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| 1e,(ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING) | | 1e, (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING) |
| REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9508080069 DOC.DATE: | | REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9508080069 DOC.DATE: 95/08/03 NOTARIZED: |
| 95/08/03NOTARIZED: | | NO FACIL:50-335 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power&Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BENKEN,E.J. |
| NOFACIL:50-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION BENKEN,E.J.
| | Florida Power&Light Co.SAGER,D.A. |
| FloridaPower&LightCo.SAGER,D.A.
| | Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET g 05000335 |
| FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKETg05000335
| |
|
| |
|
| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER95-003-00:on 950708,automatic reactortripoccurredduringturbineoverspeed surveillance testingduetopersonnel error.Personnel involvedineventcounseled
| | LER 95-003-00:on 950708,automatic reactor trip occurred during turbine overspeed surveillance testing due to personnel error.Personnel involved in event counseled&procedure changes being made.W/950803 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NORRIS,J-EHZE~R NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POOREiW NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECZPZENTS: |
| &procedure changesbeingmade.W/950803 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTESRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-1PDINTERNAL: | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) |
| ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2FILE01EXTERNAL:
| | TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27 Florida Power&Light Company, P.O.Box 128, Fort Pierce, FL 34954.0128 August 3, 1995 L-95-218 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 1 Docket No.50-335 Reportable Event: 95-003 Date of Event: July 8, 1995 Automatic Reactor T i Duri Tes i due t Pe so el Erro Turb'0 e s e d Sur eilla ce The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, D.A..ger Vice r sident St.Lu ie Plant DAS/EJB Attachment cc: Stewart D.Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant 9508080069 950803 PDR ADOCK 05000335 8 PDR |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHY,G.A NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME NORRIS,J-EHZE~RNRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOOREiWNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111221111NOTETOALL"RZDS"RECZPZENTS:
| | ~~NRC FORH 366 (5-92)U.S.IN)CLEAR REGUULTORY C(NIT SS ION APPROVED BY QS NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)EST IHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO C(WPLY lllTH THIS INFORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST I HATE TO THE INFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIONg MASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEKENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON OC 20503.FACILITY IWK (1)St.Lucie Unit 1 DOCKET IRWBER (2)05000335 PAGE (3)1OF5 TITLE (4)Automatic Reactor Trip During Turbine Overspeed Surveillance Testing due to Personnel Error.EVENT DATE 5 HONTH DAY YEAR 07 08 95 YEAR 95 LER NNBER 6 SEQUENT IAL NUHBER 003 REVISION NOSER 0 REPORT DATE 7 HONTH DAY 08 03 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILITY NAHE YEAR N/A FACILITY NAHE N/A DOCKET NUHBER DOCKET NUHBER OPERAT INGa IRmE (9)LEVEL (10)100 THIS REPORT IS SUSHI TTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A To THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR: Check one or more 11 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAHE Edwin J.Benken, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(407)468-4248 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH C(NPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORI'3 CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYS'IEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES (If yes, coagulate EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBHI SSI ON DATE (15)HONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On July 8, 1995, Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent reactor power.Operations personnel were conducting a scheduled Turbine overspeed trip surveillance per an approved plant procedure. |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D8(415-2083)
| | During the portion of the surveillance that tests a solenoid valve for Overspeed Protection Control (20-1 OPC)a utility non-licensed Operator failed to close an isolation valve as directed by the procedure. |
| TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | Failure to close this valve allowed electro-hydraulic (EH)fluid from the Governor valves (GV)and Intercept valves (IV)to drain when the solenoid valve was opened in a subsequent step.Draining of the EH fluid caused closure of the Main Turbine Governor and Intercept valves which resulted in an automatic reactor trip.The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error on the part of a utility non-licensed operator who failed to properly implement a procedural step during performance of a surveillance. |
| LTTR27ENCL27 FloridaPower&LightCompany,P.O.Box128,FortPierce,FL34954.0128 August3,1995L-95-21810CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Reportable Event:95-003DateofEvent:July8,1995Automatic ReactorTiDuriTesiduetPesoelErroTurb'0esedSureillaceTheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,D.A..gerVicersidentSt.LuiePlantDAS/EJBAttachment cc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant9508080069 950803PDRADOCK050003358PDR
| | Corrective actions for this event: 1)Operations personnel involved with the event were counselled. |
| ~~NRCFORH366(5-92)U.S.IN)CLEARREGUULTORY C(NITSSIONAPPROVEDBYQSNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)ESTIHATEDBURDENPERRESPONSETOC(WPLYlllTHTHISINFORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORMARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATIONANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIONg MASHINGTON, OC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3140-0104), | | 2)Procedure changes are being made to incorporate human factors improvements and additional step verifications. |
| OFFICEOFHANAGEKENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTON OC20503.FACILITYIWK(1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETIRWBER(2)05000335PAGE(3)1OF5TITLE(4)Automatic ReactorTripDuringTurbineOverspeed Surveillance TestingduetoPersonnel Error.EVENTDATE5HONTHDAYYEAR070895YEAR95LERNNBER6SEQUENTIALNUHBER003REVISIONNOSER0REPORTDATE7HONTHDAY0803OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED8FACILITYNAHEYEARN/AFACILITYNAHEN/ADOCKETNUHBERDOCKETNUHBEROPERATINGaIRmE(9)LEVEL(10)100THISREPORTISSUSHITTEDPURSUANT20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER(SpecifyinAbstractbelowandinText,NRCForm366AToTHEREQUIREHENTS OF10CFR:Checkoneormore11LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER12NAHEEdwinJ.Benken,Licensing EngineerTELEPHONE NUHBER(IncludeAreaCode)(407)468-4248COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHC(NPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORI'3CAUSESYSTEHCOHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYS'IEHCOHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSSUPPLEHENTAL REPORTEXPECTED14YES(Ifyes,coagulate EXPECTEDSUBHISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBHISSIONDATE(15)HONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJuly8,1995,Unit1wasoperating at100percentreactorpower.Operations personnel wereconducting ascheduled Turbineoverspeed tripsurveillance peranapprovedplantprocedure.
| | 3)Other load threatening surveillances are being reviewed to determine if generic changes are warranted. |
| Duringtheportionofthesurveillance thattestsasolenoidvalveforOverspeed Protection Control(20-1OPC)autilitynon-licensed Operatorfailedtocloseanisolation valveasdirectedbytheprocedure.
| | 4)A technical subcommittee is evaluating this event for additional corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. |
| Failuretoclosethisvalveallowedelectro-hydraulic (EH)fluidfromtheGovernorvalves(GV)andIntercept valves(IV)todrainwhenthesolenoidvalvewasopenedinasubsequent step.DrainingoftheEHfluidcausedclosureoftheMainTurbineGovernorandIntercept valveswhichresultedinanautomatic reactortrip.Therootcauseofthiseventwascognitive personnel erroronthepartofautilitynon-licensed operatorwhofailedtoproperlyimplement aprocedural stepduringperformance ofasurveillance.
| | 5)Site management held a trip review meeting open to all disciplines for lessons learned from this event.NRC FORH () |
| Corrective actionsforthisevent:1)Operations personnel involvedwiththeeventwerecounselled. | | ~(, KRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQKI SSI(NI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY CHB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, MASHINGTOM, DC 20555-0001(AND TO THE PAPERNNK REDUCT IOM PROJECT (31/0-0104), OFF ICE OF HAMAGEHEMT AND BUDGET MASHIMGTON DC 20503.FACI LI TY MAHE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 05000335 95 LER MINBER 6 SEQUEHT IAL 003 REVISION PAGE 3 2OF5 TEXT If mo e s ce is r ired use additional co ies of M C Form 3 (17)DESCRIPTION OP THE EVENT On July 8, 1995, St.Lucie Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent Reactor power.A utility non-licensed Operator was performing the monthly turbine overspeed trip te"t in accordance with an approved plant procedure. |
| 2)Procedure changesarebeingmadetoincorporate humanfactorsimprovements andadditional stepverifications. | | The non-licensed operator was performing the steps of the procedure while a utility licensed Operator maintained radio communication with the control room.During the portion of the test which checks the operability of an Overspeed Protection Control (OPC)solenoid valve, SE22138 (EIIS:TG), the procedure directed the operator to unlock and close V22482 (EIIS:TG),"EH Test Header to 20-1/OPC Isolation." This is the electro-hydraulic (EH)fluid inlet isolation to the OPC solenoid valve.This step ensures that the OPC solenoid valve is isolated from the actual EH fluid system (EIIS:TG)supplying the turbine Governor (GV)and Intercept valves (IV)(EIIS:SB)prior to testing the solenoid.The NPO removed the locking device from isolation valve V22482, but was momentarily distracted by placing the locking device in a secure position, and failed to close the valve as directed by the procedure. |
| 3)Otherloadthreatening surveillances arebeingreviewedtodetermine ifgenericchangesarewarranted. | | When the next step of the procedure was executed (the actual stroke testing of solenoid valve SE22138)EH fluid was drained from the GVs and IVs causing the GVs and IVs to rapidly close.Closure of the turbine valves quickly reduced steam flow through the turbine which resulted in a reactor trip from high pressurizer pressure at 1122 hours.Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-1,"Standard Post Trip Actions" was immediately implemented. |
| 4)Atechnical subcommittee isevaluating thiseventforadditional corrective actionstopreventreoccurrence. | | The Reactor Coolant System (RCS)Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV)(EIIS:AB)actuated as designed during the time the high Pressurizer pressure signal was present (less than 4 seconds), and then reclosed.The maximum RCS pressure reached during this event was 2430 psia.The maximum secondary pressure reached was 1023 psia.Operators observed increasing level in the 1A SG after the trip and closed the 15 percent feedwater bypass valve.Level continued to increase and the Control Room Operators closed the isolation valve for the 1A Feedwater Regulating Valve (EIIS: JB).The 1B Main Feedwater Pump (MFW)(EIIS:SJ) subsequently tripped from a low flow condition, and the 1A MFW Pump tripped due to high level in the 1A SG.The 1B MFW Pump was restarted and SG levels were then controlled within the normal band.A relief valve in the Letdown Level Control System (EIIS:CB)opened during the event due to the system transient, and subsequently closed when Control Room operators reduced the letdown pressure controller (EIIS:CB)setpoint.The Steam Generator Safety Valves (EIIS:SB)functioned as designed to limit SG pressure during the initial transient. |
| 5)Sitemanagement heldatripreviewmeetingopentoalldisciplines forlessonslearnedfromthisevent.NRCFORH() | | The Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS)(EIIS:Jl)functioned properly to control RCS temperature during this event.NRC-FORH 366A (5-92) |
| ~(,KRCFORH366A(5-92)U.SNUCLEARREGULATORY CQKISSI(NILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYCHBNO3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYNITHTHISINFORHATIONCOLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORNARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, MASHINGTOM, DC20555-0001( | | NRC FORN 366A (5 92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGUIATOIY COBIISSIOI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OS NO.3150-0104 EXP IRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY MITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD CONHENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHIISSIOI,'MASHINGTOH, DC 20555.0001(AND TO THE PAPERMDRK REDUCT IOI PROJECT (3140.0104), OFFICE OF IIANAGEHENT AND BUDGET MASH INGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NANE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 DOXET NNBER 2 LER NWBER 6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVI SIOI PAGE 3 05000335 TEXT lf aero s ce is r ired use edditiooeI co ies of NRC Fo 366A (17)95 003 0 30F5 DESCRXPTXON OF THE EVENT conti ued The Control Room crew completed the actions of EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions", and implemented EOP-02,"Reactor Trip Recovery" after diagnosing an uncomplicated trip.Upon completion of the Reactor Trip Recovery procedure, the unit was maintained in a stable, Mode 3 condition for post trip review and event investigation. |
| ANDTOTHEPAPERNNKREDUCTIOMPROJECT(31/0-0104),
| | CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of this event was cognitive personnel error by a utility non-licensed operator who failed to correctly implement a procedural step during performance of a turbine overspeed trip surveillance. |
| OFFICEOFHAMAGEHEMT ANDBUDGETMASHIMGTON DC20503.FACILITYMAHE1St.LucieUnit10500033595LERMINBER6SEQUEHTIAL003REVISIONPAGE32OF5TEXTIfmoesceisrireduseadditional coiesofMCForm3(17)DESCRIPTION OPTHEEVENTOnJuly8,1995,St.LucieUnit1wasoperating at100percentReactorpower.Autilitynon-licensed Operatorwasperforming themonthlyturbineoverspeed tripte"tinaccordance withanapprovedplantprocedure.
| | The operator was momentarily distracted by placing a valve locking device in a secure position, and did not close the valve as directed by the procedure. |
| Thenon-licensed operatorwasperforming thestepsoftheprocedure whileautilitylicensedOperatormaintained radiocommunication withthecontrolroom.Duringtheportionofthetestwhichcheckstheoperability ofanOverspeed Protection Control(OPC)solenoidvalve,SE22138(EIIS:TG),
| | YSXS OF THE EVENT This event is reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, as"any event that resulted in a manual or automatic action of any Engineered Safety Feature." The closure of the Main Turbine Governor and Intercept valves caused a rapid reduction in secondary steam flow.The effect of the reduction in secondary steam demand was an increase in SG pressure and temperature, and RCS temperature and pressure.Increasing RCS pressure resulted in an uncomplicated Reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure as designed.An investigation performed after the event revealed that the calibration on the 1A Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FCV-9011) electro-pneumatic transducer (E/P)had drifted, so that the feedwater flow control valve did not close fully as expected on the plant trip.This caused the 1A Steam Generator level to increase above the normal value to the high level trip setpoint for the Main Feedwater Pump.Closing the Main Feedwater Block valve secured the flow to the 1A SG from FCV-9011, stabilizing SG level.This event is bounded by section 15.2.7 of the St.Lucie Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)"Loss of External Electrical Load or Turbine Stop Valve Closure." This section describes a rapid, large reduction of power demand on the reactor while operating at full power.The UFSAR states,"When the turbine stop/control valve closes, the steam flow is terminated, causing the secondary system temperature and pressure to increase.The primary-to-secondary heat transfer decreases as secondary system temperature increases. |
| theprocedure directedtheoperatortounlockandcloseV22482(EIIS:TG),
| | If the reactor is not tripped when the turbine is tripped,.~.the reactor will trip on high pressurizer pressure, reducing the primary heat source." NRC FORII 366A (5-92) |
| "EHTestHeaderto20-1/OPCIsolation." | | NRC FORll 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQHIISS ION'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BZ QNI NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO CONPLY MITH THIS IHFORNAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS NANAGENEHT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONHI SS ION, MASHINGTQI, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3140-0104), OF FICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BlmGET MASHINGTQl DC 20503.FACILITY lUWE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 DOCKET NQIBER 2 05000335 YEAR 95 LER NWBER 6 SEQUENT IAL REVISION 003 PAGE 3 4OF 5 TEXT If mor s c is r ired use additions co ies of N C Form 366 (17)ANALYSIS OP THE EVENT cont,i ued In addition to the above, UFSAR section 15.2.7, states that,"The mitigative features of the pressurizer spray, pressurizer relief valves (PORV), and the Steam Bypass System are assumed not to function so as to exacerbate the calculated pressurization of the primary system.The purpose,...is to demonstrate that the primary safety relief capability is sufficient to limit primary pressure to less than 110%of the design pressure (2750 psia), and to demonstrate that the secondary safety relief capacity is sufficient to limit secondary pressure to less than 110/of the design pressure (1100 psia)." During this event, the PORVs (EIIS:AB)functioned properly to limit primary pressure to 2430 psia, so that the Pressurizer code safety valves (EIIS:AB)were not challenged. |
| Thisistheelectro-hydraulic (EH)fluidinletisolation totheOPCsolenoidvalve.ThisstepensuresthattheOPCsolenoidvalveisisolatedfromtheactualEHfluidsystem(EIIS:TG) supplying theturbineGovernor(GV)andIntercept valves(IV)(EIIS:SB) priortotestingthesolenoid.
| | The SG code safeties (EIIS:SB)limited SG pressure to 1023 psia and SBCS functioned as designed.This event is less limiting than that described in UFSAR section 15.2.7.The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1)Operations personnel involved with this event were counseled on the importance of applying self-checking principles. |
| TheNPOremovedthelockingdevicefromisolation valveV22482,butwasmomentarily distracted byplacingthelockingdeviceinasecureposition, andfailedtoclosethevalveasdirectedbytheprocedure.
| | 2)The surveillance procedure for conducting this test, OP 1/2-0030150,"Secondary Plant Operating Checks and Tests" will be changed to incorporate format improvements, and to include additional verification that critical steps have been completed, 3)Plant Staff will review other load threatening surveillances to determine if additional procedural changes or precautions are necessary to minimize the potential for personnel error.4)A technical subcommittee was formed to evaluate this event for generic implications and provide additional corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. |
| Whenthenextstepoftheprocedure wasexecuted(theactualstroketestingofsolenoidvalveSE22138)EHfluidwasdrainedfromtheGVsandIVscausingtheGVsandIVstorapidlyclose.Closureoftheturbinevalvesquicklyreducedsteamflowthroughtheturbinewhichresultedinareactortripfromhighpressurizer pressureat1122hours.Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-1,"Standard PostTripActions"wasimmediately implemented.
| | 5)Site management held a trip review meeting, attended by personnel from Operations, Maintenance, Training, Engineering, Technical staff, and senior Nuclear Division management to examine this event.The meeting was video taped to assure that lessons learned are available to all Operations personnel. |
| TheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PowerOperatedReliefValves(PORV)(EIIS:AB) actuatedasdesignedduringthetimethehighPressurizer pressuresignalwaspresent(lessthan4seconds),
| | 6)Instrument and Control (I/C)and System Engineers calibrated the 1A Main Feedwater Regulating Valve E/P transducer prior to unit startup.The Main Feedwater RegUlating valve positioning components affecting this event are being evaluated for additional corrective actions.7)This Event will be included into Operations training for both licensed and non-licensed Operations personnel. |
| andthenreclosed.
| | HRC-FORH 366A (5-92) |
| ThemaximumRCSpressurereachedduringthiseventwas2430psia.Themaximumsecondary pressurereachedwas1023psia.Operators observedincreasing levelinthe1ASGafterthetripandclosedthe15percentfeedwater bypassvalve.Levelcontinued toincreaseandtheControlRoomOperators closedtheisolation valveforthe1AFeedwater Regulating Valve(EIIS:JB).The1BMainFeedwater Pump(MFW)(EIIS:SJ) subsequently trippedfromalowflowcondition, andthe1AMFWPumptrippedduetohighlevelinthe1ASG.The1BMFWPumpwasrestarted andSGlevelswerethencontrolled withinthenormalband.AreliefvalveintheLetdownLevelControlSystem(EIIS:CB) openedduringtheeventduetothesystemtransient, andsubsequently closedwhenControlRoomoperators reducedtheletdownpressurecontroller (EIIS:CB) setpoint.
| | NRC FORM 366A 5-92)U.S.NUCLENI REGULATORY CQHIISSIQI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QS NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTINATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CQ(PLY MITH THIS IN FORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 KRS.FORMARD CQINENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AMD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HMBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY CQBIISSION, llASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001~ |
| TheSteamGenerator SafetyValves(EIIS:SB) functioned asdesignedtolimitSGpressureduringtheinitialtransient.
| | AND TO THE PAPERMORk REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104) |
| TheSteamBypassControlSystem(SBCS)(EIIS:Jl) functioned properlytocontrolRCStemperature duringthisevent.NRC-FORH366A(5-92)
| | ~OFFICE OF HANAGEHEMT AMD BIIGET, MASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NU%1 DO(XET NMBER 2 LER NNBER 6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISIOH PAGE 3 St.Lucie Unit 1 05000335 95 pp3 p 5 OF 5 EXT If mor s ce is ired use edditione co ies of MRC Form 366A (17)ADDITIONAL NPORMATION il'n I nifi ti No component failures were identified for this event.Pr vi mil rEv n LER 389/86-002 describes a Reactor trip initiated by loss of load during Turbine overspeed testing due to cognitive personnel error.HRC FORM}} |
| NRCFORN366A(592)U.S.NUCLEARREGUIATOIY COBIISSIOI LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOSNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCONPLYMITHTHISINFORHATIONCOLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORMARDCONHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HHBB7714),U.S~NUCLEARREGULATORY COHIISSIOI,
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| 'MASHINGTOH, DC20555.0001( | |
| ANDTOTHEPAPERMDRK REDUCTIOIPROJECT(3140.0104),
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| OFFICEOFIIANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTONDC20503.FACILITYNANE1St.LucieUnit1DOXETNNBER2LERNWBER6YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIOIPAGE305000335TEXTlfaerosceisrireduseedditiooeI coiesofNRCFo366A(17)95003030F5DESCRXPTXON OFTHEEVENTcontiuedTheControlRoomcrewcompleted theactionsofEOP-01,StandardPostTripActions",
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| andimplemented EOP-02,"ReactorTripRecovery" afterdiagnosing anuncomplicated trip.Uponcompletion oftheReactorTripRecoveryprocedure, theunitwasmaintained inastable,Mode3condition forposttripreviewandeventinvestigation.
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| CAUSEOFTHEEVENTThecauseofthiseventwascognitive personnel errorbyautilitynon-licensed operatorwhofailedtocorrectly implement aprocedural stepduringperformance ofaturbineoverspeed tripsurveillance.
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| Theoperatorwasmomentarily distracted byplacingavalvelockingdeviceinasecureposition, anddidnotclosethevalveasdirectedbytheprocedure.
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| YSXSOFTHEEVENTThiseventisreportable undertherequirements of10CFR50.73.a.2.iv, as"anyeventthatresultedinamanualorautomatic actionofanyEngineered SafetyFeature."
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| TheclosureoftheMainTurbineGovernorandIntercept valvescausedarapidreduction insecondary steamflow.Theeffectofthereduction insecondary steamdemandwasanincreaseinSGpressureandtemperature, andRCStemperature andpressure.
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| Increasing RCSpressureresultedinanuncomplicated Reactortriponhighpressurizer pressureasdesigned. | |
| Aninvestigation performed aftertheeventrevealedthatthecalibration onthe1AMainFeedwater Regulating Valve(FCV-9011) electro-pneumatic transducer (E/P)haddrifted,sothatthefeedwater flowcontrolvalvedidnotclosefullyasexpectedontheplanttrip.Thiscausedthe1ASteamGenerator leveltoincreaseabovethenormalvaluetothehighleveltripsetpointfortheMainFeedwater Pump.ClosingtheMainFeedwater Blockvalvesecuredtheflowtothe1ASGfromFCV-9011,stabilizing SGlevel.Thiseventisboundedbysection15.2.7oftheSt.LucieUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)"LossofExternalElectrical LoadorTurbineStopValveClosure."
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| Thissectiondescribes arapid,largereduction ofpowerdemandonthereactorwhileoperating atfullpower.TheUFSARstates,"Whentheturbinestop/control valvecloses,thesteamflowisterminated, causingthesecondary systemtemperature andpressuretoincrease.
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| Theprimary-to-secondary heattransferdecreases assecondary systemtemperature increases.
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| Ifthereactorisnottrippedwhentheturbineistripped,.
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| ~.thereactorwilltriponhighpressurizer | |
| : pressure, reducingtheprimaryheatsource."NRCFORII366A(5-92)
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| NRCFORll366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CQHIISSION'LICENSEE EVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBZQNINO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPOHSETOCONPLYMITHTHISIHFORNATIONCOLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORMARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSNANAGENEHT BRANCH(HHBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CONHISSION,MASHINGTQI, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERMORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT(3140-0104),
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| OFFICEOFHANAGEHENT ANDBlmGETMASHINGTQl DC20503.FACILITYlUWE1St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNQIBER205000335YEAR95LERNWBER6SEQUENTIALREVISION003PAGE34OF5TEXTIfmorscisrireduseadditions coiesofNCForm366(17)ANALYSISOPTHEEVENTcont,iuedInadditiontotheabove,UFSARsection15.2.7,statesthat,"Themitigative featuresofthepressurizer spray,pressurizer reliefvalves(PORV),andtheSteamBypassSystemareassumednottofunctionsoastoexacerbate thecalculated pressurization oftheprimarysystem.Thepurpose,...is todemonstrate thattheprimarysafetyreliefcapability issufficient tolimitprimarypressuretolessthan110%ofthedesignpressure(2750psia),andtodemonstrate thatthesecondary safetyreliefcapacityissufficient tolimitsecondary pressuretolessthan110/ofthedesignpressure(1100psia)."Duringthisevent,thePORVs(EIIS:AB) functioned properlytolimitprimarypressureto2430psia,sothatthePressurizer codesafetyvalves(EIIS:AB) werenotchallenged.
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| TheSGcodesafeties(EIIS:SB) limitedSGpressureto1023psiaandSBCSfunctioned asdesigned.
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| Thiseventislesslimitingthanthatdescribed inUFSARsection15.2.7.Thehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotaffectedbythisevent.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS1)Operations personnel involvedwiththiseventwerecounseled ontheimportance ofapplyingself-checkingprinciples.
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| 2)Thesurveillance procedure forconducting thistest,OP1/2-0030150, "Secondary PlantOperating ChecksandTests"willbechangedtoincorporate formatimprovements, andtoincludeadditional verification thatcriticalstepshavebeencompleted, 3)PlantStaffwillreviewotherloadthreatening surveillances todetermine ifadditional procedural changesorprecautions arenecessary tominimizethepotential forpersonnel error.4)Atechnical subcommittee wasformedtoevaluatethiseventforgenericimplications andprovideadditional corrective actionstopreventreoccurrence. | |
| 5)Sitemanagement heldatripreviewmeeting,attendedbypersonnel fromOperations, Maintenance, | |
| : Training, Engineering, Technical staff,andseniorNuclearDivisionmanagement toexaminethisevent.Themeetingwasvideotapedtoassurethatlessonslearnedareavailable toallOperations personnel.
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| 6)Instrument andControl(I/C)andSystemEngineers calibrated the1AMainFeedwater Regulating ValveE/Ptransducer priortounitstartup.TheMainFeedwater RegUlating valvepositioning components affecting thiseventarebeingevaluated foradditional corrective actions.7)ThisEventwillbeincludedintoOperations trainingforbothlicensedandnon-licensed Operations personnel. | |
| HRC-FORH366A(5-92) | |
| NRCFORM366A5-92)U.S.NUCLENIREGULATORY CQHIISSIQI LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYQSNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTINATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCQ(PLYMITHTHISINFORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0KRS.FORMARDCQINENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION AMDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(HMBB7714),U.S.HUCLEARREGULATORY CQBIISSION, llASHINGTON, DC20555-0001~
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| ANDTOTHEPAPERMORk REDUCTION PROJECT(3140-0104)
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| ~OFFICEOFHANAGEHEMT AMDBIIGET,MASHINGTON, DC20503.FACILITYNU%1DO(XETNMBER2LERNNBER6YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIOHPAGE3St.LucieUnit10500033595pp3p5OF5EXTIfmorsceisireduseedditione coiesofMRCForm366A(17)ADDITIONAL NPORMATION il'nInifitiNocomponent failureswereidentified forthisevent.PrvimilrEvnLER389/86-002 describes aReactortripinitiated bylossofloadduringTurbineoverspeed testingduetocognitive personnel error.HRCFORM}} | |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr. ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999 ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines. ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999 SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept. ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209. ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998 Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project). ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr. ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
jpRIORITY.
1e, (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9508080069 DOC.DATE: 95/08/03 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-335 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power&Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BENKEN,E.J.
Florida Power&Light Co.SAGER,D.A.
Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET g 05000335
SUBJECT:
LER 95-003-00:on 950708,automatic reactor trip occurred during turbine overspeed surveillance testing due to personnel error.Personnel involved in event counseled&procedure changes being made.W/950803 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NORRIS,J-EHZE~R NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POOREiW NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECZPZENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27 Florida Power&Light Company, P.O.Box 128, Fort Pierce, FL 34954.0128 August 3, 1995 L-95-218 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 1 Docket No.50-335 Reportable Event: 95-003 Date of Event: July 8, 1995 Automatic Reactor T i Duri Tes i due t Pe so el Erro Turb'0 e s e d Sur eilla ce The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, D.A..ger Vice r sident St.Lu ie Plant DAS/EJB Attachment cc: Stewart D.Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant 9508080069 950803 PDR ADOCK 05000335 8 PDR
~~NRC FORH 366 (5-92)U.S.IN)CLEAR REGUULTORY C(NIT SS ION APPROVED BY QS NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)EST IHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO C(WPLY lllTH THIS INFORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST I HATE TO THE INFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIONg MASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEKENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON OC 20503.FACILITY IWK (1)St.Lucie Unit 1 DOCKET IRWBER (2)05000335 PAGE (3)1OF5 TITLE (4)Automatic Reactor Trip During Turbine Overspeed Surveillance Testing due to Personnel Error.EVENT DATE 5 HONTH DAY YEAR 07 08 95 YEAR 95 LER NNBER 6 SEQUENT IAL NUHBER 003 REVISION NOSER 0 REPORT DATE 7 HONTH DAY 08 03 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILITY NAHE YEAR N/A FACILITY NAHE N/A DOCKET NUHBER DOCKET NUHBER OPERAT INGa IRmE (9)LEVEL (10)100 THIS REPORT IS SUSHI TTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A To THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR: Check one or more 11 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAHE Edwin J.Benken, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(407)468-4248 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH C(NPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORI'3 CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYS'IEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES (If yes, coagulate EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBHI SSI ON DATE (15)HONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On July 8, 1995, Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent reactor power.Operations personnel were conducting a scheduled Turbine overspeed trip surveillance per an approved plant procedure.
During the portion of the surveillance that tests a solenoid valve for Overspeed Protection Control (20-1 OPC)a utility non-licensed Operator failed to close an isolation valve as directed by the procedure.
Failure to close this valve allowed electro-hydraulic (EH)fluid from the Governor valves (GV)and Intercept valves (IV)to drain when the solenoid valve was opened in a subsequent step.Draining of the EH fluid caused closure of the Main Turbine Governor and Intercept valves which resulted in an automatic reactor trip.The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error on the part of a utility non-licensed operator who failed to properly implement a procedural step during performance of a surveillance.
Corrective actions for this event: 1)Operations personnel involved with the event were counselled.
2)Procedure changes are being made to incorporate human factors improvements and additional step verifications.
3)Other load threatening surveillances are being reviewed to determine if generic changes are warranted.
4)A technical subcommittee is evaluating this event for additional corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence.
5)Site management held a trip review meeting open to all disciplines for lessons learned from this event.NRC FORH ()
~(, KRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQKI SSI(NI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY CHB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, MASHINGTOM, DC 20555-0001(AND TO THE PAPERNNK REDUCT IOM PROJECT (31/0-0104), OFF ICE OF HAMAGEHEMT AND BUDGET MASHIMGTON DC 20503.FACI LI TY MAHE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 05000335 95 LER MINBER 6 SEQUEHT IAL 003 REVISION PAGE 3 2OF5 TEXT If mo e s ce is r ired use additional co ies of M C Form 3 (17)DESCRIPTION OP THE EVENT On July 8, 1995, St.Lucie Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent Reactor power.A utility non-licensed Operator was performing the monthly turbine overspeed trip te"t in accordance with an approved plant procedure.
The non-licensed operator was performing the steps of the procedure while a utility licensed Operator maintained radio communication with the control room.During the portion of the test which checks the operability of an Overspeed Protection Control (OPC)solenoid valve, SE22138 (EIIS:TG), the procedure directed the operator to unlock and close V22482 (EIIS:TG),"EH Test Header to 20-1/OPC Isolation." This is the electro-hydraulic (EH)fluid inlet isolation to the OPC solenoid valve.This step ensures that the OPC solenoid valve is isolated from the actual EH fluid system (EIIS:TG)supplying the turbine Governor (GV)and Intercept valves (IV)(EIIS:SB)prior to testing the solenoid.The NPO removed the locking device from isolation valve V22482, but was momentarily distracted by placing the locking device in a secure position, and failed to close the valve as directed by the procedure.
When the next step of the procedure was executed (the actual stroke testing of solenoid valve SE22138)EH fluid was drained from the GVs and IVs causing the GVs and IVs to rapidly close.Closure of the turbine valves quickly reduced steam flow through the turbine which resulted in a reactor trip from high pressurizer pressure at 1122 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.26921e-4 months <br />.Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-1,"Standard Post Trip Actions" was immediately implemented.
The Reactor Coolant System (RCS)Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV)(EIIS:AB)actuated as designed during the time the high Pressurizer pressure signal was present (less than 4 seconds), and then reclosed.The maximum RCS pressure reached during this event was 2430 psia.The maximum secondary pressure reached was 1023 psia.Operators observed increasing level in the 1A SG after the trip and closed the 15 percent feedwater bypass valve.Level continued to increase and the Control Room Operators closed the isolation valve for the 1A Feedwater Regulating Valve (EIIS: JB).The 1B Main Feedwater Pump (MFW)(EIIS:SJ) subsequently tripped from a low flow condition, and the 1A MFW Pump tripped due to high level in the 1A SG.The 1B MFW Pump was restarted and SG levels were then controlled within the normal band.A relief valve in the Letdown Level Control System (EIIS:CB)opened during the event due to the system transient, and subsequently closed when Control Room operators reduced the letdown pressure controller (EIIS:CB)setpoint.The Steam Generator Safety Valves (EIIS:SB)functioned as designed to limit SG pressure during the initial transient.
The Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS)(EIIS:Jl)functioned properly to control RCS temperature during this event.NRC-FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORN 366A (5 92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGUIATOIY COBIISSIOI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OS NO.3150-0104 EXP IRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY MITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD CONHENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHIISSIOI,'MASHINGTOH, DC 20555.0001(AND TO THE PAPERMDRK REDUCT IOI PROJECT (3140.0104), OFFICE OF IIANAGEHENT AND BUDGET MASH INGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NANE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 DOXET NNBER 2 LER NWBER 6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVI SIOI PAGE 3 05000335 TEXT lf aero s ce is r ired use edditiooeI co ies of NRC Fo 366A (17)95 003 0 30F5 DESCRXPTXON OF THE EVENT conti ued The Control Room crew completed the actions of EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions", and implemented EOP-02,"Reactor Trip Recovery" after diagnosing an uncomplicated trip.Upon completion of the Reactor Trip Recovery procedure, the unit was maintained in a stable, Mode 3 condition for post trip review and event investigation.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of this event was cognitive personnel error by a utility non-licensed operator who failed to correctly implement a procedural step during performance of a turbine overspeed trip surveillance.
The operator was momentarily distracted by placing a valve locking device in a secure position, and did not close the valve as directed by the procedure.
YSXS OF THE EVENT This event is reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, as"any event that resulted in a manual or automatic action of any Engineered Safety Feature." The closure of the Main Turbine Governor and Intercept valves caused a rapid reduction in secondary steam flow.The effect of the reduction in secondary steam demand was an increase in SG pressure and temperature, and RCS temperature and pressure.Increasing RCS pressure resulted in an uncomplicated Reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure as designed.An investigation performed after the event revealed that the calibration on the 1A Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FCV-9011) electro-pneumatic transducer (E/P)had drifted, so that the feedwater flow control valve did not close fully as expected on the plant trip.This caused the 1A Steam Generator level to increase above the normal value to the high level trip setpoint for the Main Feedwater Pump.Closing the Main Feedwater Block valve secured the flow to the 1A SG from FCV-9011, stabilizing SG level.This event is bounded by section 15.2.7 of the St.Lucie Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)"Loss of External Electrical Load or Turbine Stop Valve Closure." This section describes a rapid, large reduction of power demand on the reactor while operating at full power.The UFSAR states,"When the turbine stop/control valve closes, the steam flow is terminated, causing the secondary system temperature and pressure to increase.The primary-to-secondary heat transfer decreases as secondary system temperature increases.
If the reactor is not tripped when the turbine is tripped,.~.the reactor will trip on high pressurizer pressure, reducing the primary heat source." NRC FORII 366A (5-92)
NRC FORll 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQHIISS ION'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BZ QNI NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO CONPLY MITH THIS IHFORNAT ION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORMARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS NANAGENEHT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONHI SS ION, MASHINGTQI, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3140-0104), OF FICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BlmGET MASHINGTQl DC 20503.FACILITY lUWE 1 St.Lucie Unit 1 DOCKET NQIBER 2 05000335 YEAR 95 LER NWBER 6 SEQUENT IAL REVISION 003 PAGE 3 4OF 5 TEXT If mor s c is r ired use additions co ies of N C Form 366 (17)ANALYSIS OP THE EVENT cont,i ued In addition to the above, UFSAR section 15.2.7, states that,"The mitigative features of the pressurizer spray, pressurizer relief valves (PORV), and the Steam Bypass System are assumed not to function so as to exacerbate the calculated pressurization of the primary system.The purpose,...is to demonstrate that the primary safety relief capability is sufficient to limit primary pressure to less than 110%of the design pressure (2750 psia), and to demonstrate that the secondary safety relief capacity is sufficient to limit secondary pressure to less than 110/of the design pressure (1100 psia)." During this event, the PORVs (EIIS:AB)functioned properly to limit primary pressure to 2430 psia, so that the Pressurizer code safety valves (EIIS:AB)were not challenged.
The SG code safeties (EIIS:SB)limited SG pressure to 1023 psia and SBCS functioned as designed.This event is less limiting than that described in UFSAR section 15.2.7.The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1)Operations personnel involved with this event were counseled on the importance of applying self-checking principles.
2)The surveillance procedure for conducting this test, OP 1/2-0030150,"Secondary Plant Operating Checks and Tests" will be changed to incorporate format improvements, and to include additional verification that critical steps have been completed, 3)Plant Staff will review other load threatening surveillances to determine if additional procedural changes or precautions are necessary to minimize the potential for personnel error.4)A technical subcommittee was formed to evaluate this event for generic implications and provide additional corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence.
5)Site management held a trip review meeting, attended by personnel from Operations, Maintenance, Training, Engineering, Technical staff, and senior Nuclear Division management to examine this event.The meeting was video taped to assure that lessons learned are available to all Operations personnel.
6)Instrument and Control (I/C)and System Engineers calibrated the 1A Main Feedwater Regulating Valve E/P transducer prior to unit startup.The Main Feedwater RegUlating valve positioning components affecting this event are being evaluated for additional corrective actions.7)This Event will be included into Operations training for both licensed and non-licensed Operations personnel.
HRC-FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORM 366A 5-92)U.S.NUCLENI REGULATORY CQHIISSIQI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QS NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTINATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CQ(PLY MITH THIS IN FORHAT10N COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 KRS.FORMARD CQINENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AMD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HMBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY CQBIISSION, llASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001~
AND TO THE PAPERMORk REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104)
~OFFICE OF HANAGEHEMT AMD BIIGET, MASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NU%1 DO(XET NMBER 2 LER NNBER 6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISIOH PAGE 3 St.Lucie Unit 1 05000335 95 pp3 p 5 OF 5 EXT If mor s ce is ired use edditione co ies of MRC Form 366A (17)ADDITIONAL NPORMATION il'n I nifi ti No component failures were identified for this event.Pr vi mil rEv n LER 389/86-002 describes a Reactor trip initiated by loss of load during Turbine overspeed testing due to cognitive personnel error.HRC FORM