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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULA, | {{#Wiki_filter:REGULA,YINFORMATION DISTRIBUTIYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8802020148 DOC.DATE:88/01/29NOTARIZED: | ||
NOFACIL:50-389St.LuciePlant>Unit2>FloridaPoeer5LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILlATION JOHNSON'. | |||
B.FloridaPoeer5LightCo.WOODY.C.O.FloridaPower5LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389, | |||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
NRCForm3SSA19413lLICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAIONU.S, | LER87-007-01: | ||
URCForm366A(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAONU.S. | on871125.reactortrippedonlossofloadduetoturbinetrip.Causedbgpersonnel error.Permanent magnetgenerator 5exciterbearingreplacedZcexciterbearingthermocouple removed.W/880129ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22DCOPIESRECEIVED: | ||
P.O.14000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408. | LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER)iIncidentRptietc.NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME PD2-2LATOURIGNYi ECOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME PD2-2PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL: | ||
ACRSMICHELSON AEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB A)R/SIBREGFILE02IBRGN2FILE01EXTERNAL: | |||
EG5GGROHiMHSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYSTG11112211011111111111111111155111111ACRSMOELLERAEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/E*B NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RESTELFORDiJRES/DRPSDIRFORDBLDGHOY>ALPDR"NSICHARRIS>J2211111111111111111211111111111TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: | |||
LTTR46ENCL45 | |||
NRCForm3SSA19413lLICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAIONU.S,NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150&104EXPIRES:9/31/BBFACILITYNAMEIIISt.Lucie,Unit2OOCKETNUMBERIllYEARLERNUMBERIBI@~a.SFOVENT/AL NvMErrxo,:REvrsroNiMNVMEllPAGE0)TEXT/ifmoros/rscoisrsr/rr/rsd, rrsosddio'orrs/ | |||
H/ICFonrr3////A'/(IT)osooo389'870070102OF04DESCRIPTION OFENTENTEOn25November, 1987,St.LucieUnitTwowasoperating at50percentpowersteadystateinMode1.Theunitwasreturnedtoserviceon23Novemberfollowing arefueling outageandwasholdingat50percentpowerwhilerepairswereinprogressonthe2ASteamGenerator FeedPump(SGFP)(EIIS:SJ) duetoasmallwaterleakthatdeveloped ontheventlineatthepumpcasing.Thereactorwasbeingmaintained inasteadystatecondition withallautomatic controllers placedinautomatic withtheexception oftheControlRodDriveSystem(EIZS:JD) whichwasinOFF.At2331hours,theReactorProtective System(EIZS:JC) initiated areactortriponlossofloadduetoaturbinetrip.Theturbinetrippedonamaingenerator (EIIS:TB) lockout.Thecontrolroomwasalertedwithinformation thatsmokewasseencomingoutoftheMainGenerator Exciter(EZIS:TL). | |||
TheAssistant NuclearPlantSupervisor (ANPS)instructed theTurbineOperator(TO)tocheckforrubsontherotatingcomponents oftheturbine-generator. | |||
TheTOreportedevidenceofturbine-generator rubstothecontrolroomandtheANPSinstructed theReactorControlRoomOperators (RCOs)toopenthevacuumbreakersonthemaincondenser (EIZS:SG) toaidinslowingdowntheturbine.Afireteamwasassembled andstationed withfirefightingequipment atthevicinityofthemaingenerator exciter.Therewerenoreportsofanactualfire.Thetripwasanuncomplicated tripandallsystemsfunctioned normally. | |||
TheSteamBypassControlSystem(SBCS)(EIIS:JI) operatedtoreduceprimaryaveragetemperature (T-avg)tothezeropercentpowersetpointof532degreesF.Auxiliary feedwater (EIZS:BA) wasinitiated manuallytocontrolthesteamgenerator (S/G)levelforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)(EIZSEAB) heatremoval.Thestandardposttripactionswerecompleted andtheunitwasimmediately stabilized inHotStandby,Mode3.NRCFORM316A19831 NRCForm3ddA(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUONV.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMSNO.3150MI(HEXP!RES:8/3(188FACILITYNAME(I)DOCKETNUMBER(3)LERNVMSER(8)PACE(3)St.Lucie,Unit2TERT(Ilmoro<<>>oobror)rrr'rod, Ir>>odds'onel NRCFarm3ddl3I()T)osoooYEAR@gSEQUENTIAL NUMtR007REVISIONNUMER0103OF04CAUSEOFTBBEVENTSTheimmediate causeofthemaingenerator lockoutwaslossofthegenerator field.Thelossoffieldwascausedbydestruction oftheexciterPermanent MagnetGenerator (PMG)thatoccurredwhentheexciterbearingfailedallowingthePMGarmaturetorubonthePMGstator.Furtherinvestigation intothefailureoftheexciterbearingindicated thatagroundwascausedbyacompleted electrical circuitbetweentheexciterbearingandtheexciterbase.Thiscompleted electrical circuitbypassedtheinsulation betweenthebearingpedestalandtheexciterbase.Thegroundwascausedbyanimproperinstallation ofaninstrument cable(EIIS:IT). | |||
Theinstrument cableprovidestheterminalconnection fromthethermocouple oftheN9exciterbearinghousingtoitsterminalbox,whichprovidesremotetemperature indication inthecontrolroom.Theas-foundcondition oftheinstrument cableindicated thatthebraidedwirecableshieldwasnotproperlypositioned intheclamp;therefore, agrounddeveloped attheexciterbearing.Examination oftheexciterbearingrevealedpittingmarksonthebearingsurface,characteristic ofcurrentflowingacrossthebearingjournaltothebearingpad,whichresultedinthebearingfailure.Theimproperarrangement oftheinstrument cablecannotbeconclusively identified asawiringerrorduringtheinstallation ofthenewmaingenerator exciter.ThePMGandtheinstrument cableweremeggeredtodetectforpossiblegroundsandtheresultswereacceptable. | |||
Ithasbeenpostulated thatoneoftwocircumstances mayhaveoccurred: | |||
1)theinstrument cablewasinstalled correctly withthebraidedwireshieldintheclampwhenitwasmeggered; thenatsomelaterdate,theinstrument cablewasaccidently steppedoncausingthecableshieldtobecomeseparated fromtheclamp;or2)theinstrument cable,beingclampedincorrectly tothepedestal, hadnotyetbeenconnected totheterminalboxwhenthemeggertestwasperformed. | |||
Afterplacingthemaingenerator backinservice,thegroundshouldhavebeendetectedduringtheperformance oftheweeklygenerator excitergroundcheck.Thepreventative maintenance PlantWorkOrder(PWO)requiresvoltagestobereadacrosstheN9bearingshafttogroundandacrossthe59bearingpedestaltoground.Thedataistobeevaluated toensurenogroundshavedeveloped inthemaingenerator exciter.Earlyrecognition ofthegroundwouldhavepromptedimmediate actiontoremovethemaingenerator fromserviceforthenecessary repairs.Therootcauseoftheeventwasacognitive personnel errorbyautilitymain-tenancesupervisor inmisinterpretation ofthemaingenerator excitergroundvoltagereadings. | |||
Theappropriate procedure wasproperlyfollowed. | |||
However,lackofunderstanding ofthesignificance ofthegenerator excitergroundcheckandinadequate acceptance criteriainthePWOwerecontributing factorsinthepersonnel error.Therewerenounusualcharacteristics oftheworklocationthatdirectlycontributed tothepersonnel error.NRCfORM3ddA(983) | |||
URCForm366A(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAONU.S.NVCLEARRECULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150WIOiEXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(11St.Lucie,Unit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMEllPACE(3)TEXT/I/mortt/Mcoitror)rr/rtd. | |||
IhtotdChr/ont/HRC Forrrr36(L('ti(17)p5ppp389870070104OF04ANALYSISOFTHEEVENT:Theeventisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), | |||
"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinmanualorautomatic actuation ofanyEngineered SafetyFeature,including theReactorProtection System."Thiseventwasobservedtobearoutinereactortriponlossofload.Theresulting transient waswellenveloped bytheSt.LucieUnitII2FinalUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportsection15.2.1.2"Limiting ReactorCoolantSystemPressureEvent-Isolation ofTurbine(100%power)."AllPlantSafetyFunctions weremetandtherewerenoadditional complications. | |||
Consequently, thehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotaffectedbythisevent.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.1.ThePermanent MagnetGenerator wasreplaced. | |||
2.TheExciterBearingwasreplaced. | |||
3.Anevaluation wasmadeand'theExciterBearingthermocouple wasdetermined tobeunnecessary anditwasremovedtopreventfutureincidents ofthistype.4.Thepreventative maintenance plantworkorderwasrevisedtoadequately definetheacceptance criteriaandtheproperactionswhentheacceptance criteriaarenotmet.5.TrainingwasgiventoallElectrical Maintenance personnel toelaborate ontheimportance ofproperlyevaluating thedataduringperformance oftheweeklygenerator excitergroundcheck.h6.Theplanttraininggroupwillevaluatethisitemtodetermine appropriate trainingrequirements andmethods.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: | |||
FAILEDCOMPONENT INFORMATION: | |||
Westinghouse ExciterBearing(89bearing)PartI)613F432 GOlPREVIOUSSIMILAREVENTS:SeeLER5389-84-011 forapreviousreactortripduetoexciterbearingfailure.NRCFORM366*(983) | |||
P.O.14000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408.0420 SKNLI5291988L-88-4110CFR50,73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555,Gentlemen: | |||
Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:87-07Revision1DateofEvent:November25,1987ReactorTriponLossofLoadCausedbyMainGenerator ExciterBearinFailureDuetoPersonnel ErrorTheattachedLicenseeEventReport(LER)isbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovideanupdateonthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,C.0.odyExecutive VicePresident COW/GRM/gp Attachment cc:Dr.J.NelsonGrace,RegionalAdministrator, RegionZI,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlantGRM/022.LER anFPLGroupcompany}} |
Revision as of 16:46, 29 June 2018
ML17221A601 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Saint Lucie ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/29/1988 |
From: | JOHNSON A B, WOODY C O FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
References | |
L-88-41, LER-87-007, LER-87-7, NUDOCS 8802020148 | |
Download: ML17221A601 (6) | |
Text
REGULA,YINFORMATION DISTRIBUTIYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8802020148 DOC.DATE:88/01/29NOTARIZED:
NOFACIL:50-389St.LuciePlant>Unit2>FloridaPoeer5LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILlATION JOHNSON'.
B.FloridaPoeer5LightCo.WOODY.C.O.FloridaPower5LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389,
SUBJECT:
LER87-007-01:
on871125.reactortrippedonlossofloadduetoturbinetrip.Causedbgpersonnel error.Permanent magnetgenerator 5exciterbearingreplacedZcexciterbearingthermocouple removed.W/880129ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:
LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER)iIncidentRptietc.NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME PD2-2LATOURIGNYi ECOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME PD2-2PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:
ACRSMICHELSON AEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB A)R/SIBREGFILE02IBRGN2FILE01EXTERNAL:
EG5GGROHiMHSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYSTG11112211011111111111111111155111111ACRSMOELLERAEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/E*B NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RESTELFORDiJRES/DRPSDIRFORDBLDGHOY>ALPDR"NSICHARRIS>J2211111111111111111211111111111TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR46ENCL45
NRCForm3SSA19413lLICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAIONU.S,NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150&104EXPIRES:9/31/BBFACILITYNAMEIIISt.Lucie,Unit2OOCKETNUMBERIllYEARLERNUMBERIBI@~a.SFOVENT/AL NvMErrxo,:REvrsroNiMNVMEllPAGE0)TEXT/ifmoros/rscoisrsr/rr/rsd, rrsosddio'orrs/
H/ICFonrr3////A'/(IT)osooo389'870070102OF04DESCRIPTION OFENTENTEOn25November, 1987,St.LucieUnitTwowasoperating at50percentpowersteadystateinMode1.Theunitwasreturnedtoserviceon23Novemberfollowing arefueling outageandwasholdingat50percentpowerwhilerepairswereinprogressonthe2ASteamGenerator FeedPump(SGFP)(EIIS:SJ) duetoasmallwaterleakthatdeveloped ontheventlineatthepumpcasing.Thereactorwasbeingmaintained inasteadystatecondition withallautomatic controllers placedinautomatic withtheexception oftheControlRodDriveSystem(EIZS:JD) whichwasinOFF.At2331hours,theReactorProtective System(EIZS:JC) initiated areactortriponlossofloadduetoaturbinetrip.Theturbinetrippedonamaingenerator (EIIS:TB) lockout.Thecontrolroomwasalertedwithinformation thatsmokewasseencomingoutoftheMainGenerator Exciter(EZIS:TL).
TheAssistant NuclearPlantSupervisor (ANPS)instructed theTurbineOperator(TO)tocheckforrubsontherotatingcomponents oftheturbine-generator.
TheTOreportedevidenceofturbine-generator rubstothecontrolroomandtheANPSinstructed theReactorControlRoomOperators (RCOs)toopenthevacuumbreakersonthemaincondenser (EIZS:SG) toaidinslowingdowntheturbine.Afireteamwasassembled andstationed withfirefightingequipment atthevicinityofthemaingenerator exciter.Therewerenoreportsofanactualfire.Thetripwasanuncomplicated tripandallsystemsfunctioned normally.
TheSteamBypassControlSystem(SBCS)(EIIS:JI) operatedtoreduceprimaryaveragetemperature (T-avg)tothezeropercentpowersetpointof532degreesF.Auxiliary feedwater (EIZS:BA) wasinitiated manuallytocontrolthesteamgenerator (S/G)levelforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)(EIZSEAB) heatremoval.Thestandardposttripactionswerecompleted andtheunitwasimmediately stabilized inHotStandby,Mode3.NRCFORM316A19831 NRCForm3ddA(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUONV.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMSNO.3150MI(HEXP!RES:8/3(188FACILITYNAME(I)DOCKETNUMBER(3)LERNVMSER(8)PACE(3)St.Lucie,Unit2TERT(Ilmoro<<>>oobror)rrr'rod, Ir>>odds'onel NRCFarm3ddl3I()T)osoooYEAR@gSEQUENTIAL NUMtR007REVISIONNUMER0103OF04CAUSEOFTBBEVENTSTheimmediate causeofthemaingenerator lockoutwaslossofthegenerator field.Thelossoffieldwascausedbydestruction oftheexciterPermanent MagnetGenerator (PMG)thatoccurredwhentheexciterbearingfailedallowingthePMGarmaturetorubonthePMGstator.Furtherinvestigation intothefailureoftheexciterbearingindicated thatagroundwascausedbyacompleted electrical circuitbetweentheexciterbearingandtheexciterbase.Thiscompleted electrical circuitbypassedtheinsulation betweenthebearingpedestalandtheexciterbase.Thegroundwascausedbyanimproperinstallation ofaninstrument cable(EIIS:IT).
Theinstrument cableprovidestheterminalconnection fromthethermocouple oftheN9exciterbearinghousingtoitsterminalbox,whichprovidesremotetemperature indication inthecontrolroom.Theas-foundcondition oftheinstrument cableindicated thatthebraidedwirecableshieldwasnotproperlypositioned intheclamp;therefore, agrounddeveloped attheexciterbearing.Examination oftheexciterbearingrevealedpittingmarksonthebearingsurface,characteristic ofcurrentflowingacrossthebearingjournaltothebearingpad,whichresultedinthebearingfailure.Theimproperarrangement oftheinstrument cablecannotbeconclusively identified asawiringerrorduringtheinstallation ofthenewmaingenerator exciter.ThePMGandtheinstrument cableweremeggeredtodetectforpossiblegroundsandtheresultswereacceptable.
Ithasbeenpostulated thatoneoftwocircumstances mayhaveoccurred:
1)theinstrument cablewasinstalled correctly withthebraidedwireshieldintheclampwhenitwasmeggered; thenatsomelaterdate,theinstrument cablewasaccidently steppedoncausingthecableshieldtobecomeseparated fromtheclamp;or2)theinstrument cable,beingclampedincorrectly tothepedestal, hadnotyetbeenconnected totheterminalboxwhenthemeggertestwasperformed.
Afterplacingthemaingenerator backinservice,thegroundshouldhavebeendetectedduringtheperformance oftheweeklygenerator excitergroundcheck.Thepreventative maintenance PlantWorkOrder(PWO)requiresvoltagestobereadacrosstheN9bearingshafttogroundandacrossthe59bearingpedestaltoground.Thedataistobeevaluated toensurenogroundshavedeveloped inthemaingenerator exciter.Earlyrecognition ofthegroundwouldhavepromptedimmediate actiontoremovethemaingenerator fromserviceforthenecessary repairs.Therootcauseoftheeventwasacognitive personnel errorbyautilitymain-tenancesupervisor inmisinterpretation ofthemaingenerator excitergroundvoltagereadings.
Theappropriate procedure wasproperlyfollowed.
However,lackofunderstanding ofthesignificance ofthegenerator excitergroundcheckandinadequate acceptance criteriainthePWOwerecontributing factorsinthepersonnel error.Therewerenounusualcharacteristics oftheworklocationthatdirectlycontributed tothepersonnel error.NRCfORM3ddA(983)
URCForm366A(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAONU.S.NVCLEARRECULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150WIOiEXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(11St.Lucie,Unit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMEllPACE(3)TEXT/I/mortt/Mcoitror)rr/rtd.
IhtotdChr/ont/HRC Forrrr36(L('ti(17)p5ppp389870070104OF04ANALYSISOFTHEEVENT:Theeventisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv),
"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinmanualorautomatic actuation ofanyEngineered SafetyFeature,including theReactorProtection System."Thiseventwasobservedtobearoutinereactortriponlossofload.Theresulting transient waswellenveloped bytheSt.LucieUnitII2FinalUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportsection15.2.1.2"Limiting ReactorCoolantSystemPressureEvent-Isolation ofTurbine(100%power)."AllPlantSafetyFunctions weremetandtherewerenoadditional complications.
Consequently, thehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotaffectedbythisevent.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.1.ThePermanent MagnetGenerator wasreplaced.
2.TheExciterBearingwasreplaced.
3.Anevaluation wasmadeand'theExciterBearingthermocouple wasdetermined tobeunnecessary anditwasremovedtopreventfutureincidents ofthistype.4.Thepreventative maintenance plantworkorderwasrevisedtoadequately definetheacceptance criteriaandtheproperactionswhentheacceptance criteriaarenotmet.5.TrainingwasgiventoallElectrical Maintenance personnel toelaborate ontheimportance ofproperlyevaluating thedataduringperformance oftheweeklygenerator excitergroundcheck.h6.Theplanttraininggroupwillevaluatethisitemtodetermine appropriate trainingrequirements andmethods.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
FAILEDCOMPONENT INFORMATION:
Westinghouse ExciterBearing(89bearing)PartI)613F432 GOlPREVIOUSSIMILAREVENTS:SeeLER5389-84-011 forapreviousreactortripduetoexciterbearingfailure.NRCFORM366*(983)
P.O.14000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408.0420 SKNLI5291988L-88-4110CFR50,73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555,Gentlemen:
Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:87-07Revision1DateofEvent:November25,1987ReactorTriponLossofLoadCausedbyMainGenerator ExciterBearinFailureDuetoPersonnel ErrorTheattachedLicenseeEventReport(LER)isbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovideanupdateonthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,C.0.odyExecutive VicePresident COW/GRM/gp Attachment cc:Dr.J.NelsonGrace,RegionalAdministrator, RegionZI,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlantGRM/022.LER anFPLGroupcompany