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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORYINFOiQQTIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9909290014DOC.DATE:99/09/22NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterGAUTF,.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION.RUBY,R.M.RochesterGas&.ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET¹05000244VISSING,G.S.
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFOiQQTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9909290014 DOC.DATE:
99/09/22NOTARIZED:
NOFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester GAUTF,.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
.RUBY,R.M.
Rochester Gas&.ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000244VISSING,G.S.


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER99-011-00:on990823,smalltearswerediscoveredinflexibleductworkconnectorwtinletofCRHVACsysreturnairfan(AKF08).Causedbyin-leakagegreaterthanassumed.Jointwasrestoredtoleaktightcondition.With990922ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMELPINTEL:FILECENTERR/DRIP~RERBRES/DET/ERABRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111'RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,GNRR/DIPM/IOLBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DRAA/OERABLMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1'1111111'1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLSTORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRODESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR15ENCL15 4NDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVEhlUE,ROCHESTER,N.YId6d9-0001AREACODE7165'-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidentNvcleorOperationsSeptember22,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateIWashington,D.C.20555
LER99-011-00:on 990823,small tearswerediscovered inflexibleductworkconnector wtinletofCRHVACsysreturnairfan(AKF08).Caused byin-leakage greaterthanassumed.Jointwasrestoredtoleaktightcondition.
With990922ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
05000244RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPINTEL:FILECENTERR/DRIP~RERB RES/DET/ERAB RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:
LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111'RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G NRR/DIPM/IOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DRAA/OERAB LMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1'1111111'1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LSTORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRODESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR15ENCL15 4NDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION
~89EASTAVEhlUE, ROCHESTER, N.YId6d9-0001 AREACODE7165'-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresident NvcleorOperations September 22,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate IWashington, D.C.20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
LER1999-011,SmallBreachinVentilationSystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasisR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
LER1999-011, SmallBreachinVentilation SystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasisR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244


==DearMr.Vissing:==
==DearMr.Vissing:==
TheattachedLicenseeEventReportLER1999-011issubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii)(B)and(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequireareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...thatresultedinthenucltarpowerplantbeing...Inaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant."or"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Vertrulyyours,RobertC.Mecxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorateIDivisionofLicensingProjectManagementOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555RegionalAdministrator,RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSenior'esidentInspector99092'st0014990922PDRAOQCK050002448PDR
TheattachedLicenseeEventReportLER1999-011issubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii)(B)and(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequireareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...that resultedinthenucltarpowerplantbeing...In acondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant."or"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications".
Vertrulyyours,RobertC.Mecxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorate IDivisionofLicensing ProjectManagement OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555RegionalAdministrator, RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSenior'esident Inspector 99092'st0014 990922PDRAOQCK050002448PDR


NRCFORM366IBIBBB}U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)fsbCPelPurPeynpeYresponketlatcorIIpPywiNLIsrrdn<PaIoryinformationcollectionrequest:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporatedintothelicensingprocessandfedbacktohdustiy.ForwardcommentsregardingburdenestimatetotheRecordsMa'nagementBranch(T4F33),U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,Washington,DC205554001~andtothePaperworkReductionProject(31504104),OfficeofManagementandBudget,Washington,OC20503.IfaninformationcollectiondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andaFACILITYNAMEI1}R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantmLEI4)DQGKETNUMBER<2}05000244-PAGEf3}1OF6SmallBreach,inVentilationSystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasis.MONTHOAYYEAREVENTDATE(5),LERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIALNUMBERREVSIONNUMBERMONTHOAYREPORTDATE(7}DOCKETNUMBER05000FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(6)082319991999-011-0009221999FAGILrrYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12}50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm36BATELEPHONENUMBERIirciudeAieeCode)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)'11)'RobertM.Ruby-SeniorLicensingEngineer(716)771-3572CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPOR'TABLETOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXVlECONVOB7SUPPLEMENTALREP08TExPEGTED(14}YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).NOXEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnAugust23,1999,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately10:15EDST,smalltearswerediscoveredintheflexibleductworkconnectorattheinletoftheControlRoomHVAC,SystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).TheplantenteredTechnicalSpecificationLimitingConditionforOperation3.0.3forapproximately48minuteswhiletemporaryrepairsweremade.Subsequently,itwasdeterminedthattheopeningscouldhavecausedanin-leakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis,placingtheplantineconditionoutsideitsdesignbasis.ThiswasreportedtotheNRCwithinonehourofthedeterminationper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceislistedinSectionV.B.
NRCFORM366IBIBBB}U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)fsbCPelPurPeynpeYresponke tlatcorIIpPywiNLIs rrdn<PaIory information collection request:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporated intothelicensing processandfedbacktohdustiy.Forwardcommentsregarding burdenestimatetotheRecordsMa'nagement Branch(T4F33),U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC205554001
lI NRCFORM366AIBIBBB)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETI2)LERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244TEARSEQUENTIALREMSIQNNUMBERNUMBER1999-O11..OP2OF6TEXTlifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AII17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnAugust23,1999theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Engineeringmanagementwasmakingatour/inspectionoftheControlRoomHVACsysteminpreparationforanupcomingmodification.TheControlRoomHVACsystemisdesignedtoprovideconditionedairatthepropertemperatureandtoisolateandre-circulatetheairuponreceivinganisolationsignalindicatingthepresenceofradioactivityortoxicgas.DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES'August23,1999,1015EDST:Eventdateandtime.o~August23,1999,1015EDST:Discoverydateandtime.August23,1999,1103EDST:Temporaryrepairscompleted.August23,1999,.1145EDST:Furtherevaluationindicatesthatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakagebeyonddesignbasis.August23,1999,1225EDST:NRCOperationsCenterisnotifiedofthiseventper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)EVENT:OnAugust23,1999,atapproximately1015EDST,whileperformingawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem,theBalanceofPlaritSystemsEngineeringManagerdiscoveredtearsintherubberportionoftheinletflexibleductworkconnector(expansionjoint)fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).Atearatthislocationwouldallowou)qideairflowintothesysteminthepostaccidentrecirculationmode.TheControlRoomoperatorsw~(enotified,thesystemwasdeclaredinoperable,andtheplantenteredGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.0.3.Atapproximately1103EPPT,TemporaryModification99-029wassuccessfullyinstalledwhichsealedtheductfrompotentialin-leakage.ThesystemwasthendeclaredoperableandITSLCO3.0.3.wasexited;."Duetothetimelyrepairs/modification,aunitshutdownwasnotrequiredandaloadreductionwasnotcommenced.Subsequenttoreturningthesystemtooperablestatus,evaluationscompletedatapproximately1145EDSTindicatedthatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakageinexcessoftheassumedleakratelistedintheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Section6.4,Table6.4-1.WiththisinformationitwasassumedthatthesystemhadbeenoutsidethedesignbasisandthiswasreportedtotheNRCOperationsCenterper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),at1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.
~andtothePaperwork Reduction Project(31504104),
OfficeofManagement andBudget,Washington, OC20503.Ifaninformation collection doesnotdisplayacurrently validOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andaFACILITYNAMEI1}R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantmLEI4)DQGKETNUMBER<2}05000244-PAGEf3}1OF6SmallBreach,inVentilation SystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasis.MONTHOAYYEAREVENTDATE(5),LERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBERREVSIONNUMBERMONTHOAYREPORTDATE(7}DOCKETNUMBER05000FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(6)082319991999-011-0009221999FAGILrrYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b) 20.2203(a)
(1)20.2203(a)
(2)(i)20.2203(a)
(2)(ii)20.2203(a)
(2)(iii)20.2203(a)
(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)
(v)20.2203(a)
(3)(i)20.2203(a)
(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12}50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm36BATELEPHONE NUMBERIirciudeAieeCode)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMEN TSOF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)'11)'RobertM.Ruby-SeniorLicensing Engineer(716)771-3572CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPOR'TABLE TOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXVlECONVOB7SUPPLEMENTAL REP08TExPEGTED(14}YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).NOXEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnAugust23,1999,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately 10:15EDST,smalltearswerediscovered intheflexibleductworkconnector attheinletoftheControlRoomHVAC,SystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).TheplantenteredTechnical Specification LimitingCondition forOperation


NRCFORM366A(6ISSB)'U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)RBEUUENTNLRatISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)3OF6TEXT(llmorespaceisrequired,useeddidonelcopiesofIVRCForm366A)(17)C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:Theconditionwasself-identifiedbyengineeringmanagementpersonnelduringawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem.F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomOperators,uponnotificationofthecondition,enteredITSLCO3.0.3andpreparedtostartaplantshutdown,ifrequired.A'fterthesystemwasdeclaredoperableat1103EDST,theLCOwasexited.Atapproximately1145EDST,plantstaffdeterminedthatanon-emergencyonehournotification,per10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),shouldbemadetotheNRCOperationsCenter.TheShiftSupervisormadethisnotificationatapproximately1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.TheNRCResidentwasalsonotifiedatthistime.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheplantbeinginoutsideitsdesignbasiswasasmallbreachintheflexibleductconnectionfortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.Thecalculatedleakagewasinexcessoftheallowablein-leakagelistedinUFSARTable6.4-1.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:TheintermediatecauseofthesmallbreachwastwosmalltearsintheflexibleductworkconnectoronthesuctionoftheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.
==3.0. 3forapproximately==
NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)~RBEOOENtIALRDIISIONNOMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)4OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofhfRCForm366AJI17)C.ROOTCAUSE:Twotearswereidentifiedonoppositesidesoftheroundductattheinletofthereturnairfan.Similarmaterialfrom'stockwaslatercutbyaknifeandexamined.ItwasconfirmedthattheknifecutwasnotsimilartothatwhichwasdiscoveredintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroom.Itwasalsoverifiedthatthematerialisverystrongandnotsubjecttotearingwithmanualhandforces.AlloftheflexiblejointconnectorsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroom,includingthedamagedjoint,hadbeenreplacedduringthe1999refuelingoutage.PostmodificationtestingandQCinspectionsduringandaftertheinstallationsverifiedacceptableductworkflexiblejointconfigurationsaspartofthemodificationturnoverprocess.Theductworkuptotheedgeofthejointwasinsulatedafterthetesting.Thejointwasnotre-testedaftercompletionoftheinsulationworkandotherpostmodificationdemobilization.ThecharacteristicsoftheTemporaryModificationmakevisualinspectionofthetearsimpossibleatthistime.Therefore,giventhatthejointwas,intactandinspectedforleakageattheendoftheoutageand,giventheknownphysicalcharacteristicsofthetear,itwasdeterminedthatfurtherevaluationmustbeconductedwhenthejointisdisassembledforreplacement.DuetotheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsforoperabilityoftheControlRoom"HVACSystem,itisexpectedthatthiswilloccurduringthenextrefuelingoutage.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportingSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...thatresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeing...lnaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant"and10CFR50.73,LicenseEventReportingSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B)whichrequiresareportof"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Theleakageduetothetearintheflexiblecouplingwasgreaterthantheassumedleakageintheaccidentanalysis,asdescribedintheUFSAR.Anassessmentconsideringtheconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventresultedinthefollowingconclusions:Therewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesandimplicationsattributedtotheincreasein"leakagebecause:Althoughthein-leakagewasinexcessofthatassumedintheUFSAR,theactualamountwasonly2.2%ofthetotalflowinthesystem.Inaddition,duringaccidentconditions,approximately20%ofthetotalflowisdivertedthroughthecharcoalfilterunitdownstreamofthein-leakage.Thiswouldservetoreducetheeffectofanyexcessactivityingestedintothesystemduetothetear.AnyeventthatresultsinasignificantreleasewouldrequireentryintotheNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan,resultingincontinuousRadiationProtection(RP)techniciancoverageintheControlRoom.InthissituationtheControlRoomarearadiationandairborneactivityarecontinuouslymonitored.Shouldtheactivityconcentrationreachunacceptablelevels,theRPtechnicianwouldimplementappropriateprotectiveactions.Someofthecontingenciesavailablearerespiratorsandpotassiumiodidetabletstolimittheuptakeofradioactiveiodine.
48minuteswhiletemporary repairsweremade.Subsequently, itwasdetermined thattheopeningscouldhavecausedanin-leakage greaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis, placingtheplantinecondition outsideitsdesignbasis.ThiswasreportedtotheNRCwithinonehourofthedetermination per10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B).
NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective,themostlikelysourceofsignificanttoxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrousammoniatankoutsidetheCondensateDemineralizerbuilding.Theremainingon-sitechemicals,whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation(chlorine,ammonia,hydrazine,sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide)areinaliquidstate.Therefore,duetotheslowerevaporationrate,theControlRoomatmosphereislesslikelytoreachhazardousairborneconcentrationsduringaspill.Inaddition,thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxidetanksintheprimarydemineralizerroomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensateDemineralizerbuildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertentmixingofthesechemicals.ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximatelyonemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificantdilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.Also,thewaterplantisinalocation,wheretheprevailingwindsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmospherewouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperatorsduetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditionalfiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:TemporaryModification99-029wasimplementedtorestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewconditionwithnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspectedforpotentialdamagemechanismduringthereplacement,presentlyplannedforthenextrefuelingoutage.Shouldthisinspectionyieldanyadditionalinformationrelatingtorootcause,appropriatecorrectiveactionswillbeimplementedandarevisedLERwillbe.transmittedtotheNRC.  
Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence islistedinSectionV.B.
lI NRCFORM366AIBIBBB)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETI2)LERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244TEARSEQUENTIAL REMSIQNNUMBERNUMBER1999-O11..OP2OF6TEXTlifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AII17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:
OnAugust23,1999theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Engineering management wasmakingatour/inspection oftheControlRoomHVACsysteminpreparation foranupcomingmodification.
TheControlRoomHVACsystemisdesignedtoprovideconditioned airatthepropertemperature andtoisolateandre-circulate theairuponreceiving anisolation signalindicating thepresenceofradioactivity ortoxicgas.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES' August23,1999,1015EDST:Eventdateandtime.o~August23,1999,1015EDST:Discovery dateandtime.August23,1999,1103EDST:Temporary repairscompleted.
August23,1999,.1145 EDST:Furtherevaluation indicates thatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakage beyonddesignbasis.August23,1999,1225EDST:NRCOperations Centerisnotifiedofthiseventper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)EVENT:OnAugust23,1999,atapproximately 1015EDST,whileperforming awalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem,theBalanceofPlaritSystemsEngineering Managerdiscovered tearsintherubberportionoftheinletflexibleductworkconnector (expansion joint)fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).Atearatthislocationwouldallowou)qideairflowintothesysteminthepostaccidentrecirculation mode.TheControlRoomoperators w~(enotified, thesystemwasdeclaredinoperable, andtheplantenteredGinnaStationImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.0.3.Atapproximately 1103EPPT,Temporary Modification 99-029wassuccessfully installed whichsealedtheductfrompotential in-leakage.
ThesystemwasthendeclaredoperableandITSLCO3.0.3.wasexited;."
Duetothetimelyrepairs/modification, aunitshutdownwasnotrequiredandaloadreduction wasnotcommenced.
Subsequent toreturning thesystemtooperablestatus,evaluations completed atapproximately 1145EDSTindicated thatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakage inexcessoftheassumedleakratelistedintheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Section6.4,Table6.4-1.Withthisinformation itwasassumedthatthesystemhadbeenoutsidethedesignbasisandthiswasreportedtotheNRCOperations Centerper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),
at1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.  


NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALNUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentis"Flexglas",manufacturedbyVentFabrics,Inc.ThespecificapplicationisasaFlexibleDuctConnectorSCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None}}
NRCFORM366A(6ISSB)'U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)RBEUUENTNL RatISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)3OF6TEXT(llmorespaceisrequired, useeddidonel copiesofIVRCForm366A)(17)C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:
Thecondition wasself-identified byengineering management personnel duringawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem.F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomOperators, uponnotification ofthecondition, enteredITSLCO3.0.3andpreparedtostartaplantshutdown, ifrequired.
A'fterthesystemwasdeclaredoperableat1103EDST,theLCOwasexited.Atapproximately 1145EDST,plantstaffdetermined thatanon-emergency onehournotification, per10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),
shouldbemadetotheNRCOperations Center.TheShiftSupervisor madethisnotification atapproximately 1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.TheNRCResidentwasalsonotifiedatthistime.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:
NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeoftheplantbeinginoutsideitsdesignbasiswasasmallbreachintheflexibleductconnection fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.Thecalculated leakagewasinexcessoftheallowable in-leakage listedinUFSARTable6.4-1.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeofthesmallbreachwastwosmalltearsintheflexibleductworkconnector onthesuctionoftheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.
NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)~RBEOOENtIAL RDIISIONNOMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)4OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofhfRCForm366AJI17)C.ROOTCAUSE:Twotearswereidentified onoppositesidesoftheroundductattheinletofthereturnairfan.Similarmaterialfrom'stock waslatercutbyaknifeandexamined.
Itwasconfirmed thattheknifecutwasnotsimilartothatwhichwasdiscovered intheControlBuildingHVACequipment room.Itwasalsoverifiedthatthematerialisverystrongandnotsubjecttotearingwithmanualhandforces.Alloftheflexiblejointconnectors intheControlBuildingHVACequipment room,including thedamagedjoint,hadbeenreplacedduringthe1999refueling outage.Postmodification testingandQCinspections duringandaftertheinstallations verifiedacceptable ductworkflexiblejointconfigurations aspartofthemodification turnoverprocess.Theductworkuptotheedgeofthejointwasinsulated afterthetesting.Thejointwasnotre-tested aftercompletion oftheinsulation workandotherpostmodification demobilization.
Thecharacteristics oftheTemporary Modification makevisualinspection ofthetearsimpossible atthistime.Therefore, giventhatthejointwas,intact andinspected forleakageattheendoftheoutageand,giventheknownphysicalcharacteristics ofthetear,itwasdetermined thatfurtherevaluation mustbeconducted whenthejointisdisassembled forreplacement.
DuetotheTechnical Specification requirements foroperability oftheControlRoom"HVACSystem,itisexpectedthatthiswilloccurduringthenextrefueling outage.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73, LicenseeEventReporting System,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),
whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...that resultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeing...ln acondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant"and10CFR50.73, LicenseEventReporting System,item(a)(2)(i)(B) whichrequiresareportof"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications".
Theleakageduetothetearintheflexiblecouplingwasgreaterthantheassumedleakageintheaccidentanalysis, asdescribed intheUFSAR.Anassessment considering theconsequences andimplications ofthiseventresultedinthefollowing conclusions:
Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences andimplications attributed totheincreasein"leakagebecause:Althoughthein-leakage wasinexcessofthatassumedintheUFSAR,theactualamountwasonly2.2%ofthetotalflowinthesystem.Inaddition, duringaccidentconditions, approximately 20%ofthetotalflowisdivertedthroughthecharcoalfilterunitdownstreamofthein-leakage.
Thiswouldservetoreducetheeffectofanyexcessactivityingestedintothesystemduetothetear.Anyeventthatresultsinasignificant releasewouldrequireentryintotheNuclearEmergency ResponsePlan,resulting incontinuous Radiation Protection (RP)technician coverageintheControlRoom.Inthissituation theControlRoomarearadiation andairborneactivityarecontinuously monitored.
Shouldtheactivityconcentration reachunacceptable levels,theRPtechnician wouldimplement appropriate protective actions.Someofthecontingencies available arerespirators andpotassium iodidetabletstolimittheuptakeofradioactive iodine.
NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective, themostlikelysourceofsignificant toxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrous ammoniatankoutsidetheCondensate Demineralizer building.
Theremaining on-sitechemicals, whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation (chlorine, ammonia,hydrazine, sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide) areinaliquidstate.Therefore, duetotheslowerevaporation rate,theControlRoomatmosphere islesslikelytoreachhazardous airborneconcentrations duringaspill.Inaddition, thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxide tanksintheprimarydemineralizer roomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensate Demineralizer buildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertent mixingofthesechemicals.
ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximately onemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificant dilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.
Also,thewaterplantisinalocation, wheretheprevailing windsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmosphere wouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperators duetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditional fiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:Temporary Modification 99-029wasimplemented torestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.
WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipment roomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewcondition withnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:
~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspected forpotential damagemechanism duringthereplacement, presently plannedforthenextrefueling outage.Shouldthisinspection yieldanyadditional information relatingtorootcause,appropriate corrective actionswillbeimplemented andarevisedLERwillbe.transmitted totheNRC.
 
NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL NUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired, useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:
Thefailedcomponent is"Flexglas",
manufactured byVentFabrics,Inc.Thespecificapplication isasaFlexibleDuctConnector SCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.
C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
None}}

Revision as of 12:32, 29 June 2018

LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A754
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/22/1999
From: MECREDY R C, RUBY R M
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-99-011, NUDOCS 9909290014
Download: ML17265A754 (12)
v • d • e


Text

REGULATORY INFOiQQTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9909290014 DOC.DATE:

99/09/22NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester GAUTF,.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION

.RUBY,R.M.

Rochester Gas&.ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000244VISSING,G.S.

SUBJECT:

LER99-011-00:on 990823,small tearswerediscovered inflexibleductworkconnector wtinletofCRHVACsysreturnairfan(AKF08).Caused byin-leakage greaterthanassumed.Jointwasrestoredtoleaktightcondition.

With990922ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPINTEL:FILECENTERR/DRIP~RERB RES/DET/ERAB RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111'RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G NRR/DIPM/IOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DRAA/OERAB LMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1'1111111'1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LSTORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRODESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR15ENCL15 4NDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVEhlUE, ROCHESTER, N.YId6d9-0001 AREACODE7165'-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresident NvcleorOperations September 22,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate IWashington, D.C.20555

Subject:

LER1999-011, SmallBreachinVentilation SystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasisR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

TheattachedLicenseeEventReportLER1999-011issubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii)(B)and(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequireareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...that resultedinthenucltarpowerplantbeing...In acondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant."or"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications".

Vertrulyyours,RobertC.Mecxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorate IDivisionofLicensing ProjectManagement OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555RegionalAdministrator, RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSenior'esident Inspector 99092'st0014 990922PDRAOQCK050002448PDR

NRCFORM366IBIBBB}U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)fsbCPelPurPeynpeYresponke tlatcorIIpPywiNLIs rrdn<PaIory information collection request:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporated intothelicensing processandfedbacktohdustiy.Forwardcommentsregarding burdenestimatetotheRecordsMa'nagement Branch(T4F33),U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC205554001

~andtothePaperwork Reduction Project(31504104),

OfficeofManagement andBudget,Washington, OC20503.Ifaninformation collection doesnotdisplayacurrently validOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andaFACILITYNAMEI1}R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantmLEI4)DQGKETNUMBER<2}05000244-PAGEf3}1OF6SmallBreach,inVentilation SystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasis.MONTHOAYYEAREVENTDATE(5),LERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBERREVSIONNUMBERMONTHOAYREPORTDATE(7}DOCKETNUMBER05000FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(6)082319991999-011-0009221999FAGILrrYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b) 20.2203(a)

(1)20.2203(a)

(2)(i)20.2203(a)

(2)(ii)20.2203(a)

(2)(iii)20.2203(a)

(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)

(v)20.2203(a)

(3)(i)20.2203(a)

(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12}50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm36BATELEPHONE NUMBERIirciudeAieeCode)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMEN TSOF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)'11)'RobertM.Ruby-SeniorLicensing Engineer(716)771-3572CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPOR'TABLE TOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXVlECONVOB7SUPPLEMENTAL REP08TExPEGTED(14}YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).NOXEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnAugust23,1999,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately 10:15EDST,smalltearswerediscovered intheflexibleductworkconnector attheinletoftheControlRoomHVAC,SystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).TheplantenteredTechnical Specification LimitingCondition forOperation

3.0. 3forapproximately

48minuteswhiletemporary repairsweremade.Subsequently, itwasdetermined thattheopeningscouldhavecausedanin-leakage greaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis, placingtheplantinecondition outsideitsdesignbasis.ThiswasreportedtotheNRCwithinonehourofthedetermination per10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B).

Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence islistedinSectionV.B.

lI NRCFORM366AIBIBBB)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETI2)LERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244TEARSEQUENTIAL REMSIQNNUMBERNUMBER1999-O11..OP2OF6TEXTlifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AII17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:

OnAugust23,1999theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Engineering management wasmakingatour/inspection oftheControlRoomHVACsysteminpreparation foranupcomingmodification.

TheControlRoomHVACsystemisdesignedtoprovideconditioned airatthepropertemperature andtoisolateandre-circulate theairuponreceiving anisolation signalindicating thepresenceofradioactivity ortoxicgas.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES' August23,1999,1015EDST:Eventdateandtime.o~August23,1999,1015EDST:Discovery dateandtime.August23,1999,1103EDST:Temporary repairscompleted.

August23,1999,.1145 EDST:Furtherevaluation indicates thatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakage beyonddesignbasis.August23,1999,1225EDST:NRCOperations Centerisnotifiedofthiseventper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)EVENT:OnAugust23,1999,atapproximately 1015EDST,whileperforming awalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem,theBalanceofPlaritSystemsEngineering Managerdiscovered tearsintherubberportionoftheinletflexibleductworkconnector (expansion joint)fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).Atearatthislocationwouldallowou)qideairflowintothesysteminthepostaccidentrecirculation mode.TheControlRoomoperators w~(enotified, thesystemwasdeclaredinoperable, andtheplantenteredGinnaStationImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.0.3.Atapproximately 1103EPPT,Temporary Modification 99-029wassuccessfully installed whichsealedtheductfrompotential in-leakage.

ThesystemwasthendeclaredoperableandITSLCO3.0.3.wasexited;."

Duetothetimelyrepairs/modification, aunitshutdownwasnotrequiredandaloadreduction wasnotcommenced.

Subsequent toreturning thesystemtooperablestatus,evaluations completed atapproximately 1145EDSTindicated thatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakage inexcessoftheassumedleakratelistedintheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Section6.4,Table6.4-1.Withthisinformation itwasassumedthatthesystemhadbeenoutsidethedesignbasisandthiswasreportedtotheNRCOperations Centerper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),

at1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.

NRCFORM366A(6ISSB)'U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)RBEUUENTNL RatISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)3OF6TEXT(llmorespaceisrequired, useeddidonel copiesofIVRCForm366A)(17)C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:

Thecondition wasself-identified byengineering management personnel duringawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem.F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomOperators, uponnotification ofthecondition, enteredITSLCO3.0.3andpreparedtostartaplantshutdown, ifrequired.

A'fterthesystemwasdeclaredoperableat1103EDST,theLCOwasexited.Atapproximately 1145EDST,plantstaffdetermined thatanon-emergency onehournotification, per10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),

shouldbemadetotheNRCOperations Center.TheShiftSupervisor madethisnotification atapproximately 1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.TheNRCResidentwasalsonotifiedatthistime.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:

NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeoftheplantbeinginoutsideitsdesignbasiswasasmallbreachintheflexibleductconnection fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.Thecalculated leakagewasinexcessoftheallowable in-leakage listedinUFSARTable6.4-1.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeofthesmallbreachwastwosmalltearsintheflexibleductworkconnector onthesuctionoftheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.

NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)~RBEOOENtIAL RDIISIONNOMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)4OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofhfRCForm366AJI17)C.ROOTCAUSE:Twotearswereidentified onoppositesidesoftheroundductattheinletofthereturnairfan.Similarmaterialfrom'stock waslatercutbyaknifeandexamined.

Itwasconfirmed thattheknifecutwasnotsimilartothatwhichwasdiscovered intheControlBuildingHVACequipment room.Itwasalsoverifiedthatthematerialisverystrongandnotsubjecttotearingwithmanualhandforces.Alloftheflexiblejointconnectors intheControlBuildingHVACequipment room,including thedamagedjoint,hadbeenreplacedduringthe1999refueling outage.Postmodification testingandQCinspections duringandaftertheinstallations verifiedacceptable ductworkflexiblejointconfigurations aspartofthemodification turnoverprocess.Theductworkuptotheedgeofthejointwasinsulated afterthetesting.Thejointwasnotre-tested aftercompletion oftheinsulation workandotherpostmodification demobilization.

Thecharacteristics oftheTemporary Modification makevisualinspection ofthetearsimpossible atthistime.Therefore, giventhatthejointwas,intact andinspected forleakageattheendoftheoutageand,giventheknownphysicalcharacteristics ofthetear,itwasdetermined thatfurtherevaluation mustbeconducted whenthejointisdisassembled forreplacement.

DuetotheTechnical Specification requirements foroperability oftheControlRoom"HVACSystem,itisexpectedthatthiswilloccurduringthenextrefueling outage.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73, LicenseeEventReporting System,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),

whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...that resultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeing...ln acondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant"and10CFR50.73, LicenseEventReporting System,item(a)(2)(i)(B) whichrequiresareportof"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications".

Theleakageduetothetearintheflexiblecouplingwasgreaterthantheassumedleakageintheaccidentanalysis, asdescribed intheUFSAR.Anassessment considering theconsequences andimplications ofthiseventresultedinthefollowing conclusions:

Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences andimplications attributed totheincreasein"leakagebecause:Althoughthein-leakage wasinexcessofthatassumedintheUFSAR,theactualamountwasonly2.2%ofthetotalflowinthesystem.Inaddition, duringaccidentconditions, approximately 20%ofthetotalflowisdivertedthroughthecharcoalfilterunitdownstreamofthein-leakage.

Thiswouldservetoreducetheeffectofanyexcessactivityingestedintothesystemduetothetear.Anyeventthatresultsinasignificant releasewouldrequireentryintotheNuclearEmergency ResponsePlan,resulting incontinuous Radiation Protection (RP)technician coverageintheControlRoom.Inthissituation theControlRoomarearadiation andairborneactivityarecontinuously monitored.

Shouldtheactivityconcentration reachunacceptable levels,theRPtechnician wouldimplement appropriate protective actions.Someofthecontingencies available arerespirators andpotassium iodidetabletstolimittheuptakeofradioactive iodine.

NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective, themostlikelysourceofsignificant toxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrous ammoniatankoutsidetheCondensate Demineralizer building.

Theremaining on-sitechemicals, whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation (chlorine, ammonia,hydrazine, sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide) areinaliquidstate.Therefore, duetotheslowerevaporation rate,theControlRoomatmosphere islesslikelytoreachhazardous airborneconcentrations duringaspill.Inaddition, thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxide tanksintheprimarydemineralizer roomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensate Demineralizer buildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertent mixingofthesechemicals.

ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximately onemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificant dilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.

Also,thewaterplantisinalocation, wheretheprevailing windsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmosphere wouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperators duetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditional fiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:Temporary Modification 99-029wasimplemented torestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.

WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipment roomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewcondition withnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:

~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspected forpotential damagemechanism duringthereplacement, presently plannedforthenextrefueling outage.Shouldthisinspection yieldanyadditional information relatingtorootcause,appropriate corrective actionswillbeimplemented andarevisedLERwillbe.transmitted totheNRC.

NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL NUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired, useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:

Thefailedcomponent is"Flexglas",

manufactured byVentFabrics,Inc.Thespecificapplication isasaFlexibleDuctConnector SCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.

C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:

None

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