ML17264A541

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LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A541
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/1996
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-005, LER-96-5, NUDOCS 9606260096
Download: ML17264A541 (9)


Text

~CATEGORYREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9606260096DOC.DATE:96/06/17NOTARIZED:NODOCKETgFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSTMARTIN,J.T.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGassElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONVISSING,G.S.Ef050002440NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

SUBJECT:

LER96-005-00:on960516,PORCdetermineddeficientproceduresdonotmeetSRsfortestingsafety-relatedlogiccircuits.Causedbyinadequanciesinindividualtestingprocedures.ProceduresreImprovedTSsrevised.W/960617ltr.DZSTRZSUTZONCODE:ZE22TCOPZESRECEZVED:LTRjENCLiSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPDl-1PDINTERNAL:AEOD/SPDjNTERifE/EENRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHYPG.ANRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,G.AEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DSIR/EIBLITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOORE,W.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111221111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.'ONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.43.5-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR25ENCL25 4NPJune17,1996U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

LER96-005,DeficientProceduresforTestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits,IdentifiedUsingCriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,ResultedinConditionProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-005isherebysubmitted.IThiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verylyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionMr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStop14C7)PWRProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector"C.'l)0596062600969606i7PDRADOCK050002448PDRgpss' NRCFORM366.(4.95)~U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150.0104EXPIRES04/30/98ESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORYINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHELICENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKToINDUSTRY.,FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCHIT-6F33),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION,WASHINGTON,DC20555.0001.ANDTOTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECTFACILBYNAME(llR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMSLR(2)05000244FAOB(3)1OF7ITLB(elDeficientProceduresforTestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits,IdentifiedUsingCriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,ResultedinConditionProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsMONTHDAYYEAREVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHOAYYEARREPORTDATE(7)FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)DOCKETNUMBER0516OPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)9600096-005-00061796FACILITYNAME20.2201(b)20.2203(al(1)20.2203(al(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(al(3)(I)20.2203(al(3)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)SUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRE:(CheckoneorTHISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURDocKET((UMBERmore)(11l50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.7120.2203(al(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(ivl20.2203(al(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)OTHERSpecifyinAbsuec(beloworinNRCForm366AAMEELEFHONENUMBER(InCIVrreAreaCedarJohnT.St.Martin-TechnicalAssistant(716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToNPRDSSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyas,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single.spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnMay16,1996,atapproximately1500EDST,theplantwasdefueled.UsingthecriteriaofNRCGenericLetter96-01,itwasidentifiedthatseveralsurveillancetestprocedureshadnotfullycompliedwiththeSurveillanceRequirementsoftheGinnaImprovedTechnicalSpecifications.ThePlantOperationsReviewCommitteedeterminedthatthesedeficientproceduresdidnotmeettherequirementsofSpecification5A.1thatproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedfortheseactivities.Immediatecorrectiveactionwastoperformtherequiredtestingofthesafety-relatedlogiccircuitsduringthe1996refuelingoutage.Theunderlyingcauseoftheinadequateprocedureswasanassumptionthatitwasadequatetouseindustry-acceptedmethodsfortestingofthesecircuits,andtheneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(D).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceisoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4.95)

~NRCFORM366AI4.9SI~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1IOOCKETLERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERPAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant0500024496pp5pp2OF7TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366A/I17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:TopreparetheresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)96-01,"TestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits",RochesterGasandElectric(RGSE)formeda"GL96-01ReviewTeam"inMarch,1996,withrepresentationfromElectricalEngineering,InstrumentandControl,ResultsandTest,SystemEngineering,andNuclearSafetyandLicensing.ThisteamagreedthattestprocedurereviewsperformedunderprioractivitieswerenotdocumentedtotheextentdesiredtobecompatiblewiththeGL96-01requirements.Therefore,theteamperformedthisreview,startinginearlyApril,1996.TheteamidentifiedandreviewedprocedureswhichimplementtheGinnaImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)SurveillanceRequirements(SRs).Thisreviewcomparedelectricalschematicdrawingsandlogicdrawingsagainstsurveillancetestprocedurestoensurethatallportionsofthelogiccircuitryareadequatelycoveredintheprocedure,andtoverifycompliancewithallapplicableITSSRsassociatedwithsafety-relatedlogiccircuits.Numerousindividualfindingswereidentifiedduringthecourseofthisreview.Individualfindingswereclassifiedintofourgroups:a.Omission:Anapplicablelogiccomponentisnotintegratedintoanexistingformaltestprocedure.Failureorinoperabilityofthiscomponentcouldadverselyaffectarequiredsafetyfunction.Deficiency:Anapplicablelogiccomponentisincorporatedintoanexistingformaltestprocedure.However,thestepsusedtotestallrequiredfunctionsandfailuremodesareinadequatetoverifycompleteoperabilityofthesubjectcomponent.Failureorinoperabilityofthiscomponentcouldadverselyaffectarequiredsafetyfunction.Weakness:Anapplicablelogiccomponentisincorporatedintoanexistingformaltestprocedure.However,thestepsusedtotestallrequiredfunctionsandfailuremodesareinadequatetoverifycompleteoperabilityofthesubjectcomponent.Duetotheinherentlyconservativedesignoftheassociatedlogiccircuitry,failureorinoperabilityofthiscomponentcannot,byitself,preventoractuatearequiredsafetyfunction.ThesubjectcomponentfunctionandfailuremodesarenotrequiredtobetestedbyanyITSSR.ProactiveInitiative:AlogiccomponentthatisoutofthescopeoftherequirementsofGL96-01,whereithasbeenidentifiedthatthestepsusedtotestallassociatedfunctionsandfailuremodesmaybeinadequatetoverifycompleteoperabilityofthesubjectcomponent.Failureorinoperabilityofthiscomponentcannot,byitself,preventoractuatearequiredsafetyfunction.Improvementstotheassociatedtestprocedurewouldenhancethesafeandreliableoperationoftheplant.ThisreviewwascompletedonMay14,1996,andtheresultsweredocumentedininternalplantdocuments.Therewereno"omissions",sixteen(16)"deficiencies",twenty-one(21)"weaknesses",andseven(7)"proactiveinitiatives"identifiedbytheteam.The16deficiencieswerecorrectedduringthe1996Refuelingoutageassoonasfeasibleafteridentification,andpriortotheaffectedcomponenthavingtobeoperablepertheITS.Allweaknessesandproactiveinitiativeswillberesolvedpriortostartupfromthe1997Refuelingoutage.NRCFORM366A(495I

~NRCFORM366Ai495)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETLERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF796-005-00TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm886AI(17)DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:January29,1996:NRCGL96-01isreceivedatRG&E.0May14,1996:GL96-01ReviewTeamidentifiesnoomissionsandsixteen(16)deficiencies.0May16,1996,1500EDST:ThePORCdeterminesthatthesedeficienciesdidnotmeettherequirementsofSpecification5.4.1.Eventdateandtime.0May16,1996,1500EDST:Discoverydateandtime.0May21,1996:Theaffectedcomponentsforall16deficiencieshavebeensatisfactorilytested.B.EVENT:OnMay16,1996,atapproximately1500EDST,theplantwasdefueled(whichisnotamodeasdefinedintheITS)withnospecificoperationaloroutageactivitiesinprogressrelatedtothereviewofGL96-01ortothetestingofcomponentsidentifiedduringthisreview.TheGL96-01ReviewTeamreportedtheresultsoftheirreviewtothePORC.ThePORCconcurredwiththeresultsofthereview.ThePORCdeterminedthathaving16deficientproceduresdidnotmeettherequirementsofSpecification5.4.1,whichstates,inpart,thatwrittenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978.RegulatoryGuide1.33recommendswrittenproceduresforsurveillancetestsforthereactorprotectionsystemandothersystems.ThePORCdeterminedthatwrittenprocedureswerenotadequatelyestablishedfortheseactivities,whichisaconditionprohibitedbySpecification5.4.1.ThePORCconcludedthattheseproceduresweredeficientduetoacommonrootcauseandcollectivelyrepresentedasubstantialbreakdowninthesurveillancetestingprogram.C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:NoneNRCFORM366Ai495)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)rLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGE(3)4OF7TEXTIifmorespeceisrequired,useeddirionelcopiesofNRCForm386AI(17)METHODOFDISCOVERY:RG&EformedtheGL96-01ReviewTeaminMarch,1996,toensurethatallportionsoflogiccircuitryforsafety-relatedsystemsandcomponentsareadequatelycoveredinanassociatedsurveillancetestproceduretomeetallapplicableITSSRs.ThisreviewwascompletedonMay14,1996.TheReviewTeamreportedtheresultsoftheirreviewtothePORConMay16,1996.ThePORCdeterminedthathaving16deficientproceduresdidnotmeettherequirementsofSpecification5.4.1.OPERATORACTION:TheOperationsGroupreviewedthestatusoftestingoftheindividualfindings(deficiencies,weaknesses,andproactiveinitiatives),anddirectedthatamoderestrictionbeplacedontheplantnottoenterMode5untilthecompletionofallapplicabletestingforanyremainingdeficiencies.TheNRCSeniorResidentInspectorhadalreadybeennotifiedofthesefindingsbytheOperationsGroup.Theplantwasdefueledatthistime,andthefindingsdidnotaffectanysafetyfunctionsrequiredwiththeplantinthiscondition.Therefore,nootheractionswererequiredoftheoperators.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:Theimmediatecauseofthe16deficientproceduresusedforthetestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuitswasinadequaciesinindividualsurveillancetestingprocedures.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Theintermediatecauseoftheinadequaciesinsurveillancetestingprocedureswasunidentifieddeficienciesinthesurveillancetestingprogram.NRcFORM366A(4-95I NRCFORM36BAI4.95)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEIl)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERIB)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGEI3)5OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlyingcauseofnotpreviouslyidentifyingthedeficienciesinthesurveillancetestingprogramwasanassumptionthatitwasadequatetouseindustry-acceptedmethodsfortestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuitstomeetITSSRs.Theneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized,duetothisassumptionand,inmanycases,<uetothedesignofthesystem.ThespecificityofGL96-01(includingthedirectionforthescopeoftheexpectedreviews,levelofdetail,andexamplesforindividualcontacts)providedtheclarificationneededtoidentifytheprogramdeficiencies.Whiletechnicallyestablishingnonewrequirements,GL96-01providedtheseclarifications,whichledtothediscoveryoflogictestingdeficiencieswhichwerepreviouslyunrecognized.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(D),"DefectiveProcedure".ThiseventdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"IndustryGuidelineforMonitoringtheEffectivenessofMaintenanceatNuclearPowerPlants",definitionofa"MaintenancePreventableFunctionalFailure",becausetherewerenofunctionalfailures.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyop'erationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Thedeficientsurveillancetestingproceduresfortestingofsafety-relatedcircuitsidentifiedduringtheGL96-01reviewdidnotmeettherequirementsofSpecification5.4.1.ThefollowingITSSRshaddeficiencies:SR3.3.1.5SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.2.4forTable3.3.2-1,Function2.a(viaTable3.3.5.1,Function4)SR3.3.2.7forTable3.3.2-1,Function1.b(twodeficiencies)SR3.3.2.7forTable3.3.2-1Function6.bSR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.6SR3.7.5.5(twodeficiencies)SR3.7.5.6(threedeficiencies)SR3.8.1.9(threedeficiencies)NRCFORM366A(4-95)

~NRCFORM36BA(4.95)~LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-005-00PAGE(3)6OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofiVRCForm386A)(17)Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:Therewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesorimplicationsattributedtothedeficientproceduresusedforthetestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuitsbecause:0Allsafety-relatedlogiccircuitsweretestedtothecompleterequirementsoftheITSSRs.0Nocomponentfailureswereidentifiedduringthistesting.0Theidentifiedsurveillanceinadequaciesdidnotresultintheunavailabilityofthesafetysystemwhencalledon.0Theaffectedsystemshadsufficientredundancytomitigateanaccidentintheeventthattheuntestedlogicfailed.Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:0ProceduresassociatedwithperformingtheITSSRswererevised,asnecessary,tofullycomplywiththeSRs.0All16deficienciesintestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuitswerecorrectedbycompletingtherequiredtestingpriortothecomponenthavingtobeoperablepertheITS.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:0SurveillancetestproceduresidentifiedbytheGL96-01ReviewTeamwillbeverifiedtofullycomplywiththeITSSRspriortothenextscheduledsurveillancefortheassociatedcomponent.0Findingsforcomponentsthatcouldhavethepotentialforadverselyaffectingasafetyfunctionwerecorrectedduringthe1996Refuelingoutage.Findingsidentifiedaseither"weaknesses"or"proactiveinitiatives"willberesolvedpriortostartupfromthe1997Refuelingoutage.0AspartofContinuingTraining,NRCGL96-01,GL96-01ReviewTeamfindings,andlessonslearnedwillbeprovidedtoappropriatepersonnel.ThePlantChangeRequestIPCR)processwillbereviewed,toensurethattheprocessforanyplantmodification(thatchangesorinstallssafety-relatedlogiccircuits)includesconsiderationofthelessonslearnedfromGL96-01.NRCFORM366A(4.95)

NRCFORM36/AI4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER95-005-00PAGEI3)7OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJl17)Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:LER93-005wasasimilarevent(failuretoperformTSSR,resultinginaconditionprohibitedbyTS),withadifferentrootcause(misinterpretationofTS).0LER94-004wasasimilarevent(missedsurveillancesnotidentifiedinLER93-005,resultinginaconditionprohibitedbyTS),withasimilarrootcause(lackofclearlydefinedinterpretationsofTSrequirements).C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NoneNRCFORM366AI4-95I