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{{#Wiki_filter:APPENDIXBtotheSTRUCTURALREANALYSISPROGRAMForTheRE.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANT83053i014i8305f9PDRADOCK05000244PPDR Addendumto"CriticalityAnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"forRochesterGas&ElectricCorporationGinnaPlantDatedNovember1982byPickard,LoweandGarrick,Xnc.120018thStreet,N.W.Washington,D.C.20036March1983 Addendumto"CriticalityAnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"ForRochesterGas&ElectricCorporationGinnaPlant,DatedNovemberl982InadditiontotheaccidentconditionsrelatedtothespentfuelstorageracksasdiscussedinSection5.0oftheoriginalreport,anotheraccidentconditionwasevaluatedwhichinvolvesamissileorahighvelocityforeignobjectfallingontop.of,thestorageracks.CrushingorcompactionofthefuelassembliescausedbyimpactwouldcompactthefuellatticeandresultinamoreundermoderatedandthereforelessreactiveconfigurationaspreviouslydescribedinSection5.0ofthereport.Ifthemissileorthehighvelocityobjectisassumedtocausedisplacementofafuelstoragebox,aconfigurationsimilartothatdepictedinFigure6(b)couldconveivableresult.Asshown,onewaterboxandonefuelboxareassumedtobeinterchangedascomparedtothenormalstoragepattern[Figure6(a)].Figure6(c)representsa'onditionwhichis.evenmorelimitingwithrespecttocriticalitysafety.Inthe.lattercase,halfofthewaterboxesintheracksystemareassumedtobereplacedwithfuelstoragelocations.Theresultingkofthisveryconservativemodelisonly0.8894whenthe2000ppmofsolubleboronpresentinthepoolwaterisincludedinthecalculation.ThusthekfortheassumedaccidentconfigurationshowninFigure6(b)shouldbesignificantlylessthan0.8894andmuch'lessthanthenormal 4
{{#Wiki_filter:APPENDIXBtotheSTRUCTURAL REANALYSIS PROGRAMForTheRE.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANT83053i014i 8305f9PDRADOCK05000244PPDR Addendumto"Criticality AnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"forRochester Gas&ElectricCorporation GinnaPlantDatedNovember1982byPickard,LoweandGarrick,Xnc.120018thStreet,N.W.Washington, D.C.20036March1983 Addendumto"Criticality AnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"ForRochester Gas&ElectricCorporation GinnaPlant,DatedNovemberl982Inadditiontotheaccidentconditions relatedtothespentfuelstorageracksasdiscussed inSection5.0oftheoriginalreport,anotheraccidentcondition wasevaluated whichinvolvesamissileorahighvelocityforeignobjectfallingontop.of,thestorageracks.Crushingorcompaction ofthefuelassemblies causedbyimpactwouldcompactthefuellatticeandresultinamoreundermoderated andtherefore lessreactiveconfiguration aspreviously described inSection5.0ofthereport.Ifthemissileorthehighvelocityobjectisassumedtocausedisplacement ofafuelstoragebox,aconfiguration similartothatdepictedinFigure6(b)couldconveivable result.Asshown,onewaterboxandonefuelboxareassumedtobeinterchanged ascomparedtothenormalstoragepattern[Figure6(a)].Figure6(c)represents a'ondition whichis.evenmorelimitingwithrespecttocriticality safety.Inthe.lattercase,halfofthewaterboxesintheracksystemareassumedtobereplacedwithfuelstoragelocations.
rackcell[Figure6(a)]kof0.9305(seeTable5)at68F,4.25w/oU-235andnosolubleboron.Basedonthisconservativeanalyticmodel,theassumedaccidentinvolvingamissileorhighvelocityfallingobjectwillposenothreattothecriticalitysafetyofthespentfuelstorageracks.Referencel,AttachmentBtoProposedTechnicalSpecificationChange,submittedbyletterdatedFebruary23,l983fromJohnE.Maier,RG&E,toArnoldDenton,USNRC.  
Theresulting kofthisveryconservative modelisonly0.8894whenthe2000ppmofsolubleboronpresentinthepoolwaterisincludedinthecalculation.
~~~rFigure6AccidentGeometryfor'DisplacementofOneFuelStorageLocationCausedbyMissileStrike(a)NORMALCONFIGURATION~weBasicrackcellk.(nosolubleboron)=.9305Rackcellk(2000ppm(solubleboron)=.6622(b)ASSUMEDACCIDENTCONFIGURATION(onewaterboxandfuelboxinterchanged)Rackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron)<.8894(c)CONSERVATIVEMODELOFACCIDENTCONFIGURATION(eliminate50%ofwaterboxes)Conservativerackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron).8894auFuelStorageLocationWaterBox}}
Thusthekfortheassumedaccidentconfiguration showninFigure6(b)shouldbesignificantly lessthan0.8894andmuch'lessthanthenormal 4
rackcell[Figure6(a)]kof0.9305(seeTable5)at68F,4.25w/oU-235andnosolubleboron.Basedonthisconservative analyticmodel,theassumedaccidentinvolving amissileorhighvelocityfallingobjectwillposenothreattothecriticality safetyofthespentfuelstorageracks.Reference l,Attachment BtoProposedTechnical Specification Change,submitted byletterdatedFebruary23,l983fromJohnE.Maier,RG&E,toArnoldDenton,USNRC.  
~~~rFigure6AccidentGeometryfor'Displacement ofOneFuelStorageLocationCausedbyMissileStrike(a)NORMALCONFIGURATION
~weBasicrackcellk.(nosolubleboron)=.9305Rackcellk(2000ppm(solubleboron)=.6622(b)ASSUMEDACCIDENTCONFIGURATION (onewaterboxandfuelboxinterchanged)
Rackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron)<.8894(c)CONSERVATIVE MODELOFACCIDENTCONFIGURATION (eliminate 50%ofwaterboxes)Conservative rackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron).8894auFuelStorageLocationWaterBox}}

Revision as of 13:49, 29 June 2018

App B to Structural Reanalysis Program, Criticality Analysis for Spent Fuel Storage Racks.
ML17256A707
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/1983
From:
PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:
Shared Package
ML17256A706 List:
References
PROC-830331, NUDOCS 8305310141
Download: ML17256A707 (6)


Text

APPENDIXBtotheSTRUCTURAL REANALYSIS PROGRAMForTheRE.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANT83053i014i 8305f9PDRADOCK05000244PPDR Addendumto"Criticality AnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"forRochester Gas&ElectricCorporation GinnaPlantDatedNovember1982byPickard,LoweandGarrick,Xnc.120018thStreet,N.W.Washington, D.C.20036March1983 Addendumto"Criticality AnalysisfortheSpentFuelStorageRacks"ForRochester Gas&ElectricCorporation GinnaPlant,DatedNovemberl982Inadditiontotheaccidentconditions relatedtothespentfuelstorageracksasdiscussed inSection5.0oftheoriginalreport,anotheraccidentcondition wasevaluated whichinvolvesamissileorahighvelocityforeignobjectfallingontop.of,thestorageracks.Crushingorcompaction ofthefuelassemblies causedbyimpactwouldcompactthefuellatticeandresultinamoreundermoderated andtherefore lessreactiveconfiguration aspreviously described inSection5.0ofthereport.Ifthemissileorthehighvelocityobjectisassumedtocausedisplacement ofafuelstoragebox,aconfiguration similartothatdepictedinFigure6(b)couldconveivable result.Asshown,onewaterboxandonefuelboxareassumedtobeinterchanged ascomparedtothenormalstoragepattern[Figure6(a)].Figure6(c)represents a'ondition whichis.evenmorelimitingwithrespecttocriticality safety.Inthe.lattercase,halfofthewaterboxesintheracksystemareassumedtobereplacedwithfuelstoragelocations.

Theresulting kofthisveryconservative modelisonly0.8894whenthe2000ppmofsolubleboronpresentinthepoolwaterisincludedinthecalculation.

Thusthekfortheassumedaccidentconfiguration showninFigure6(b)shouldbesignificantly lessthan0.8894andmuch'lessthanthenormal 4

rackcell[Figure6(a)]kof0.9305(seeTable5)at68F,4.25w/oU-235andnosolubleboron.Basedonthisconservative analyticmodel,theassumedaccidentinvolving amissileorhighvelocityfallingobjectwillposenothreattothecriticality safetyofthespentfuelstorageracks.Reference l,Attachment BtoProposedTechnical Specification Change,submitted byletterdatedFebruary23,l983fromJohnE.Maier,RG&E,toArnoldDenton,USNRC.

~~~rFigure6AccidentGeometryfor'Displacement ofOneFuelStorageLocationCausedbyMissileStrike(a)NORMALCONFIGURATION

~weBasicrackcellk.(nosolubleboron)=.9305Rackcellk(2000ppm(solubleboron)=.6622(b)ASSUMEDACCIDENTCONFIGURATION (onewaterboxandfuelboxinterchanged)

Rackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron)<.8894(c)CONSERVATIVE MODELOFACCIDENTCONFIGURATION (eliminate 50%ofwaterboxes)Conservative rackcellk(2000ppmsolubleboron).8894auFuelStorageLocationWaterBox