ML17326B548

Annual Operating Rept,1988. W/890228 Ltr

ML17326B548
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/31/1988
From:	GIBSON L S, SMITH W G, SVENSSON B A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 8903100329
Download: ML17326B548 (21)

Text

ACCELERATED DIUBUTlON DEMONSTR!0.i SYFTEklREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKET0500031505000316ACCESSION NBR:8903100329 DOC.DATE:

88/12/31NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&50-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Indiana&AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STEVENSON,B.A.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleGIBSON,L.S IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleSMITH,W.G.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION I

SUBJECT:

"AnnualOperating Rept,1988."

W/890228ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE47DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.59AnnualReportofChanges,TestsorExperiments MadeNOTES:W/outApprovSRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANG,JINTERNAL:

AEOD/DOANRR/DLPQ/HFB 10NQDRBPp4B10LE02EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1010111122111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDAEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DOEA/EAB 11NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RGN3FILE01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL551111111111pgg;gysz/zest JEST5~aw,8lIRINOTETQALL"RIDS"RECIPZEZFS'IZASE HELPUSV3REDUCEHASTE!CDNZACr'IHEDOCUME,'iZ CONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)K)ELIKCNATE YOURNAHEFBCHDIST!KBVZIGN LISTSPORDOCUMENTS YOUDClN'TNEED!a/lfTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR~ENCL DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTANNUALOPERATING REPORT1988COMPILEDBY:~c'.~~B.A.SvenssonLicensi'vitiesCoordinator REVIEWEDBY:))(nS>re(g,uL..xbsonAsst.PlantMgr.-Technical SupportAPPROVEDBY:UMr".J~W.G.Smith,Jr.PlantManager TABLEOFCONTENTSTITLEPAGENUMBERIntroduction Personnel ExposureSummarySteamGenerator Inservice Inspection ReportsChangestoFacilityChangestoProcedures Challenges toPressurizer PORVSandSafetyValvesIrradiated FuelInspection 1516 INTRODUCTION TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,ownedbyIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyislocatedfivemilesnorthof'Bridgman, Michiganandconsistsoftwonuclearpowerunits.Eachunitemploysapressurized waterreactornuclearsteamsupplysystemfurnished byWestinghouse ElectricCorporation.

TheUnit1reactoriscurrently designedforapoweroutputof3250MWtandtheUnit2reactorisdesignedforapoweroutput.of3411MWt,whicharetheirlicensedratings.Theapproximate grossandnetelectrical outputsofUnit1are1056MWeand1020MWeandofUnit2are1100MWeand1060MWe,respectively.

Themaincondenser cooling.methodisopencycleusingLakeMichiganwaterasthecoolingsource.TheCookNuclearPlantwasthefirstdomesticnuclearfacilitytoemployetheicecondenser reactorcontainment system.TheAmericanElectricPowerServiceCorporation wasthearchitect-engineer andconstructor.

ThisReportwascompiledbyB.A.Svenssonwiththefollowing individuals contributing information asfollows:D.C.LoopeC.A.FreerS.D.DeLongJ.B.DrosteB.K.WormR.W.HennenPersonnel ExposureSummarySteamGenerator ISISummaryChangestoFacilityChangestoProcedures Challenges toPressurizer PORVsandSafetyValvesResultsofIrradiated FuelInspections Page1 ANNUALOPERATING REPORT-RG1.16for1988/IPERSONNEL

>100mRSTAT.UTIL.CONT.TOTALMAN-REMSTATIONUTILITYCONTRACTREACTOROPERATIONS

&SURVEILLANCE Maintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel ROUTINEMAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel IN-SERVICE INSPECTION Maintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel SPECIALMAINTENANCE Maintenance-Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel WASTEPROCESSING Maintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel REFUELING Maintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel TOTALSMaintenance Personnel Operations Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel GRANDTOTALS00070056001800000010010100190006000200030005000300030001000000110020000000100010000100000000000000010004001000020000.000101020073001800030011051100000001'0000000000000020001000000000003000000010000000000000031001000000010001000000000000000000000000000010000000000010002000200000000000400790010003300610001000402410022001300010000001800140003000000010680001100790012002000540004001700000001001800660014000000000324010600790001000519130000.971, 0015.451000>.3530000.0000001.8220044.3390005.9100001.2050000.2850000.3570000.9540000.6300000.4940000.1700000.0000001.7220004.9610000.0000001.1020000.1450000.6200000.0000000.0000000.0000000.1700000.5280004.7500000.2050000.0000000.1210047.5320026.7410009.2570000.4550002.4700172.9100000.0000000.1550000.0000000.0000000.0000000.2670000.3380000.0000000.0000000.5360000.0000000.6500000.0000000F0000000.0000028.9970004.9870000.000.0000.4320003.1300000.0000000.0000000.0000000.0000000.0000000.0000000.1060000.0000000.0000000.1510000.2670001.2490000.0000000.0000000.6870004.4060003.0620013.6990022.9520000.1300000.6740155,8890006.2460005.1060000.2440000.0000003.4480008.5860000.9290000.0000000.1700541.6330010.3320103.184'0004.257 0022.9180019.0970002.4290004.5970000.0000000.1750008.6640033.3890005.7430000.0000000.0000192.3570064.4580039.3270000.4840001.0190595.290Page2 1'6REPORT-WORKFUNCTIONCATEGORIES Reactor0rationsandSurveillance lThoseactivities involvedwithoperating theplantormonitoring it'soperation, including chemistry, performance testing,surveillance testing,etc.Theplantmaybeatanypowerlevel,including zero,andstillhaveworkfallingintothisarea.ManySTP'srunduringshutdownorrefueling maystillfallintothiscategory.

RoutineMaintenance Allequipment orsystemmaintenance, whetherpreventative orrestorative, whichdoesnotinvolvesignificant modifications toequipment orsystems.IncludedisI&Crepairwork,aswellasworktoadjustoperableequipment toimproveperformance (adjusting fanbladepitch,forexample).

Inservice InsctionInspections of'equipment andsystemstomonitorchangesthatwouldbedetrimental tofunctionorintegrity.

Alsoincludedisallworkrequiredtopermitsuchinspections, suchasbuildingrequiredscaffolding, removingorreplacing supportsofinsulation, ordisassembly ofvalves,pumps,etc.Notincludedareinspection to.assessormonitornormalwear,etc.Forexample,dissembly ofachargingpumptoinspectbearingwearwouldnotbeInservice Inspection, butdissembly toinspectforrotorcrackingorcasingdamagewouldbe.Inspection ofaweldonanewlyaddedlineisSpecialMaintenance, orinspection ofaweldrepairataleakingfittingisRoutineMaintenance.

SecialMaintenance Allworkonequipment orsystemsperformed tomakesignificant modifications.

Installation ofnewsystemsorequipment, replacement oradditionofsupportsorhangers,additionofnewlinesorinstruments, removalofexistingequipment, replacement ofexisting.

equipment.

withsignificantly different equipment areallSpecialMaintenance.

Forexample,replacement ofaproperlyfunctioning, originalequipment pressuretransmitter withadifferent modelwithimprovedcharacteristics orcertification wouldbeSpecialMaintenance, butreplacement oramalfunctioning pressuretransmitter withanewerorimprovedmodelwouldprobablybeRoutineMaintenance.

Page3 WasteProceaiin Allworkassociated withdecontamination ofequipment, areas,systems,etc.(ifnotanintegralpartofanotherjob,suchaspumprepair),collection andprocessing ofwaste,whethersolid,liquid,orgas.Operations insupportofwastehandlingarealsoincluded.

Forexample,drainingafiltertopermitchangingit,orventingitafterchangingarepartofWasteProcessing, butvalvingacleanfilterintothesystemisReactorOperations.

RepairoftheBalerordrummingroomcraneisRoutineMaintenance.

RefuelinAllworkisdirectlyconcerned withrefueling thereactor,including allsupportoperations, isclassified asRefueling.

Testingthepolarcraneorinstalling thecavityfilterrigispartofRefueling, asiscavitydeconbeforeorafterflood-up.

Changingthecavityfilter,however,isWasteProcessing andfixingthemanipulator craneisRoutineMaintenance.

Page4 STEAMOPERATORTUBEINSERVICE INSPECTION REPORTS1988SUMMARYREPORTSUNITNO.1Therewerenoinservice inspections ofUnitNo.1'ssteamgenerators fortheyear1988.UNITNO.2UnitNo.2wasremovedfromserviceonApril23,1988,forthecompletereplacement ofthefoursteamgenerator lowerassemblies.

Acomplete"preservice inspection" ofthenewlowerassemblies wasperformed following thefieldhydrostatic testandpriortoinitialoperation usingequipment andtechniques expectedtobeusedduringsubsequent inservice inspection, pursuanttotherequirements ofTechnical Specification 4.4.5.4.a.9.

Therewerenoreportable indications identified duringthepreservice inspection.

Page5 REQUESTFORCHANGECHANGESTOFACILITYBriefdescriptions andsummarysafety'valuations fordesignchanges(RFCs)madetothefacilityasdescribed intheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)arepresented inthissection.Thesechangeswerecompleted pursuanttotheprovisions ofTitle10,CodeofFederalRegulations subsection 50.59(a).RFC-12-2859 BRIEFDESCRIPTION RFC-DC-12-2859 providedforthereplacement oftheSouthBoricAcidEvaporator SteamCoilTubeBundle.Eddycurrenttestin'goftheoriginaltubesindicated severepittingofthetubes.ThispittingwasmostlikelycausedbyChlorides presentintheevaporator bottoms.Althoughoriginally installed asaBoricAcidEvaporator, thisevaporator iscurrently beingusedtoprocessradwastewhichhasmuchhigherchlorideconcentrations thatcanbeexpectedinboricacidservice.Basedonrecommendations fromtheVendor,thetubebundlewasreplacedwithatubebundlemanufactured fromIncoloy825material.

ItisexpectedthattheIncoloy825willperformbetterthantheoriginally supplied304SSbundlebecauseofitssuperiorresistance tochloridepitting.SAFETYEVALUATION ThisRFChasbeenclassified asSafety-Interface sincetheSouthBoricAcidEvaporator isaSeismicClassIIcomponent.

NuclearSafetyandLicensing hasreviewedt'echangeasperthereviewcriteriainNS&Lprocedure No.7.AsaresultoftheSafetyReview,therewerenoopenitemsforthisRFC.TheIncoloymaterialwasdetermined tohavehigherallowable stresslimitsthanthestainless steelmaterial.

Thepurposeofthisreviewwasforprocurement, designandinstallation.

Itwasconcluded, bythereview,thatthisRFCdidnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59,nordiditcreateasubstantial hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.RFC-12-2908 (Addendum f/3)BRIEFDESCRIPTION RFC-DC-12-2908 (Addendum Pi3)providedfortheinstallation ofanew150ton/20tonAuxiliary BuildingCraneandbridgesystem.Thiscranewasinstalled ontheexistingcranerailsandwasusedintandemwiththeexistingcranethatwasmodifiedunderRFC-DC-12-2962 (alsoincludedinthissubmittal).

Together, thesecraneswereusedtoliftandmovethesteamgenerators throughtheauxiliary buildingduringtheSteamGenerator Replacement Project.Page6 Section9.7oftheFSARhasbeenrevisedtoincorporate thechangesmadetotheauxiliary building.

crane.Additional information concerning thecranesmaybefoundinthatsectionoftheFSAR.SAFETYEVALUATION ThisRFChasbeenclassified assafetyrelatedbecauseitinvolvesmodifications totheauxiliary buildingcranewhichisSeismicClassIequipment.

Inadditiontothesafetyevaluation providedforRFC-DC-12-2962, itwasnecessary toevaluatetheconsequences ofaloaddropduringtheinstallation ofthecranecomponents.

Itemscoveredwere:(1)theindividual cranecomponents whiletheywerebeingliftedbyaboomcrane,and(2)inadvertently droppingtheboomcranecomponents ontotheauxiliary buildingstructural elementsorinadvertently hittingtheauxiliary buildingstructural elements.

Theseevaluations wereperformed bytheAEPSCStructural Designsection.NuclearSafetyandLicensing hasreviewedtheseevaluations andfoundthemtobeacceptable withthefollowing commentsontheboomevaluation:

a)Theboomcranehasacapacityof600Kandthemaximumweightliftedwasthatofthetrolleyat144K.Thesafetyfactoravailable was4.17.Thiswasreasonably highforhandlinganoccasional load.Itwasnotedthat,inordertoavoidanytypeofinadvertent humanerror,anadditional operating engineerwasavailable whoalsoworkedasan"oiler."Itwasrecommended thatadedicated operating engineerbepostedwithoutanyotherassignments thatwoulddemandhisattention.

c)Afterdiscussion withtheAEPSCMaterialHandlingDivision, itwasNuclearSafetyandLicensing's understanding that,themaximumloadliftedduringthecraneinstallation activitywas72tonsandtheboomcranewascertified tocarryatestloadof110KofthemaximumloadasperANSIB30.5.Aftertheboomcranewasinstalled atthesite,aninstallation certificate wasissuedtodocumentthattheboomcranewasinstalled perthemanufacturer's guidelines.

d)Theprocedures forthecraneinstallation werereviewedandapprovedbytheappropriate engineering disciplines inAEPSC.Basedontheevaluation notedabove,itisconcluded thattheinstallation ofthecranesdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasper10CFR50.59Section(a)(2)andwillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Page7 RFC-12-2962 BRIEFDESCRIPTION RFC-DC-12-2962 providedformodifications totheauxiliary buildingcraneinordertoconformtothesingle-failure-proof requirements ofNUREG-0554.

Specifically, themodification involved(a)replacing theoriginaltrolley(150T/20T) withanewtrolley(150T)designedandbuilttosingle-failure-proof (SFP)requirements, (b)addingasecondholdingbrakeandaninchingmechanism tothebridgedrive,and(c)upgrading thecranerunwaygirderintheauxiliary buildingtoresistthehigherwheelloads.Thesemodifications wereperformed fortworeasons:(1)Thecranemust=meettherequirements ofNUREG-0612 and0554inregardtohandlingofheavyloadsintheauxiliary building.

(2)Thesingle-failure-proof featuresofthemodifiedcranewerenecessary forthemovementofsteamgenerators inandoutoftheauxiliary buildingduringtheS/Greplacement project.Section9.7oftheFSARhasbeenrevisedincorporating thechangesmadetotheauxiliary buildingoverheadcrane.Reference therevisedtextinSection9.7shouldanyadditional information bedesired.SAFETYEVALUATION Theauxiliary buildingcraneisaSeismicClassIcomponent whichperformsvariousSafety-Related activities suchasopening/closing ofthecontainment equipment hatchesandmovingnewandspentfuelassemblies andliftingandtransporting steamgenerators duringtheirreplacement activities.

Therefore, thisRFCwasclassified asSafety-Related.

Thesafetymemospecifically addressed thefollowing itemsrelatedtothecranemodifications:

1.Themodifications tothecraneasnotedintheoriginalRFChavebeencompleted.

Specifically, (a)thenewtrolleyhasbeendesignedandfabricated tomeetthesingle-failure-proof requirements ofNUREG-0554, (b)asecondholdingbrakeandaninchingmechanism hasbeenaddedtothebridgedriveand(c)thecranerunwaygirderhasbeenmodifiedtotakethehigherwheelloads.2.KS&Lhasreviewedthestress/seismic analysisofthemodifiedcraneperformed byWhitingandfoundittobeacceptable.

h3.AEPSCCognizant Engineers havevisitedtheWhitingofficestoreviewthevendordocuments aspertherequirements ofspecification DCC-MH-105-QCN andacceptedthenewtrolley.4.Theauxiliary buildingcraneisaseismicClass1component andallmodifications tothecranehavebeenprocuredandinstalled tomeettheseismicClass1requirements.

Page8 Basedontheevaluation described above,itisconcluded thatthedesignmodification performed totheauxiliary buildingcranedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestions asper10CFR50.59,Section(a)(2)andthatitwillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TheNRChasreViewedthemodific'ations totheauxiliary buildingcraneinamendment 100tofacilityoperating licenseNo.DPR-74.Theirconcurrence readsasfollows:"Basedonthelicensee's demonstration ofcompliance totheguidelines ofNUREG-0554 andtheadequacyofthecrane'sstructural component inmeetingtheirallowable stressvalues,thestafffindsthattheproposednewcraneinstallation isacceptable."

RFC-DC-12-4042 BRIEFDESCRIPTION RFC-4042providedfortheinstallation ofanadditional levelindicator andlow-level alarmfortheVolumeControlTank(VCT)levelcontrolsystem.Thesemodifications wereinstalled toeliminate anundesirable situation shouldoneofthetwo(2)originally installed VCTlevelchannelsfail.Afailureofthecapillary reference legontheVCTLevelController (QLC-452) willcausetheinstrument tofailhigh.ThishighlevelsignalcausestheVCTDivertValve(QRV-303) toopeninanefforttoreduceandmaintaintheVCTlevelwithinanormaloperating band.AslongastheRedundant VCTLevelController (QLC-451) functioned

normally, noalarmwouldhavesounded.Thisscenariohadthepotential ofallowingtheVCTtobepumpeddownuntilthechargingpumpslostsuction.Theadditional lowlevelalarmaddedunderthisRFCisfedfromQLC-451.Thisalleviates anyconcernsregarding thescenariodescribed above.SAFETYEVALUATION ThisdesignchangewasanNRCcommitment toprovideadditional VCTlevelinstrumentation toaidplantoperations.

Sincethismodification willenhancethesafetyfunctionoftheVCT,thisRFChasbeenclassified as"SafetyInterface".

ThisRFChasbeenreviewedinaccordance withNS&Lprocedure number7"SafetyReviewofDesignChanges".

Subsequent conversations withtheIGCengineerpermitted aconclusion thattherewerenoopenitemswithregardtoRFC-DC-12-4042 andthemodifications described abovedidnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.Page9 MINORMODIFICATIONS CHANGESTOFACILITYBriefdescriptions andsummarysafetyevaluations fordesignchanges(MinorModifications) madetothefacilityasdescribed intheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)arepresented inthissection.Thesechangeswerecompleted pursuanttotheprovisions ofTitle10,CodeofFederalRegulations subsection 50.59(a).12-MM-010 REMOVEWASTEEVAPORATOR FILTERELEMENTSBRIEFDESCRIPTION ThisMinorModification removedtheWasteEvaporator FilterelementsfromtheWasteEvaporator FeedFilters.Mostliquidradwasteattheplantiscurrently treatedwiththeDuratekdemineralization systemratherthantheradwasteevaporators.

AlthoughDuratekhasitsownfilterspriortothedemineralizers, wastesarecurrently alsobeingpassedthroughthewasteevaporator filters.Ithasbeendetermined thatthisextrafiltration isnotneededtoobtainadequateclean-upwiththeDurateksystem.Thewasteevaporator filtersaredifficult tochangeandresultinworkerexposures thatarenotconsistent withtheprinciples ofALARA.SAFETYEVALUATION Thischangeisclassified asSafetyInterface becauseitinvolvesasystemthathandlesradioactive wastes.Atechnical evaluation wasperformed bytheChemicalEngineering section.Specifics ofthesafetyreviewforthemodifications areprovidedbelow.1.Thefilterunitsaredesignated seismicClassII.Operation withouttheremovable filterelementsinplaceinthefilterhousingwillnotdegradetheseismicratingofthepiping.2.Allliquideffluents areroutedtothemonitortanks,wheretheyaresampledpriortodischarge tothelake.Thesamplingensuresthattheeffluents willnotviolate10CFR20orTechnical Specification limits.Thus,evenifcleanupcapability isreducedbyremovalofthefilterelements, itwouldnotresultinreleasesexceeding thoselimits.3.Thewasteevaporator filtersarediscussed inChapterlj.loftheFSAR.Page10 Thesafetyevaluation concluded thatremovalofthewasteevaporator filterelementsdoesnotconstitute andunreviewed safetyquestionasdescribed in10CFR50.59,"Changes, TestsandExperiments,"

Section(a)(2)andthatitdoesnotsignificantly impactpublichealthandsafety.Pagell TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS CHANGESTOFACILITYBriefdescriptions andsummarysafetyevaluations forTemporary Modifications madetothefacilityasdescribed intheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)arepresented inthissection.Thesechangeswerecompleted pursuant'o theprovisions ofTitle10;CodeofFederalRegulations subsection 50.59(a).Temporary Mod.819(Unit2)BRIEFDESCRIPTION ThisTemporary Modification involvestheliftingofCables3167C-2,3168-1,3153C-2,3138-2and3139-2whichisthepowerfeedforpressurizer heatersf/3,f/4,f!53,k/55and/f56,respectively.

Thesepressurizer heatershaveadefective heaterelement.Bydisconnecting thesecables,pressurizer heaters(J3,f/4,853,f155and//56willnotbeabletoperformtheirintendedfunction.

SAFETYEVALUATION ThisTemporary Modification hasbeenclassified assafetyrelatedbecauseitaffectstheReactorCoolantSystem.ThePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee (PNSRC)hasreviewedthisTemporary Modification perthereviewcriteriaofPMI-1040, Rev.3Itwasconcluded bythereview,thatthisTemporary Modification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestions asdefinedin10CFR50.59,nordoesitcreateasubstantial hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TemorarMod.835(Unit1)BRIEFEVALUATION ThisTemporary Modification involvestheliftingofCable3151-1whichisthepowerfeedforpressurizer heaterf!48.Thispressurizer heaterhasadefective heaterelement.Bydisconnecting thiscable,pressurizer heaterf148willnotbeabletoperformitsintendedfunction.

SAFETYEVALUATION ThisTemporary Modification hasbeenclassified assafetyrelatedbecauseitaffectstheReactorCoolantSystem.ThePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommi.ttee (PNSRC)hasreviewedthisTemporary Modification perthereviewcriteriaofPMI-1040, Rev.3.Page12 Itwasconcluded byt'ereview,thatthisTemporary Modification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestions asdefinedin10CFR50.59nordoesitcreateasubstantial hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TemorarMod.836(Unit1)BRIEFDESCRIPTION ThisTemporary Modification involvestheliftingofCable3139-1whichisthepowerfeedforpressurizer heater856.Thispressurizer heaterhasadefective heaterelement.Bydisconnecting thiscable,pressurizer heater//56willnotbeabletoperformitsintendedfunction.

SAFETYEVALUATION ThisTemporary Modification hasbeenclassified assafetyrelatedbecauseitaffectstheReactorCoolantSystem.ThePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee (PNSRC)hasreviewedthisTemporary Modification perthereviewcriteriaofPMI-1040, Rev.3.Itwasconcluded bythereview,thatthisTemporary Modification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59nordoesitcreateasubstantial hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TemorarMod.f/43(Unit1&2)BRIEFDESCRIPTION Installation oftheDuratekDemineralization Systemusingamechanical jumpertoroutewastehold-uptankwatertothe587'rumming roomforprocessing.

Theeffluentwillberoutedtothewasteevaporator condensate tanks.Allhoseconnections willhaveaworkingpressureat300PSI.Thesystemaddsadditional w'asteprocessing capability withamaximumfeedflowof55GPMandwillbeusedasanalternative toSouthRadwasteEvaporator operation.

SAFETYEVALUATION ThisTemporary Modification hasbeenclassified asSafetyInterface becausethissystemhandlesradioactive solids,liquidsandgases.ThesystemitselfisentirelySeismicClassIII.TheNuclearSafetyandLicensing SectionhasreviewedthisproposedchangeasperthereviewcriteriainNS&LProcedure No.7.AsaresultoftheSafetyreview,itwasconcluded thatthisTemporary Modification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59nordoesitcreateasubstantial hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Page13 TemorarMod.!/149(Unit1&2)BRIEFDESCRIPTION ThisTemporary Modification involvestheadditionofa15XSodiumHypochlorite solutionintotheCirculating WatersupplyinlieuoftheChlorination Systemtocontrolalgaeandslimeandtoregaincoolingefficiency intheCirculating WaterCondensers.

SAFETYEVALUATION Thesubjectmodification hasbeenclassified asSafetyInterface sinceitinvolvesaddingchemicals thatmayinteractwiththeEssential ServiceWaterSystem,aClassIsystem.Itwasconcluded thattheadditionofSodiumHypochlorite wouldnotadversely affectthesafetysystemsofthePlant.Further,itwaspointedoutthatoneofthereasonsthesystemisdescribed intheFSARisthattheNRCistheleadFederalAgencyandadditionofSodiumHypochorite tothelakeisanenvironmental matternormallyhandledbytheEnvironmental Protection Agency.ThisModification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59andwillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Page14 CHANGESTOPROCEDURES Abriefdescription ofaprocedure changeimplemented undertheprovisions of10CFR50.59andtheassociated safetyevaluation isprovidedbelow:Unit2MainSteamSafetValveSetPointVerification Procedure ThechangeinUnit2mainsteamsafetyvalvesetpointverification consisted ofanewprocedure implemented throughSpecialProcedure 12MHPSP.126,Revision1,whichallowssetpointtestingofmainsteamsafetyvalvesinModes1,PowerOperation, throughMode3,HotStandby.,Onesafetyvalveistestedatatime.Duringtestingthevalveisconsidered inoperable perT/S3.7.1.1.ThuspertheActionStatement, thePowerRangeNeutronFluxHighSetpointisreducedperTable3.7-1.Ifaproblemshouldoccur,themostplausible problemwiththetestwouldasafetyvalvestickingopen.Sinceonlyonevalveatatimeis,tested,anytransient resulting fromastuck-open valveisboundedbytheUnit2steamlinebreakanalysisfoundinSection14.1.5oftheupdatedFSAR.Thisconclusion isvalidinModes1,2,and3.Accidentanalysisassumptions whichrelyonthesafetyvalvetoopentorelievepressure, aremaintained bycausingastuck-open safetyvalveduringpoweroperation, thereisapossibility ofareactortrip.Althoughthispotential exists,itspossibility isminimized byprovidedahydraulic closingdevice.Evenifatripoccurstheconsequences areboundedbuytheexistingaccidentanalyses.

AchangetoSection10.2.4oftheUpdatedFSARhasbeenmadewhichstatesthat"steamgenerator safetyvalvesetpoints arecheckedperiodically priortoorduringscheduled outages".

Thesafetyevaluation concluded thattestingoftheUnit2mainsteamsafetyvalvesinModes1,2,or3doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.Page15 CHALLENGES TOPRESSURIZER PORV'SANDSAFETYVALVESTherewerenochallenges tothePressurizer PORV'sorSafetyValvesforeitherUnit1or-2oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantduring1988.Page16 Annual0eratinReort-Irradiated FuelExaminations During1988,twoseparate'xaminations wereperformed ontheirradiated fueldischarged fromUnit2Cycle6.Theseexaminations wereconducted inparallelwith,orshortlyafter,thecorewasunloaded, andtheintentwastodetermine fuelpinfailuresaswellasgrossstructural defectsintheassemblies.

Thefirstexamination wasaroutinebinocular

'inspection ofthefuelassemblies

(**12THP6040PER.353).

Aseachassemblyisdownloaded totheSpentFuelPool,-itisexaminedonallfour.sidesvisually.

Theexaminerislookingspecifically fortomormissinggridstraps, missingordamagedfuelpins,excessive cladhydriding, orrodbowtogapclosure.Thisinspection isprimarily intendedtodetectfueldamagecausedbymechanical interaction betweenassemblies orbafflejetting,andisdoneduringeachrefueling.

Therewasnoindication ofanyfueldamage.DuetoRCSchemistry levelsindicative ofseveralleakingfuelpins,acontractwaslettoAdvancedNuclearFuels(ANF)toprovideUltrasonic (UT)examination oftheassemblies makinguptheUnit2Cycle6core,aswellasanyreplacement assemblies forCycle7.theUltrasonic systemworksbyaprobetransceiver sendingahighfrequency soundwaveintoafuelpinandmeasuring thestrengthofthereturning signal,or"ringback".Afuelpincanbedetermined tohavewaterinitbymonitoring therelativestrengthofthisringback.Inthisway,notonlycananassemblybedetermined tohaveleakingpins,butthenumbersandlocations ofthebadpinscanbeidentified.

Testingresults:Assemblies Tested:AssemblieS.

withFailuresNumberofFailedFuelPins1966'FuelBatchAssemblies VendorTestedAssemblies PinsM(1timeburned)R(3timesburned)S(3timesburned)T(2timesburned)U(1timeburned)WWANFANFANF3112,9288196000516000819Threeofthefailedfuelpins(2inassemblyT24and1inassemblyU39)wereontheperiphery.

Usingthesmallcameramountedonthetestingsystem,ashortvideoinspection wasperformed.

TherodsinassemblyT24bothshowedsignsofsecondary hydriding.

TherodletinassemblyU39wasinconclusive.

Page17 IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyCookNuclearPlantP.O.Box458Bridgman, Ml491066164655901INDIANANICHIGiAN POPOVERFebruary28,1989UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Attention:

DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555,DocumentControlManager:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantDocketNos.50-315/50-316 LicenseNos.DPR-58/DPR-74 Twocopiesofthe1988AnnualOperating ReportfortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantarebeingtiansmitted toyouunderthiscoverletter.Theinformation contained inthisreportcoverstheactivities delineated intheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantTechnical Specifications, Section6.9.1.5,andtherequirements of10CFR50.59.Copiesofthisreporthavebeentransmitted totheRegionalAdministrator, theDirectorofInspection andEnforcement, theDirector, OfficeofManagement Information andProgramControloftheUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission andtheNRCResidentInspector asspecified in10CFR50.4and10CFR50.59.Respectfully, W.G.Smith,JPlantManagerCC~gy[g~g/~sz/2&SI'I II~lZEsQi~~e4/D.H.Williams, Jr.M.P.AlexichP.A.BarrettS.J.BrewerJ.F.KurganA.B.Davis,RegionalAdministrator, RegionIIIDirector, Inspection andEnforcement

Director, OfficeofManagement Information andProgramAnalysisNRCResidentInspector, BridgmanG.Charnoff, Esq,R.C.Callen,MPSCD.HahnINPODottieSherman,ANILibrary