DC Battery Charger 212 2DC04E 104 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC04 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Firing Amplifier and Miscellaneous Alarm Modules 125V DC and 250V DC Battery Chargers 105 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF19 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram 32V DC Battery Charger lAFOlEA-1 and lAFOlEB-1 106 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF19 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram 32V DC Battery Charger 2AF01EA-1 and 2AF01EB-1 107 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030IP01Sheet1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 1 108 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P01Sheet2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 2 Page 28 o f 73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 109 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030IP01Sheet3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 3 110 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP01Sheet4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 4 111 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP02 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 1 112 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP02 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 2 113 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P02 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 3 114 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P02 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 4 115 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP03 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 1 116 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 2 117 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 3 118 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 4 119 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 1 120 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 2 121 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP04 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 3 122 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 4 123 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP01Sheet1 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 1 124 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP01 Sheet 2 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 (21POSE) Part 2 125 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P01Sheet3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 3 126 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P01Sheet4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 4 127 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 1 Page 29 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 128 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 2 129 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 3 130 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP02 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 4 131 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P03 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 1 132 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP03 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 2 133 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P03 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 3 134 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP03 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 4 135 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 1 136 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 2 137 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 3 138 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP04 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 4 139 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lC Rev. BC, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 140 Braidwood Drawing M-50Sheet1D Rev. BD, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 141 Braidwood Drawing M-130 Sheet lA Rev. BN, Diagram of Diesel Oil and Fuel Oil Supply Unit 2 142 Braidwood Drawing M-130 Sheet lB Rev. BM, Diagram of Diesel Oil and Fuel Oil Supply Unit 2 143 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lA Rev. BA, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 144 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lB Rev. BB, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 145 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030D002 Rev. J 002, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps lDOOlPA and lDOOlPC 146 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030D003 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps lDOOlPB and lDOOlPD 147 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030D002 Rev. H 002, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 2D001PA and 2D001PC 148 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030D003 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 2D001PB and 2D001PD Page 30 of 73 1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 149 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet lA Rev. BL, Diagram of Essential Service Water Units 1 and 2 150 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 2A Rev. AV, Diagram of Essential Service Water Units 1 and 2 151 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 3 Rev. BN, Diagram of Essential Service Water Unit 1 152 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 6 Rev. U, Diagram of Essential Service Water 153 Braidwood Drawing M-126 Sheet 1 Rev. BP, Diagram of Essential Service Water Unit 2 154 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX01 Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump lA lSXOlPA 155 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX02 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump lB lSXOlPB 156 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX01 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump 2A 2SX01PA 157 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX02 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump 2B 2SX01PB 158 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX17 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Gen lA and lB ESS Service Water Valves 1SX169A and 1SX169B 159 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX17 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A and 2B Essential Service Water Valves 2SX169A and 2SX169B 160 Braidwood Drawing M-97 Rev. Y, Diagram of Diesel Generator Rooms lA and lB Ventilation System 161 Braidwood Drawing M-98 Rev. Y, Diagram of Diesel Generator Rooms 2A and 2B Ventilation System 162 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD01 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation Fan lA lVDOlCA 163 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD02 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lB HVAC System Ventilation Fan lB lVDOlCB 164 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD03 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms-Part I 165 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD04 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part II 166 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD01 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation Fan 2A 2VD01CA 167 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD02 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2B HVAC System Ventilation Fan 2B 2VD01CB 168 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD03 Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part I Page 31 o f 73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 169 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD04 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part II 170 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD07 Rev. K2, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA and lB HVAC System Exhaust Fans lA and lB -1VD03CA and 1VD03CB 171 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD07 Rev. L2, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A and 2B HVAC System Exhaust Fans 2A and 2B 2VD03CA and 2VD03CB 172 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4007A Rev. M, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 131X (lAPlOE) 173 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4007D Rev. P, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 132X (1AP12E) 174 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4007A Rev. K, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 231X (2AP10E) 175 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4007D Rev. 0, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 232X 2AP12E 176 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4010A Rev. M, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 111 (lDCOSE) Part 1 177 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010B Rev. J, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Buslll {lDCOSE) Part 2 178 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010D Rev. L, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 112 (1DC06E) Part 1 179 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010E Rev. I, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Busl12 (1DC06E) Part 2 180 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010A Rev. L, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211 (2DCOSE) Part 1 181 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010B Rev. I, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211 (2DCOSE) Part 2 182 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010D Rev. K, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 212 {2DC06E) Part 1 183 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010E Rev. H, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 212 (2DC06E) Part 2 184 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008A Rev. AF, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131Xl {1AP21E) Part 1 185 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4008B Rev. AD, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131Xl and 131X1A 1AP21E and 1AP21EA Part 2 186 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008J Rev. AJ, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132Xl (1AP23E) 187 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008L Rev. AP, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132X2 and 132X2A 1AP27E and 1AP27EA Page 32 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 188 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008Q Rev. Z, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131X3 1AP22E 189 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008Y Rev. AF, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132X3 (1AP24E) 190 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008A Rev. R, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231Xl (2AP21E) Part 1 191 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008B Rev. R 02, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231Xl-A (2AP21E-A)

Part 2 192 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008J Rev. AD, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232Xl (2AP23E) 193 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008L Rev. Al, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232X2 (2AP27E) and 232X2A (2AP27E-A) 194 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008Q Rev. Z, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231X3 22AP22E 195 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008Y Rev. V, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232X3 (2AP24E) 196 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP27 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 131X -ACB 1415X 197 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP36 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 132X -ACB 1425X 198 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP27 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 231X -ACB 2415X 199 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP36 Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 Feed to 480V Auxiliary 200 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2, High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 201 15C0347-RPT-001, Rev. 2, Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation Page 33 o f 73 1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 A Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation is extracted from Reference

[200]. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [200] reference section shown on the following page. Notes: 1. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per Ref. [200] reference section shown on the following page. 2. This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRI high-frequency guidance [8] and the flexible coping strategies guidance document NEI 12-06 [16]. Page 34 of73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.

1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL

-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 32 of 44 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Stevemon & As'SOC'ia t es Check: MD 10/03/2016 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes. Guidance.

and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015. 1.2. EPRI 3002002997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary." September 2014. 1.3. EPRI NP-7147-Sl, "Se i smic Ruggedness of Relays", August 1991. 1.4. NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Rev. 2, December 2015, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide." 1.5. EPRI NP-5223-Sl, Rev. 1, "Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant Equipment." 2. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission Documents

2.1. Braidwood

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Rev. 0, NRC Docket No. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Correspondence No. RS-14-064.

3. Station Documents 3.1. BRAIDWOOD-UFSAR, Rev.15 3.2. Calculation BYR08-091, Rev. 0, "Review of Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) Seismic Qualificat i on Report No. ES-SR-08-106, Revision 0, For a Replacement Speed Circuit for the Auxiliary Feedwater Diesel Dr i ven Pump at Byron Station." 3.3. DC-ST-04-BB, Rev. 2, "Development of Seismic Subsystem (or Equipment)

Design Criteria (Horizontal and Vertical) and Response Spectra." 3.4. Calculation SM-AF143, Rev. C, "Cales. For Aux Feed Pump (2)1B Diesel Engine Oil Pressure Switch." 3.5. Calculation CQD-200156, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of Westinghou s e 7300 Series Process Control and Protection System, Spec. No. F/L-2812." 3.6. Calculation EMD-020714, Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Qualification Report for the Aux. Feedwater Diesel Drive and Control Panel (Safety-Related)." 3.7. Calculation BRW-05-0094-E, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification of ABB Protective Relays for the 480V, 4.16 kV and 6.9 kV Switchgear at Byron and Braidwood Stat i ons. (WCAP-16451-P, Revision 01)." 3.8. Calculat i on 018815(EMD) (Wyle Report 44369-2), Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Qualification for Eng i ne/Generator Panel of Cooper Energy Services." 3.9. Calculation 012617 (CQD), Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Test Reports for various Control Components." 3.10. Calculation CQD-012527 (Wyle Report 44247-1), "Seismic Simulation Test Program on a 130-VDC Battery Char g er." 3.11. Calculation CQD-200164 (Wyle Report 47993-1), "Seismic Qualification Test Report for Battery Chargers, OSX02EA-1 thru OSX02ED-1, l,2AF01EA-1, l,2AF01EB-1 (Model #32-50)." 3.12. Calculation CQD-007041 , Rev. 0 & 1, "Se i smic Qualification Review for HVAC Control In s trumentation

." 3.13. Not Used 3.14. Calculation CQD-007999, Rev. 1, "S e ismic Qualification of Westin g house 480 Volt Switchgear (1&2AP10E, 1&2AP12E, 1&2AP98E, 1&2AP99E)." P a ge 3 5 of 73

& AssooatE5 S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 4. Station Drawing 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 33 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 4.1. Draw i ng 20E-1-4030AF12, Rev. AE, "Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel Driven) Engine Startup Panel lAFOlJ." 4.2. Drawing 20E-1-4468, Rev. V, "Elevation Feedwater Pump lB Startup Panel lAFOlJ." 4.3. Drawing 20E-2-4030AF12, Rev. AC, "Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Pump 2B (DieselDriven) Engine Startup Panel 2AF01J." 4.4. Drawing 20E-2-4468, Rev. P, "Elevation Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Startup Panel 2AF01J." 4.5. Drawing 20E-1-4031AF14, Rev. D, "Loop Schematic Diagram Aux. Feedwater Pump Suction Press Cab. 1PA34J." 4.6. Drawing 20E-2-4031AF14, Rev. E, "Loop Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure Cabinet 2PA34J." 4.7. Drawing 20E-1-4030DG01, Rev. AB, " Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Feed to 4.16kV ESF SWGR. BUS 141 ACB #1413." 4.8. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP23, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram System Auxil i ary Transformer 142-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Sw i tchgear BUS 141-ACB 1412." 4.9. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP25, Rev. AA, "Schemat i c Diagram Reserve Feed From 4.16KV ESF SWGR. BUS 241 To 4.16KV ESF SWGR. BUS 141 -ACB #1414." 4.10. Drawing 20E-2-4030DG01, Rev. V, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Feed to 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 ACB #2413." 4.11. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP23, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram System Aux i l i ary Transformer 242-1 Feed to 4160V ESF Switchgear BUS 241 ACB #2412." 4.12. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP25, Rev. Y, "Schematic Dia g ram Reserve Feed From 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 141 TO 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 ACB #2414." 4.13. Not Used 4.14. Not Used 4.15. Drawing 20E-1-4030SX02, Rev. V, "Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump l B lSXOlPB." 4.16. Draw i ng 20E-1-4030VD07, Rev. K, " Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA & lB HVAC System Exhaust Fans lA & lB 1VD03CA & B." 4.17. Drawing 20E-2-4030VD07, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A & 2B HVAC System Exhaust Fans 2A & 2B 2VD03CA & 2VD03CB." 4.18. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP27, Rev. J, "Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 141 Feed t o 480V. Auxiliary Transformer 131X -ACB 1415X." 4.19. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP27, Rev. J, " Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 Feed to 480V. Auxiliary Transformer 231X -ACB 2415X." 5. S&A Documents 5.1. 15C0347-RPT-001, Rev. 2, "Selection of Relays and Switches for Hi g h Frequency Sei s mic Evaluation." Pa ge 3 6 o f 73 SA StCYenson

& lwocbtes S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 6. Miscellaneous Documents 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 34 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 6.1. Test Report ES-1000 , "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Report On Agastat E7000 Series Timing Relays." (See Attachment El 6.2. Report 60967, Rev. 0, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Report for a Mlcroswitch, P/N BZLN-LH." (See Attachment G) 6.3. Solon Manufacturing Company Catalog, "Model Series 7PS Pressure Sw i tch Diaphragm Sensing Element." (See Attachment H) 6.4. Ashcroft Data Sheet, "B Series Switches -Pressure, Differential Pressure & Hydraulics." (See Attachment J) 7 INPUTS Inputs are provided as necessary within Section 8 of this calculat i on. Pa g e 37 o f 7 3 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL

-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand 15C0347-RPT

-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 36 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology frcm Ref. 1.1. Sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is presented belCMt. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal

Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation.

A plot of GMRS can be found in Attachment C of this calculation. Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz. Peak acceleration of hor i zontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation):

= 0.409g (at 15 Hz) Calculate the hor i zontal i n-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the sub j ect floor elevation.

Grade Elevation (Ref. 3.1): El g rade := 400ft Per Ref. 3.1, Table 3.7-3, the embedment depth of the fo u ndation var i es between O' to 70'. Conservati11ely use 70' as the Auxiliary Bu i ldin g embedment depth. Auxiliary Buildin g Embedment Depth (Ref. 3.1, Table 3.7-3) Foundation Elevation (Auxiliary Building): Relay floor elevation (Ref. 4.1): embedab := 70ft Elfound.ab := EL g rade -embedab = 330.00*ft E l relay := 383ft R elay components 1AF01J-K4 and lA F OlJ-KlO ar e both loc a t e d i n th e Auxiliary Bu i ld i n g at elevation 383'-0". D is tanc e between relay floor and foundation

hrelay := E lrelay-Eltound.ab

= 5 3.00*ft P ag e 38 o f 73 1SC0347-RPT

-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 37 of 44 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd) Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor. Slope of amplification factor line, Oft < hrelay < 40ft Intercept of amplification factor line: Horizontal in-structure amplification factor: 2.1 -1.2 1 mh := = 0.0225*-40ft -Oft ft AFsH{hrelay)

= I (mh*hrelay

+ bh) if hrelay !> 40ft 2.1 otherwise Calculate the horizontal i n-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay. Type of cabinet (per Ref. 4.1) cab := " Control Cabinet" (enter "MCC', " Switchgear", "Control cabinet", or " R i gid"): Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13): AFc.h(cab) := 3.6 if 7.2 if 4.5 i f 1.0 if AFc.h(cab) = 4.5 cab= "MCC" cab = " Switchgear" cab = "Control Cabinet" cab = "Rigid" Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays. Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12 , Eq. 4-la and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4): Note that the horizontal se i smic demand is sam e for both r e l a y compon e nt s 1A F 01J-K4 and 1A F 01J-K10. Pa g e 39 o f 73 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 38 of 44 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 S t evenson & Associa t es Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic D e mand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz. Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS between 1 5 Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

= 0.409*g (at 15 Hz) Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the hor i zontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation).

PGAGMRS := 0.208g Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (V, 30) from Ref. 1.1, p. 3-5 and Attachment D. Shear Wave Velocity:

where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft) V si: Shear w a ve velocity of the layer (ft/s) (30m) Vs30 = :E ( di.) vs, Per Attachment D, the sum of th i ckn e ss of the layer over s h ea r wave velocity of the layer is 0.03125 sec. Shear Wave Veloc i ty: 30m ft Vs 3 o := 0.03125sec = Page 40 o f 7 3 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand !cont'd) 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 39 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.208g and shear wave velocity of 3150ft/sec at Braidwood Nuclear Generatin g Station, the site soil class is B-Hard. Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. hor i zontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency.

Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz by the correspondin g horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS. See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between lSHz and 40Hz. Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAvGM RS l between frequenc i es of lSHz and 40Hz. (By i nspection of Attachment B , the SAvGMR s occurs at lSHz.) V/H ratio at lSHz (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak vertical GMRS (at lSHz) (See Attachment B of th i s calculation)

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz: VH := 0.68 HGMRS := 0.409g SAVGMRS := VH*HGMRS = 0.278*g (at 15 Hz) A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is prov i ded in Attachment C of this calculation. P a g e4 1o f 7 3 15C0347-RPT

-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 40 of 44 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 H i gh-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd) Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the dstance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

D i stance between relay floor and foundation (see Sect. 8. 2.1 of this calculation):

hrelay = 53.00*ft Work the distance between the relay floor a rd foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor. 2.7 -1.0 1 Slope of amplification factor line: mv := = 0.017*-lOOft -Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line: bv := 1.0 Vertical in-structure amplification factor: The sample relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are mounted within host lAFOlJ. Therefore, the vertical in-cabinet amplification for sample r elay components i s 4. 7 per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-3. Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor: AFc.v := 4.7 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration by the vertical I n-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determ i ne the in-cab i net response spectrum demand on the relay. Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-lb and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4): I CRSc.v := AFsv*A F c.v*SAvGMRS

= 2.485*g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay compon e nts 1AF01J-K4 ard 1A F 01J-K10. Pa g e42 o f73 SA S t evenson & Associa t es S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 41 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO relay components are presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic capacities for all of the Ref. 1.1 subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.3.1 Seismic

Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testin g program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ru g gedness Spectra (GERS). Per Ref. 1.1, Sect. 4. 5. 2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency GERS capacity into the high frequency ran g e to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz. Therefore, if the high frequency capacity was not available for a component, a SAT value equal to the GERS spectral acceleration from 4 to 16 Hz could be used. For the relay component 1AF01J-K4 (Model#: 70120EL) and lAFOlJ-KlO (Model#: KHS17Dll), the GERS spectral acceleration from Ref. 1.3 is used as the seismic test capacity.

Seismic test capacity (SA*): 8.3.2 E ffectiv e Spectral Test Capacity (12.5) SA':= 10 g ( 1AF01J-K4 (Ref. 1.3, Pa ge B-8) ) lAFOlJ-KlO (Ref. 1.3, Pa ge B-29) GERS spectral acceleration for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is used as the seismic test c a pac i ty. Therefore for the r e lay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO there is no spectral acceleration increase.

Effective spectral test capacity (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16): (SA'1) (12.50) SA *= = *g T . SA'2 10.00 ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO Page43 o f73 SA S t t.....em.on

& Assoda t es S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL

-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor 1SC0347-RPT

-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 42 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testin g used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay. The knockdown factor for relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is obtained per Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2. Seismic capacity knockd<Mtn factor: 8.3.4 Seismic Testing Single-Ax i s Correction Factor ( 1AF01J-K4 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) ) lAFOlJ-KlO (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not. Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bdted together in a row, mrunted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cab i nets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2. The sample relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are mounted within host lAFOlJ. Per Ref. 1.1 , pp. 4-18, conservatively take the FMs value as 1.0. Single-axis correction factor (Ref.1.1, pp. 4-17to4-18):

FMS := 1.0 Page 44 of 7 3 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 43 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 S t emlSOn & As.sodates Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleratioo Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5. Effective wide-band component capacity acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5) (SAT) (8.333) TRS := -*FMS = *g Fk 6.667 8.4 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4.1 Effectiv e Wide-Band Component Capacity Acc e l e ratioo ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO Per a review of the capacity generation methodolo g ies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 relay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% probabilityoffailure (C 1"' Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability offailure (C1Cl%* Ref. 1.4). Per Ref. 1.4 , App. H, Table H.1, use the Cu l% vs. C 1" ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays. C ul% vs. C 1" ratio Effective wide-band component capacity accel e ration (R e f. 1.4, App. H, Sect. H.5) c 10 := 1.36 (11.333) TRS 14 := TRS*C10 = *g . 9.067 ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO P a g e 4 5 of 7 3

S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL

-001, Rev. 2 Title: High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.S Relay (Ref. l.l)Hgh-Frequency Margin 15C0347-RPT

-002,Rev.l Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Sheet 44 of 44 By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.1 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6. A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO i s presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): TRS (2.156) ICRSc.h = 1.725 Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): TRS (3.354) ICRSc.v = 2.683 > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are g reat e r than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high-frequency se i sm ic spectral ground motion. The sample re l ay s are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.1 functions.

8.6 Relay

(Ref. 1.4)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the h i gh-frequency seismic mar g in for Ref. 1.4 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6. A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic mar g in for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref 1.1, Eq. 4-6): TRSi.4 (2.932) I CRSc.h = 2.346 Vertical se i smic mar gi n (R e f. 1.1 , E q. 4-6): TRSl.4 (4.561) ICRSc.v = 3.649 > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. > 1.0, O.K. ( 1A F 01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-KlO ( 1AF01J-K4 ) lAFOlJ-K lO Both the hor i zontal and vertical seismic mar gi n s for th e relay components 1A F0 1J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are g re a t e r than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for h ig h-fr e qu e ncy s e ismic spectral g round motion for th e ir R e f. 1.4 functions.

Pag e46 o f 7 3 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 10 Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result 1 1 lAFOlJ-Control Relay Core Low Lube Oil P&B lAFOlJ Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem KlO Cooling Pressure Relay KHS-17Dll Cabinet Building 2 1 lAFOlJ-Control Relay Core Low Oil Pressure Agastat lAFOlJ Control Auxiliary 383 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Kll Cooling Time Delay Relay 70220C Cabinet Building Test 3 1 1AF01J-K4 Control Relay Core Overcrank Timer Agastat 70120EL lAFOlJ Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Relay Cabinet Building 4 1 1AF01J*K7 Control Relay Core Overcrank relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOlJ Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building s 1 1AF01J-K8 Control Relay Core High water P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOlJ Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling temperature relay Cabinet Building 6 1 1AF01J*K9 Control Relay Core Overspeed relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOU Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cool i ng Cabinet Building lSS-Core Control Auxiliary BRW 7 1 AF8002 Process Switch Speed switch Dyna I co SST-2400A lAFOlJ 383 Cap> Dem 115111 Cooling Cabinet Building Report lTSH-Core High water Control Auxiliary BRW 8 1 AF147 Process Switch Cooling temperature Square D 902S-BCW-32 lAFOlPB Cabinet Building 383 Report Cap> Dem "510 11 switch 486-1413 AC/DC 9 1 @ Control Relay Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse WL lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem lAPOSEF Support Lockout Relay Building System 486-1412 AC/DC 10 1 @ Control Relay Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse WL lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem lAPOSER Support Lockout Relay Building System PR30A-451 AC/DC Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 11 1 @ Westinghouse C0-7 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPOSER Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Bu il d i ng Report System Page47 of 73 No. Unit 10 Type PR30C-451 Protective 12 1 @ Relay lAPOSER PR31-451N Protective 13 1 @ 1AP05ER Relay 486-1414X 14 1 @ Control Relay 1AP05EP PR27A-451 Protective 15 1 @ Relay 1AP05EP PR27C-4Sl 16 1 @ Protective Relay 1AP05EP PR28-451N 17 1 @ Protective 1AP05EP Relay 18 1 62CL@ Control Relay 1PL07J 19 1 48@ Control Relay 1PL07J 86E@ 20 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 63QELX@ 21 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW Westinghouse C0-7 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay Bu i ld i ng Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault A u x ilia ry BRW Westinghouse C0-6 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> De m Support Relay B uildin g Report System AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse WL 1AP05E Swit ch gear A u x ilia ry 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay B uildin g System AC/DC Power Phase A A uxilia ry BRW Westinghouse C0-7 1AP05E Swit ch gear 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay B uild i n g R ep ort System AC/DC Power Phase C West i nghouse C0-7 1AP05E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay Bu i ld i ng Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault Westinghouse C0-6 1AP05E Swit ch gear A uxili ary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay B uildin g R e port System AC/DC National Power Cranking limit Technical 812-1-6 1PL07J Control A u x ilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Time Delay Relay System OD cab in et B uildin g Report System AC/DC Incomplete Power Starting Sequence Agastat GPDR-C740 1PL07J Control A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Ca b in et B uildin g Report System AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Shutdown Agastat C2017-004 Co n trol A uxilia ry BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Relay Ca b in et B uildin g R e port System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Engine Lube Oil EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Low Pressure Agastat C2017-004 Co n trol A ux i l i a ry BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Shutdown ca b inet Buil d ing Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Page48 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 63QTLX@ 22 1 Control Relay 1Pl07J 23 1 26MBHTX Control Relay @ 1PL07J 24 1 38TBFX@ Control Relay 1Pl07J 26JWSX@ 25 1 Contro l Relay 1Pl07J 63CX@ 26 1 1PL07J Co n t r o l Relay 86G@ 27 1 1Pl07J Control Relay SlX@ Protective 28 1 1PL07J Rel a y 59GX@ 29 1 1PL07J Control Relay 30 1 40X@ Control Relay 1Pl07J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Turbo Low Lube EGPDR-Power Oil Pressure Ag a stat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem 1PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Cab i net B ui ld i ng Report System Repeater Relay Aga s t a t GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Main and EGPDR-AC/DC Connecting Rod Agastat C2017-004 Cap> Dem Power High Bearing Cont r ol A uxilia ry 401 BRW Support Temperature 1PL07J Ca bine t B uildin g R epo rt System Shutdown Ag a s t a t GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Thrust Power Bearing Failure Ag a s t a t GPDR-C740 1PL07J Control Aux i l i ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Cab i ne t B uildin g Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Jacket Water High EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Temperature Agastat C2017-004 Co n t r ol A uxiliary BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Ca bine t B uildin g Report System Repeater Relay Ag as tat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Crankcase High EGPDR-Cap>Dem Power Agastat C2017-004 Control Aux i l i ary BRW Support Pressure Repeater 1PL07J Ca bine t B uildin g 401 Report System Relay Ag as t a t GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Generator Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Support Shutdown Relay 1PL07J Ca bine t Building 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-C a p> Dem Power Generator Agastat C2017-004 Control Aux i l i ary BRW Support Overcurrent Relay 1PL07J Ca bine t B uilding 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator Neutral Agastat EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power C2017-004 Control Aux ili ary BRW Support Ground Voltage 1PL07J Ca b i n et B uil d in g 401 Report System Aux il iary Relay Ag as tat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Power Loss of Field Ag a stat 1PL07J Control Aux i l i ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support A uxiliary R ela y GPDR-C740 Cab i ne t B uildin g Report System Page 49 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 32X@ 31 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 81UX@ 32 1 1PL07J Control Relay 87GlX@ 33 1 1PL07J Control Relay 87G2X@ 34 1 1PL07J Control Relay 12Xl@ 3S 1 1PL07J Control Relay 12X2@ 36 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 86S2@ 37 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 38 1 lPS-Process Switch DG108A 39 1 lPS-ProcessSwitch DG2S1A 40 1 lPS-Process Switch DG2S2A 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Reverse Power Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Auxiliary Relay Cab i net B ui ld i ng Report System Ag as t a t GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Under Frequency Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Support Auxiliary Relay 1PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C20ff004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown 1PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown 1PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Support Shutdown Relay 1PL07J Cabinet Bu i ld i ng 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control A uxilia ry BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Unit Shutdown Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 1PL07J 401 Support Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem Support Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 lDGOlKA Generator Building 401 Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Honeywell Control Auxiliary SQURTS Support Switch BZLN-LH 1PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS Support Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 1PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report Cap> De m System Page 50 of 73 No. Unit ID Type S2@ Medium Circuit 41 1 lAPOSEF Breaker 42 1 S2@ Medium Circuit lAPOSEU Breaker 43 1 S2@ Medium Circuit lAPOSEB Breaker S2@ Low Circuit 44 1 lAPlOEF Breaker S2@ Low Circuit 4S 1 lAPlOEJ Breaker 46 1 S2@ Low Circuit lAPlOEL Breaker S2@ Low Circuit 47 1 lAPlOEQ Breaker 486-141SX 48 1 @ Control Relay lAPOSEU PR37A-Protective 49 1 4S0/4Sl@ lAPOSEU Relay PR37B-Protective so 1 4S0/4Sl@ lAPOSEU Relay 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DGlA Circuit Power Aux i l i ary EPRIHF Breaker (ACB Westinghouse SO DHP 3SO lAPOSE Swit ch g ea r 426 Cap> Dem Support 1413) B uildin g Test System AC/DC Transformer 131X Power Primary Circuit West in g h o u se Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Breaker (ACB SODHP 3SO lAPOSE Building Test System 141SX) AC/DC Power ESWPump lA Westi n ghouse SO DHP 3SO 1AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Circuit Breaker Building Test System AC/DC MCC 131Xl Power Auxiliary BRW Feeder Circuit Westi n ghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Breaker Building Report System AC/DC DG Room Vent Power Auxiliary BRW Support Fan lA Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Sw i tchgear Building 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker AC/DC Battery Charger Power 111 Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Building Report System Breaker AC/DC MCC 131X3 Power Auxiliary BRW Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Building Report System Breaker AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse S03A804G01 lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSAOS Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase B Auxiliary BRW lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 14S6COSAOS Bu i ld i ng Report Cap> Dem System Page 51of73 No. Unit ID Type PR37C-51 1 450/451@ Protective lAPOSEU Relay PR38-450N 52 1 @ Protective lAPOSEU Relay PR1-351N 53 1 @ Protective lAPlOEA Relay PR3A-54 1 450/451@ Protective 1AP05EB Relay PR3C-55 1 450/451@ Protective lAPOSEB Relay PR4-4SON 56 1 @ Protective lAPOSEB Relay 57 1 SXlAX@ Protective lAPOSEB Relay lPDS-58 1 Process Switch VD103 59 1 1DC03E-Protective DSH-Kl Relay 486-1423 60 l @ Control Relay 1AP06EF 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluatlon Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase C Auxiliary 426 BRW lAPOSE Switchgear Support Overcurrent Relay West i nghouse 1456COSAOS Bu i ld i ng Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap>Dem Power Neutral lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Power Ground Fault Westinghouse C0-6 lAPlOE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Building Report System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase A lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase C lAPOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Bu i ld i ng Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Ground Fault lAPOSE Switc h gear A uxilia ry 426 BRW Support Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 B uil d in g Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Low Suction Power Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 lAPOSE Switchgear A u x ilia ry 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Delay Relay B uildin g System AC/DC High DG 1A D i esel Power A uxilia ry Exhaust Fan lA Solon 7PS/7P2A 1VD03CA Ge n e r ator 401 GERS Cap> Dem Support Delta Pressure Vent Fan B uildin g System AC/DC Power Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A Battery A uxilia ry BRW Support 1DC03E Ch ar ger B uildin g 451 Re po rt Cap> Dem Svstem AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse 656A830G01 1AP06E Swit ch gear A uxilia ry 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL B uildin g System Page 52 of73 No. Unit ID Type 486-1422 61 1 @ Control Relay lAPOGES PR33A-451 Protect i ve 62 1 @ lAPOGES Relay PR33C-451 Protect i ve 63 1 @ lAPOGES Relay PR34-451N 64 1 @ Protective lAPOGES Relay 486-1424X 65 1 @ C ontrol Relay lAPOGEQ PR30A-451 66 1 @ Protective lAPOGEQ Relay PR30C-451 67 1 @ P r otect i ve lAPOGEQ Relay PR31*4S1N 68 1 @ P r otect i ve lAPOGEQ Relay 69 1 62CL@ C ontrol Relay lPLOBJ 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC 656A830G01 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse TypeWL 1AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay S01A817G01 B uildin g Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC Power Phase A 1456COSA09, Auxiliary BRW Westing h ouse 1AP06E Sw i tchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report System AC/DC Power Phase C 1456COSA09, A uxiliary BRW West in gho u se 1AP06E Sw i tchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 B u i ld i n g Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault West in gho u se 1321D79A02, 1AP06E S wi tchgear A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay C0-6 B uildin g Report System AC/DC 656A830G01 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker West in gho u se TypeWL lAPOGE Switchgear A uxilia ry 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay 501A817G01 B uildin g Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC Power Phase A Westinghouse 1456COSA09, 1AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report System AC/DC Power Phasec West ing h ouse 1456COSA09, lAPOGE Sw i tchgea r A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 B u i lding Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault W estinghouse 14S6COSA08, 1AP06E S w i tchgear A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay C0-6 Bu i ld i ng Report System AC/DC Nat i o nal Power Cranking Limit T echnical 812-1-6 lPLOBJ Co n t r ol A uxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem S upport T i me D e l ay Relay OD ca b i net Build i ng Report System System Page 53 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 48@ 70 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 86E@ 71 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 63QELX@ 72 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 63QTLX@ 73 1 lPLOSJ Co n t r o l Relay 74 1 26MBHTX Control Relay @ lPLOSJ 38TBFX@ 75 1 Contro l Relay lPLOSJ 26JWSX@ 76 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 63CX@ 77 1 Control Re l ay lPLOSJ 86G@ 78 1 C ontro l R elay 1PL08J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation BuDding Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Incomplete EGPDR-Cap>Dem Power Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW Starting Sequence 401 Support Cabinet Bu il d i ng Report System Relay Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR* Cap> Dem Power Engine Shutdown Agastat C2017*004 lPLOSJ Control Aux ili ary BRW 401 Support Relay cabinet B uildin g Report System Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Engine Lube Oil EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Low Pressure Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Aux i l i ary BRW 401 Support Shutdown cab i n et B uildin g Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Turbo Low Lube EGPDR-Power Oil Pressure Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Co n t r ol A u xili ary BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown ca bine t B uild i n g 401 Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Main and EGPDR-Cap> Dem AC/DC Connecting Rod Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Power High Bearing Control Aux i l i ary 401 BRW Support Temperature ca b in e t B uildin g R epo rt System Shutdown Ag a s t a t GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Thrust EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Bearing Failure Agastat C2017-004 1PL08J Control Aux ili ary BRW 401 Support Shutdown ca binet B uildin g Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Jacket Water High Agastat EGPDR-lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power Temperature C2017*004 Control A uxiliary BRW 401 Support Shutdown Cab i net Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Crankcase High Agastat EGPDR-lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power C2017-004 Control Aux ili ary BRW Pressure Repeater 401 Support cab i net B uildin g Report System Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Agastat EGPDR* lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power Generator C2017-004 Co n t r ol Aux i l i ary BRW 401 Support Shutdown Relay ca bine t B uild i n g Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Page 54 of 73 No. Unit ID Type SlX@ Protective 79 1 lPLOSJ Relay S9GX@ 80 1 Control Relay 1PL08J 40X@ 81 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 32X@ 82 1 lPLOSJ Control Relay 81UX@ 83 1 lPLOSJ Control Relay 87G1X@ 84 1 lPLOSJ Control Relay 87G2X@ 8S 1 lPLOSJ Control Relay 12Xl@ 86 1 Control Relay lPLOSJ 12X2@ 87 1 Control Relay 1PL08J 88 1 86S2@ Control Relay lPLOSJ 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Generator Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Cab i net Bu i ld i ng 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator Neutral EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW Ground Voltage 401 Support Cabinet Building Report System Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Loss of Field Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW 401 Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Reverse Power Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Under Frequency Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Auxiliary BRW Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control Aux i l i ary BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Cab i net Bu ildin g 401 Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Control A u x ilia ry BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Cab i n et B uil d in g 401 R e port System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 lPLOSJ Co n trol A uxilia ry BRW 401 Support Shutdown Relay Ca bin et B uildin g Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Co n trol A uxilia ry BRW lPLOSJ 401 Support Shutdown Relay Ca b i n et B uildin g R e port System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Power Unit Shutdown Agastat Cont r ol A uxilia ry BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Ca bin et B uildin g 401 R e port System Page 55 of73 No. Unit ID Type lPS-89 1 DG108B Process Switch 90 1 lPS-Process Switch DG251B 91 1 lPS-Process Switch DG252B Medium 92 1 52@ Voltage Circuit 1AP06EF Breaker Medium 93 1 52@ Voltage Circuit 1AP06EP Breaker Medium 94 1 52@ Voltage Circuit 1AP06EB Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 95 1 1AP12EC Circuit Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 96 1 1AP12EF Circuit Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 97 1 1AP12EG Circuit Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 98 1 1AP12EJ Circuit Breaker 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 lDGOlKB Generator Bu i ld i ng Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Honeywell BZLN-LH lPLOBJ Control Auxiliary 401 SQURTS Cap> De m Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Honeywell BZLN-LH 1PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 SQURTS Cap> D em Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC DG lB Circuit Power Breaker (ACB Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Building Test System 1423) AC/DC Transformer 132X Power Primary Circuit Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Breaker (ACB Building Test System 1425X) AC/DC Power ESW Pump lB Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Swit ch gear Aux i l i ary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Circuit Breaker B u il d i n g Test System AC/DC MCC 132X3 Power Auxiliary BRW Support Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 1AP12E Switchgear Bu i ld i ng 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker AC/DC MCC 132Xl Power Aux ili ary BRW Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Breaker Bu il d i n g Report System AC/DC MCC 132X2 Power Aux ilia ry BRW Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Swit c hgear 426 Cap> D em Support Breaker B uil d in g Report Svstem AC/DC DG Room Vent Power A u x ilia ry BRW Fan lB Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Swit ch gear 426 Cap> Dem Support Breaker B uildin g Report System Page 56 of 73 No. Unit ID Type S2@ Low Voltage 99 1 1AP12EL Circuit Breaker 486*142SX 100 1 @ Control Relay 1AP06EP PR28A-101 1 4S0/451@ Protective 1AP06EP Relay PR28B-Protective 102 1 450/451@ 1AP06EP Relay PR28C-Protect i ve 103 1 450/451@ 1AP06EP Relay PR29-450N Protective 104 1 @ 1AP06EP Relay PR1-351N Protective 105 1 @ 1AP12EA Relay PR4A-Protective 106 1 450/451@ 1AP06EB Relay PR4C-107 1 450/4Sl@ Protective Relay 1AP06EB PRS-108 1 450/451@ Protective 1AP06EB Relay 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC Battery Charger Power Auxiliary BRW 112 Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Building Report System Breaker AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse S03A804G01 1AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem Power Phase A 1AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem Power Phase B Auxiliary BRW 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem Power PhaseC Auxiliary BRW 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem Svstem AC/DC West i nghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Neutral Auxiliary BRW 1AP06E Swit ch gear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 B uildin g Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-6 Cap> Dem Power Ground Fault A uxilia ry BRW 1AP12E Swit ch gear 426 Support Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA08 B uildin g R e port Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase A A uxilia ry BRW 1AP06E Swit ch gear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 B uild i n g Rep o rt Cap>Dem System AC/DC Cap> Dem Power Phase C Westinghouse Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay CO-SA 1AP06E Bu il d i ng Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Ground Fault 1AP06E Switchgear Aux ili ary 426 BRW Support Relay West i nghouse 1321079A03 B uil d in g Report Cap> Dem System Page 57 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 109 1 SXlBX@ Control Relay 1AP06EB 110 1 lPDS-Process Switch VD105 1DC04E-Protective 111 1 DSH-Kl Relay lAFOlEA-Protective 112 1 1-DSH-Kl Relay 113 lAFOlEB-Protective 1 1-DSH-Kl Relay 114 2 2AF01J-Control Relay KlO 115 2 2AF01J* Control Relay Kll 116 2 2AF01J-K4 Control Relay 117 2 2AF01J-K7 Control Relay 118 2 2AF01J-K8 Control Relay 119 2 2AF01J-K9 Control Relay 2SS-120 2 AF8002 Process Switch 0 51" 2TSH-121 2 AF147 Process Switch "510 11 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Low Suction Power Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 1AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Delay Relay Building System AC/DC High DG lB Diesel Power Exhaust Fan lB Solon 7PS/7P2A 1VD03CB Generator Auxiliary 401 GERS Cap> De m Support Delta Pressure Vent Fan Building System AC/DC Power N/A N/A Battery Auxiliary 451 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overvoltage Relay 1DC04E Charger Building Report System AC/DC Power Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A lAFOlEA-Battery Auxiliary 386.17 BRW Cap> Dem Support 1 Charger Building Report System AC/DC Power Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A lAFOlEB-Battery Auxiliary 389.42 BRW Cap> Dem Support 1 Charger Building Report System Core Low Lube Oil P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Pressure Relay Cabinet Building Core Low Oil Pressure Agastat 70220C 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Cooling Time Delay Relay cabinet Building Test Core Overcrank Timer Agastat 70120EL 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Relay Cabinet Building Core Overcrank relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap>Dem Cooling Cabinet Building Core High water P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling temperature relay Cabinet Building Core Overspeed relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J Control Auxiliary 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building Core Control Auxiliary BRW Speed switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2AF01J 383 Cap> Dem Cooling cabinet Building Report Core High water Control Auxiliary BRW temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 2AF01PB 383 Cap> Dem Cooling switch cabinet Building Report Page 58 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 486-2413 122 2 @ Control Relay 2APOSES 486-2412 123 2 @ Control Relay 2APOSEG PR9A-451 124 2 @ Protective 2APOSEG Relay PR9C-451 Protective 125 2 @ 2APOSEG Relay PR10-451N 126 2 @ Protective 2AP05EG Relay 127 2 486-2414 Control Relay @2AP05EJ 128 2 PR13A-451 Protective

@2AP05EJ Relay 129 2 PR13C-451 Protective

@2AP05EJ Relay 130 2 PR14-451N Protective

@ 2AP05EJ Relay 131 2 62CL@ Control Relay 2PL07J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse WL 2APOSES Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Bu il d i ng System AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse 2APOSEG Switchgear A uxilia ry 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay WL B uildin g System AC/DC Power Phase A Westinghouse C0-7 2APOSEG Swit ch gear A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay B uildin g R e port System AC/DC Power Phase C A uxilia ry BRW Westinghouse C0-7 2APOSEG Swit ch g ea r 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay B uildin g Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault Westinghouse C0-6 2AP05EG Swit ch g ea r A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay B uildin g Re po rt System AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker We s ti ng h o u se A uxilia ry 426 GERS Cap> De m Support Lockout Relay WL 2AP05EJ Swit c hgear B uil d in g System AC/DC Power Phase A West i n ghouse C0-7 2AP05EJ Sw i tc h gear A u x ilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay B uildin g R e port System AC/DC Power Phase C We s t in gho u se A uxilia ry 426 BRW Cap>Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 2AP05EJ Sw i t ch gear B uildin g R epo rt System AC/DC Power Ground Fault We s t ing ho u se 2AP05EJ Sw i tchgear A ux i l i a ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay C0-6 Bu i ld i ng Report Svstem AC/DC N a t iona l Power Cranking Limit Tec hnica l 812-1-6-05-2PL07J Control Aux ili ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Time Delay Relay OD Cab i net Bu il d i n g Report System Sy s t em Page 59 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 132 2 48@ Contro l Relay 2PL07J 133 2 86E@ Control Re l ay 2PL07J 134 2 63QELX@ Control Relay 2PL07J 135 2 63QTLX@ Control Re l ay 2PL07J 136 2 26MBHTX Contro l Relay @ 2PL07J 137 2 38TBFX@ Control Relay 2PL07J 26JWSX@ 138 2 Contro l Relay 2PL07J 63CX@ 139 2 2PL07J C ontro l R e l ay 140 2 86G@ Control R e l ay 2PL07J 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Incomplete Power Starting Sequence Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Control Aux ili ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Cab i net B uildin g Report System AC/DC Power Engine Shutdown Ag as t a t GPDR-C740 2PL07J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Ca b in e t Building Report System AC/DC Engine Lube Oil Power Low Pressure A gas t a t GPDR-C740 2PL07J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Cab i net Bu i ld i ng Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Low Lube Power Oil Pressure Control A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Agast a t GPDR-C740 2Pl07J Cab i net B uilding Report System Repeater Relay Main and EGPDR-AC/DC Connecting Rod Agastat C2017-004 Cap> Dem Power High Bearing 2PL07J Control Aux ili ary 401 BRW Support Temperature Cab i net B uild i n g R epo rt System Shutdown Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Repeater Relay AC/DC T ur bo T hrus t Power B earing F a i l u re Ag a s t a t GPDR-C740 2PL07J Control Aux i l i ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support S h utdown Cabinet B u i ld i ng R epo rt System Repeater Relay AC/DC Jacket Water H i gh EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Temperature Agastat C2017-004 Co n t r ol A uxilia ry BRW 2PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Ca b i ne t B uild i n g R epo rt System Repeater Relay Aga s t a t GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Crankcase H i gh Power Control A uxiliary BRW Suppo rt Press ure Repea t er Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Cab i net Bu i ld i ng 401 R epo rt Cap> Dem System Relay AC/DC Power Gene r ator Aga s t a t GPDR-C740 2PL07J Co n t r ol A uxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Re l ay Ca b i ne t B u i ld i ng R e po rt System Page 60 of 73 No. Unit ID Type SlX@ Protective 141 2 2PL07J Relay 59GX@ 142 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 143 2 40X@ Control Relay 2PL07J 144 2 32X@ 2PL07J Control Relay 145 2 81UX@ Control Relay 2PL07J 87GlX@ 146 2 2PL07J Control Relay 87G2X@ 147 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 12Xl@ 148 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 12X2@ 149 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 150 2 86S2@ Control Relay 2PL07J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Generator Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> De m Support Overcurrent Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator Neutral Power Control Auxiliary BRW Ground Voltage Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem Support Cabinet Building Report System Auxiliary Relay AC/DC Power Loss of Field Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Reverse Power Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report System AC/DC Power Under Frequency Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power D i fferent i a I Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown 2PL07J Cabinet Building 401 Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> De m AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differentia I Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem 2PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 2PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem 2PL07J 401 Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Power Unit Shutdown Agastat GPDR-C740 Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay 2PL07J Cabinet Bu i lding Report System Page61 of73 No. Unit ID Type 151 2 2PS-Process Switch DG108A 152 2 2PS-Process Sw i tch DG251A 153 2 2PS-Process Sw i tch DG252A M e d ium 154 2 52@ Volt a ge C ircui t 2AP05ES B reake r M e d ium 155 2 52@ Voltage Circu i t 2AP05ED Breaker Med i um 156 2 52@ Voltage Circuit 2AP05EW Breaker 157 2 52@ low Voltage 2AP10EF Circuit Breaker 52@ low Voltage 158 2 2AP10EJ Circuit Breaker 52@ low Voltage 159 2 2AP10EL Circuit Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 160 2 2AP10EQ Circuit Breaker 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Square D Diesel Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Sw i tch 9012-BC0-22 2DG01KA Generator Bu i ld i ng Report System AC/DC Power Engi ne Ov e rs p eed Honeywell Control Auxiliary 401 SQURTS Cap> Dem Support Sw i tch BZLN-LH 2Pl07J Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Eng i ne Ove rs peed Honeywell 2PL07J Control Auxiliary 401 SQURTS Cap> De m Support Sw i tch BZLN-LH Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC DG2A C ir c ui t Power B reake r (ACB Westinghouse 50DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem S up port 2413) Building Test Sy s te m AC/DC Tr ans fo rm er 231X Power P r i ma ry Ci rc uit West i nghouse 50 DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Breaker (ACB Building Test System 2415X) AC/DC Power ESWPu m p2A West in g hous e 50 DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Circuit Breaker Building Test System AC/DC MCC 231Xl Power Feeder Circuit We s t in g h o u se OS 206 2AP10E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Breaker Building Report System AC/DC DG Room Vent Power Auxiliary BRW Support Fan 2A Circuit We s t in g h o u se DS206 2AP10E Sw i tchgear Building 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker AC/DC Battery Charger Power Auxiliary BRW Support 211 Circuit W es t inghous e DS206 2AP10E Sw i tchgear Building 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker AC/DC MCC231X3 Power Auxiliary BRW Support Feeder Circuit We stin g hous e DS206 2AP10E S w i tchgear Building 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker Page 62 of 73 No. Unit ID Type 486-241SX 161 2 @ Control Relay 2APOSEO PR3A-Protective 162 2 450/451@ 2AP05EO Relay PR3B-163 2 450/451@ Protective 2APOSED Relay PR3C-Protective 164 2 450/4Sl@ 2APOSEO Relay PR4-450N Protective 16S 2 @ 2APOSEO Relay PR1-351N Protective 166 2 @ Relay 2AP10EA PR36A-167 2 4S0/451@ Protective 2APOSEW Relay PR36C-Protective 168 2 4S0/4Sl@ 2APOSEW Relay PR37-4SON 169 2 @ Protective 2AP05EW Relay 170 2 SXlAX@ Control Relay 2AP05EW 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker Westinghouse S03A804G01 2APOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Bu i ld i ng System AC/DC Power Phase A A u x ilia ry BRW Westinghouse DHP 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay Bu il d in g Report System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase B 2APOSE Swit chg ear A u x ilia ry 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 14S6C05A05 B uildin g Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase C A uxilia ry BRW 2APOSE Swit ch gear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 14S6C05A05 B uildin g Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Neutral A uxilia ry BRW 2APOSE Swit ch ge a r 426 Support Overcurrent Relay West i nghouse 1321079A03 B uildin g R e port Cap> Dem System AC/DC Power Ground Fault A uxilia ry BRW Westinghouse C0-6 2AP10E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Relay Building Report System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase A 2APOSE Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A04 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A04 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Ground Fault 2AP05E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Relay Westinghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Low Suction Power Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 2APOSE Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Delay Relay Bu i ld i ng System Page63 of73 No. Unit ID Type 171 2 2PDS-Process Switch VD103 172 2 2DC03E-Protect i ve DSH-Kl Relay 486-2423 173 2 @ Control Relay 2AP06ER 486-2422 174 2 @ Contro l R e l ay 2AP06 EF PR7A*451 175 2 @ Protect i ve 2AP06EF Relay PR7C-451 176 2 @ Protect i v e 2AP06EF Relay PR8-451N 177 2 @ Pr o t ective 2AP06EF Relay 486-2424 178 2 @ C ontro l R e l ay 2AP06ED PR3A-451 179 2 @ Protect i ve 2AP06ED Relay 15C03 47-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC High DG 2A Diesel Power Exhaust Fan 2A Solon 7PS/7P2A 2VD03CA Generator Auxiliary 401 GERS Cap> Dem Support Delta Pressure Vent Fan Bu i ld i ng System AC/DC Power Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 2DC03E Battery Auxiliary 451 BRW Cap> Dem Support Charger Building Report System AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker West i nghouse 656A830G01 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL B uildin g System AC/DC 656A830G01 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker W est i nghouse TypeWL 2AP06E Sw i tchgea r A u x i liary 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay 501A817G01 Bu il d i ng Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC Power Phase A W estinghouse 1456C05A09, 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Aux ili ary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 B uil d in g Report System AC/DC Power Phase C Westinghouse 1456C05A09, 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building R e po rt System AC/DC Power Ground Fault West i ngho u se 1456C05A08, 2AP06E S wi t chgea r Aux i l i ary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay C0-6 B u i ld i ng Report System AC/DC 656A830G01 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker West i ng h ouse TypeWL 2AP06E S w i tchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay S01A817G01 B u il d in g Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC Power Phase A West i ng ho us e 1456C05A09, 2AP06E S witchgear A ux i l i ary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Build i ng Report System Page 64 of 73 No. Unit ID Type PR3C-451 180 2 @ Protective 2AP06ED Relay PR4-4S1N 181 2 @ Protect i ve 2AP06ED R elay 182 2 62CL@ Contro l Relay 2PL08J 183 2 48@ Co n trol Relay 2PL08J 184 2 86E@ Control Relay 2PL08J 185 2 63QELX@ Control Relay 2PL08J 186 2 63QTLX@ Control Relay 2PL08J 187 2 26MBHTX Control Relay @ 2PL08J 188 2 38TBFX@ Control Re l ay 2PL08J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Power Phase C West i nghouse 14S6C05A09, 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Aux ili ary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Bu il d in g Report System AC/DC Power Ground Fault We s t ing h ou se 14S6COSA08 , 2AP06E S w i tchgear A u x ilia ry 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay C0-6 B uil d in g Report System AC/DC National Power Cranking Limit Techn ic al 812-1-6 2PL08J Co n trol A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support T i me Delay Relay OD Cab in et B uildin g Report System System AC/DC Incomplete Power Starting Sequence Ag as t a t GPDR-C740 2PL08J Co n trol A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Ca b in et B uildin g R e port System AC/DC Power Eng i ne Shutdown Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Co n trol A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Ca b i n et B uildin g Report System AC/DC Engine Lube O il Power Low Pressure Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Co n trol A uxilia ry 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Cab in e t B uildin g Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Low Lube Power Oil Press u r e Agastat GPDR*C740 2PL08J Co n t r ol A uxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Ca bine t B u i lding Report System Repeater Relay Ma i n and AC/DC Connecting Rod Power High Bearing Agastat 2PL08J Control Aux ili ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Temperature GPDR-C740 Ca b i n e t B u i lding Report System Shutdown Repeater Relay AC/DC Tu r bo Thrust Power B ear i n g Failure Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Co n t r ol Aux ili ary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Ca binet B uil d in g R ep ort System Repeater Relay Page65 of73 No. Unit 10 Type 189 2 26JWSX@ Control Relay 2PL08J 63CX@ 190 2 Control Relay 2PL08J 191 2 86G@ Control Relay 2PL08J SlX@ Protective 192 2 2PL08J Relay S9GX@ 193 2 Control Relay 2PL08J 194 2 40X@ Control Relay 2PL08J 195 2 32X@ Control Relay 2PL08J 196 2 81UX@ Control Relay 2PL08J 87G1X@ 197 2 Control Relay 2PL08J 87G2X@ 198 2 Control Relay 2PL08J 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Jacket Water High Power Temperature GPDR-C740 2PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Agastat cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Crankcase High Power Control Auxiliary BRW Pressure Repeater Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem Support Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Generator 2PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Shutdown Relay Ag a stat GPDR-C740 cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Generator Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> De m Support Overcurrent Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator Neutral Power Control Auxiliary BRW Ground Voltage Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem Support cabinet Building Report System Auxiliary Relay AC/DC Power Loss of Field Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Reverse Power Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Under Frequency Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Auxiliary Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem 2PL08J 401 Support Shutdown cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-Power Differential Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Cap> Dem 2PL08J 401 Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Ag a stat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Page66 of 73 No. Unit 10 Type 12Xl@ 199 2 Control Relay 2PL08J 12X2@ 200 2 2PL08J Control Relay 201 2 86S2@ Control Relay 2PL08J 202 2 2PS-Process Switch DG108B 203 2 2PS-Process Switch DG2SlB 204 2 2PS-Process Switch DG2S2B Med i um 20S 2 S2@ Voltage Circuit 2AP06ER Breaker Medium S2@ 206 2 Voltage Circuit 2AP06EH Breaker Medium 207 2 S2@ Voltage Circuit 2AP06EJ Breaker 208 2 S2@ Low Voltage 2AP12EC Circuit Breaker 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> Dem Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 2PL08J 401 Support Shutdown Relay cabinet Bu i ld i ng Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Cap> De m Power Engine Overspeed Agastat C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Support Shutdown Relay 2PL08J Cabinet Building 401 Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> De m AC/DC Power Unit Shutdown Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J Control Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary 401 BRW Cap> Dem Support Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 2DG01KB Generator Building Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Honeywell Control Auxiliary 401 SQURTS Cap> Dem Support Switch BZLN-LH 2PL08J Cabinet Build i ng Report System AC/DC Power Engine Overspeed Honeywell BZLN-LH 2PL08J Control Auxi l i ary 401 SQURTS Cap> D em Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC DG 2B Circuit Power Breaker (ACB Westinghouse SODHP 3SO 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support 2423) Building Test System AC/DC Transformer 232X Power Primary Circuit Auxiliary EPRIHF Westinghouse SO DHP 3SO 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Support Breaker (ACB Building Test System 242SX) AC/DC Power ESWPump2B Westinghouse SO DHP 350 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Support Circuit Breaker Building Test System AC/DC MCC232X3 Power Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 2AP12E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> D em Support Bu i ld i ng Report System Breaker Page67 of73 No. Unit ID Type 209 2 S2@ Low Voltage 2AP12EF Circuit Breaker 210 2 52@ Low Voltage 2AP12EG Circuit Breaker 211 2 52@ Low Voltage 2AP12EJ Circuit Breaker 52@ Low Voltage 212 2 2AP12EL Circuit Breaker 486-2425X 213 2 @ Control Relay 2AP06EH PRllA-214 2 450/4Sl@ Protect i ve Relay 2AP06EH PRUB-215 2 450/451@ Protective 2AP06EH Relay PRllC-216 2 450/451@ Protective 2AP06EH Relay PR12-450N 217 2 @ Protective 2AP06EH Relay PR1-351N 218 2 @ Protective 2AP12EA Relay 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC MCC232Xl Power Feeder Circuit West i nghouse DS206 2AP12E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Breaker Bu il d i ng Report System AC/DC MCC232X2 Power Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 2AP12E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Breaker Building Report System AC/DC DG Room Vent Power Fan 2B Circuit Westinghouse DS206 2AP12E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Building Report System Breaker AC/DC Battery Charger Power Auxiliary BRW Support 212 Circuit Westinghouse DS206 2AP12E Switchgear Building 426 Report Cap> Dem System Breaker AC/DC Power Circuit Breaker West i nghouse 503A804G01 2AP06E Sw i tchgear Auxiliary 426 GERS Cap> D em Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building System AC/DC Power Phase A Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Overcurrent Relay DHP Building Report System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase B 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem Power Phase c 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Neutral 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay West i nghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> De m System AC/DC Power Ground Fault N/A N/A 2AP12E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Cap> Dem Support Relay Bu i ld i ng Report System Page68 of73 No. Unit ID Type PR13A-219 2 450/451@ Protective 2AP06EJ Relay PR13C-220 2 450/451@ Protective 2AP06EJ Relay 221 2 PR14-450N Protective

@2AP06EJ Relay 222 2 SXlBX@ C ontrol Relay 2AP06EJ 2PDS-223 2 C ontrol Switch VDlOS 224 2 2DC04E-Protect i ve DSH-Kl Relay 225 2 2AF01EA-Pr o t ective 1-DSH-Kl Relay 226 2 2AF01EB-P ro t ective 1-DSH-Kl Relay 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase A 2AP06E Switchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay West i nghouse 1456C05A04 B u i ld i n g Report Cap>Dem System AC/DC West i nghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem Power Phase c 2AP06E S witchgear Auxiliary 426 BRW Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem Power Ground Fault 2AP06E Sw i t chgea r A uxili ary 426 BRW Support Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 B u i lding R epo rt Cap> Dem System AC/DC Low Suct i on Power Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 2AP06E Sw itchgea r A uxilia ry 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support B uildin g System Delay Relay AC/DC High DG lB Diesel Power A uxiliary Exhaust Fan lB So l o n 7PS/7P2A 2VD03CB Generator 401 GERS C a p> Dem Support B u i lding System Delta Pressure Vent Fan AC/DC Power Overvo l tage Re l ay N/A N/A Battery A uxilia ry 451 BRW Cap> Dem Support 2DC04E Charger B uilding R ep ort System AC/DC Power Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 2AF01EA-B a tt e ry A uxili ary BRW Cap> D em Support 1 Ch arger B uildin g 389.25 R epo rt System AC/DC Power 2AF01EB-Battery A uxilia ry BRW Su p port Overvo l t a ge Re la y N/A N/A 1 Charger B uildin g 385.92 Report C a p> Dem Sy s tem Page 69 of 73 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 1RC8037A M-60 lA 1 1RC8037B M-60 2 1 1RC8037C M-60 3 1 1RC80370 M-60 4 1 1RC014A M-60 lB 1 1RC014B M-60 lB 1 1RC014C M-60 lB 1 1RC0140 M-60 lB 1 1RY8000A M-60 5 1 1RY455A M-60 5 1 1RY8000B M-60 5 1 1RY456 M-60 5 1 1Sl8900A M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8900B M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8900C M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89000 M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949A M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949B M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949C M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89490 M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819A M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819B M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819C M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl88190 M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948A M-61 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948B M-61 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948C M-61 6 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89480 M-61 6 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Page 70 of 73 VALVE P&ID 1RH8701A-1 M-62 1RH8701B-2 M-62 1RH8702A-1 M-62 1RH8702B-2 M-62 1CV8377 M-64 1CV8378A M-64 1CV8379A M-64 1PS9351A M-68 1PS9351B M-68 1PS9358A M-68 1PS9358B M-68 1PS9358C M-68 1PS9358D M-68 1PS9356A M-68 1PS9350A M-68 1PS9350B M-68 1PS9354A M-68 1PS9355A M-68 2RC8037A M-135 2RC8037B M-135 2RC8037C M-135 2RC8037D M-135 2RC014A M-135 2RC014B M-135 2RC014C M-135 2RC014D M-135 2RY8000A M-135 2RY455A M-135 SHEET 1 1 1 1 5 5

5 lA lA lA lA lA lA lA lB lB lB lB UNIT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE 15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 EC 384171 to isolate flowpath EC 384171 to isolate flowpath EC 384171 to isolate flowpath EC 384171 to isolate flowpath Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Unit 2 Braidwood RCS leakage valves lA 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 lB 2 lB 2 lB 2 lB 2 5 2 5 2 Page 71of73 VALVE P&ID 2RY8000B M-13S 2RY4S6 M-13S 2Sl8900A M-136 2Sl8900B M-136 2Sl8900C M-136 2Sl8900D M-136 2Sl8949A M-136 2Sl8949B M-136 2Sl8949C M-136 2Sl8949D M-136 2Sl8819A M-136 2Sl8819B M-136 2Sl8819C M-136 2Sl8819D M-136 2Sl8948A M-136 2Sl8948B M-136 2Sl8948C M-136 2Sl8948D M-136 2RH8701A-1 M-137 2RH8701B-2 M-137 2RH8702A-1 M-137 2RH8702B-2 M-137 2CV8377 M-138 2CV8378A M-138 2CV8379A M-138 2PS93S1A M-140 2PS93S1B M-140 2PS93S8A M-140 2PS93S8B M-140 SHEET UNIT s 2 s 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 s 2 s 2 6 2 6 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 SC 2 SC 2 SC 2 lA 2 lA 2 lA 2 lA 2 1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 NOTE Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Page 72 of73 VALVE P&ID 2PS9358C M-140 2PS9358D M-140 2PS9356A M-140 2PS9350A M-140 2PS9350B M-140 2PS9354A M-140 2PS9355A M-140 SHEET UNIT lA 2 lA 2 lA 2 lB 2 lB 2 lB 2 lB 2 NOTE 15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Page 73 of73