ML17251A166

Rev 2 to Design Criteria Ginna Station Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Program.

ML17251A166
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/29/1987
From:	DAVIS R T, SMITH J H ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17251A167	List: ML17251A166 ML17309A405
References
EWR-4539, NUDOCS 8807130072
Download: ML17251A166 (35)

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wDesignCriteriaGinnaStationSafetyRelatedMotorOperatedValveProgramRochester GasandElectricCorporation 89EastAvenueRochester, NewYork14649EWR4539Revision2December29,1987Preparedby:Electrical Engineering LeadEngineel-8-88DATEReviewedby:~~yuaz,yssuranceDATEApprovedby:Manage,Electrica Engineering DATE8807g300728~000Pc}4880708pgpADOC~pt4u8DCSHPagei4292 RevisionStatusSheetLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.0007101213DesignCriteriaWR4539PageiiRevision212/29/87Date4291 1.0.1.1.1SummarDescritionSummaryMotoroperatedvalves(MOVS)arepresently usedinbothClass1EandnonClass1Eapplications atGinnaStation.Theoperatorsize,andprotective featureswereoriginally selectedbythemanufacturer, Limitorque, andarebasedondesigninformation suppliedbythedesignengineerinconjunction withinformation suppliedbythevalvemanufacturer.

Onceavalveandoperatoraresizedforaspecificapplication, Iimitorque thenselectedatorqueswitchsettingwhichinsuredproperoperability underaccidentdesignconditions andalsoaffordedequipment protection againstoverseating.

Limitorque maintains ahistorical fileonsuchdesigndata.SpecifictorqueswitchsettingswereobtainedforeachMOVandtheinformation documented oncontrolconfiguration drawingsseries03021.Theprimarypurposeofthiscriteriaistoestablish therequirements necessary toensurepropertorqueswitchsettingsconsistent withtheguidelines established inIENotice85-03,(reference 2.7).Theexistingtorqueswitchsettingswillbereviewedandcomparedtosettingsobtainedfromaninsitutestingprogramdeveloped byMOVATSInc.TheMOVATSprogramusesasignature analysistechnique, whichhasbeenproveneffective indiagnosing theoverallperformance ofmotoroperatedvalves.ThebasisfortheseswitchsettingsareoutlinedinSections17.1.2and17.1.7.1.1.2TheprimarysourceofmostMOVfailurescanbeattributed totheimpropersettingofthelimitswitches.

Theseswitches, unlikethetorqueswitches, arenot,setbythemanufacturer.

Therequirements forsettingthelimitswitchesisthe,responsibility ofthedesignengineerandmustbecontrolled alongwiththetorqueswitchsettings.

Theoriginallimitswitchsettingshavebeenestablished generically forallMOVSbytheArchitecht/Engineer (A/E)tobeapproximately 10%ofvalvetravel.Thesesettingsareassumedtoexist,onallMOVS.However,fieldinvestigation indicates thattheactualsettingsareinmostcases,muchlower.Therefore, abasesmustbeestablished tosetthelimitswitchesthatwillinsureoperability duringpostulated eventsconsistent withIEBulletin85-03.TheMOVATSprogramaddresses thesesettings, andthecriteriaforresetting eachlimitswitchwillbeestablished duringtheinsitutesting.ThebasisfortheseswitchsettingsareoutlinedinSections17.1.3,17.1.4,17.1.5,17.1.6,17.1.8,17.1.9,and17.1.10.DesignCriteria4539Page1Revision1 Inaddition, someoftheproposedworkmayconsistofactualmodifications.

Onesuchmodification thatisproposedwillconsistofinstalling newrotorsonselectedvalveoperators whichwillallowseparation oftheswitchesusedforcontrolandindication.

Theadditional rotorsshallbeusedforindication andwillbesetindependently ofthecontrolrotors.Theserotorswillmonitoractualvalveposition.

Whenlimitswitchesareusedforindication onatworotorvalveoperator, thefullyclosedindica-tionisreceivedwheninfactthevalveisnot,fullyseated.Thiscondition hasbeenidentified byINPOonSOER-B6-2, (reference 2.12).Intheperformance ofinsituMOVtesting,theconsequences oferroneous valvepositionindication willbeevaluated.

Newrotorswillbeaddediftheindicating limitswitchescannot,besettoprecludeerroneous indications asoutlinedinSOER-86-2.

Thedesignrequirements fortheadditionofnewrotorswillbeaddressed herein,howevertheactualmodification willbeperformed atalaterdateunderEWR4539.Anothermodification thatisproposedwillconsistofrewiringthecircuitry ofselectedvalveoperators whichwillpreventrepeatedclosureofthevalvewhenthetorqueswitchresetsduetowormgearrelaxation.

Atorqueswitcheallowsthevalvetocloseuntilapredetermined forceisappliedtotheseat.Onnon-locking gearratiosthewormgearmayrelaxtothepointwherethetorqueswitchresets,initiating hammerblow.

Thiscondition hasbeenidentified byUSNRConIEInformation Notice85-20(Reference 2.4)andreferences 2.5and2.6.Intheperformance ofinsitutesting,theconsequences ofhammering effectswillbeevaluated andthecircuitry changedifrequired.

Thedesignrequirements forthemodification tothecircuitry willbeaddressed herein,howevertheactualmodification willbeperformed atalaterdateunderEWR4539.Subsequent monitoring ofMOV'swithACmotors.Subsequent monitoring ofACMOVperformance shallbebasedonDatacollected usingmotorloadmonitoring techniques.

Motorloadmonitoring, deve1oped forthe"MOVATS"program,consistsofmeasuring linecurrentsandlinevoltages.

Athreshold valuewillbeestablished basedupondatacollected duringtestingwhichwillbeusedasareference todocumentproperMOVoperation onaperiodicbasis.Thesevalueswillbecontrolled throughtheuseofControlled Configuration Drawings-DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page2.Revision 1

1.1.5Subsequent Monitoring ofMOV'swithDCMotors1.1.5.1Subsequent monitoring ofDCMOVperformance shallbebasedonperforming the"Movats"InsituTest.Thistest,shallbeperformed periodically tomonitorperformance oftheMOV.1.2Functions 1.2.1Thefunctionoftheinsitutestingprogramistoestablish torqueandlimitswitchsettingsthatwillinsuresystemoperability undertherequireddesignbaseseventsasrequiredbyIEB-85-03 (ref.2.7).1.3Performance Requirements 1.3.1Thetestingshallnotadversely affecttheexistingMOVconfiguration andsystemoperability.

1.4Control1.4'.1Thistestingprogram,orsubsequent modifications ifrequired, willnotchangeormodifyanyofthecontrolfeaturesofthemotoroperatedvalves.1.5ModesofOperation 1.5.1Thesafetyrelatedmotoroperatedvalvesshallbecapableofoperation duringallnormalplantoperating andallpostaccidentconditions.

2.0 Referenced

Documents 2.1GinnaStationUpdatedFinalFacilityDescription andSafetyAnalysisReport,Rev.1,datedDecember, 1985.2.2USNRCIEInformation Notice84-10,"Motor-Operated ValveTorqueSwitchesSetBelowtheManufacturer's Recommended Value",datedFebruary21,1984.2.3Letter,G.S.LinktoB.A.SnowdatedJuly24,1984.2.4USNRCIEInformation Notice85-20,"MOVFailuresDuetoHammering Effects",

datedMarch12,1985.2.52.6Letter,G.S.LinktoC.EdgardatedAugust16,1985.Letter,C.EdgartoG.S.LinkdatedAugust23,1985.2.7DesignCriteriaPage3EWR4539USNRCIEBulletin85-03,"Motor-Operated ValveCommonModeFailuresDuringPlantTransients-DuetoImproperSwitchSettings",

datedNovember15,1985.'Revision1 2.8Corrective ActionReport51679,datedNovember26,1985,Reference DocumentIEB85-03.2.92.102.112.122.132.142.152.16USNRCIEInformation Notice86-29,"EffectsofChangingValveMotor-Operator SwitchSettings",

datedApril25,1986.Letter,G.S.LinktoS.SpectordatedJune16,1986.Letter,G.S.LinktoG.W.DanielsdatedJuly18,1986.INPOSignificant Operating Experience Report(SOER)86-2,"Inaccurate ClosedPositionIndication onMotor-Operated Valves",datedJuly29,1986.Ietter,G.W.DanielstoR.E.SmithdatedAugustll,1986."GenericProcedure forBaselineTestingofLimitorque MotorOperatedValvesUsingtheMovats2100or2150System",Rev.1,datedApril31,1987.SEPTopicIII-10A.DesignAnalysis, "MotorOperatedValves,IEBulletin85-03",EWR4348,datedApril30,1986,Theresultsofwhicharecontained inAttachment 1.3.0SeismicCateor3.1Anymodifications tothevalveoperators asaresultoftheprogramoutlinedbelowwillbeSeismicCategoryI.4.0ualitGrouCodeClassFluidSstemsOnl4.15.0NotApplicable.

Electrical SstemSafetClassification 5.1Anymodifications toIEvalveoperators orcircuitry asaresultofthetestingprogramoutlinedbelowwillbeSeismicCategoryIClassIE.6.06.1AProramAlicabilit CTheQAprogramrequirements oftheGinnaQAmanualwillapplytoanalysis, testing,modification, andsetpointmaintenance activities performed onthevalveoperators.

7.0Codes,Standards, andRelatorGuides7.1Thefollowing codes,.standards, andregulatory guideswillbeusedasguidelines inthedesignofanymodifica-tionsrequired.

DesignCriteria4539Page4Revision1 7.27.2.17.2.1.17.2.1.27.2.1.3.7.2.1.47.3NuclearRegulatoiy Commission (NRC)Regulatory GuidesRegulatory Guide1.29-SeismicDesignClassification.

Regulatory Guide1.75-PhysicalIndependence ofElectricSystems(Rev.1-1/75).Regulatory Guide1.89-Qualification ofClassIEEquipment forNuclearPowerPlants.Regulatory Guide1.39-Housekeeping Requirements forWater-Cooled NuclearPowerPlants(Rev.2-9/77).Institute ofElectrical andElectronic Engineers (IEEE)7.3.17.3.27;3.3IEEE-308(1974)IEEE-323(1983)IEEE-344(1975)StandardCriteriaforClassIEPowerSystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations.

StandardforQualifying Class1EEquipment forNuclearPowerGenerating Stations..

Recommended Practices forSeismicQualification ofClassIEEquipment forNuclearPowerGenerating Stations.

7.3.47.3.5IEEE-383(1974)IEEE-384(1981)GuideforTypeTestofClassIEElectricCables,FieldSplices,andConnections forNuclearPowerGenerating Stations.

StandardCriteriaforSeparation Independence ofClassIEEquipment andCircuits.

7.47.4.18.08.19.09.1AmericanNationalStandardInstitute (ANSI)ANSI-N45.2.2 (1978)Packaging,

Shipping, Receiving, Storage,andHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlants.DesiConditions NotApplicable LoadConditions NotApplicable.

Design-CriteriaEWR4539Page5Revision1Date11387 10.0Environmental Conditions NormalAccident10.110.210.3Auxiliary BuildingAmbientTemperature

('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity (rads)Flooding(in)Intermediate BuildingAmbientTemperature

('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity (rads)Flooding(ft)Auxiliary BuildingAnnexAmbientTemperature

('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity (rads)Flooding(ft)50-104060<100mr/hr50-104060<1mr/hr60-120060Negligible 50-1040602.8x10RadTotal8215.25100Negligible 060=120.060Negligible 11.011.112.012.113.013.114.014.1Interface Reuirements ThetorqueswitchsettingsareintendedtoallowtheMOVtooperateduringabnormalconditions.-

ThecurrenttooperatetheMOVatthesesettingsmustbecoordinated withthethermaloverloadsystemthathasbeendeveloped underEWR3319consistent withSEPTopicIII-10.A.

MaterialReirementsNotApplicable.

Mechanical Reuirements NotApplicable.

Structural ReirementsNotApplicable.

DesignCriteria4539Page6Revision1 15.015.1HdraulicReirementsAttachment 1providesalistofthevalvestobeincludedinthisprogramanddesigninformation fortheoperation ofeachvalve.Theinformation consistsof:a.ValveNumber.b.Briefdescription ofvalvefunction.

c.Conditions analyzed.

d.Maximumdifferential pressures foropeningandclosingasdetermined byafluidsystemsevaluation.

(Ref.2.16)15.2Themaximumanticipated systemdifferential pressures areidentified inReference 2.16andwillbethelowestvaluesused:intheInsituTestingProgramtosetthetorqueandlimitswitches.

16.016.117.017.1ChemistrReuirements NotApplicable.

Electrical ReirementsThetechnical basisforestablishing setpoints forthetorqueandlimitswitcheshasbeendeveloped byMOVATS.MOVATSutilizedtestresults.frommanyplantstoestablish andjustifyseveralalternate policiesfortorqueandlimitswitchsetpointadjustments.

17.1.1Listedbelowaretheswitchesforwhichithasbeendetermined thatsetpointpoliciesarerequiredinresponsetoIEBulletin85-03.Attachment 2isatypicalMOVschematic andisintendedtoshowtherelativepositions ofthetorque,andlimitswitches'his schematic isagenericrepresentation onlyandshouldnot,beusedasasourceforspecificMOVinformation-Specificcircuitinformation shoul'dbeobtainedfromapprovedelementaries and/orcontrolschematics.

a0b.C.d.e.f.OpenTorqueSwitch(to)OpenTorqueSwitchBypassLimitSwitch(bc)OpenLimitSwitch(bo)OpenIndication LimitSwitch(ac)CloseTorqueSwitch(tc)CloseTorqueSwitchBypassLimitSwitch(ao)CloseIndication LimitSwitch(bo)DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page7Revision11387

Theopentorqueswitch(to)issettoactuateatamaximumthrustvalueofapproximately 90%oftheoperatorrating,or90%ofthetotalthrustavailable ifalimiterplateisused.Theminimumthrustvalueshallbe1.25(runningload+openingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferential pressureaftertheopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc)opens)..However,valueslessthan1.25mayberequiredtoensuretheoperatordesignisnotexceeded, inwhichcaseengineering direction willberequiredtoacceptthelowervalue.A"MOVATS"signature analysiswillbeperformed toverifythesevaluesandtoverifythattheoperatordesignisnotexceeded.

Themaximumoperatordesignshallbethe-thrustratingfornon-rotating stemsandthetorqueratingforrotatingstems.Theopeningthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferential pressurewillbedetermined usingthedifferential pressurevaluescontained inRef.2.16andapplyingthemtoformulaedeveloped byMOVATS.Therelationships developed byMOVATSapplyonlytovalvesizescontained intheirdatabase.

Avalvewillbeconsidered tobeincludedintheirdatabaseifoneofthetwofollowing conditions aresatisfied.

1)Four(4)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypeandsizeofvalve.2)Twenty(20)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypebutvarioussizeofvalve.Intheeventthe"MOVATS"databaseisnotused,fullorpartialdifferential pressuretestingwillberequired.

A"MOVATS"Signature Analysiswillbeperformed toverifythattheTorqueSwitchissetto.providetherequiredthrust.Theopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc)willbesettobypasstorqueswitchactuation duringtheinitialhighloadingconditions duetovalveunseating plustheopeningthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferential pressure.

Theresulting settingshouldbelessthan10%oftotalvalvetravel.However,settingsgreaterthan10%mayberequiredtoovercomefulldifferential

pressure, inwhichcaseengineering-direction willberequiredtoacceptthehighersetting.Theopenlimitswitch(bo)sh'allbesetatapproximately 90%ofstrokefromtheclose-to-open position.

Toinsurethatbackseating doesnotoccur,thevalvewillbeelectrically openedandallowedtocometoacompletestop.AnattemptwillthenbemadetomanuallyoperateDesignCriteriaEWR4539Page8Revision2Date122987

thevalveintheopendirection.

Ifanyvalvetravelcanbedetermined, thesettingisacceptable.

However,iftravelcannotbedetected, thevalvewillbeassumedtobeonitsbackseatandtheopenlimitswitchsettingwillbeloweredinsmallincrements, typically 1%,untilitcanbeassuredthatbackseating doesnotoccur.OpenIndication IimitSwitch(ac)onTwoRotorSystems:Theopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc),asdescribed in17.1.3,alsodetermines theopenindication limitswitch(ac)setting.Theseswitchesarelocatedonthesamerotorandcannotbesetindependently.

Theeffecttheopentorqueswitchbypassswitchhasontheopenindication limitswitchwillbeevaluated byEngineering toassesstheaccuracyofindication anditsapplicability toINPOSOER86-2,Ref.2.12.OpenIndication IimitSwitch(ac)onFourRotorSystems:Theopenindication limitswitch(ac)willbesetascloseaspractical tothepointatwhichthevalveisopen.Thisvaluewillbeverifiedbyperforming a"MOVATS"signature analysis.

Theclosetorqueswitch(tc)issettoactuateatamaximumthrustvalueofapproximately 90%oftheoperatorrating,or90%ofthetotalthrustavailable ifalimiterplateisused.Theminimumthrustvalueshallbe1.25(runningload+closingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferential pressure).

However,valueslessthan1.25mayberequiredtoensuretheoperatordesignisnotexceeded, inwhichcasetheengineering direction willberequiredtoacceptthelowervalue.A"MOVATS"signature analysiswillbeperformed toverifythesevaluesandtoverifythattheoperatordesignisnotexceeded.

Themaximumoperatordesignshallbethethrustratingfornon-rotating stemsandthetorqueratingforrotatingstems.Theclosingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferential pressurewi2.1bedetermined byusingthedifferential pressurevaluescontained inRef.2.16andapplyingthemtoformulaedeveloped byMOVATS.Therelationships developed byMOVATSapplyonlytovalvesizescontained intheirdatabase.

Avalvewillbeconsidered tobeincludedintheirdatabaseifoneofthetwofollowing conditions aresatisfied.

1)Four(4)setsofpressuredataexist,forthesametypeandsizeofvalve.DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page9Revision

2)Twenty(20)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypebut.varioussizeofvalve.Intheeventthe"MOVATS"databaseisnotused,fullorpartialdifferential pressuretestingwillberequired.

A"MOVATS"signature analysiswillbeperformed toverifythatthetorqueswitchissettoprovidetherequiredthrust.17.1.8Theclosetorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch-(ao) doesnotrequireaspecificsettingcriteriabecausethevalvesdonottorqueoutintheopendirection, andarenotallowedtobackseat.

17.1.9CloseIndication LimitSwitch(bo)onTwoRotorSystems:Theopenlimitswitch(bo)setting,*asdescribed in17.1.4,alsodetermines thecloseindication limitswitch(bo)setting.Theseswitchesarelocatedonthesamerotorandcannotbesetindependently.

Theeffecttheopenlimitswitchhasontheoperation ofthecloseindication limitswitchwillbeevaluated byEngineering toassesstheaccuracyofindication anditsapplicability toINPOSOER86-2,Ref.2.12.17.1.10CloseIndication LimitSwitch(bo)onFourRotorSystems:Thecloseindication limitswitch(bo)willbesetascloseaspractical tothepointatwhichthevalveisclosed.Thisvaluewillbeverifiedbyperforming a"MOVATS"signature analysis.

17.2TheInsitutestprogramwilldemonstrate thatthevalveswillfunctionproperlyunderthemaximumsystemdifferential pressures expectedonthevalvesduring.bothnormalandabnormaleventswithinthedesignbasisasidentified inRef.2.16.17.3Atestmethoddeveloped byMOVATswillbeusedforsubsequent testingwhichverifiesvalveoperability oncetheMOVATssignature analysishasbeenperformed.

Thismethodmonitorstheloadcharacteristic oftheMOVasthevalveisoperated.

'threshhold valueisthendetermined foreachMOV.Aslongastheresultant valueisbelowthe"Threshold Value",thevalvecanbeshowntohavesufficient thrustneededtooperatethevalveunderdesignbaseevents.DesignCriteriaPage10EWR4539Themotorloadthreshold valuecanbedetermined'y thrustsignature analysis.

Thethreshold valueisthethrustdeveloped bytheoperatoratcontrolswitchtriplessthesystemdifferential pressurethrustrequirements'evision 2

17.3.2Thethreshold valverepresents theexcessthrustcapability oftheoperatorabovetherunningloadthrust.Motorloadvaluesrecordedduringroutinetestswillbecomparedtotheestablished threshold value.Aslongasthemotorrunningloadislessthanthethreshold, value,theoperatoriscapableofdelivering sufficient thrusttosatisfyvalveoperatorthrust,requirements.

Ifthemotorrunningloadincreases tothethreshold value,thevalvewillbedeclaredinoperable untilrepairandtestingverifiesoperability.

17.417.5Newcableorsplicesshallbequalified perIEEE383-1974.

Theminimumvoltageratingofallnewcontrolcableshallbe600.volts.18.018.10erational ReirementsNoadditional requirements fornormalplantoperations willbeimposedduetothistestingprogram.19.019.120.020.120.221.021.122.022.1Instrumentation andControlReuirements NotApplicable.

AccessandAdministrative ControlReirementsTheexistingcontrolled drawingsshallbeupgradedtoreflectanynewsetpoints thatarederivedfromthistestingprogram.AfileofMOVATSsignature analysiswillbemaintained atGinnaStationwithaduplicate filemaintained atEngineering.

Redundanc

,Diversit,andSearationReuirements NotApplicable.

FailureEffectsReirementsSpurioustorqueorlimitswitchoperation detectegduring-operation, subsequent tothecompletion oftheinsitutestingforaparticular MOV,willrequireretesting beforepermanent switchchangescanbemade.Shorttermswitchchangesmaybemadetomaintaintheoperability of.thesystemprovidedthat'thedeviation isdocumented, trackedandevaluated byengineering.

22.2Operatororvalvefailurescausedby0hetestprogramwillbecorrected and/orresovedpriortotheMOVbeingdeclaredoperable.

DesignCriteria4539Page11Revision2Date122987 23.023.1TestReuirements Testprocedures willbedeveloped aspartofthisEWRtoestablish andmonitorMOVperformance data,limitswitchsettings, andtorqueswitchsettings.

23.2MOV'swithACMotorsEachMOVwillbetestedasaminimumonceperyearusingmotorloadmonitoring andonceeveryfouryearsusingthefullMOVATSsignature analysis.

Thesetestsandfrequencies willbeevaluated andrevisedasnecessary astestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.

23.3MOV'swithDCMotorsEachMOVwillbetestedasaminimumonceperyearusingthefullMOVATSsignature analysis.

Thesetestsandfrequencies willbeevaluated andrevisedasnecessary astestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.

23.424.0Appropriate testingwillbeperformed following MOVmaintenance orrepairswhichcouldimpactperformance.

Thesetestsandfrequencies willbeevaluated andrevisedasnecessary astestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.

Accessibilit

,Maintenance, ReairandInservice InsectionReirements24.125.025.1NotApplicable.

Personnel ReirementsPersonnel performing testingshallbequalified inaccordance withANSIN45.2.6andtrainedintheuseMOVAT'stestequipment andprocedures.

26.026.127.027.128.028.129.029.1Transortabilit ReirementsNotApplicable.

FireProtection ReirementsNotApplicable.

HandlinReuirements NotApplicable.

PublicSafetReuirements NotApplicable.

DesignCriteria4539Page12Revision 30.030.131.031.132.0.32.1Alicabilit NotApplicable.

Personnel SafetReuirements Appropriate principles ofALARAwillbeappliedtominimizepersonalexposures.

Environmental uglification ReirementsModifications toIEvalveoperators asaresultofthisprogramwillbesubjecttotheenvironmental qualifica-tionrequirements ofIEEE-323.

AppendixEtotheGinnaQAmanualshallapplytomodifications tovalveoperators listedinTable1ofAppendixE.33.033.1UnieReuirements Asfoundstemthrust,motorloadcharacteristics (ACMotors),andswitchsettingwillbedocumented.

Asleftstemthrust,motorloadcharacteristics (ACMotors),andswitchsettingswillbedocumented andcontrolled.

DesignCriteria4539Page13Revision2Date122987 S

Nm.NPto83AgBgCgDoSIpapmcticnfambxmacidtankso2~malleipaths,2ml~pec~tho1viepecpathisnxrrallycpenoallmlveecpencnSIifrotcpenoallelvesclosQ~bxicacidtanksteachl(R17p3&9.2psxdo2~rallelistic,1mlveperIathonxnaQyclceed;cpen'autxnatiadly if8'brotcpenin5searcho%ivescpaedfeeSI~tdxmefranBABIhtofMP~levelineither'81 beechesER.

PtMRMEBtoClcxRl~,Bo%Q~axeaurallygal<U~Caywillautcnathaliy cpmcnSXahyal.AUpeal871AgBoMmesreallycpen;ifApapfailstostart>8719willclcee;ifBpepfhilstoetaxt<871Awillcine.

ATTACHMENT 1TABLE1NOTES1.Themaximumopening~Pxsduetoelevation headfromtheBASTonones1deande1evat>onheadoftheRWSTontheotherside~Sinceacheckvalvemaintains RHSTpressureontheSIpxpxng<themax>mum~PacrosstheclosedvalveoccurswithmaximumRMSTlevelandminimumBASTlevel.2.Thevalveautomatically closeswhentheBASTlevelreaches-10'.ThegPiscalculated assumingnegligible pumpsuctionpressure(0psxg)andtheBASTat10%level.3.Thevalvesareconfzguredintwoparallelpathswithtwosecuresvalvesperpath.Assuminginadvertent operation isasinglefailureIz.e.<onlyonevalveisassumedtobeinadvertently operatedI theworstcase4PisboundedbytheNote1scenario.

4.ThemaximumopeningDPoccurswhennegligible pumpsuet>onpressureexistsonthedownstream sadeandmaximumlevelxntheRHST.5.Sxncethevalvesareconfigured inparallelpaths<eachcontrolled byseparateswitchesonthecontrolboard,onlyoneinadvertent operation isassumedtooccur(similartothesinglefailurecriteria).

Therefore, themaximumabnormal',

Pacrossaninadvertently closedvalvexstheDPdeveloped Iacrosstheparallelvalveunderfullflow.ThxspressureisboundedbytheNote4scenario.

6.Themaximumopening6Pisduetoelevation'ead or.theRNSTatmaximumlevelpressurizing throughacheck'alve andnegligiole CSIpumpsuctionpressure.

~'4ATTACHtFMT 17.Themaximumpressureforclosingwouldoccurduringhighheadrecircula tionwhenthe1815sareusedtoisolatethenormalhighheadrecirculation pathandtheCSIpumpis.operating atman>mumflow.8.Twocaseswereevaluated.

Caselithevalvewasinadvertently closedawhilesupplying waterfromtheRWST.Case2<thevalvewasinadvertently closedwhilesupplying waterfromRHRpumps.BoundingAPresultedfromCase2.ThevalvemustcloseoropenagainstRHRpumpshutoffhead.9.Twocaseswereevaluated.

Case1,valveis'equl,red toc1oseduringsmallLOCAbecauseSIpumpfailstostart.Case2,valveisrequiredtocloseduringlargeLOCAbecauseSIpumpfailstostart.Inbothcasescheckvalvespreventthe871sIfromseeingtheoperating pump'spressure.

Sincethepipedownstream ofthevalveispressurizing asthevalveisclosing<the8Pacrossthevalveisnegligible.

10.Twocaseswereevaluated Case1,valveopening8,Pafterthevalvewasinadvertently closed.Case2<valveclosing6PtoisolatetheCSIpump.Case1assumedthevalvewasinadvertently closedwiththeAorBSIpumpnotoperating<

thepxpxngdownstream of871wasdepressurxzed>

andtheCSIpumpwasoperating atshutof'fheadwithmax>mumRWSTlevel.TheSounding4PacrossthevalvetoopenisthepumpshutoffheadplusRWSTelevation head.Case2assumedthevalvemustbeclosedwhiletheCSIpumpisrunningwithmaximumRWSTlevel.

TPKE2AUXILMcYFHIMQMAxx.StdcLCBtlclruetoClceeoA:arallychxed-cpnto~ly&ltoKAEHpeporoundlyclawed-cpento~y&toNNRJpnpTLV84pjrpdefer~oanallycpenQxnalClate3'1MFWsteminletornmdly~-autcnatically chere'A81CpQ Au.DPta359%i3RXA(cxntimed) ovalveinitially

<pcsfullcpenUSAClCBBSbOAMA'tilbl 28)QJll1450psid1475gaud1475pardiKKAI4XXBovslvsaurallyclued,cperadtaCXGBSCXXXRCC~1475~1475padl475peud1475pm'

ATTACHMENT 1TABLF.2NOTESNormalopeningassumesservicewaterdesignpressureonupstreamsideandemptycondensate tankandlinesondownstream side.Normalclosingassumesclosingagainstservicewaterdesignpressure.

2.Ifthevalveisinadvertently opened,theclosingAPisboundedbyNotel.3.Sincecheckvalvepreventsreversepressure>themaximumclosingpressureapproaches TDAFHpumpdischarge pressureatl00gpmbypassflowwithnegligible SGpressureanddesignservicewaterpressureatthepumpsuction.4.NormalopeningandclosingassumesSGatHZPcondition andtheturbineatatmospheric oressure.

5.Assumesthevalveisinadvertently closedoropenedwithSGpressureatthefirstsafetysetpointwith3%accumulation andtheturbineatatmospheric pressure.

6.Assumesthevalveisinadvertently closedoropenedwithMDAFHpumpdischarge pressureatbypassheadwithnegligible SGpressureanddesignservicewaterpressureatthepumpsuction.7.MaximumnormalopeningbPoccurswhendownstream pumpfailstostart,checkvalvepreventsdownstream pipingfromseeingSGpressure>

operating pumpnearshutoffheadwithdesignservicewaterpressureatoperating pumpsuction.8.MaximumnormalclosinghPoccursunderthesameconditionsasNote7excepttheSGisassumedtohavenegligible pressure.

TAKE3SI'%4MKKILIPRYFEEBNIH<lhlveI4515,4616Dxeri~cnSl23"Iachrvalve-~teeSAFsystanonxrrally~-valveclceer3aUtcrIGtirxrlly cnSI.afdLct39oft303spod'u(.4Pto75p;idRm.Staticaa975pseud75ps'4toSAFW~mcticnonxn81Iy~-ruaotcrrouc acticn>arlycperad~S4m~liedtoEianyin.u9rectent calvecIxxaucnisbaxxhdQth~abovemse&BIpapcKafmrporurallycpen<asficrwinxemeeuoltetlxottles flowtoZOcpnAxialwtaucnNotte2le.Iaxd%NA,BSMl0chs9arp..

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ATACHNilT1TABlE3NOTES1.NaximumopeningorclosingpressureisS'vfdesignpressure.

2.Naximumpressureoccurswithpumpatshutoffhead>negligible SGpressureandsuctionpressureatdesignSHpressure.

3.Naximumnormalopening>Poccurswhenpumpfailstostartlcheck.valvepreventsdownstream pipingfromseeingSGpressure>

SGwithoperating pumpatHZPpressureand50psiflowlosses.4.NaximumclosingpressureoccurswithoneSGbeingfedwhileoperating atsafetyvalvepressureplus3%accumulation>

50psiflowlossesandabreakoccursintheloopoftheinoperable pump.

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