ML17261A484

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LER 87-004-00:on 870424,during Full Power,Train B Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Accidentally Bumping Relay in Safeguards Cabinet During Electrical Wire Checkout.Personnel counseled.W/870522 Ltr
ML17261A484
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1987
From: BACKUS W H, KOBER R W
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-004, LER-87-4, NUDOCS 8705290244
Download: ML17261A484 (10)


Text

REGULATORY IhRMATION DISTRIBUTION SYST(RIDS)>gACCESSION NBR:8705290244 DOC.DATE:87/05/22NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetQinnaNuclearPlant>Unit1>Rochester'005000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION BACKUSW.H.Rochester Gas8cElectricCorp.KOBER>R.W.Rochester Gas8cElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER87-004-00:

on870424>duringiul1power>TrainBcontainment isolation occurred.Causedbypersonnel accidental 1!)bumpingrelayinsaieguards cabinetduringelectrical

!!!irecheckout.

Personnel counseled.

W/870522itr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22DCOPIESRECEIVEl):

LTRENCLSIZE:TlTLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LF'R)>IncidentRpt>etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordance iith10CFR2>2.109(9/19/72).

05000244INTERNAL:

CaEXTERNAL:

RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LASTAHLE>CACRSMICHELSON AEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEBT/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/PTSB RESDgPVGIaiEGaGGROH,MLPDRNSI,CHARRIS,JCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111110111111112211551111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PDi-3PDACRSMOELLERAEOD/DSP/ROAB DEXTRONHR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELO NRR/DEST/MEO VHR/DEST/PSB ted%R/DEST/SGBNRR/DLPG/GAB NRP/DREP/RAB

/ILRBREDFILE02RGiILE01HSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNICMAYS,GCOPIESLTTRENCL1122221101111111111111111TOTALNUMBEROFCOPlESREQUIRED:

LTIR42ENCL40

UCENSEEEVENTREPORTLER)U4.Sh)CLEANhtOULATONY CCMI~AOTNOVSDOSNNO.0)CLOlOStXOINELSOIMOOCXET~hOlOACILITYNAME(llR.E.GinnNuclearPowerPlant05000OfInadvertent Containaent Isolation DueToPersonnel ErrorDuringElectrical WireectiEVENTOATSOlLth)NNNSh(0)htOONTDATE(T)OTHthfACILmttINVOLVEDItlMONTHDAYYEANYEANj@~(IIrseeTIAL "y.eeveeoshOAYYEAhoACILITYHAIICSDOCKETHUMSS1(S)06000042487870040005228705000DOESAT)NDMOOSN)~ONE1LEVtLISN~HIHSN)A(NW(1)O)

SSA4)(INN)

S(LSSS(el(1)(srlSS~)Ill(el~SAQel()l~S~O)M.TSslO)ll

~SPSQHSO)NPSsHS)(N)OOhT)INLthlit)~S.TSs)OHHIO.TSslOHe)

N.TS(s)O)

)et)~S.TSWO)(eN)(Al N.TSWOl)shill~S.TSWOXs)Ts(N1ERONTNSUNIITTSD KINSUA)IT TOT)Nhs(x)lhtMENTE oo10cohf.(essesoeoorseesoe'soooooe4es(

lll7&1WTARSIWOTHEh(Soossl(oAseosrt~sieeroeeO SeTert.N1CSorerTSLEOHOHS HUMSthW.H.BackusTechnical Assistant totheationsManarAhCOOS315524-4446COSNLETtONSLINtOOIIEACHCOSNONSNT OA(LUht~NEOINTl(NhtSONT(IS)CAUSESYSTtMCOMPONENT MANU)eACTUhthtsDIITAsLtTOHONDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMOOHtHTMAHUOACTU1th~OONTASLTOHONDSMJSOLEMSNTAL htOOATSXSECTSOIIS)YESlllyer.sereneCXPSCTSDSUSMISS(Der DATflAssTNAOT(Llrsr(Ioto00Moose,le.,eooroesseeory re(sees~oNeooeoIyorw(INs llseel(10)MONTHEXOECTtO'USMISt)OHOATSIIS)DAYYEAIIOnApril24,1987at1130EDSTwiththeunitat100'treactorpower,aTrainBContainment Isolation occurredduetopersonnel inadvertently bumpingarelayinthesafeguards cabinetswhileperforming afieldwalkdownfortheelectrical drawingupgradeprogram.AllContainment Isolation valvesrequiredtoclose,operatedasdesigned.

Immediate correction actiontakenwas:afterthecauseoftheContainment Isolation wasdetermined, Operations restoredallsystemsaffectedtotheirpre-event status.Therootcauseoftheeventwaspersonnel errorbytheElectrical Engineerwhobumpedtherelay.intheperformance ofworkinthesecabinets.

Corrective actiontakentopreventrecurrence wastoreinforce, withallpersonnel whohavetoworkinsafeguards

cabinets, theprecautions thatmustbetakenandtominimizeaccesstothesecabinetsduringpoweroperation.

Allaccesswillbesupervised bytrainedplantpersonnel.

8705290244 870522PDRADOCK050002448PDRNNCOsroe~(04$)

NRCFOUR366A(9.83(LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION V.S,NUCLEARRECULATORY COMM(SSION ACCROVEOOMBNO3150-0(04 EXPIRES8(3(F85FACILITYNAME(I)OOCKETNUMBER(2(YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIAL i,REViSIONNUMBER'UMBER~AOE(31R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTlllmomSPocoiecoqoired, v(ooddemolNl(C%%dnn36(SA'cl021050002447004OFPRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS Theunitwasat100%reactorpowerandtwoElectrical Engineers wereperforming fieldwalkdowns ofelectrical systemsaspartoftheon-goingelectrical drawingupgradeprogram.TheyhadstartedthisworkonApril22,1987andtheirintentions weretoreviewthefieldconditions innineelectrical cabinetsintheRelayRoom:Ml,M2,RAl,RA2,RA3,SIA1,SIA2,SIBl,andSIB2.PriortostartingtheworkthetwoElectrical Engineers reviewedtheproposedworkscopewiththeInstrument andControlSupervisor andtheShiftSupervisor andweregivenpermission toproceedwiththefollowing restrictions:

Onlyonecabinetbeopenatattimeandthatnotiewrapsorwiresbetouched.Priortotheeventworkhadsuccessfully beencompleted onsevenofthenineelectrical cabinets.

DESCRIPTION OFEVENTA.EVENT:OnApril24,1987at1130EDST,whilethetwoElectri-calEngineers wereperforming theirinspection ofelectrical cabinetSIB1,aTrainBContainment Isolation (CI)occurred.

AllContainment Isolation valvesnotrequiredtobe'penduringaccidentconditions closedasdesigned.

B.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:None.NRCCORMSBBA(9.83(

NRCFOIIR366A(9831LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U5,NUCLEARREGULATORV COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO3150&104EKPIRE58/31I85FACILITYNAMElllDOCKETNUMBER13lVEAALERNUMBERl6ISLOUENTIAL NUMaSRREVISIONNUMBFRPACE13)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXT(IfmosoapsoisIoqoiRRLo>>pffOORoffffICFerns8R'A'll1171osooo244004000306C.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESFORMAJOROCCURRENCES:

oApril24,1987,1130EDST:Eventdateandtime.oApril24,1987,1130EDST:Discovery dateandtime.oApril24,1987,1137EDST:AllTrainBCIrelaysresetandallCIvalvesreturnedtonormalposition.

D.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

WiththeTrainBCI,thefollowing majorsystemslineswereisolated:

oInstrument AirtotheContainment Vessel(CV)E.oReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)LetdownLineoReactorCoolantPumps(RCP)glSealReturnLineoContainment Ventilation oSteamGenerator BlowdownMETHODOFDISCOVERY:

Theeventwasimmediately apparentduetoacontrolboardannunciator, TrainBCIrelayindication, andCIvalvepositions indication intheControlRoom.F~OPERATORACTION:Operations andanInstrument andControl(1&C)Technician immediately checkedoutthereasonfortheCI.Afterfindingallrelaysintheirnormalstatus,Operations restoredallsystemsaffectedbytheBTrainCItotheirpre-event status.NSICFOAM366A1983I 0

r6EINRCFosm366AI983I'LICENSEE EVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROYEDOM8NO3I50DIOSEXPIRES8/3Ii85FACILITYNAMEIIIDOCKETNUMSERI?IYEAssLERNUMSERISISEQUENTIAL NUMSSRREVISIONNUMSSAPAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIllmorespesoieseoosod,we~HACForm3SSA'sl(17)05000244870040004OF06CAUSEOFEVENTA.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:BTrainCIrelayC-2actuateddue,tobeinginadver-tentlybumpedbyEngineering personnel inspecting electrical cabinetSIB1.B.ROOTCAUSE:Therootcausewasdetermined tobepersonnel errorbytheElectrical Engineerbynotbeingmorecarefulwhenworkingintheelectrical cabinets.

IV.ANALYSISOFEVENTThiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),

whichrequiresreporting of"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinmanualorautomatic actuation ofanyEngineered SafetyFeature(ESF),including theReactorProtection System(RPS)"inthatContainment Isolation isaESFsub-system.

Anassessment wasperformed ofthesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:

Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed totheinadvertent CIbecause;0TheCIsystemoperatedasdesigned.

00Thesystemsaffectedwererestoredtonormalstatusveryquickly(withinapproximately 7minutes).

Thesystemsaffectedwerecapableofwithstanding theisolation forashortperiodoftime.NACCORM366AI883I NRCForm3ddA19431LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROUEOOM8NO3150M(CdEXPIRES8131'85FACILITYNAME(11OOCKETNUMSER(2(YEARLERNUM8ER(dlEEOUENTrAL NUMEERrlEvI5roNNUMERPAGE(31R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTillmoreTrrooolreoerr'eoo, rroo~HRCForm3684'Fl(LT(06000244004-0005oF06V.CORRECTIVE ACTIONA.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:oOperations, afterfindingthatthecausefortheCIwasinadvertent, restoredallsystemsaffectedbytheeventtotheirpre-event status.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:

I'TheOperations ManagerhassentalettertoallSectionsManagersaffected, thatstatestotheextentpractical, workinallelectrical safe-guardsandprotection cabinetswillbeminimized whiletheplantisatpower..BothoftheElectrical Engineers involvedwiththeeventhavehadtheirawareness reinforced astotheprecautions whichmustbetakenwhileworkinginelectrical safeguards andprotection cabinets.

00AllEngineering personnel requiring accesstoelectrical safeguards andprotection cabinetshavebeenmadeawareofthiseventbytheirmanagers.

Placardswillbe'adeandattachedtoallelectrical safeguard cabinetsthatread:Duringpoweroperations

-accesswillbesupervised byOperations, I&Cpersonnel, orTestandResults'ersonnel.

NRCFORM3ddA(9831 NRCFarm36SA(943IFACILITYNAME(IIr~V.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION OOCKETNVMSER(2(YEARLERNUMBER(SISSQUSNTrAL a88r.4UMes/IAPPROVEOOMSNO.3(50&(04EXPIRES8(3(r85.'svrsro4 4UMes4~AGE(3lLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIllmoresireseiseyvr(erSvse~rYRC%%dmr3554'sl(It(pgppp24487-0040006oFo6VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:

B.Therewerenocomponent failuresthatcontributed tothisevent.rPREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLEReventscouldbeidentified.

4RCs08M36(IAIa831 ROCHES'ri

"',.-rts89EAS'TAVEh!UErROCHESTER, N.Y.14649.000' la%~C.aAMay22,1987U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555

Subject:

LER87-004,Inadvertent Containment Isolation DuetoPersonnel ErrorDuringElectrical WireCheckoutofSafetyInjection RelayCabinet.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv) whichrequiresareportof,"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinmanualorautomatic actuation ofanyEngineered SafetyFeature(ESF),including theReactorProtection System(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER87-004isherebysubmitted.

Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Vrytrulyyours,d./cRogrW.KoberxcU.S,NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI631ParkAvenueKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCResidentInspector