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| {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1yREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9804130248 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY 1y REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9804130248 DOC.DATE: 98/04/06 NOTARIZED: |
| 98/04/06NOTARIZED: | | NO" DOCKET 0 FACXL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH.N~E.AUTHOR AFFILIATION FINXSSI,M. |
| NO"DOCKET0FACXL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM05000315AUTH.N~E.AUTHORAFFILIATION FINXSSI,M. | | Indiana Michigan Power Co.SAMPSON,J.R. |
| IndianaMichiganPowerCo.SAMPSON,J.R.
| | Indiana Michigan Power Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATZON |
| IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATZON
| |
|
| |
|
| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER98-013-00:on 980306,discovered improperspliceconfigurations forPORVlimitswitches.
| | LER 98-013-00:on 980306,discovered improper splice configurations for PORV limit switches.Caused by inadequate guidance in installation documents. |
| Causedbyinadequate guidanceininstallation documents.
| | Document are being revised Ec breakout boots will be installed.W/980406 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 PD INTERNAL: ZLE EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB. |
| DocumentarebeingrevisedEcbreakoutbootswillbeinstalled.W/980406 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3PDINTERNAL:
| | NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME STANG, J AEOD/S PD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EXB LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1"1.1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Y'()U NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| ZLEEELBNRR/DRCH/HHFB.
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSXON REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24 Indiana Michigan Power Company CcuNcc ear P~zc!Or.e Cxk Pzce Bagman.Ml 490C6 INDIANA NICHIGAItI POWER April 6, 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: d Ihh'bllhdbpldgdh 0.did~i~h Ill lg 0 1 big b lgd.'8-013-00 Sincerely, J.R.Sampson Site Vice President Imbd Attachment A.B.Beach, Region III E.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.Barrett S.J.Brewer R.Whale D.Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 9804130248 980406 PDR ADOCK 05000315 PDR HRC FORH 366 (5-92).NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)ROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY IIITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORVAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEH ESTIMATE TO TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555.0001, AND TO THE PAPERNOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE 0 MAHAGEHENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAME (1)Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)50.315 Page 1 of4 TITLE (4)Improper Splice Configurations for Power Operated Relief Valve Limit Switches Results in Unanalyzed Condition EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH 03 DAY YEAR 06 98 YEAR 98 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 013 REVI S ION NUMBER 00 HONTM 04 DAY 06 FACILIT'Y NAHE Cook Unit 2 FACILITY HAHE DOCKET NUMBER 50-316 DOCKET NUHBER OPERATING MODE (9)PONER LEVEL (10)0 TH S REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 20.2201(b) 20.2203 a 20.2203(a)(2)(i) |
| NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN3FILE01EXTERNAL: | | TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 20.2203(a)(3)(s) 20.2203 a 3 ii 20.2203(a)(4) |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211,11111111111111'111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME STANG,JAEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EXB LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111"1.11'11111111Y'()UNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | Check one or more 11 73.71 (b)73.71o 50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73 a 2 iv OTHER 50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.2203 a 2 ii 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSXON REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | X 50.36 c 1 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73 a 2 vii 50.73(a)(2)(vfii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x)(Specify in Abstract beloM and in Text, NRC Form 366A)NAME LICENSEE CONTAC1'OR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Mr.Mike Finissi, Electrical Systems Manager 616/465-5901, x2830 COMPL ETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONEHT FA LURE DESCR NIS REPORT ISED IN T CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO HPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DAlE).NO EXPECTED'UBMISSIOH DATE (15)HONTH DAY YEAR 04 17 98 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On March 61998, with Unit 1 and 2 in cold shutdown, it was determined that the splices for the limit switches on the Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)were installed without the"breakout boot required for Environmental Qualification (EQ).The valves were declared inoperable, and an ENS notification was made at 1829 hours EST under 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i) for an unanalyzed condition. |
| LTTR24ENCL24 IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyCcuNccearP~zc!Or.eCxkPzceBagman.Ml490C6INDIANANICHIGAItI POWERApril6,1998UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555Operating LicensesDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:dIhh'bllhdbpldgdh 0.did~i~hIlllg01bigblgd.'8-013-00 Sincerely, J.R.SampsonSiteVicePresident ImbdAttachment A.B.Beach,RegionIIIE.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.BarrettS.J.BrewerR.WhaleD.HahnRecordsCenter,INPONRCResidentInspector 9804130248 980406PDRADOCK05000315PDR HRCFORH366(5-92).NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)ROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYIIITHTHIINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORVARCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDEHESTIMATETOTHINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555.0001, ANDTOTHEPAPERNORREDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| | Inspection of the PORV limit switches for Unit 2 identified that although the breakout boot was installed, a problem with the length of the splice overlap existed at a different splice location.This discrepancy resulted in the valves being declared inoperable, and an update to the original notiTication was made on March 7, 1998, at 0615 hours EST.This LER is therefore submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(ii) for both units.The root cause for the lack of breakout boots was determined to be inadequate guidance in the installation documents. |
| OFFICE0MAHAGEHENT ANDBUDGET'WASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYHAME(1)DonaldC.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)50.315Page1of4TITLE(4)ImproperSpliceConfigurations forPowerOperatedReliefValveLimitSwitchesResultsinUnanalyzed Condition EVENTDATE5LERNUMBER6REPORTDATE7O'THERFACILITIES INVOLVED8MONTH03DAYYEAR0698YEAR98SEQUENTIAL NUHBER013REVISIONNUMBER00HONTM04DAY06FACILIT'Y NAHECookUnit2FACILITYHAHEDOCKETNUMBER50-316DOCKETNUHBEROPERATING MODE(9)PONERLEVEL(10)0THSREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANT20.2201(b) 20.2203a20.2203(a)(2)(i)
| | These documents are currently being revised, and once the revisions are complete, the breakout boots will be installed. |
| TOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR20.2203(a)(3)(s) 20.2203a3ii20.2203(a)(4)
| | The root cause for the improper splice overlap length is still under investigation. |
| Checkoneormore1173.71(b)73.71o50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73a2ivOTHER50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.2203a2ii20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
| | An evaluation of the existing configurations was performed. |
| X50.36c150.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73a2vii50.73(a)(2)(vfii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
| | It was determined that although the installed configuration did not meet the EQ requirements, the configuration used would have functioned adequately during accident and post-accident conditions. |
| (SpecifyinAbstractbeloMandinText,NRCForm366A)NAMELICENSEECONTAC1'OR THISLER12TELEPHONE NUMBER(IncludeAreaCode)Mr.MikeFinissi,Electrical SystemsManager616/465-5901, x2830COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONEHT FALUREDESCRNISREPORTISEDINTCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOHPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED14XYES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DAlE).NOEXPECTED'UBMISSIOH DATE(15)HONTHDAYYEAR041798ABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnMarch61998,withUnit1and2incoldshutdown, itwasdetermined thatthesplicesforthelimitswitchesontheUnit1PowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)wereinstalled withoutthe"breakout bootrequiredforEnvironmental Qualification (EQ).Thevalvesweredeclaredinoperable, andanENSnotification wasmadeat1829hoursESTunder10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i) foranunanalyzed condition. | | It is therefore concluded that the event had minimal safety significance and the health and safety of the public were not endangered. |
| Inspection ofthePORVlimitswitchesforUnit2identified thatalthoughthebreakoutbootwasinstalled, aproblemwiththelengthofthespliceoverlapexistedatadifferent splicelocation. | | An update to this LER is expected to be submitted by April 17, 1998. |
| Thisdiscrepancy resultedinthevalvesbeingdeclaredinoperable, andanupdatetotheoriginalnotiTication wasmadeonMarch7,1998,at0615hoursEST.ThisLERistherefore submitted inaccordance with10CFR50.72(a)(2)(ii) forbothunits.Therootcauseforthelackofbreakoutbootswasdetermined tobeinadequate guidanceintheinstallation documents.
| | HRC FORM 366A.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50'HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEH ESTIMATE'TO THE INFORMATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,'WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 1 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (if core space is required.use additional NRC Forrs 366A's)<17)DOCKET NUMBER 2 50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6 SEQUEHT IAL REVI SION 013-00 PAGE 3 2 OF 4 C di n riort E e Unit 1 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown On March 6, 1998, while planning a job order on the Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), a potential discrepancy was noted between actual installation configuration and the required Environmental Qualification (EQ)configuration. |
| Thesedocuments arecurrently beingrevised,andoncetherevisions arecomplete, thebreakoutbootswillbeinstalled.
| | It was decided that a walkdown of the Unit 1 PORVs should be performed to confirm the installed configuration. |
| Therootcausefortheimproperspliceoverlaplengthisstillunderinvestigation.
| | The walkdown revealed that a single Raychem splice was used for 1-NRV-152 and 1-NRV-153 instead of the required EQ"breakout boot" as described in DCC Specification DCC-PS@30-QCN. |
| Anevaluation oftheexistingconfigurations wasperformed.
| | A breakout boot is used to splice a pair of leads to a single field cable, and physically resembles the letter"Y" or a pair of pants.It could not be determined when the improper splices were installed, but it was conservatively assumed that the improper splices had been installed while the unit was operating. |
| Itwasdetermined thatalthoughtheinstalled configuration didnotmeettheEQrequirements, theconfiguration usedwouldhavefunctioned adequately duringaccidentandpost-accident conditions.
| | The valves were subsequently declared inoperable. |
| Itistherefore concluded thattheeventhadminimalsafetysignificance andthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotendangered.
| | A walkdown of the Unit 2 PORVs was conducted early on March 7, 1998.This walkdown revealed that the breakout boots were properly installed, however, the Raychem splices for a different splice of a single conductor to another single conductor did not have the EQ required overlap length of 2 inches.These valves, 2-NRV-151, 2-NRV-152 and 2-NRV-153, were also declared inoperable. |
| AnupdatetothisLERisexpectedtobesubmitted byApril17,1998.
| | Subsequent to the discovery of the problems with the PORVs, the lack of a breakout boot was also identified on the splices for 1-NSO-21 and 1-NSO-22, the Unit 1 reactor vessel head vent valves.j The root cause of this event v7as inadequate written guidance for the installation of the required EQ breakout boot splices.The splices are to be installed in accordance with the Electrical Design Standard (EDS)for the particular installation. |
| HRCFORM366A.HUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTCONTINUATION ROVEDBYOMBNO.31500104EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50'HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDEHESTIMATE'TO THEINFORMATION AHDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MHBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION,
| | In the case of the PORVs, EDS 335 contains illustrated installation details for the limit switches themselves and includes a reference to DCC Specification DCC-PS430-QCN for the actual splice configuration. |
| 'WASHIHGTOH, DC20555-0001, AHDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104), | | DCC-PS%30-QCN describes the process for assembling a qualified splice, but does not contain any illustration to assist in that assembly.The root cause for the improper splice overlap lengths for the Unit 2 PORVs is still under investigation. |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME1CookNuclearPlant-Unit1TEXT(ifcorespaceisrequired.
| | The investigation is expected to be complete by April 13, 1998.This event was reported via ENS on March 6, 1998 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i), as an unanalyzed condition on Unit 1.The notification was updated on March 7, 1998 to include the Unit 2 PORVs.This LER is therefore submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), as an event which was found while shutdown, which if found while the reactor was operating, would have constituted an unanalyzed condition. |
| useadditional NRCForrs366A's)<17)DOCKETNUMBER250-315YEAR98LERNUMBER6SEQUEHTIALREVISION013-00PAGE32OF4CdinriortEeUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownOnMarch6,1998,whileplanningajoborderontheUnit1PowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs),apotential discrepancy wasnotedbetweenactualinstallation configuration andtherequiredEnvironmental Qualification (EQ)configuration.
| | NRC FORM 366A~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ROVED BY OMB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 MRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/ |
| ItwasdecidedthatawalkdownoftheUnit1PORVsshouldbeperformed toconfirmtheinstalled configuration.
| | WASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE 1 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (if acre space is required.use additional NRC Fom 366A's)(IT)DOCKET NUMBER 2 50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6 SEQUENTIAL REVISION 013-'0 PAGE 3 3OF4 na I ve cont'd An Engineering evaluation of the installed configurations was performed. |
| ThewalkdownrevealedthatasingleRaychemsplicewasusedfor1-NRV-152 and1-NRV-153 insteadoftherequiredEQ"breakout boot"asdescribed inDCCSpecification DCC-PS@30-QCN.
| | The first issue addressed was the lack of a breakout boot for the single conductor to two conductor splice.The breakout boot is designed to provide a seal where the two conductors leave the single conductor. |
| Abreakoutbootisusedtospliceapairofleadstoasinglefieldcable,andphysically resembles theletter"Y"orapairofpants.Itcouldnotbedetermined whentheimproperspliceswereinstalled, butitwasconservatively assumedthattheimproperspliceshadbeeninstalled whiletheunitwasoperating.
| | Raychem had qualified the breakout boots for installations exposed to direct steam impingement. |
| Thevalvesweresubsequently declaredinoperable.
| | Instead of using a breakout boot for the 1-NRV-152 and 1-NRV-153 applications, each of the three individual conductors were insulated with Raychem WCSF heat shrink tubing.Then the entire assembly was covered with a piece of the same tubing.Raychem manufactures the WCSF tubing with a pre-coated adhesive whose function is to provide an environmental seal for isolating the active electrical component from moisture.The entire WCSF sleeve is then heat shrunk to seal against the conductor. |
| AwalkdownoftheUnit2PORVswasconducted earlyonMarch7,1998.Thiswalkdownrevealedthatthebreakoutbootswereproperlyinstalled, however,theRaychemsplicesforadifferent spliceofasingleconductor toanothersingleconductor didnothavetheEQrequiredoverlaplengthof2inches.Thesevalves,2-NRV-151, 2-NRV-152 and2-NRV-153, werealsodeclaredinoperable.
| | The adhesive flows to conform to the shape of the conductor. |
| Subsequent tothediscovery oftheproblemswiththePORVs,thelackofabreakoutbootwasalsoidentified onthesplicesfor1-NSO-21and1-NSO-22, theUnit1reactorvesselheadventvalves.jTherootcauseofthiseventv7asinadequate writtenguidancefortheinstallation oftherequiredEQbreakoutbootsplices.Thesplicesaretobeinstalled inaccordance withtheElectrical DesignStandard(EDS)fortheparticular installation. | | For this particular installation, it also flowed between the two conductors to provide the sealing function normally performed by the breakout boot..The primary failure mechanism to be considered is moisture collection inside the Raychem splice on the conductor to form a low resistance path to ground.The possibility of a short circuit is a function of the length of this path, the circuit voltage and the resistance of the path.In order to develop a low resistance path to ground it would be necessary for moisture to penetrate the Raychem splice underneath the outer tubing.While a qualified assembly would have a breakout boot,'an analysis of the existing configuration shows that it also would provide protection from moisture intrusion. |
| InthecaseofthePORVs,EDS335containsillustrated installation detailsforthelimitswitchesthemselves andincludesareference toDCCSpecification DCC-PS430-QCN fortheactualspliceconfiguration.
| | The breakout boot was qualified against direct spray impingement on the splice for a 1000 volt circuit.For the existing configuration in a 250 volt DC circuit, protection against direct steam impingement is not required as these splices are located inside terminal boxes.Without direct spray impingement, it is considered unlikely that moisture would penetrated the installed splice configuration, and the physical creep distance requirements for the 250 volt DC circuit are less than required for a 1000 volt circuit.The second issue considered was that of the proper size of overlap for Raychem WCSF-N material used for conductor to conductor splices.The current Raychem installation practices requires that for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)application, the WCSF tubing is 6 inches long in order to provide 2 inches of overlap.This 2 inch length was chosen by Raychem to insure successful completion of the LOCA testing for 1000 volt applications directly exposed to steam.However, varieties of overlap lengths, some as short as one eight inch have been acceptably qualified by industry testing.The Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification prepared a report on industry testing of short Raychem splices, which was issued on May 22, 1987, and is the basis for the industry acceptance of the shorter Raychem splice.At this time these tests are under review so that a direct comparison can be made of the test parameters versus the accident profile for Cook.Additionally, as with the quaiifiied breakout boot configuration, the application for which the shorter splice length exists is a 250 vDC circuit installed inside terminal boxes, as opposed to the tested 1000 volt configuration exposed to direct steam impingement. |
| DCC-PS%30-QCN describes theprocessforassembling aqualified splice,butdoesnotcontainanyillustration toassistinthatassembly. | | In conclusion, it was determined that although the installed splices do not meet the EQ requirements for breakout boot and splice, overlap length, it is considered likely that the installed configuration would have performed adequately in a LOCA or post-LOCA environment. |
| TherootcausefortheimproperspliceoverlaplengthsfortheUnit2PORVsisstillunderinvestigation.
| | Therefore, this event is considered to be of minimal safety significance as the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized. |
| Theinvestigation isexpectedtobecompletebyApril13,1998.ThiseventwasreportedviaENSonMarch6,1998inaccordance with10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i),
| | HRC FORM 366A.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION OVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTs 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE IHFORHATIOH AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, liASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEMEHT AND BUDGET IJASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 1 DOCKET NUHBER 2 YEAR LER NUMBER 6 SEQUENTIAL REVISION PAGE 3 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (ir nore space is required.use additional NRC Fora 366A's)(17)50-315 98 013 00 4OF4~*EDS 335 will be revised to reference EDS 620, instead of the DCC Specification. |
| asanunanalyzed condition onUnit1.Thenotification wasupdatedonMarch7,1998toincludetheUnit2PORVs.ThisLERistherefore submitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),
| | EDS 620 will illustrate the required configuration for a multiple cable splice using the breakout boot.Once these revisions are completed, the breakout boots will be installed in accordance with the EDS.Action requests have already been prepared for installation of the breakout boots on both the affected PORVs and reactor vessel head vent valves.Corrective actions will be taken as appropriate for the splice overlap length problem once the root cause has been determined. |
| asaneventwhichwasfoundwhileshutdown, whichiffoundwhilethereactorwasoperating, wouldhaveconstituted anunanalyzed condition.
| | This LER will be updated at that time to reflect those actions.In response to a number of EQ discrepancies that have been identified during the restart readiness reviews currently underway, a Project Team has been assembled to assess the EQ process.This team is composed of members from EQ and Design Engineering, Maintenance Training, Maintenance Planning and Maintenance procedure writers, Quality Control, and Procurement. |
| NRCFORM366A~NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTCONTINUATION ROVEDBYOMBNO.3150.0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISIHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0MRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION/
| | The team will review and assess the EQ process for adequate knowledge and training on installation practices for each discipline. |
| WASHINGTOH, DC20555-0001, AHDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT(31500104),OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE1CookNuclearPlant-Unit1TEXT(ifacrespaceisrequired. | | The amount, content and frequency of training given to each discipline will be evaluated, as will the documents used for installation. |
| useadditional NRCFom366A's)(IT)DOCKETNUMBER250-315YEAR98LERNUMBER6SEQUENTIAL REVISION013-'0PAGE33OF4naIvecont'dAnEngineering evaluation oftheinstalled configurations wasperformed.
| | The team is expected to complete their charter within 6 months, and appropriate actions will be taken to implement solutions to the problems they identify.This information will be provided to the NRC once the long term actions have been determined. |
| Thefirstissueaddressed wasthelackofabreakoutbootforthesingleconductor totwoconductor splice.Thebreakoutbootisdesignedtoprovideasealwherethetwoconductors leavethesingleconductor.
| | Not Applicable ifi on vl 315/97-006-01 |
| Raychemhadqualified thebreakoutbootsforinstallations exposedtodirectsteamimpingement.
| | , 316/97-00640 Ev}} |
| Insteadofusingabreakoutbootforthe1-NRV-152 and1-NRV-153 applications, eachofthethreeindividual conductors wereinsulated withRaychemWCSFheatshrinktubing.Thentheentireassemblywascoveredwithapieceofthesametubing.Raychemmanufactures theWCSFtubingwithapre-coated adhesivewhosefunctionistoprovideanenvironmental sealforisolating theactiveelectrical component frommoisture.
| |
| TheentireWCSFsleeveisthenheatshrunktosealagainsttheconductor.
| |
| Theadhesiveflowstoconformtotheshapeoftheconductor.
| |
| Forthisparticular installation, italsoflowedbetweenthetwoconductors toprovidethesealingfunctionnormallyperformed bythebreakoutboot..Theprimaryfailuremechanism tobeconsidered ismoisturecollection insidetheRaychemspliceontheconductor toformalowresistance pathtoground.Thepossibility ofashortcircuitisafunctionofthelengthofthispath,thecircuitvoltageandtheresistance ofthepath.Inordertodevelopalowresistance pathtogrounditwouldbenecessary formoisturetopenetrate theRaychemspliceunderneath theoutertubing.Whileaqualified assemblywouldhaveabreakoutboot,'ananalysisoftheexistingconfiguration showsthatitalsowouldprovideprotection frommoistureintrusion.
| |
| Thebreakoutbootwasqualified againstdirectsprayimpingement onthesplicefora1000voltcircuit.Fortheexistingconfiguration ina250voltDCcircuit,protection againstdirectsteamimpingement isnotrequiredasthesesplicesarelocatedinsideterminalboxes.Withoutdirectsprayimpingement, itisconsidered unlikelythatmoisturewouldpenetrated theinstalled spliceconfiguration, andthephysicalcreepdistancerequirements forthe250voltDCcircuitarelessthanrequiredfora1000voltcircuit.Thesecondissueconsidered wasthatofthepropersizeofoverlapforRaychemWCSF-Nmaterialusedforconductor toconductor splices.ThecurrentRaycheminstallation practices requiresthatforaLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)application, theWCSFtubingis6incheslonginordertoprovide2inchesofoverlap.This2inchlengthwaschosenbyRaychemtoinsuresuccessful completion oftheLOCAtestingfor1000voltapplications directlyexposedtosteam.However,varieties ofoverlaplengths,someasshortasoneeightinchhavebeenacceptably qualified byindustrytesting.TheNuclearUtilityGrouponEquipment Qualification preparedareportonindustrytestingofshortRaychemsplices,whichwasissuedonMay22,1987,andisthebasisfortheindustryacceptance oftheshorterRaychemsplice.Atthistimethesetestsareunderreviewsothatadirectcomparison canbemadeofthetestparameters versustheaccidentprofileforCook.Additionally, aswiththequaiifiied breakoutbootconfiguration, theapplication forwhichtheshortersplicelengthexistsisa250vDCcircuitinstalled insideterminalboxes,asopposedtothetested1000voltconfiguration exposedtodirectsteamimpingement.
| |
| Inconclusion, itwasdetermined thatalthoughtheinstalled splicesdonotmeettheEQrequirements forbreakoutbootandsplice,overlaplength,itisconsidered likelythattheinstalled configuration wouldhaveperformed adequately inaLOCAorpost-LOCA environment.
| |
| Therefore, thiseventisconsidered tobeofminimalsafetysignificance asthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwasnotjeopardized. | |
| HRCFORM366A.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTCONTINUATION OVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTs50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEIHFORHATIOH ANDRECORDSMANAGEHENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSION, liASHIHGTOH, DC20555-0001, ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| |
| OFFICEOFHANAGEMEHT ANDBUDGETIJASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME1DOCKETNUHBER2YEARLERNUMBER6SEQUENTIAL REVISIONPAGE3CookNuclearPlant-Unit1TEXT(irnorespaceisrequired.
| |
| useadditional NRCFora366A's)(17)50-31598013004OF4~*EDS335willberevisedtoreference EDS620,insteadoftheDCCSpecification.
| |
| EDS620willillustrate therequiredconfiguration foramultiplecablespliceusingthebreakoutboot.Oncetheserevisions arecompleted, thebreakoutbootswillbeinstalled inaccordance withtheEDS.Actionrequestshavealreadybeenpreparedforinstallation ofthebreakoutbootsonboththeaffectedPORVsandreactorvesselheadventvalves.Corrective actionswillbetakenasappropriate forthespliceoverlaplengthproblemoncetherootcausehasbeendetermined.
| |
| ThisLERwillbeupdatedatthattimetoreflectthoseactions.InresponsetoanumberofEQdiscrepancies thathavebeenidentified duringtherestartreadiness reviewscurrently
| |
| : underway, aProjectTeamhasbeenassembled toassesstheEQprocess.ThisteamiscomposedofmembersfromEQandDesignEngineering, Maintenance
| |
| : Training, Maintenance PlanningandMaintenance procedure writers,QualityControl,andProcurement.
| |
| TheteamwillreviewandassesstheEQprocessforadequateknowledge andtrainingoninstallation practices foreachdiscipline.
| |
| Theamount,contentandfrequency oftraininggiventoeachdiscipline willbeevaluated, aswillthedocuments usedforinstallation.
| |
| Theteamisexpectedtocompletetheircharterwithin6months,andappropriate actionswillbetakentoimplement solutions totheproblemstheyidentify.
| |
| Thisinformation willbeprovidedtotheNRConcethelongtermactionshavebeendetermined.
| |
| NotApplicable ifionvl315/97-006-01
| |
| ,316/97-00640 Ev}} | |
Similar Documents at Cook |
|---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted
ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999
LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr
ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999
LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr
ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999
LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr
ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999
LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components
ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing
ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr
ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999
LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing
ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr
ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998
LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr
ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998
LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process
ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event
ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr
ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122
ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria
ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998
LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing
ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998
LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr
ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr
ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998
LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned
ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998
LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3
1999-09-17
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted
ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999
LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr
ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999
LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr
ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999
LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr
ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999
LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components
ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing
ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr
ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999
LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing
ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr
ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998
LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr
ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998
LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process
ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event
ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr
ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122
ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria
ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998
LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing
ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998
LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr
ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr
ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998
LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned
ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998
LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3
1999-09-17
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999
Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3).
ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999
Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios.
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999
Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2.
ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999
Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates.
ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr
ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr
ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999
Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218.
ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
CATEGORY 1y REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9804130248 DOC.DATE: 98/04/06 NOTARIZED:
NO" DOCKET 0 FACXL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH.N~E.AUTHOR AFFILIATION FINXSSI,M.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.SAMPSON,J.R.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATZON
SUBJECT:
LER 98-013-00:on 980306,discovered improper splice configurations for PORV limit switches.Caused by inadequate guidance in installation documents.
Document are being revised Ec breakout boots will be installed.W/980406 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 PD INTERNAL: ZLE EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB.
NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME STANG, J AEOD/S PD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EXB LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1"1.1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Y'()U NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSXON REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24 Indiana Michigan Power Company CcuNcc ear P~zc!Or.e Cxk Pzce Bagman.Ml 490C6 INDIANA NICHIGAItI POWER April 6, 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: d Ihh'bllhdbpldgdh 0.did~i~h Ill lg 0 1 big b lgd.'8-013-00 Sincerely, J.R.Sampson Site Vice President Imbd Attachment A.B.Beach, Region III E.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.Barrett S.J.Brewer R.Whale D.Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 9804130248 980406 PDR ADOCK 05000315 PDR HRC FORH 366 (5-92).NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)ROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY IIITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORVAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEH ESTIMATE TO TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555.0001, AND TO THE PAPERNOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE 0 MAHAGEHENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAME (1)Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)50.315 Page 1 of4 TITLE (4)Improper Splice Configurations for Power Operated Relief Valve Limit Switches Results in Unanalyzed Condition EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH 03 DAY YEAR 06 98 YEAR 98 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 013 REVI S ION NUMBER 00 HONTM 04 DAY 06 FACILIT'Y NAHE Cook Unit 2 FACILITY HAHE DOCKET NUMBER 50-316 DOCKET NUHBER OPERATING MODE (9)PONER LEVEL (10)0 TH S REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 20.2201(b) 20.2203 a 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 20.2203(a)(3)(s) 20.2203 a 3 ii 20.2203(a)(4)
Check one or more 11 73.71 (b)73.71o 50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73 a 2 iv OTHER 50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.2203 a 2 ii 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X 50.36 c 1 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73 a 2 vii 50.73(a)(2)(vfii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x)(Specify in Abstract beloM and in Text, NRC Form 366A)NAME LICENSEE CONTAC1'OR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Mr.Mike Finissi, Electrical Systems Manager 616/465-5901, x2830 COMPL ETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONEHT FA LURE DESCR NIS REPORT ISED IN T CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO HPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DAlE).NO EXPECTED'UBMISSIOH DATE (15)HONTH DAY YEAR 04 17 98 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On March 61998, with Unit 1 and 2 in cold shutdown, it was determined that the splices for the limit switches on the Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)were installed without the"breakout boot required for Environmental Qualification (EQ).The valves were declared inoperable, and an ENS notification was made at 1829 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00302 weeks <br />6.959345e-4 months <br /> EST under 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i) for an unanalyzed condition.
Inspection of the PORV limit switches for Unit 2 identified that although the breakout boot was installed, a problem with the length of the splice overlap existed at a different splice location.This discrepancy resulted in the valves being declared inoperable, and an update to the original notiTication was made on March 7, 1998, at 0615 hours0.00712 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.340075e-4 months <br /> EST.This LER is therefore submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(ii) for both units.The root cause for the lack of breakout boots was determined to be inadequate guidance in the installation documents.
These documents are currently being revised, and once the revisions are complete, the breakout boots will be installed.
The root cause for the improper splice overlap length is still under investigation.
An evaluation of the existing configurations was performed.
It was determined that although the installed configuration did not meet the EQ requirements, the configuration used would have functioned adequately during accident and post-accident conditions.
It is therefore concluded that the event had minimal safety significance and the health and safety of the public were not endangered.
An update to this LER is expected to be submitted by April 17, 1998.
HRC FORM 366A.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50'HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEH ESTIMATE'TO THE INFORMATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,'WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 1 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (if core space is required.use additional NRC Forrs 366A's)<17)DOCKET NUMBER 2 50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6 SEQUEHT IAL REVI SION 013-00 PAGE 3 2 OF 4 C di n riort E e Unit 1 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown On March 6, 1998, while planning a job order on the Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), a potential discrepancy was noted between actual installation configuration and the required Environmental Qualification (EQ)configuration.
It was decided that a walkdown of the Unit 1 PORVs should be performed to confirm the installed configuration.
The walkdown revealed that a single Raychem splice was used for 1-NRV-152 and 1-NRV-153 instead of the required EQ"breakout boot" as described in DCC Specification DCC-PS@30-QCN.
A breakout boot is used to splice a pair of leads to a single field cable, and physically resembles the letter"Y" or a pair of pants.It could not be determined when the improper splices were installed, but it was conservatively assumed that the improper splices had been installed while the unit was operating.
The valves were subsequently declared inoperable.
A walkdown of the Unit 2 PORVs was conducted early on March 7, 1998.This walkdown revealed that the breakout boots were properly installed, however, the Raychem splices for a different splice of a single conductor to another single conductor did not have the EQ required overlap length of 2 inches.These valves, 2-NRV-151, 2-NRV-152 and 2-NRV-153, were also declared inoperable.
Subsequent to the discovery of the problems with the PORVs, the lack of a breakout boot was also identified on the splices for 1-NSO-21 and 1-NSO-22, the Unit 1 reactor vessel head vent valves.j The root cause of this event v7as inadequate written guidance for the installation of the required EQ breakout boot splices.The splices are to be installed in accordance with the Electrical Design Standard (EDS)for the particular installation.
In the case of the PORVs, EDS 335 contains illustrated installation details for the limit switches themselves and includes a reference to DCC Specification DCC-PS430-QCN for the actual splice configuration.
DCC-PS%30-QCN describes the process for assembling a qualified splice, but does not contain any illustration to assist in that assembly.The root cause for the improper splice overlap lengths for the Unit 2 PORVs is still under investigation.
The investigation is expected to be complete by April 13, 1998.This event was reported via ENS on March 6, 1998 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(i), as an unanalyzed condition on Unit 1.The notification was updated on March 7, 1998 to include the Unit 2 PORVs.This LER is therefore submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), as an event which was found while shutdown, which if found while the reactor was operating, would have constituted an unanalyzed condition.
NRC FORM 366A~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ROVED BY OMB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 MRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
WASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE 1 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (if acre space is required.use additional NRC Fom 366A's)(IT)DOCKET NUMBER 2 50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6 SEQUENTIAL REVISION 013-'0 PAGE 3 3OF4 na I ve cont'd An Engineering evaluation of the installed configurations was performed.
The first issue addressed was the lack of a breakout boot for the single conductor to two conductor splice.The breakout boot is designed to provide a seal where the two conductors leave the single conductor.
Raychem had qualified the breakout boots for installations exposed to direct steam impingement.
Instead of using a breakout boot for the 1-NRV-152 and 1-NRV-153 applications, each of the three individual conductors were insulated with Raychem WCSF heat shrink tubing.Then the entire assembly was covered with a piece of the same tubing.Raychem manufactures the WCSF tubing with a pre-coated adhesive whose function is to provide an environmental seal for isolating the active electrical component from moisture.The entire WCSF sleeve is then heat shrunk to seal against the conductor.
The adhesive flows to conform to the shape of the conductor.
For this particular installation, it also flowed between the two conductors to provide the sealing function normally performed by the breakout boot..The primary failure mechanism to be considered is moisture collection inside the Raychem splice on the conductor to form a low resistance path to ground.The possibility of a short circuit is a function of the length of this path, the circuit voltage and the resistance of the path.In order to develop a low resistance path to ground it would be necessary for moisture to penetrate the Raychem splice underneath the outer tubing.While a qualified assembly would have a breakout boot,'an analysis of the existing configuration shows that it also would provide protection from moisture intrusion.
The breakout boot was qualified against direct spray impingement on the splice for a 1000 volt circuit.For the existing configuration in a 250 volt DC circuit, protection against direct steam impingement is not required as these splices are located inside terminal boxes.Without direct spray impingement, it is considered unlikely that moisture would penetrated the installed splice configuration, and the physical creep distance requirements for the 250 volt DC circuit are less than required for a 1000 volt circuit.The second issue considered was that of the proper size of overlap for Raychem WCSF-N material used for conductor to conductor splices.The current Raychem installation practices requires that for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)application, the WCSF tubing is 6 inches long in order to provide 2 inches of overlap.This 2 inch length was chosen by Raychem to insure successful completion of the LOCA testing for 1000 volt applications directly exposed to steam.However, varieties of overlap lengths, some as short as one eight inch have been acceptably qualified by industry testing.The Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification prepared a report on industry testing of short Raychem splices, which was issued on May 22, 1987, and is the basis for the industry acceptance of the shorter Raychem splice.At this time these tests are under review so that a direct comparison can be made of the test parameters versus the accident profile for Cook.Additionally, as with the quaiifiied breakout boot configuration, the application for which the shorter splice length exists is a 250 vDC circuit installed inside terminal boxes, as opposed to the tested 1000 volt configuration exposed to direct steam impingement.
In conclusion, it was determined that although the installed splices do not meet the EQ requirements for breakout boot and splice, overlap length, it is considered likely that the installed configuration would have performed adequately in a LOCA or post-LOCA environment.
Therefore, this event is considered to be of minimal safety significance as the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.
HRC FORM 366A.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION OVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTs 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE IHFORHATIOH AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, liASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEMEHT AND BUDGET IJASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 1 DOCKET NUHBER 2 YEAR LER NUMBER 6 SEQUENTIAL REVISION PAGE 3 Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT (ir nore space is required.use additional NRC Fora 366A's)(17)50-315 98 013 00 4OF4~*EDS 335 will be revised to reference EDS 620, instead of the DCC Specification.
EDS 620 will illustrate the required configuration for a multiple cable splice using the breakout boot.Once these revisions are completed, the breakout boots will be installed in accordance with the EDS.Action requests have already been prepared for installation of the breakout boots on both the affected PORVs and reactor vessel head vent valves.Corrective actions will be taken as appropriate for the splice overlap length problem once the root cause has been determined.
This LER will be updated at that time to reflect those actions.In response to a number of EQ discrepancies that have been identified during the restart readiness reviews currently underway, a Project Team has been assembled to assess the EQ process.This team is composed of members from EQ and Design Engineering, Maintenance Training, Maintenance Planning and Maintenance procedure writers, Quality Control, and Procurement.
The team will review and assess the EQ process for adequate knowledge and training on installation practices for each discipline.
The amount, content and frequency of training given to each discipline will be evaluated, as will the documents used for installation.
The team is expected to complete their charter within 6 months, and appropriate actions will be taken to implement solutions to the problems they identify.This information will be provided to the NRC once the long term actions have been determined.
Not Applicable ifi on vl 315/97-006-01
, 316/97-00640 Ev
