RS-16-174, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review...

ML16308A295
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/03/2016
From:	Kaegi G Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-16-174
Download: ML16308A295 (77)

Text

Exelon Generation ~

RS-16-174 10 CFR 50.54(f)

November 3, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML12333A168 and ML12333A170)

4. NRC Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic", dated February 15, 2013(ML12319A074)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC letter to NRC, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 -

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (RS-14-064) (ML14091A005 and ML14091A006)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 3, 2016 Page2

6. NRG Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML14111A147)

7. NRG Memorandum, Support Document tor Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML14136A126}

8. NEI Letter, Request tor NRG Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance tor Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396),

dated July 30, 2015 (ML15223A100/ML15223A102)

9. NRG Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance tor Functional Confirmation and Fragility", dated September 17, 2015(ML15218A569}

1o. NRG Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request tor Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015}

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a Request tor Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRG letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014.

By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRG transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination tor External Events (IPEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (IHS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation. As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRG (Reference 6) on page 4 of Enclosure 2, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6), the NRG acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) tor NRG review and endorsement. NRG endorsement was provided by Reference 9. Reference 1O provided the NRG final seismic hazard evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 3, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable. Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This transmittal completes the scope of work described in Section 4.2 of Enclosure 1 of Reference 5, for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter closes the associated regulatory commitment contained in Enclosure 2 of Reference 5 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 3rd day of November 2016.

Respectfully submitted, 1~~4-Glen T. Kaegi Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 - Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Report cc: NRC Regional Administrator - Region Ill NRC Project Manager, NRR - Braidwood Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRC Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency- Division of Nuclear Safety

Enclosure Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Report (73 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION 35100 South Route 53, Braceville, Illinois 60407 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF*72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-458 and STN 50-457 Correspondence No.: RS-16*174 Exelon Gttnaradon Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chlcqo, IL eo&llM398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Aslaclates 1661 Feehanvflla Drive, Suite 150 Maunt Prospect, IL &0056 Report Number: 15COJ47-RPT .om. Rev. 1 Printed Nam* S!snatyre D!1I F. G1natra 10/03/2016 Reviewer: M. Delaney 10/04/2016 Approver: M. Delaney 10/05/2016 Lead Responslble Enatnaer: Pe Irr Gvst. /Ofotbt>~

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Document ID: 15C0347-RPT-002

Title:

High Frequency Confirmation Report for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station in Response to Near Term Task Force (NTIF) 2.1 Recommendation Document Type:

Criteria D Interface D Report f8I Specification D Other D Drawing D Project Name:

Braidwood High Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C0347

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This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Date: 8/25/2016 Originated by: F. Ganatra ~.£-1.:--

Date: 9/01/2016 Checked by: M. Delaney

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Date: 9/01/2016 Approved by: M. Delaney

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Revision Record:

Revision Originated by/ Checked by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date 1 F. Ganatra M. Delaney M . Delaney Updated revision level of Ref.

10/03/2016 10/04/2016 10/05/2016 200 and Ref. 201 to Rev. 2.

ru~- ~"(~ ~~~ Updated Ref. 13. Added Section 1.5 and revised minor wording for Section 1.2, 2, 2.6, and 5.1.

DOCUMENT PROJECT NO.

APPROVAL SHEET 15C0347 Figure 2.8 Stevenson & Associates

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTIF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTIF developed a set of recommendations [15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (BRW). The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the BRW evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Page 3 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 1 Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54{f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54{f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54{f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details {SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8) and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, BRW submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for BRW using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results . The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the conclusions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 APPROACH EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the BRW evaluations described in this report. Section 4.1 of Reference [8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• BRW SSE and GMRS Information

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

• Summary of Results 1.4 PLANT SCREENING BRW submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 31, 2014 [4]. In a letter dated January 22, 2016, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the BRW site [14].

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [2] that the BRW GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [6].

1.5 REPORT DOCUMENTATION Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference

[200] for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed in Section 5.

Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4.

Page 6 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference (8), this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference (8) is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary."

2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all P&ID's attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic). A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report.

Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure.

The Letdown and Purification System on PWRs is a normally in service system with the flowpath open and in operation. If an event isolated a downstream valve, there are pressure relief valves that would flow water out of the RC System. Letdown has auto isolation and abnormal operating procedure which isolate the flow. There are no auto open valves in this flowpath .

Page 7 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Active Function: A function that requires mechanical motion or a change of state (e.g., the closing of a valve or relay or the change in state of a transistor)

Simple Check Valve: A valve which closes upon reverse fluid flow only.

Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected which are also identified in the section below. Based on the analysis detailed below, there are no moving contact control devices which could create a LOCA due to chatter-induced sustained valve misalignment, and thus no devices were selected for this category.

Reactor Coolant Loop Valves Drain Line Valves 1RC8037A/B/C/D, 2RC8037A/B/C/D, Reactor Head Vent Valves 1RC014A/B/C/D,2RC014A/B/C/D Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch.

There are no chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [21, 22, 23, 24).

Pressurizer Power Relief Valves 1RY455A, 1RY456, 2RY455A, 2RY456, Blocking Valves 1RY8000A/B,2RY8000A/B Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays which are energized from process control signals. There are no devices which could seal-in and cause a sustained undesirable opening of the Pressurizer Power Relief Valves [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. For this reason, these valve controls can be credited in a high frequency event, and analysis of the Blocking Valve controls is unnecessary.

Residual Heat Removal Valves Reactor Coolant Loop to Residual Heat Removal Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8701A-1/1B-2/2A-1/2B-2, 2RH8701A-1/1B-2/2A-1/2B-2 Both the P&ID and control schematic diagrams indicate 1RH8701B-2, 1RH8702A-l, 2RH8701B-2, and 2RH8702A-1 are closed and depowered during normal operation [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].

Lacking electrical power, any SILO devices in the control for these valves would have no effect on valve position. Since these valves can be credited for remaining closed following a seismic event, analysis ofthe valve controls for 1RH8701A-l, 1RH8702B-2, 2RH8701A-l, and 2RH8702B-2 is unnecessary.

Process Sampling Valves Hot Leg Loop 1&3 Sample Line Selector Valves 1PS9351A/B, 2PS9351A/B, Pressurizer Steam Sample Selector Valves 1PS9350A, 2PS9350A, Pressurizer Liquid Sample Selector Valves 1PS9350B, 2PS9350B, Cold Leg Loop 1/2/3/4 Sample Line Selector Valves 1PS9358A/B/C/D, 2PS9358A/B/C/D Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch and permissive relay. These valves are normally closed at the time of the event [37, 38, 39, 40), and in this position the (rugged) hand control switch is normally open and blocks the effect of chatter in the series permissive relay. There are no other chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [41, 42, 43, 44).

Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9356A, 2PS9356A, Pressurizer Steam Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9354A, 2PS9354A, Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9355A, 2PS9355A Page 8 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch and permissive relay. These valves are normally closed at the time of the event [37, 38, 39, 40). The only chatter sensitive device in the control circuit is the containment isolation permissive relay.

When the valve is closed the valve position switch contacts are open and block the effect of chatter in the relay. There are no other chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [45, 46, 47, 48).

2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [8) to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function ."

2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning. For BRW, the credited decay heat removal system is the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (DDAFW) Pump.

The selection of contact devices for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (DDAFW) Pump was based on the premise that DDAFW operation is desired, thus any SILO devices which would lead to DDAFW operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection [17, 18).

Only contact devices which could render the DDAFW system inoperable were considered.

Any chatter which could de-energize the normally-energized Engine Failure Lockout Relay K12 would prevent engine start [19, 20). The lockout relay itself does not seal in, however the relays with contacts in K12's coil circuit do. The Overcrank Relay K7, High Water Temperature Relay KS, Overspeed Relay K9, and Low Lube Oil Pressure Relay KlO are normally energized and sealed-in. Chatter in the seal-in contacts of K7, KS, K9, KlO, or in the contacts of the Overcrank Timer Relay K4 (input to K7), High Water Temperature Switch 1TSH-AF147 (input to KB), Speed Switch 1SS-AF8002 (input to K9), Low Oil Pressure Time Delay Relay Kll (input to KlO), could trip the lockout relay and prevent engine start. The time delay associated with K4 and Kll prevents chatter in their coil circuits from affecting engine start. It is presumed that pump suction pressure is above the reset pressure setting of lPSL-AFOSS and therefore chatter in this pressure switch and the Low Suction Pressure Timer Relay K6 have only a temporary effect on engine start and thus do not meet selection criteria.

2.5 AC/DC POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generators,

• Battery Chargers and Inverters,

• EOG Ancillary Systems, and

• Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Page 9 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip resulted from a fault condition and could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EOG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EOG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from the BRW UFSAR. BRW has four (4) EOGs which provide emergency power for their two units. Each unit has two (2) divisions of Class lE loads with one EOG for each division (49, pp. 8.3-8] . The overall power distribution, both AC and DC, is shown on the Station One-Line Diagram [SO].

The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available.

The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class lE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EOGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EOG operation as well as Class lE battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators, DGlA, DGlB, DG2A, DG2B, is divided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [49, pp. 8.3-8].

Generator Protective Relaying The control circuits for the DGlA circuit breaker [51] include ESF Bus Lockout Relays 486-1412 (Normal Feed), 486-1413 (EOG Feed), and 486-1414X (Reserve Feed). If any of these lockout relays are tripped the EOG breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP. Bus Lockout Relay 486-1412 may be tripped by chatter in Phase Overcurrent Relays PR30A-451 and PR30C-451 and Ground Overcurrent Protective Relay PR31-451N [52). Bus Lockout Relay 486-1413 is tripped by a solid-state differential relay (non-vulnerable) on the EOG breaker [51). Bus Lockout Relay 486-1414X may be tripped by chatter in Phase Overcurrent Relays PR27A-451 and PR27C-451 and Ground Overcurrent Protective Relay PR28-451N [53).

Page 10 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 The control circuits for the other three EDG circuit breakers are identical in design and sensitive to chatter in their equivalent devices: DGlB: 486-1422, 486-1423, 486-1424X, PR33A-4Sl, PR33C-4Sl, PR34-4SlN, PR30A-4Sl PR30C-4Sl and PR31-4S1N [S4, SS, S6]; DG2A: 486-2412, 486-2413, 486-2414, PR9A-4Sl, PR9C-4Sl, PR10-4SlN, PR13A-4Sl PR13C-4Sl and PR14-4S1N

[S7, S8, S9]; DG2B: 486-2422, 486-2423, 486-2424, PR7A-4Sl, PR7C-4Sl, PR8-4SlN, PR3A-4Sl PR3C-4Sl and PR4-4S1N [60, 61, 62).

Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of each EDG [63, 64, 6S, 66, 67, 68) (DGlA), [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74) (DGlB), [7S, 76, 77, 78, 79,

80) (DG2A), [81, 82, 83, 84, 8S, 86) (DG2B) using the description of operation [87, 88, 89, 90),

legends [91, 92, 93, 94), and switch development documents [9S, 96, 97, 98) as necessary. Two conditions were considered for EDG Start, Emergency Start in response to a true LOOP, and Manual Start as a defense-in-depth response to situations where a bus undervoltage trip has not occurred but offsite power may be considered unreliable after a seismic event (e.g. brownout).

SILO devices that only affect Manual Start availability are being considered based on the discussion below.

It is conservatively considered that manual start of the EDGs may be desired in the absence of a LOOP-induced emergency start. Seal-in and lockout devices which may block manual start have been identified herein. This requires verification only as necessary to remove conservatism for any devices which do not screen out seismically but screen out functionally due to their impacting manual EDG start only and not emergency start The SILO devices which may block EDG Emergency Start in response to a LOOP are the Generator Differential Shutdown Repeater Relays 87G1X and 87G2X, and Engine Overspeed Relays 12Xl and 12X2. 87G1X and 87G2X are both controlled by 486-1413 (already covered).

12Xl and 12X2 are controlled by 1PS-DG2SlA, 1PS-DG2S2A, and 1PS-DG108A. Chatter in any of these devices could prevent EDG Emergency Start.

In addition to the devices which could prevent Emergency Start, Manual Start may be blocked by the normally-energized Unit Shutdown Relay 86S2. Chatter of the seal-in contact of 86S2, or of the contacts of relays within the coil circuits of this relay, may prevent EDG manual start.

Chatter in any other device in the start control circuit would only have a transient effect, delaying start by, at most, the period of strong shaking.

The Unit Shutdown Relay is normally energized and sealed-in. This relay is controlled by the Engine Shutdown Relay 86E, Generator Shutdown Relay 86G, Generator Differential Shutdown Repeater Relays 87G1X and 87G2X, Engine Overspeed Shutdown Relays 12Xl and 12X2, and Incomplete Starting Sequence Relay 48. Chatter in the contacts of these auxiliary relays may cause tripping of the engine shutdown relay. Once tripped this relay would need to be manually reset.

The Engine Shutdown Relay 86E is controlled by the Engine Lube Oil Low Pressure Shutdown Repeater Relay 63QELX, Turbo Low Lube Oil Pressure Shutdown Repeater Relay 63QTLX, Main and Connecting Rod High Bearing Temperature Shutdown Repeater Relay 26MBHTX, Turbo Thrust Bearing Failure Shutdown Repeater Relay 38TBFX, Jacket Water High Temperature Shutdown Repeater Relay 26JWSX, and Crankcase High Pressure Repeater Relay 63CX. Engine trips (other than overspeed) are blocked when the diesel engine is not running by powering the associated auxiliary relay coil circuits via steering diodes. This design feature acts on the coils of Page 11 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 these auxiliary relays, however the contacts of these relays are active in the engine fault circuits; and thus chatter in these auxiliary relays could prevent EOG manual start.

Generator Shutdown Relay 86G is controlled by Generator Overcurrent Relay 51X, Generator Neutral Ground Voltage Auxiliary Relay 59GX, Loss of Field Auxiliary Relay 40X, Reverse Power Auxiliary Relay 32X, and Under Frequency Auxiliary Relay 81UX. Generator faults are blocked when the EOG circuit breaker is open (the normal condition at the time of the seismic event) by depowering the coil circuits of these auxiliary relays. For this reason, chatter of the protection relays in these coil circuits would have no effect.

The Incomplete Starting Sequence Relay 48 is normally energized and sealed-in. Chatter in the Cranking Limit Time Delay Relay 62CL could break the seal-in and prevent EOG manual start.

Other devices in the coil circuit of relay 48 are closed and arranged in parallel. This arrangement blocks the effect of chatter in any one of these other devices.

Note the device identifiers mentioned here are identical on all EDGs with the exception of the EOG Bus Lockout Relay: 486-1413 for DGlA; 486-1423 for DGlB; 486-2413 for DG2A; and 486-2423 for DG2B; and overspeed switches: 1PS-DG251A, 1PS-DG252A, and 1PS-DG108A for DGlA; 1PS-DG251B, 1PS-DG252B, and 1PS-DG108B for DGlB; 2PS-DG251A, 2PS-DG252A, and 2PS-DG108A for DG2A; and 2PS-DG251B, 2PS-DG252B, and 2PS-DG108B for DG2B.

Batterv Chargers Chatter analysis on the battery chargers was performed using information from the UFSAR [49]

as well as plant schematic diagrams [99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104]. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit [49, pp. 8.3-46] which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. The high voltage shutdown circuit has an output relay 1DC03E-DSH-Kl or 1DC04E-DSH-Kl (2DC03E-DSH-Kl or 2DC04E-DSH-Kl), which shunt-trips the AC input circuit breaker, shutting the charger down. Chatter in the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

The battery chargers for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump also have an overvoltage relay, lAFOlEA-1-DSH-Kl or lAFOlEB-1-DSH-Kl (2AF01EA-1-DSH-Kl or 2AF01EB-1-DSH-Kl), that may shutdown these chargers [17, 19, 105, 18, 20, 106].

Inverters Analysis of schematics for the Instrument Bus 111, 112, 113, and 114 (211, 212, 213, and 214)

Static Inverters [107, 108, 109, 110] (111), [111, 112, 113, 114] (112), (115, 116, 117, 118] {113),

[119, 120, 121, 122] {114), [123, 124, 125, 126] (211), [127, 128, 129, 130] {212), (131, 132, 133, 134] (213), [135, 136, 137, 138] (214) revealed no vulnerable contact devices in the control circuits and thus chatter analysis is unnecessary.

EDG Ancillary Svstems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators require a number of components and systems. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [49] was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Page 12 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [49, pp. 9.5-21], which are covered under the EDG engine control analysis in section above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [49, pp.

9.5-29, 139, 140, 141, 142] which do not rely on electrical control.

Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [49, pp. 9.5-23]

which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks [49, pp. 9.5-6]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps [139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144]. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered transfer pumps [145, 146, 147, 148] concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is described in the UFSAR [49, pp. 9.5-15]. This system consists of two cooling loops, jacket water and Essential Service Water (ESW). Engine driven pumps are credited for jacket water when the engine is operating. These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. The electric jacket water pump is only used during shutdown periods and is thus not included in this analysis.

Four ESW pumps, lA, lB, 2A, and 2B, provide cooling water to the heat exchangers associated with the four EDGs [149, 150, 151, 152, 153]. In automatic mode these pumps are started via a sequencing signal following EDG start. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included in Emergency Diesel Generator section above. A chatter analysis of the ESW pump circuit breaker control circuits [154, 155, 156, 157] indicates the Low Suction Pressure Relays SXlAX or SXlBX; the Phase Overcurrent Relays PR3A-450/451, PR3C-450/451, PR4A-450/451, or PR4C-450/451 (U2: PR36A-450/451, PR36C-450/451, PR13A-450/451, or PR13C-450/451); and the Ground Fault Relays PR4-450N or PR5-450N (U2: PR37-450N or PR14-450N) all could prevent automatic (sequential) breaker closure following the seismic event.

ESW valves necessary for EDG cooling are either locked out, depowered, or, in the case of valves 1SX169A and 1SX169B (2SX169A and 2SX169B), do not contain SILO devices [158, 159].

Ventilation The Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation System is described in Section 9.4.5.2 the UFSAR [49, pp. 9.4-25]. Ventilation for each Diesel Generator Enclosure is provided via intake and exhaust fans [160, 161]. In automatic mode the intake fans are started via the EDG Start Signal or high room temperature. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included in section above. Apart from SILO devices identified for the EDG start signal, chatter analysis of the control circuits for the intake fans [162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169] concluded they do not include SILO Page 13 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 devices. Contact chatter on pressure switch 1PDS-VD044 (2PDS-VD044) may set the latching relay VDOlCAX and interrupt fan operation, however a timing circuit would automatically reset this relay after 58 seconds. Since this effect is transient only, it does not meet the selection criteria.

Contact chatter on pressure switches 1PDS-VD103or1PDS-VD105 (2PDS-VD103 or 2PDS-VD105) may set latching relays VD03CAX or VD03CBX, respectively, which would lock out the exhaust fans and require a manual reset [170, 171].

Switchgear. Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EOG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded control circuits for the EOG circuit breakers, which are covered in section above, and the ESW Pump breakers which are covered in section above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above. Those medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4160V ESF Susses and 480V AC Load Centers [172, 173, 174, 175]

supplying power to loads identified in this section (battery chargers, EOG ancillary systems, etc.)

have been identified for evaluation: 52@ 1AP05EF/ACB 1413, 52@ 1AP05EU/ACB 1415X, 52@

1AP05EB, 52@ lAPlOEF, 52@ lAPlOEJ, 52@ lAPlOEL, 52@ lAPlOEQ, 52@ 1AP06EF/ACB 1423, 52@ 1AP06EP/ACB 1425X, 52@ 1AP06EB, 52@ 1AP12EC, 52@ 1AP12EF, 52@

1AP12EG, 52@ 1AP12EJ, and 52@ 1AP12EL (U2: 52@ 2AP05ES/ACB 2413, 52@ 2AP05ED/ACB 2415X, 52 @ 2AP05EW, 52 @ 2AP10EF, 52 @ 2AP10EJ, 52 @ 2AP10EL, 52 @ 2AP10EQ, 52 @

2AP06ER/ACB 2423, 52@ 2AP06EH/ACB 2425X, 52@ 2AP06EJ, 52@ 2AP12EC, 52@ 2AP12EF, 52 @ 2AP12EG, 52 @ 2AP12EJ, and 52 @ 2AP12EL). Per the UFSAR [52, pp. 8.3-44], DC Distribution [176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183] uses Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) which are seismically rugged [4, pp. 2-11]. MCCBs in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets

[184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189] (Ul), [190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195] (U2) were considered rugged as well. The only circuit breakers affected by external contact devices not already mentioned were those that distribute power from the 4160V ESF Susses to the 4160/480V step-down transformers. A chatter analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers [196, 197, 198, 199] indicates the transformer primary phase overcurrent relays PR37A-450/451, PR37B-450/451, PR37C-450/451, PR28A-450/451, PR28B-450/451, or PR28C-450/451 (U2: PR3A-450/451, PR3B-450/451, PR3C-450/451, PRllA-450/451, PRllB-450/451, or PRllC-450/451);

primary and secondary ground fault relays PR38-450N, PR29-450N, or PR1-351N (U2: PR4-450N, PR12-450N, or PR1-351N); and lockout relays 486-1415X or 486-1425X (U2: 486-2415X or 486-2425X) all could trip the transformer primary circuit breaker following the seismic event.

2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref.

[201]. A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [200] per the methodology/description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B-1.

Page 14 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 3 Seismic Evaluation 3.1 HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference (8), Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the BRW horizontal ground motion response spectrum {GMRS), which was generated as part of the BRW Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (4) submitted to the NRC on March 31, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on January 22, 2016 (14).

It is noted in Reference (8) that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum {FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. (8), "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort."

For sites founded on soil, the soil layers will shift the frequency range of seismic input towards the lower frequency range of the response spectrum by engineering judgment. Therefore, for purposes of high-frequency evaluations in this report, the GMRS is an adequate substitute for the FIRS for sites founded on soil.

The applicable buildings at BRW are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference. [8], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VG MRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference. (4), Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Page 15 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Depth Depth Thickness, Vs1 Vs30 Layer (ft) (m) d1 (ft) (ft/sec) d1/Vs1 I [ d1/ Vsi] (ft/s) 1 10.0 3.048 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0031 2 20.0 6.096 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0063 3 30.0 9.144 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0094 4 40.0 12.192 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0125 5 so.a 15.240 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0156 3150 6 60.0 18.288 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0188 7 70.0 21.336 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0219 8 80.0 24.384 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0250 9 90.0 27.432 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0281 10 100.0 30.480 10.0 3,200 0.0031 0.0313 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m {98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.5.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d1) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs1).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (I[d1/Vs1]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 =(30m)/I[d1/Vs1].

• Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 30.4m {99.8ft) instead of 30m (98.43ft). This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8],

Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.208g and the shear wave velocity of 3150ft/s, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8],

Table 3-2 values are constant between O.lHz and lSHz.

The V/H ratios and VG MRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for BRW.

Page 16 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz) HGMRS (g) V/H Ratio VGMRS(g) 100 0.208 0.8 0.166 90 0.210 0.82 0.172 80 0.212 0.87 0.184 70 0.216 0.91 0.197 60 0.223 0.92 0.205 50 0.237 0.9 0.213 45 0.251 0.89 0.223 40 0.264 0.86 0.227 35 0.285 0.81 0.231 30 0.309 0.75 0.232 25 0.341 0.7 0.239 20 0.362 0.68 0.246 15 0.409 0.68 0.278 12.5 0.432 0.68 0.294 10 0.447 0.68 0.304 9 0.442 0.68 0.301 8 0.430 0.68 0.292 7 0.413 0.68 0.281 6 0.401 0.68 0.273 5 0.386 0.68 0.262 4 0.344 0.68 0.234 3.5 0.310 0.68 0.211 3 0.253 0 .68 0.172 2.5 0.191 0.68 0.130 2 0.153 0.68 0.104 1.5 0.117 0.68 0.080 1.25 0.104 0.68 0.071 1 0.086 0.68 0.058 0.9 0.083 0.68 0.056 0.8 0.079 0.68 0.054 0.7 0.071 0.68 0.048 0.6 0.062 0.68 0.042 0.5 0.054 0.68 0.037 0.4 0.043 0.68 0.030 0.35 0.038 0.68 0.026 0.3 0.033 0.68 0.022 0.25 0.027 0.68 0.018 0.2 0.022 0.68 0.015 0.15 0.016 0.68 0.011 0.125 0.014 0.68 0.009 Page 17 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 0.50 1.00 I - VGMRS

- HG MRS 0.40 r- - -*V/H Ratio (B-Hard) - - - - __, .. ,\

, \

0.90 I \

I \

I \

I \

I \

~0.30 I \ 0.80 c 0 0 '.t:i

'.t:i ta I! a:

QJ  :::c Qi

~ 0.20 - ____________ ,  ;

I 1 --- 0.70 0 .10 1- 0 .60 1

0.00 0.50 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency [Hz]

Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios Page 18 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 3.3 COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [13]

classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [8] as follows:

• BRW Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

• BRW Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

• BRW Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VG MRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation Page 19 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [8] and is 4. 7 for all cabinet types.

Page 20 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 4 Contact Device Evaluations Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program.

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [10], [11], and

[12].

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8]

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report.

Page 21 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 5 Conclusions 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS BRW has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [8].

The evaluation identified a total of 226 components that required evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, all of the devices have adequate seismic capacity for the reevaluated seismic hazard [4].

5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS No follow-up actions were identified.

Page 22 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No. : RS-16-174 6 References 1 NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations S0.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations S0.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." October 27, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility."' September 17, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 : Seismic for BRW dated March 31, 2014, ADAMS Accession Number ML14091AOOS 5 EPRI 1015109. "Program on Technology Innovation: Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to High-Frequency Vibratory Motions." October 2007 6 EPRI 1025287. "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7 EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015 9 EPRI NP-7147-SL. "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." August 1991 10 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 1, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", September 1993 11 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", April 1995 12 EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004-02. "Relay GERS Corrections." September 10, 2004 13 EPRI NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", 1990 14 NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (B. Hanson). "Braidwood Station, Unit 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Page 23 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (CAC NOS. MF3886 and MF3887)." January 22, 2016, ADAMS Accession Number ML16014A188 15 Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 51 Century, "The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident" July 12, 2011, ADAMS Accession Number ML111861807 16 NEI 12-06, Rev. 2. "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 17 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF02 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel Driven) lAFOlPB 18 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF02 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Feedwater Pump 2B (Diesel Driven) 2AF01PB 19 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF12 Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel-Driven) Engine Startup Panel lAFOlJ 20 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF12 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Pump 2B (Diesel-Driven) Engine Startup Panel 2AF01J 21 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RC14 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram-Loop lA, lB, lC and 1D Drain Line Valves 1RC8037A, B, C, and D (AOV) 22 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RC32 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Reactor Head Vent Valves 1Rc014A,B,C,D 23 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RC14 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram Loop 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D Drain Valves 2RC8037 A, B, C, and D (AOV) 24 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RC32 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Reactor Head Vent Valves 2RC014A,B,C,D 25 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RY17 Rev. W, Pressurizer Power Relief Valves 1RY455A and 1RY456; Pressurizer Relief Tank Primary Water Supply Isolation Valve 1RY8030; Pressurizer Relief Tank Drain Valve 1RY8031 26 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY17 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Valves 2RY4SSA &

2RY456,2RY80 27 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RY13 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Non-Safety Related (Division 11) 28 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RY14 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Non-Safety Related (Division 12) 29 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY13 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Safety Related and Non-Safety Related (Division 21) 30 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RY14 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Safety Related and Non-Safety Related (Division 22) 31 Braidwood Drawing M-62 Rev. BR, Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Unit 1 32 Braidwood Drawing M-137 Rev. BH, Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Unit 2 Page 24 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 33 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030RH04 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram RC Loop lA to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8701A and 1RH8701B 34 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030RH05 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram RC Loop lC to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 1RH8702A and 1RH8702B 35 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RH04 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram RC Loop 2A to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 2RH8701A and 2RH8701B 36 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030RH05 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram RC Loop 2C to RHR Pump Isolation Valves 2RH8702A and 2RH8702B 37 Braidwood Drawing M-68 Sheet lA Rev. C, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) Unit 1 38 Braidwood Drawing M-68 Sheet lB Rev. H, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) 39 Braidwood Drawing M-140 Sheet lA Rev. E, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) Unit 2 40 Braidwood Drawing M-140 Sheet lB Rev. G, Diagram of Process Sampling (Primary and Secondary) 41 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030PS03 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Press Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9350A and 1PS9350B; 1PS9351 42 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030PS06 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram-Cold Legs Loop 1, 2, 3 and 4 Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9358A, B, C and D (ADV) 43 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS03 Rev. G, Schematic Diagram Press Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 2PS9350A, 2PS9350B, 2PS9351A and 2PS9351B 44 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS06 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Cold Leg Loops 1, 2, 3 and 4 Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9358A, B, C, and D 45 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030PS01 Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Pressurizer Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 1PS9354A and B, 1PS9355A and B 46 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030PS02 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves -1PS9356A and B Accumulator Sample Line Isolation Valves 1PS9357A and B 47 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS01 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram-Pressurizer Steam and Liquid Sample Isolation Valves 2PS9354A and B, 2PS9355A and B 48 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030PS02 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram -Loop Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9356A and B Accumulator Sample Line Isolation Valves 2PS9357A and B

49 Braidwood Report, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)," Revision 15, January 2015 50 Braidwood Drawing 20E-0-4001 Rev. AD, Station One Line Diagram 51 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG01 Rev. AB, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 - ACB 1413 Page 25 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 52 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP23 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 142-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141-ACB 1412 53 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP25 Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 - ACB 1414 54 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG02 Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Feed TO 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 - ACB 1423 55 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP32 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 142-2 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 - ACB 1422 56 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030AP34 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Reserved Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 - ACB 1424 57 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG01 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241-ACB 2413 58 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP23 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 242-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 - ACB 2412 59 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP25 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141to4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241-ACB 2414 60 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG02 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 - ACB 2423 61 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP32 Rev. U, Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 242-2 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 -ACB 2422 62 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP34 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed from 4.16KV Switchgear Bus 142 to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 - ACB 2424 63 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG31 Rev. AP, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA Part 1 - CCRD 64 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG32 Rev. AJ, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA Part 2 - CCRD 65 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG33 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKA (Part 3) 66 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG35 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Generator Control lDGOlKA 67 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG36 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Generator and Engine Governor Control lDGOlKA 68 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG40 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Shutdown and Alarm System lDGOlKA 69 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DGS1 Rev. AP, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB Part 1 - CCRD 70 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG52 Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 18 Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB Part 2 - CCRD Page 26 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 71 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG53 Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Starting Sequence Control lDGOlKB (Part 3) 72 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DGSS Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Generator Control lDGOlKB 73 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG56 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Generator and Engine Governor Control lDGOlKB 74 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG60 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Shutdown and Alarm System lDGOlKB 75 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG31 Rev. AM, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA Part 1 76 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG32 Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA Part 2 77 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG33 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KA (Part 3.

78 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG35 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator Control 2DG01KA 79 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG36 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator and Engine Governor Control 2DG01KA 80 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG40 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Shutdown and Alarm System 2DG01KA 81 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG51 Rev. AL, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 1 82 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG52 Rev. AH, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 2 83 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG53 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB (Part 3) 84 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DGSS Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Generator Control 2DG01KB 85 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG56 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Generator and Engine Governor Control 2DG01KB 86 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG60 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Shutdown and Alarm System 2DG01KB (Part 2) 87 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG34 Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) lDGOlKA Part 4 88 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030DG54 Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) lDGOlKB Part 4 89 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG34 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Sequence Control (Description of Operation) 2DG01KA Part 4 Page 27 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 90 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG54 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Starting Sequence Control 2DG01KB Part 4 91 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG41 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Legends lDGOlKA 92 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG61 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Legends lDGOlKB 93 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG41 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Legends 2DG01KA 94 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG61 Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Legends 2DG01KB 95 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG44 Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Control Cabinet Switches Development lDGOlKA 96 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DG64 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Control Cabinet Switches Development lDGOlKB 97 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG44 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Control Cabinet Switches Development 2DG01KA 98 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DG64 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Control Cabinet Switches Development 2D01KB 99 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC01 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 1111DC03E 100 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC02 Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 1121DC04E 101 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030DC04 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Firing Amplifier and Miscellaneous Alarm Modules 125V DC and 2SOV DC Battery Chargers 102 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC01 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram 125V DC Battery Charger 2112DC03E 103 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC02 Rev. R, Schematic Diagram 12SV DC Battery Charger 212 2DC04E 104 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030DC04 Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Firing Amplifier and Miscellaneous Alarm Modules 125V DC and 250V DC Battery Chargers 105 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AF19 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram 32V DC Battery Charger lAFOlEA-1 and lAFOlEB-1 106 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AF19 Rev. E, Schematic Diagram 32V DC Battery Charger 2AF01EA-1 and 2AF01EB-1 107 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030IP01Sheet1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 1 108 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P01Sheet2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 2 Page 28 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 109 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4030IP01Sheet3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 3 110 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP01Sheet4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 111 (llPOSE) Part 4 111 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP02 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 1 112 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP02 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 2 113 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P02 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 3 114 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P02 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 112 (11P06E) Part 4 115 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP03 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 1 116 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 2 117 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 3 118 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P03 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 113 (11P07E) Part 4 119 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 1 120 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 2 121 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030IP04 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 3 122 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-40301P04 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114 (11P08E) Part 4 123 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP01Sheet1 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 1 124 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP01 Sheet 2 Rev. B, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 (21POSE) Part 2 125 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P01Sheet3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 3 126 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P01Sheet4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 211 {21POSE) Part 4 127 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 1 Page 29 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 128 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 2 129 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P02 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 3 130 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP02 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram lOKVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 212 (21P06E) Part 4 131 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P03 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 1 132 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP03 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 2 133 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P03 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 3 134 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP03 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 213 (21P07E) Part 4 135 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 1 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 1 136 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 2 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 2 137 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-40301P04 Sheet 3 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 3 138 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030IP04 Sheet 4 Rev. A, Schematic Diagram 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 214 (21P08E) Part 4 139 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lC Rev. BC, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 140 Braidwood Drawing M-50Sheet1D Rev. BD, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 141 Braidwood Drawing M-130 Sheet lA Rev. BN, Diagram of Diesel Oil and Fuel Oil Supply Unit 2 142 Braidwood Drawing M -130 Sheet lB Rev. BM, Diagram of Diesel Oil and Fuel Oil Supply Unit 2 143 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lA Rev. BA, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 144 Braidwood Drawing M-50 Sheet lB Rev. BB, Diagram of Diesel Fuel Oil Unit 1 145 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030D002 Rev. J 002, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps lDOOlPA and lDOOlPC 146 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030D003 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lB Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps lDOOlPB and lDOOlPD 147 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030D002 Rev. H 002, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 2D001PA and 2D001PC 148 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030D003 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 2D001PB and 2D001PD Page 30 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 149 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet lA Rev. BL, Diagram of Essential Service Water Units 1 and 2 150 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 2A Rev. AV, Diagram of Essential Service Water Units 1 and 2 151 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 3 Rev. BN, Diagram of Essential Service Water Unit 1 152 Braidwood Drawing M-42 Sheet 6 Rev. U, Diagram of Essential Service Water 153 Braidwood Drawing M-126 Sheet 1 Rev. BP, Diagram of Essential Service Water Unit 2 154 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX01 Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump lA lSXOlPA 155 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX02 Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump lB lSXOlPB 156 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX01 Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump 2A 2SX01PA 157 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX02 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump 2B 2SX01PB 158 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030SX17 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Gen lA and lB ESS Service Water Valves 1SX169A and 1SX169B 159 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030SX17 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A and 2B Essential Service Water Valves 2SX169A and 2SX169B 160 Braidwood Drawing M-97 Rev. Y, Diagram of Diesel Generator Rooms lA and lB Ventilation System 161 Braidwood Drawing M-98 Rev. Y, Diagram of Diesel Generator Rooms 2A and 2B Ventilation System 162 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD01 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation Fan lA lVDOlCA 163 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD02 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lB HVAC System Ventilation Fan lB lVDOlCB 164 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD03 Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms-Part I 165 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD04 Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part II 166 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD01 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation Fan 2A 2VD01CA 167 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD02 Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2B HVAC System Ventilation Fan 2B 2VD01CB 168 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD03 Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part I Page 31 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 169 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD04 Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A HVAC System Ventilation and Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Relays, Switches and Alarms Part II 170 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030VD07 Rev. K2, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA and lB HVAC System Exhaust Fans lA and lB -1VD03CA and 1VD03CB 171 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030VD07 Rev. L2, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A and 2B HVAC System Exhaust Fans 2A and 2B 2VD03CA and 2VD03CB 172 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4007A Rev. M, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 131X (lAPlOE) 173 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4007D Rev. P, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 132X (1AP12E) 174 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4007A Rev. K, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 231X (2AP10E) 175 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4007D Rev. 0, Key Diagram 480V ESF Substation Bus 232X 2AP12E 176 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4010A Rev. M, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 111 (lDCOSE) Part 1 177 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010B Rev. J, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Buslll {lDCOSE) Part 2 178 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010D Rev. L, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 112 (1DC06E) Part 1 179 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4010E Rev. I, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Busl12 (1DC06E) Part 2 180 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010A Rev. L, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211 (2DCOSE) Part 1 181 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010B Rev. I, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 211 (2DCOSE) Part 2 182 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010D Rev. K, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 212 {2DC06E) Part 1 183 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4010E Rev. H, Key Diagram 125V DC ESF Distribution Center Bus 212 (2DC06E) Part 2 184 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008A Rev. AF, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131Xl {1AP21E) Part 1 185 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4008B Rev. AD, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131Xl and 131X1A 1AP21E and 1AP21EA Part 2 186 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008J Rev. AJ, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132Xl (1AP23E) 187 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008L Rev. AP, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132X2 and 132X2A 1AP27E and 1AP27EA Page 32 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 188 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008Q Rev. Z, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 131X3 1AP22E 189 Braidwood Drawing 20E-l-4008Y Rev. AF, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 132X3 (1AP24E) 190 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008A Rev. R, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231Xl (2AP21E) Part 1 191 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008B Rev. R 02, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231Xl-A (2AP21E-A) Part 2 192 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008J Rev. AD, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232Xl (2AP23E) 193 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008L Rev. Al, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232X2 (2AP27E) and 232X2A (2AP27E-A) 194 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008Q Rev. Z, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 231X3 22AP22E 195 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4008Y Rev. V, Key Diagram 480V Auxiliary Building ESF MCC 232X3 (2AP24E) 196 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP27 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 141 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 131X -ACB 1415X 197 Braidwood Drawing 20E-1-4030AP36 Rev. H, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 142 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 132X - ACB 1425X 198 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP27 Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 241 Feed to 480V Auxiliary Transformer 231X - ACB 2415X 199 Braidwood Drawing 20E-2-4030AP36 Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF Switchgear Bus 242 Feed to 480V Auxiliary 200 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2, High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays 201 15C0347-RPT-001, Rev. 2, Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation Page 33 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 A Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation is extracted from Reference [200]. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [200] reference section shown on the following page.

Notes:

1. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per Ref. [200] reference section shown on the following page.

2. This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRI high-frequency guidance [8] and the flexible coping strategies guidance document NEI 12-06 [16] .

Page 34 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 32 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Stevemon & As'SOC'iates Check: MD 10/03/2016 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes. Guidance. and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015 .

1.2. EPRI 3002002997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014.

1.3. EPRI NP-7147-Sl, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", August 1991.

1.4. NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Rev. 2, December 2015, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."

1.5. EPRI NP-5223-Sl, Rev. 1, "Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant Equipment."

2. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission Documents 2.1. Braidwood Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Rev. 0, NRC Docket No. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Correspondence No. RS-14-064.

3. Station Documents 3.1. BRAIDWOOD-UFSAR, Rev.15 3.2. Calculation BYR08-091, Rev. 0, "Review of Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) Seismic Qualification Report No. ES-SR-08-106, Revision 0, For a Replacement Speed Circuit for the Auxiliary Feedwater Diesel Driven Pump at Byron Station."

3.3. DC-ST-04-BB, Rev. 2, "Development of Seismic Subsystem (or Equipment) Design Criteria (Horizontal and Vertical) and Response Spectra ."

3.4. Calculation SM-AF143, Rev. C, "Cales. For Aux Feed Pump (2)1B Diesel Engine Oil Pressure Switch."

3.5 . Calculation CQD-200156, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control and Protection System, Spec. No. F/L-2812."

3.6. Calculation EMD-020714, Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Qualification Report for the Aux.

Feedwater Diesel Drive and Control Panel (Safety-Related)."

3.7. Calculation BRW-05-0094-E, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification of ABB Protective Relays for the 480V, 4.16 kV and 6.9 kV Switchgear at Byron and Braidwood Stations. (WCAP-16451-P, Revision 01)."

3.8. Calculation 018815(EMD) (Wyle Report 44369-2), Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Qualification for Engine/Generator Panel of Cooper Energy Services."

3.9. Calculation 012617 (CQD), Rev. 0, "Review of Seismic Test Reports for various Control Components."

3.10. Calculation CQD-012527 (Wyle Report 44247-1), "Seismic Simulation Test Program on a 130-VDC Battery Charger."

3.11. Calculation CQD-200164 (Wyle Report 47993-1), "Seismic Qualification Test Report for Battery Chargers, OSX02EA-1 thru OSX02ED-1, l,2AF01EA-1, l,2AF01EB-1 (Model #32-50)."

3.12. Calculation CQD-007041, Rev. 0 & 1, "Seismic Qualification Review for HVAC Control Instrumentation ."

3.13. Not Used 3.14. Calculation CQD-007999, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification of Westinghouse 480 Volt Switchgear (1&2AP10E, 1&2AP12E, 1&2AP98E, 1&2AP99E)."

Page 35 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 33 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 St~nson & AssooatE5 Check: MD 10/03/2016

4. Station Drawing 4.1 . Drawing 20E-1-4030AF12, Rev. AE, "Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lB (Diesel Driven) Engine Startup Panel lAFOlJ."

4.2. Drawing 20E-1-4468, Rev. V, "Elevation Feedwater Pump lB Startup Panel lAFOlJ."

4.3. Drawing 20E-2-4030AF12, Rev. AC, "Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Building Pump 2B (Diesel-Driven) Engine Startup Panel 2AF01J ."

4.4. Drawing 20E-2-4468, Rev. P, "Elevation Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Startup Panel 2AF01J."

4.5. Drawing 20E-1-4031AF14, Rev. D, "Loop Schematic Diagram Aux. Feedwater Pump Suction Press Cab. 1PA34J."

4.6. Drawing 20E-2-4031AF14, Rev. E, "Loop Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure Cabinet 2PA34J."

4.7. Drawing 20E-1-4030DG01, Rev. AB, " Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator lA Feed to 4.16kV ESF SWGR. BUS 141 ACB #1413."

4.8. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP23, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram System Auxil iary Transformer 142-1 Feed to 4.16KV ESF Switchgear BUS 141 - ACB 1412."

4.9. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP25, Rev. AA, "Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed From 4.16KV ESF SWGR. BUS 241 To 4.16KV ESF SWGR. BUS 141 - ACB #1414."

4.10. Drawing 20E-2-4030DG01, Rev. V, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Feed to 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 ACB #2413."

4.11. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP23, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram System Auxiliary Transformer 242-1 Feed to 4160V ESF Switchgear BUS 241 ACB #2412."

4.12. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP25, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram Reserve Feed From 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 141 TO 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 ACB #2414."

4.13. Not Used 4.14. Not Used 4.15. Drawing 20E-1-4030SX02, Rev. V, "Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump l B lSXOlPB."

4.16. Drawing 20E-1-4030VD07, Rev. K, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room lA & lB HVAC System Exhaust Fans lA & lB 1VD03CA & B."

4.17. Drawing 20E-2-4030VD07, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room 2A & 2B HVAC System Exhaust Fans 2A & 2B 2VD03CA & 2VD03CB."

4.18. Drawing 20E-1-4030AP27, Rev. J, "Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 141 Feed to 480V. Auxiliary Transformer 131X -ACB 1415X."

4.19. Drawing 20E-2-4030AP27, Rev. J, " Schematic Diagram 4.16KV ESF SWGR BUS 241 Feed to 480V. Auxiliary Transformer 231X - ACB 2415X."

5. S&A Documents 5.1. 15C0347-RPT-001, Rev. 2, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

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15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 34 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 StCYenson & lwocbtes Check: MD 10/03/2016

6. Miscellaneous Documents 6.1. Test Report ES-1000, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Report On Agastat E7000 Series Timing Relays." (See Attachment El 6.2. Report 60967, Rev. 0, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Report for a Mlcroswitch, P/N BZLN-LH ." (See Attachment G) 6.3. Solon Manufacturing Company Catalog, "Model Series 7PS Pressure Switch Diaphragm Sensing Element." (See Attachment H) 6.4. Ashcroft Data Sheet, "B Series Switches - Pressure, Differential Pressure & Hydraulics." (See Attachment J) 7 INPUTS Inputs are provided as necessary within Section 8 of this calculation.

Page 37 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No. : 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 36 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology frcm Ref. 1.1.

Sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is presented belCMt. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation. A plot of GMRS can be found in Attachment C of this calculation.

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS S~MRS  := 0.409g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation):

Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Grade Elevation (Ref. 3.1): Elgrade := 400ft Per Ref. 3.1, Table 3.7-3, the embedment depth of the foundation varies between O' to 70'. Conservati11ely use 70' as the Auxiliary Building embedment depth.

Auxiliary Building Embedment Depth embedab := 70ft (Ref. 3.1, Table 3.7-3)

Foundation Elevation (Auxiliary Building): Elfound.ab := ELgrade - embedab = 330.00*ft Relay floor elevation (Ref. 4.1): El relay := 383ft Relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are both locat ed in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 383'-0" .

Distance between relay floor and foundation: hrelay := Elrelay- Eltound.ab = 53.00 *ft Page 38 of 73

1SC0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By:

Check:

FG MD Sheet 37 of 44 10/03/2016 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor.

2.1 - 1.2 1 Slope of amplification factor line, mh := = 0.0225 *-

Oft < hrelay < 40ft 40ft - Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line:

Horizontal in-structure amplification factor:

AFsH{hrelay) := I (mh*hrelay + bh) 2.1 otherwise if hrelay !> 40ft Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay.

Type of cabinet (per Ref. 4.1) cab := "Control Cabinet" (enter "MCC', "Switchgear", "Control cabinet", or "Rigid"):

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc.h(cab) := 3.6 if cab= "MCC" (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13):

7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab = "Rigid" AFc.h(cab) = 4.5 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays.

Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-la and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

Note that the horizontal seismic demand is same for both re lay components 1AF01J-K4 and 1AF01J-K10.

Page 39 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 38 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Stevenson & Associates Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS S~MRS = 0.409*g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation).

PGAGMRS := 0.208g Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (V, 30 ) from Ref. 1.1, p. 3-5 and Attachment D.

(30m)

Shear Wave Velocity:

Vs30 = :E ( di.)

vs, where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft)

Vsi: Shear w ave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Attachment D, the sum of th ickness of the layer over shea r wave velocity of the layer is 0.03125 sec.

30m ft Shear Wave Velocity: 3150 Vs 3o := 0.03125sec = *~

Page 40 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 39 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand !cont'd)

Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.208g and shear wave velocity of 3150ft/sec at Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz by the correspondin g horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS.

See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between lSHz and 40Hz.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAvGM RSl between frequencies of lSHz and 40Hz. (By inspection of Attachment B, the SAvGMRs occurs at lSHz.)

V/H ratio at lSHz VH := 0.68 (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak HGMRS := 0.409g vertical GMRS (at lSHz)

(See Attachment B of this calculation):

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between SAVGMRS := VH

• HGMRS = 0 .278 *g (at 15 Hz) 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is provided in Attachment C of this calculation.

Page41of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,R ev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By:

Check:

FG MD Sheet 40 of 44 10/03/2016 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the dstance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Distance between relay floor and foundation hrelay = 53 .00 *ft (see Sect. 8. 2.1 of this calculation):

Work the distance between the relay floor a rd foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor.

2.7 - 1.0 1 Slope of amplification factor line: mv := = 0.017 *-

lOOft - Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line: bv := 1.0 Vertical in-structure amplification factor:

The sample relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are mounted within host lAFOlJ. Therefore, the vertical in-cabinet amplification for sample relay components is 4. 7 per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-3.

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor: AFc.v := 4.7 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration by the vertical In-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relay.

Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-lb and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

ICRSc.v := AFsv*AFc.v*SAvGMRS = 2.485

• g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay components 1AF01J-K4 ard 1AF01J-K10.

Page42 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 41 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Stevenson & Associates Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO relay components are presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic capacities for all of the Ref. 1.1 subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.3.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS). Per Ref. 1.1, Sect. 4. 5. 2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency GERS capacity into the high frequency range to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz. Therefore, if the high frequency capacity was not available for a component, a SAT value equal to the GERS spectral acceleration from 4 to 16 Hz could be used.

For the relay component 1AF01J-K4 (Model#: 70120EL) and lAFOlJ-KlO (Model#: KHS17Dll), the GERS spectral acceleration from Ref. 1.3 is used as the seismic test capacity.

12.5) 1AF01J-K4 (Ref. 1.3, Page B-8) )

Seismic test capacity (SA*): SA':= ( 10 g ( lAFOlJ-KlO (Ref. 1.3, Page B-29) 8.3.2 Effective Spectral Test Capacity GERS spectral acceleration for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is used as the seismic test capacity.

Therefore for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO there is no spectral acceleration increase.

1AF01J-K4 )

Effective spectral test capacity SA *= SA'1) = (12.50) *g (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16): T . ( SA'2 10.00 ( lAFOlJ-KlO Page43 of73

1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA Stt.....em.on & Assodates S&A Cale. No.: 1SC0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By:

Check:

FG MD Sheet 42 of 44 10/03/2016 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay.

The knockdown factor for relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is obtained per Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2.

1AF01J-K4 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) )

Seismic capacity knockd<Mtn factor:

( lAFOlJ-KlO (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) 8.3.4 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not.

Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bdted together in a row, mrunted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2.

The sample relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are mounted within host lAFOlJ. Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-18, conservatively take the FMs value as 1.0.

Single-axis correction factor FMS := 1.0 (Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17to4-18):

Page 44 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 43 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 StemlSOn & As.sodates Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleratioo Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5.

Effective wide-band component capacity 1AF01J-K4 )

TRS := -SAT) *FMS = (8.333) *g acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5) ( Fk ( lAFOlJ-KlO 6.667 8.4 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4.1 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleratioo Per a review of the capacity generation methodologies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 relay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% probabilityoffailure (C1"' Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability offailure (C1Cl%* Ref. 1.4).

Per Ref. 1.4, App. H, Table H.1, use the Cul% vs. C1" ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays.

Cul% vs. C1" ratio c10 := 1.36 Effective wide -band component capacity 11.333 ) 1AF01J-K4 )

TRS 14 := TRS

• C10 = *g acceleration (Ref. 1.4, App. H, Sect. H.5) . ( 9.067 ( lAFOlJ-KlO Page 45 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.l Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 S&A Cale. No.: 15C0347-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 44 of 44

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: FG 10/03/2016 Ste~n&As:\oc.iates Check: MD 10/03/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.S Relay (Ref. l.l)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.1 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): TRS ( 2.156) > 1.0, O.K. 1AF01J-K4 )

ICRSc.h = 1.725 > 1.0, O.K. ( lAFOlJ-KlO Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): TRS ( 3.354) > 1.0, O.K. 1AF01J-K4 )

ICRSc.v = 2.683 > 1.0, O.K. ( lAFOlJ-KlO Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion. The sample relays are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.1 functions.

8.6 Relay (Ref. 1.4)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.4 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

TRSi.4 ( 2.932) > 1.0, O.K. 1AF01J-K4 )

ICRSc.h = 2.346 > 1.0, O.K. ( lAFOlJ-KlO Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

TRSl.4 ( 4.561 ) > 1.0, O.K. 1AF01J-K4 )

ICRSc.v = 3.649 > 1.0, O.K. ( lAFOlJ-KlO Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1AF01J-K4 and lAFOlJ-KlO are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.4 functions.

Page46 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Evaluation 10 Type Basis for System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result lAFOlJ- Core Low Lube Oil Control Auxiliary 1 1 Control Relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOlJ 383 GERS Cap> Dem KlO Cooling Pressure Relay Cabinet Building lAFOlJ- Core Low Oil Pressure Control Auxiliary EPRIHF 2 1 Control Relay Agastat 70220C lAFOlJ 383 Cap> Dem Kll Cooling Time Delay Relay Cabinet Building Test Core Overcrank Timer Control Auxiliary 3 1 1AF01J-K4 Control Relay Agastat 70120EL lAFOlJ 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Relay Cabinet Building Core Control Auxiliary 4 1 1AF01J* K7 Control Relay Overcrank relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOlJ 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building Core High water Control Auxiliary s 1 1AF01J-K8 Control Relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOlJ 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling temperature relay Cabinet Building Core Control Auxiliary 6 1 1AF01J*K9 Control Relay Overspeed relay P&B KHS-17Dll lAFOU 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building lSS-Core Control Auxiliary BRW 7 1 AF8002 Process Switch Speed switch Dyna Ico SST-2400A lAFOlJ 383 Cap> Dem 115111 Cooling Cabinet Building Report lTSH- High water Core Control Auxiliary BRW 8 1 AF147 Process Switch temperature Square D 902S-BCW-32 lAFOlPB 383 Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building Report "510 11 switch AC/DC 486-1413 Power Circuit Breaker Auxiliary 9 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse WL lAPOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Building lAPOSEF System AC/DC 486-1412 Power Circuit Breaker Auxiliary 10 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse WL lAPOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Building lAPOSER System AC/DC PR30A-451 Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 11 1 @ Westinghouse C0-7 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report lAPOSER System Page47 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 10 Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC PR30C-451 Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 12 1 @ Westinghouse C0-7 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Build ing Report lAPOSER System AC/DC PR31-451N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 13 1 @ Westinghouse C0-6 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Building Report 1AP05ER System AC/DC 486-1414X Power Circuit Breaker Auxilia ry 14 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse WL 1AP05E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Building 1AP05EP System AC/DC PR27A-451 Protective Power Phase A Auxilia ry BRW 15 1 @ Westinghouse C0-7 1AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report 1AP05EP System AC/DC PR27C-4Sl Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 16 1 @ Westinghouse C0-7 1AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Bu ilding Report 1AP05EP System AC/DC PR28-451N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 17 1 @ Westinghouse C0-6 1AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Building Report 1AP05EP System AC/DC 62CL@ National Power Cranking limit 812-1-6 Control Auxilia ry BRW 18 1 Control Relay Technical 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 1PL07J Support Time Delay Relay OD cabinet Building Report System System AC/DC Incomplete 48@ Power Control Auxilia ry BRW 19 1 Control Relay Starting Sequence Agastat GPDR-C740 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 1PL07J Support Ca binet Building Report Relay System AC/DC EGPDR-86E@ Power Engine Shutdown Agastat Cap> Dem 20 1 Control Relay C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 1PL07J Support 1PL07J 401 Relay Ca binet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Engine Lube Oil EGPDR-63QELX@ Power Low Pressure Agastat Cap> Dem 21 1 Control Relay C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 1PL07J 1PL07J 401 Support Shutdown ca binet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Page48 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Turbo Low Lube EGPDR-63QTLX@ Power Oil Pressure Ag astat Cap> Dem 22 1 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1Pl07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agast at GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Main and EGPDR-AC/DC Connecting Rod Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 26MBHTX Power High Bearing Control Auxilia ry BRW 23 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401

@ 1PL07J Support Temperature Ca binet Building Report System Shutdown Ag ast at GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Thrust 38TBFX@ Power Bearing Failure Control Auxiliary BRW 24 1 Control Relay Agast at GPDR-C740 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 1Pl07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Jacket Water High EGPDR-26JWSX@ Power Temperature Agastat Cap> Dem 25 C2017-004 Cont rol Auxiliary BRW 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1Pl07J Support Shutdown Ca binet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Crankcase High Agastat Cap>Dem 63CX@ Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 26 1 Cont rol Relay Pressure Repeater 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Ca binet Building Report Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem System AC/DC EGPDR-86G@ Power Generator Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 27 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1Pl07J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-SlX@ Protective Power Generator Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 28 1 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Ca binet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Generator Neutral Agastat Cap> Dem 59GX@ Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 29 1 Control Relay Ground Voltage 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Ca binet Building Report Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem System AC/DC 40X@ Power Loss of Field Control Auxiliary BRW 30 1 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 1Pl07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Page 49 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-32X@ Power Reverse Power Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 31 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agast at GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-81UX@ Power Under Frequency Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 32 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87GlX@ Power Differential Agastat Auxiliary Cap> Dem C20ff004 Control BRW 33 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G2X@ Power Differential Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 34 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12Xl@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 3S 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12X2@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxilia ry BRW 36 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-86S2@ Power Unit Shutdown Agastat Cap> Dem 37 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 1 Control Relay 1PL07J 401 1PL07J Support Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary BRW 38 1 Process Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 lDGOlKA 401 Cap> Dem DG108A Support Switch Generator Building Report System AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 39 1 ProcessSwitch Honeywell BZLN-LH 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem DG2S1A Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 40 1 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 1PL07J 401 Cap> Dem DG2S2A Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System Page 50 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DGlA Circuit S2@ Medium Circuit Power Auxiliary EPRIHF 41 1 Breaker (ACB Westinghouse SO DHP 3SO lAPOSE Switchgea r 426 Cap> Dem lAPOSEF Breaker Support Building Test 1413)

System AC/DC Transformer 131X S2@ Medium Circuit Power Primary Circuit Auxiliary EPRIHF 42 1 Westinghouse SODHP 3SO lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPOSEU Breaker Support Breaker (ACB Building Test System 141SX)

AC/DC S2@ Medium Circuit Power ESWPump lA Auxiliary EPRIHF 43 1 Westinghouse SO DHP 3SO 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPOSEB Breaker Support Circuit Breaker Building Test System AC/DC MCC 131Xl S2@ Low Circuit Power Auxiliary BRW 44 1 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPlOEF Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC DG Room Vent S2@ Low Circuit Power Auxiliary BRW 4S 1 Fan lA Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPlOEJ Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC Battery Charger S2@ Low Circuit Power Auxiliary BRW 46 1 111 Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPlOEL Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC MCC 131X3 S2@ Low Circuit Power Auxiliary BRW 47 1 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem lAPlOEQ Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC 486-141SX Power Circuit Breaker S03A804G01 Auxiliary 48 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse lAPOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building lAPOSEU System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PR37A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 49 1 4S0/4Sl@ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSAOS Building Report Cap> Dem lAPOSEU System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PR37B-Protective Power Phase B Auxiliary BRW so 1 4S0/4Sl@

Relay Support Overcurrent Relay lAPOSE Switchgear Building 426 Report lAPOSEU Westinghouse 14S6COSAOS Cap> Dem System Page 51of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluatlon No. Unit Building Elev. Evaluation ID Type System Basis for Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PR37C-Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 51 1 450/451@ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSAOS Building Report Cap> Dem lAPOSEU System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap>Dem PR38-450N Protective Power Neutral Auxiliary BRW 52 1 @ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 Building Report Cap> Dem lAPOSEU System AC/DC PR1-351N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 53 1 @ Westinghouse C0-6 lAPlOE Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Building Report lAPlOEA System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR3A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 54 1 450/451@ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP05EB System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR3C-Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 55 1 450/451@ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap> Dem lAPOSEB System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR4-4SON Protective Power Ground Fault Auxilia ry BRW 56 1 @ lAPOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 Build ing Report Cap> Dem lAPOSEB System AC/DC Low Suction SXlAX@ Protective Power Auxilia ry 57 1 Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 lAPOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem lAPOSEB Relay Support Building Delay Relay System AC/DC High DG 1A Diesel lPDS- Power Auxilia ry 58 1 Process Switch Exhaust Fan lA Solon 7PS/7P2A 1VD03CA Generator 401 GERS Cap> Dem VD103 Support Building Delta Pressure Vent Fan System AC/DC 1DC03E- Protective Power Battery Auxilia ry BRW 59 1 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 1DC03E 451 Cap> Dem DSH-Kl Relay Support Charger Building Report Svstem AC/DC 486-1423 Power Circuit Breaker 656A830G01 Auxilia ry 60 l @ Control Relay Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building 1AP06EF System Page 52 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC 656A830G01 486-1422 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker TypeWL Auxiliary 61 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay S01A817G01 Building lAPOGES Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC PR33A-451 Protective Power Phase A 1456COSA09, Auxiliary BRW 62 1 @ Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report lAPOGES System AC/DC PR33C-451 Protective Power Phase C 1456COSA09, Auxiliary BRW 63 1 @ Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Build ing Report lAPOGES System AC/DC PR34-451N Protective Power Ground Fault 1321D79A02, Auxiliary BRW 64 1 @ Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay C0-6 Building Report lAPOGES System AC/DC 656A830G01 486-1424X Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker TypeWL Auxilia ry 65 1 @ Control Relay Westinghou se lAPOGE Switchgear 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay 501A817G01 Building lAPOGEQ System Cap> Dem TypeWL AC/DC PR30A-451 Protective Power Phase A 1456COSA09, Auxiliary BRW 66 1 @ Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report lAPOGEQ System AC/DC PR30C-451 Protective Power Phasec 1456COSA09, Auxiliary BRW 67 1 @ Westinghouse lAPOGE Switchgea r 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report lAPOGEQ System AC/DC PR31*4S1N Protective Power Ground Fault 14S6COSA08, Auxilia ry BRW 68 1 @ Westinghouse 1AP06E Sw itchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay C0-6 Building Report lAPOGEQ System AC/DC 62CL@ National Power Cranking Limit 812-1-6 Cont rol Auxiliary BRW 69 1 Control Relay Technical lPLOBJ 401 Cap> Dem lPLOBJ Support Time Delay Relay OD ca binet Building Report System System Page 53 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit BuDding Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-Incomplete Agastat lPLOSJ Cap>Dem 48@ Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 70 1 Control Relay Starting Sequence 401 lPLOSJ Support Cabinet Building Report Relay Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem System AC/DC EGPDR*

86E@ Power Engine Shutdown Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem 71 1 Control Relay C2017*004 Control Auxiliary BRW lPLOSJ 401 Support Relay cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Engine Lube Oil EGPDR-63QELX@ Power Low Pressure Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem 72 1 Control Relay C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW lPLOSJ 401 Support Shutdown cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR*C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Turbo Low Lube EGPDR-63QTLX@ Power Oil Pressure Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem 73 1 C2017-004 Co nt rol Auxiliary BRW Cont rol Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown ca binet Build ing Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Main and EGPDR-AC/DC Connecting Rod Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem C2017-004 26MBHTX Power High Bearing Control Auxiliary BRW 74 1 Control Relay 401

@ lPLOSJ Support Temperature ca binet Building Report System Shutdown Agast at GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Thrust EGPDR-38TBFX@ Power Bearing Failure Agastat 1PL08J Cap> Dem 75 1 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown ca binet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Jacket Water High EGPDR-26JWSX@ Power Temperature Agastat lPLOSJ Control BRW Cap> Dem 76 C2017*004 Auxiliary 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Crankcase High Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem 63CX@ Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 77 1 Control Relay Pressure Repeater 401 lPLOSJ Support cabinet Building Report Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem System AC/DC EGPDR*

Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem 86G@ Power Generator C2017-004 Cont rol Auxiliary BRW 78 1 Control Relay 401 1PL08J Support Shutdown Relay ca binet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Page 54 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-SlX@ Protective Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power Generator C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 79 1 401 lPLOSJ Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Cabinet Bu ilding Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-Generator Neutral Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem S9GX@ Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 80 1 Control Relay Ground Voltage 401 1PL08J Support Cabinet Building Report Auxiliary Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem System AC/DC EGPDR-40X@ Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power Loss of Field C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 81 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-32X@ Power Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Reverse Power C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 82 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-81UX@ Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem Power Under Frequency C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 83 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G1X@ Power Differential Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 84 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown Cabinet Bu ilding Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G2X@ Power Differential Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxilia ry BRW 8S 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12Xl@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat lPLOSJ Cap> Dem C2017-004 Control Auxilia ry BRW 86 1 Control Relay 401 lPLOSJ Support Shutdown Relay Ca binet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12X2@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem 87 1 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay lPLOSJ 401 1PL08J Support Shutdown Relay Ca binet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC 86S2@ Power Unit Shutdown Control Auxilia ry BRW 88 1 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 lPLOSJ 401 Cap> Dem lPLOSJ Support Relay Ca binet Building Report System Page 55 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Evaluation ID Type System Function Basis for Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary BRW 89 1 Process Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 lDGOlKB 401 Cap> Dem DG108B Support Switch Generator Building Report System AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 90 1 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH lPLOBJ 401 Cap> Dem DG251B Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC lPS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 91 1 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 1PL08J 401 Cap> Dem DG252B Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Medium DG lB Circuit 52@ Power Auxiliary EPRIHF 92 1 Voltage Circuit Breaker (ACB Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP06EF Support Building Test Breaker 1423)

System AC/DC Transformer 132X Medium 52@ Power Primary Circuit Auxiliary EPRIHF 93 1 Voltage Circuit Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP06EP Support Breaker (ACB Building Test Breaker System 1425X)

AC/DC Medium 52@ Power ESW Pump lB Auxiliary EPRIHF 94 1 Voltage Circuit Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP06EB Support Circuit Breaker Building Test Breaker System AC/DC MCC 132X3 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 95 1 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP12EC Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC MCC 132Xl 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 96 1 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP12EF Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC MCC 132X2 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxilia ry BRW 97 1 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP12EG Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker Svstem AC/DC DG Room Vent 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxilia ry BRW 98 1 Fan lB Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP12EJ Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System Page 56 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev.

ID Type System Basis for Evaluation Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC Battery Charger S2@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 99 1 112 Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 1AP12EL Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC 486*142SX Power Circuit Breaker S03A804G01 Auxiliary 100 1 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 1AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building 1AP06EP System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem PR28A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 101 1 4S0/451@ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EP System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem PR28B-Protective Power Phase B Auxiliary BRW 102 1 450/451@ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EP System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9 Cap> Dem PR28C-Protective Power PhaseC Auxiliary BRW 103 1 450/451@ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA05 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EP Svstem AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR29-450N Protective Power Neutral Auxiliary BRW 104 1 @ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EP System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-6 Cap> Dem PR1-351N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxilia ry BRW 105 1 @ 1AP12E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA08 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP12EA System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR4A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 106 1 450/451@ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap>Dem 1AP06EB System AC/DC Cap> Dem PR4C-Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 107 1 450/4Sl@ Westinghouse CO-SA 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EB System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PRS-Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 108 1 450/451@ 1AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Relay Westinghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> Dem 1AP06EB System Page 57 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Low Suction SXlBX@ Power Auxiliary 109 1 Control Relay Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 1AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem 1AP06EB Support Building Delay Relay System AC/DC High DG lB Diesel lPDS- Power Auxiliary 110 1 Process Switch Exhaust Fan lB Solon 7PS/7P2A 1VD03CB Generator 401 GERS Cap> Dem VD105 Support Building Delta Pressure Vent Fan System AC/DC 1DC04E- Protective Power Battery Auxiliary BRW 111 1 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 1DC04E 451 Cap> Dem DSH-Kl Relay Support Charger Building Report System AC/DC lAFOlEA- Protective Power lAFOlEA- Battery Auxiliary BRW 112 1 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 386.17 Cap> Dem 1-DSH-Kl Relay Support 1 Charger Building Report System AC/DC lAFOlEB- Protective Power lAFOlEB- Battery Auxiliary BRW 113 1 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 389.42 Cap> Dem 1-DSH-Kl Relay Support 1 Charger Building Report System 2AF01J - Core Low Lube Oil Control Auxiliary 114 2 Control Relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J 383 GERS Cap> Dem KlO Cooling Pressure Relay Cabinet Building 2AF01J* Core Low Oil Pressure Control Auxiliary EPRIHF 115 2 Control Relay Agastat 70220C 2AF01J 383 Cap> Dem Kll Cooling Time Delay Relay cabinet Building Test Core Overcrank Timer Control Auxiliary 116 2 2AF01J-K4 Control Relay Agastat 70120EL 2AF01J 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Relay Cabinet Building Core Control Auxiliary 117 2 2AF01J-K7 Control Relay Overcrank relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J 383 GERS Cap>Dem Cooling Cabinet Building Core High water Control Auxiliary 118 2 2AF01J-K8 Control Relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling temperature relay Cabinet Building Core Control Auxiliary 119 2 2AF01J-K9 Control Relay Overspeed relay P&B KHS-17Dll 2AF01J 383 GERS Cap> Dem Cooling Cabinet Building 2SS-Core Control Auxiliary BRW 120 2 AF8002 Process Switch Speed switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2AF01J 383 Cap> Dem 0 Cooling cabinet Building Report 51" 2TSH- High water Core Control Auxiliary BRW 121 2 AF147 Process Switch temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 2AF01PB 383 Cap> Dem Cooling cabinet Building Report "510 11 switch Page 58 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 486-2413 Power Circuit Breaker Auxiliary 122 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse WL 2APOSES Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Building 2APOSES System AC/DC 486-2412 Power Circuit Breaker Auxiliary 123 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse WL 2APOSEG Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay Building 2APOSEG System AC/DC PR9A-451 Protective Power Phase A Auxilia ry BRW 124 2 @ Westinghouse C0-7 2APOSEG Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report 2APOSEG System AC/DC PR9C-451 Protective Power Phase C Auxilia ry BRW 125 2 @ Westinghouse C0-7 2APOSEG Switchgea r 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report 2APOSEG System AC/DC PR10-451N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 126 2 @ Westinghouse C0-6 2AP05EG Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Building Report 2AP05EG System AC/DC 486-2414 Power Circuit Breaker Auxilia ry 127 2 Control Relay Westinghouse WL 2AP05EJ Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem

@2AP05EJ Support Lockout Relay Build ing System AC/DC PR13A-451 Protective Power Phase A Auxilia ry BRW 128 2 Westinghouse C0-7 2AP05EJ Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem

@2AP05EJ Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report System AC/DC PR13C-451 Protective Power Phase C Auxilia ry BRW 129 2 West inghouse C0-7 2AP05EJ Switchgear 426 Cap>Dem

@2AP05EJ Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report System AC/DC PR14-451N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 130 2 West inghouse C0-6 2AP05EJ Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem

@ 2AP05EJ Relay Support Relay Bu ilding Report Svstem AC/DC Nat ional 62CL@ Power Cranking Limit 812-1-6 Control Auxiliary BRW 131 2 Control Relay Technica l 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Time Delay Relay OD Cabinet Building Report System System Page 59 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Incomplete 48@ Power Control Auxiliary BRW 132 2 Control Relay Starting Sequence Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Cabinet Building Report Relay System AC/DC 86E@ Power Engine Shutdown Control Auxiliary BRW 133 2 Control Relay Agast at GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Relay Ca binet Building Report System AC/DC Engine Lube Oil 63QELX@ Power Low Pressure Control Auxiliary BRW 134 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Low Lube 63QTLX@ Power Oil Pressure Control Auxilia ry BRW 135 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2Pl07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Main and EGPDR-Agastat Cap> Dem AC/DC Connecting Rod C2017-004 26MBHTX Power High Bearing Control Auxiliary BRW 136 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 401

@ 2PL07J Support Temperature Cabinet Building Report Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem System Shutdown Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Thrust 38TBFX@ Power Bearing Failure Control Auxiliary BRW 137 2 Control Relay Agast at GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Jacket Water High EGPDR-26JWSX@ Agastat Cap> Dem Power Temperature C2017-004 Cont rol Auxilia ry BRW 138 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 401 2PL07J Support Shutdown Ca binet Building Report Aga stat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem System Repeater Relay AC/DC Crankcase High 63CX@ Power Control Auxiliary BRW 139 2 Control Relay Pressure Repea t er Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Cabinet Building Repo rt Relay System AC/DC 86G@ Power Generator Cont rol Auxiliary BRW 140 2 Control Relay Agast at GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Shutdown Relay Ca binet Building Report System Page 60 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC SlX@ Protective Power Generator Control Auxiliary BRW 141 2 Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator Neutral 59GX@ Power Control Auxiliary BRW 142 2 Control Relay Ground Voltage Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Cabinet Building Report Auxiliary Relay System AC/DC 40X@ Power Loss of Field Control Auxiliary BRW 143 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 32X@ Power Reverse Power Control Auxiliary BRW 144 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 81UX@ Power Under Frequency Control Auxiliary BRW 145 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87GlX@ Power Differentia I Agastat Cap> Dem 146 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 2 Control Relay 2PL07J 401 2PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G2X@ Power Differentia I Agastat Cap> Dem 147 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL07J 401 2PL07J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12Xl@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem 148 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL07J 401 2PL07J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12X2@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem 149 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL07J 401 2PL07J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC 86S2@ Power Unit Shutdown Control Auxiliary BRW 150 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL07J Support Relay Cabinet Building Report System Page61 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary BRW 151 2 Process Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 2DG01KA 401 Cap> Dem DG108A Support Switch Generator Building Report System AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 152 2 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 2Pl07J 401 Cap> Dem DG251A Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Ove rspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 153 2 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 2PL07J 401 Cap> Dem DG252A Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC M edium DG2A Circuit 52@ Power Auxiliary EPRIHF 154 2 Voltage Circuit Breaker (ACB Westinghouse 50DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP05ES Support Building Test Breaker 2413)

System AC/DC Transform er 231X M edium 52@ Power Primary Circuit Auxiliary EPRIHF 155 2 Voltage Circu it Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP05ED Support Breaker (ACB Building Test Breaker System 2415X)

AC/DC Medium 52@ Power ESWPum p2A Auxiliary EPRIHF 156 2 Voltage Circuit Westinghouse 50 DHP 350 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP05EW Support Circuit Breaker Building Test Breaker System AC/DC MCC 231Xl 52@ low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 157 2 Feeder Circuit West inghouse OS 206 2AP10E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP10EF Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC DG Room Vent 52@ low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 158 2 Fan 2A Circuit West inghouse DS206 2AP10E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP10EJ Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC Battery Charger 52@ low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 159 2 211 Circuit West inghouse DS206 2AP10E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP10EL Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC MCC231X3 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 160 2 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse DS206 2AP10E Sw itchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP10EQ Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System Page 62 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Evaluation ID Type System Basis for Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 486-241SX Power Circuit Breaker S03A804G01 Auxiliary 161 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 2APOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Bu ilding 2APOSEO System AC/DC PR3A-Protective Power Phase A Auxilia ry BRW 162 2 450/451@ Westinghouse DHP 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report 2AP05EO System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PR3B-Protective Power Phase B Auxilia ry BRW 163 2 450/451@ 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 14S6C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem 2APOSED System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PR3C-Protective Power Phase C Auxilia ry BRW 164 2 450/4Sl@ 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 14S6C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem 2APOSEO System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR4-450N Protective Power Neutral Auxilia ry BRW 16S 2 @ 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> Dem 2APOSEO System AC/DC PR1-351N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 166 2 @ Westinghouse C0-6 2AP10E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Building Report 2AP10EA System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR36A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 167 2 4S0/451@ 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A04 Building Report Cap> Dem 2APOSEW System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR36C-Protective Power Phase C Auxiliary BRW 168 2 4S0/4Sl@ 2APOSE Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A04 Building Report Cap> Dem 2APOSEW System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR37-4SON Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 169 2 @ 2AP05E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Relay Westinghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> Dem 2AP05EW System AC/DC Low Suction SXlAX@ Power Auxiliary 170 2 Control Relay Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 2APOSE Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem 2AP05EW Support Build ing Delay Relay System Page63 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC High DG 2A Diesel 2PDS- Power Auxiliary 171 2 Process Switch Exhaust Fan 2A Solon 7PS/7P2A 2VD03CA Generator 401 GERS Cap> Dem VD103 Support Build ing Delta Pressure Vent Fan System AC/DC 2DC03E- Protective Power Battery Auxiliary BRW 172 2 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 2DC03E 451 Cap> Dem DSH-Kl Relay Support Charger Building Report System AC/DC 486-2423 Power Circuit Breaker 656A830G01 Auxiliary 173 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building 2AP06ER System AC/DC 656A830G01 486-2422 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker TypeWL Auxiliary 174 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgea r 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay 501A817G01 Bu ilding 2AP06EF Cap> Dem System TypeWL AC/DC PR7A*451 Protective Power Phase A 1456C05A09, Auxiliary BRW 175 2 @ Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report 2AP06EF System AC/DC PR7C-451 Protective Power Phase C 1456C05A09, Auxiliary BRW 176 2 @ Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Building Report 2AP06EF System AC/DC PR8-451N Prot ective Power Ground Fault 1456C05A08, Auxiliary BRW 177 2 @ Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgea r 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay C0-6 Building Report 2AP06EF System AC/DC 656A830G01 486-2424 Cap> Dem Power Circuit Breaker TypeWL Auxiliary 178 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 2AP06E Sw itchgear 426 GERS Support Lockout Relay S01A817G01 Build ing 2AP06ED System Cap> Dem TypeWL AC/DC PR3A-451 Protective Power Phase A 1456C05A09, Auxiliary BRW 179 2 @ Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Build ing Report 2AP06ED System Page 64 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC PR3C-451 Protective Power Phase C 14S6C05A09, Auxiliary BRW 180 2 @ Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay C0-7 Build ing Report 2AP06ED System AC/DC PR4-4S1N Protective Power Ground Fault 14S6COSA08, Auxiliary BRW 181 2 @ West inghou se 2AP06E Sw itchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay C0 -6 Building Report 2AP06ED System AC/DC National 62CL@ Power Cranking Limit 812-1-6 Control Auxilia ry BRW 182 2 Control Relay Technical 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Time Delay Relay OD Cabinet Building Report System System AC/DC Incomplete 48@ Power Control Auxilia ry BRW 183 2 Control Relay Starting Sequence Agast at GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Ca binet Building Report Relay System AC/DC 86E@ Power Engine Shutdown Control Auxiliary BRW 184 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Relay Ca binet Building Report System AC/DC Engine Lube Oil 63QELX@ Power Low Pressure Control Auxilia ry BRW 185 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Turbo Low Lube 63QTLX@ Power Oil Pressure Co nt rol Auxiliary BRW 186 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR*C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Shutdown Ca binet Building Report System Repeater Relay Main and AC/DC Connecting Rod 26MBHTX Power High Bearing Control Auxiliary BRW 187 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem

@ 2PL08J Support Temperature Ca binet Building Report System Shutdown Repeater Relay AC/DC Tu rbo Thrust 38TBFX@ Power Bearing Failure Cont rol Auxiliary BRW 188 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Shutdown Ca binet Building Report System Repeater Relay Page65 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 10 Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Jacket Water High 26JWSX@ Power Temperature Control Auxiliary BRW 189 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Shutdown cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay AC/DC Crankcase High 63CX@ Power Control Auxiliary BRW 190 2 Control Relay Pressure Repeater Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support cabinet Building Report Relay System AC/DC 86G@ Power Generator Control Auxiliary BRW 191 2 Control Relay Aga stat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Shutdown Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC SlX@ Protective Power Generator Control Auxiliary BRW 192 2 Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Relay Support Overcurrent Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator Neutral S9GX@ Power Control Auxiliary BRW 193 2 Control Relay Ground Voltage Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support cabinet Building Report Auxiliary Relay System AC/DC 40X@ Power Loss of Field Control Auxiliary BRW 194 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Auxiliary Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 32X@ Power Reverse Power Control Auxiliary BRW 195 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 81UX@ Power Under Frequency Control Auxiliary BRW 196 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Auxiliary Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G1X@ Power Differential Agastat Cap> Dem 197 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL08J 401 2PL08J Support Shutdown cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC Generator EGPDR-87G2X@ Power Differential Agastat Cap> Dem 198 2 Control Relay C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW 2PL08J 2PL08J 401 Support Shutdown Cabinet Building Report System Repeater Relay Aga stat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem Page66 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 10 Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC EGPDR-12Xl@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem 199 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL08J 401 2PL08J Support Shutdown Relay cabinet Bu ilding Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC EGPDR-12X2@ Power Engine Overspeed Agastat Cap> Dem 200 2 C2017-004 Control Auxiliary BRW Control Relay 2PL08J 401 2PL08J Support Shutdown Relay Cabinet Building Report System Agastat GPDR-C740 Cap> Dem AC/DC 86S2@ Power Unit Shutdown Control Auxiliary BRW 201 2 Control Relay Agastat GPDR-C740 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem 2PL08J Support Relay cabinet Building Report System AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Overspeed Diesel Auxiliary BRW 202 2 Process Switch Square D 9012-BC0-22 2DG01KB 401 Cap> Dem DG108B Support Switch Generator Building Report System AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 203 2 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem DG2SlB Support Switch Cabinet Build ing Report System AC/DC 2PS- Power Engine Overspeed Control Auxiliary SQURTS 204 2 Process Switch Honeywell BZLN-LH 2PL08J 401 Cap> Dem DG2S2B Support Switch Cabinet Building Report System AC/DC Medium DG 2B Circuit S2@ Power Auxiliary EPRIHF 20S 2 Voltage Circuit Breaker (ACB Westinghouse SODHP 3SO 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP06ER Support Building Test Breaker 2423)

System AC/DC Transformer 232X Medium S2@ Power Primary Circuit Auxiliary EPRIHF 206 2 Voltage Circuit Westinghouse SO DHP 3SO 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP06EH Support Breaker (ACB Building Test Breaker System 242SX)

AC/DC Medium S2@ Power ESWPump2B Auxiliary EPRIHF 207 2 Voltage Circuit Westinghouse SO DHP 350 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP06EJ Support Circuit Breaker Building Test Breaker System AC/DC MCC232X3 S2@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 208 2 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP12EC Circuit Breaker Support Build ing Report Breaker System Page67 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table 8-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC MCC232Xl S2@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 209 2 Feeder Circuit Westi nghouse DS206 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP12EF Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC MCC232X2 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 210 2 Feeder Circuit Westinghouse OS 206 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP12EG Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC DG Room Vent 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 211 2 Fan 2B Circuit Westinghouse DS206 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP12EJ Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC Battery Charger 52@ Low Voltage Power Auxiliary BRW 212 2 212 Circuit Westinghouse DS206 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem 2AP12EL Circuit Breaker Support Building Report Breaker System AC/DC 486-2425X Power Circuit Breaker 503A804G01 Auxiliary 213 2 @ Control Relay Westinghouse 2AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem Support Lockout Relay TypeWL Building 2AP06EH System AC/DC PRllA-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 214 2 450/4Sl@ Westinghouse DHP 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Building Report 2AP06EH System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PRUB-Protective Power Phase B Auxiliary BRW 215 2 450/451@ 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem 2AP06EH System AC/DC Westinghouse C0-9A Cap> Dem PRllC-Protective Power Phase c Auxiliary BRW 216 2 450/451@ 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A05 Building Report Cap> Dem 2AP06EH System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR12-450N Protective Power Neutral Auxiliary BRW 217 2 @ 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1321079A03 Building Report Cap> Dem 2AP06EH System AC/DC PR1-351N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 218 2 @ N/A N/A 2AP12E Switchgear 426 Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Bu ilding Report 2AP12EA System Page68 of73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) Result Capacity AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR13A-Protective Power Phase A Auxiliary BRW 219 2 450/451@ 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456C05A04 Building Report Cap>Dem 2AP06EJ System AC/DC Westinghouse CO-SA Cap> Dem PR13C-Protective Power Phase c Auxiliary BRW 220 2 450/451@ 2AP06E Switchgear 426 Relay Support Overcurrent Relay Westinghouse 1456COSA04 Building Report Cap> Dem 2AP06EJ System AC/DC Westinghouse SSC-T Cap> Dem PR14-450N Protective Power Ground Fault Auxiliary BRW 221 2 2AP06E Switchgea r 426

@2AP06EJ Relay Support Relay Westinghouse 1321D79A03 Building Report Cap> Dem System AC/DC Low Suction SXlBX@ Power Auxilia ry 222 2 Control Relay Pressure Time Tyco E7012PD004 2AP06E Switchgear 426 GERS Cap> Dem 2AP06EJ Support Building Delay Relay System AC/DC High DG lB Diesel 2PDS- Power Auxiliary 223 2 Control Switch Exhaust Fan lB Solon 7PS/7P2A 2VD03CB Generator 401 GERS Cap> Dem VDlOS Support Building Delta Pressure Vent Fan System AC/DC 2DC04E- Protective Power Battery Auxilia ry BRW 224 2 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 2DC04E 451 Cap> Dem DSH-Kl Relay Support Charger Building Report System AC/DC 2AF01EA- Prot ective Power 2AF01EA- Battery Auxiliary BRW 225 2 Overvoltage Relay N/A N/A 389.25 Cap> Dem 1-DSH-Kl Relay Support 1 Charger Building Report System AC/DC 2AF01EB- Prot ective Power 2AF01EB- Battery Auxiliary BRW 226 2 Overvolt age Relay N/A N/A 385 .92 Cap> Dem 1-DSH-Kl Relay Support 1 Charger Building Report System Page 69 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 1RC8037A M-60 lA 1 1RC8037B M-60 2 1 1RC8037C M-60 3 1 1RC80370 M-60 4 1 1RC014A M-60 lB 1 1RC014B M-60 lB 1 1RC014C M-60 lB 1 1RC0140 M-60 lB 1 1RY8000A M-60 5 1 1RY455A M-60 5 1 1RY8000B M-60 5 1 1RY456 M-60 5 1 1Sl8900A M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8900B M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8900C M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89000 M-61 2 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949A M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949B M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8949C M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89490 M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819A M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819B M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8819C M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl88190 M-61 3 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948A M-61 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948B M-61 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl8948C M-61 6 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1Sl89480 M-61 6 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Page 70 of 73

15C0347-RPT-002, Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 1RH8701A-1 M -62 1 1 EC 384171 to isolate flowpath 1RH8701B-2 M-62 1 1 EC 384171 to isolate flowpath 1RH8702A-1 M-62 1 1 EC 384171 to isolate flowpath 1RH8702B-2 M-62 1 1 EC 384171 to isolate flowpath 1CV8377 M-64 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1CV8378A M-64 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1CV8379A M-64 5 1 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 1PS9351A M-68 lA 1 1PS9351B M -68 lA 1 1PS9358A M-68 lA 1 1PS9358B M-68 lA 1 1PS9358C M-68 lA 1 1PS9358D M -68 lA 1 1PS9356A M-68 lA 1 1PS9350A M-68 lB 1 1PS9350B M-68 lB 1 1PS9354A M -68 lB 1 1PS9355A M-68 lB 1 Unit 2 Braidwood RCS leakage valves 2RC8037A M-135 lA 2 2RC8037B M-135 2 2 2RC8037C M-135 3 2 2RC8037D M-135 4 2 2RC014A M-135 lB 2 2RC014B M-135 lB 2 2RC014C M-135 lB 2 2RC014D M-135 lB 2 2RY8000A M-135 5 2 2RY455A M-135 5 2 Page 71of73

1SC0347-RPT-002, Rev. 2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2RY8000B M-13S s 2 2RY4S6 M-13S s 2 2Sl8900A M-136 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8900B M-136 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8900C M-136 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8900D M-136 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8949A M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8949B M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8949C M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8949D M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8819A M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8819B M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8819C M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8819D M-136 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8948A M-136 s 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8948B M-136 s 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8948C M-136 6 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2Sl8948D M-136 6 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2RH8701A-1 M-137 1 2 EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath 2RH8701B-2 M-137 1 2 EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath 2RH8702A-1 M-137 1 2 EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath 2RH8702B-2 M-137 1 2 EC 38S243 to isolate flowpath 2CV8377 M-138 SC 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2CV8378A M-138 SC 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2CV8379A M-138 SC 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2PS93S1A M-140 lA 2 2PS93S1B M-140 lA 2 2PS93S8A M-140 lA 2 2PS93S8B M-140 lA 2 Page 72 of73

15C0347-RPT-002,Rev.2 Correspondence No.: RS-16-174 VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2PS9358C M-140 lA 2 2PS9358D M-140 lA 2 2PS9356A M-140 lA 2 2PS9350A M-140 lB 2 2PS9350B M-140 lB 2 2PS9354A M-140 lB 2 2PS9355A M-140 lB 2 Page 73 of73