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NRCFORM366A(4-95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCONIMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6IYEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE(3I2OF5TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm886A/(17IPRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnJuly22,1996,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately1130EDST,aRadiationProtection(RP)technician,whowasperformingaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding,observedwaterdrippinginanareabehindtheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST).TheRPtechniciannotifiedtheControlRoomoperators.EffortstolocatethesourceofthedrippingwaterandtoquantifytheleakratewereinitiatedbyOperationsandNuclearEngineeringServices(NES).ThesourceofwaterwasdeterminedtobeasmallleakonatestlinefortheContainmentSpray(CS)systemintheAuxiliaryBuilding,whichisoutsidetheContainment(CNMT).Theleakratewasestimatedtobeapproximatelyone(1)gallonpernour(GPH).TheControlRoomoperatorsdidnotidentifyanyrequirementthatwouldlimitplantoperations.TheShiftSupervisornotifiedOperationsmanagement,maintenancemanagement,andplantandNESstaffoftheleak.Allreachedasimilarconclusion.Thestaffworkedondevelopingandimplementinganactionplantoaddresstheproblem.TheissuesoflineintegrityandRWSToperabilitywereinvestigatedbyNESandLaboratoryInspectionServices(LIS)personnel~LISpersonnelmeasuredtheamountofpipecross-sectionandweldmetalremaining,andNESpersonneldeterminedthattherewasamplemetalintheaffectedareatoprovidesystemintegrity.Thesourceoftheleakwasidentifiedasasmallpinholeleakonapipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweldonatwo(2)inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10stainlesssteeltestlinefortheCSsystem.Theleakwasinapart-oftheCSsystemthatcouldnotbeisolatedfromtheRWSTbyvalvemanipulationswithoutmakingbothtrainsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)inoperable.Theleakwasmonitoredthroughouttheremainderofthedayandnight.AnoperabilityassessmenthadbeenrequestedbytheShiftSupervisoronJuly22.Onthe'morningofJuly23,1996,thisassessmentwasreviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC).Thisassessment,whichwasbasedonconservativeassumptions,concludedthattheRWSTandECCSwerestilloperablewiththeunisolatedleak.Thisconclusionwassupportedbythefactthattherewasstillamplemetalareainthecross-sectionthatcanprovideintegrityofthepipeduringaseismicevent,andthatthetotalcombinedstresswaslessthantheyieldstrengthofthematerial.PORCrequestedamoreaccurateestimateoftheleakrate.Theleakratewasmeasuredandestimatedtobe2.5GPH.Thisleakrateisinexcessoftwo(2)GPH,whichisspecifiedinSurveillanceTestProcedurePT-39,"LeakageEvaluationofPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainment",astheprogramlimitforthemaximumintegratedleakrateoutsideCNMTfromthesesources.TheleakrateexceededtherequirementsofprocedurePT-39,anditwasinitiallyjudgedtobeaviolationofthe"PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgram",asspecifiedintheGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)Section5.5.2.ThePORCchairmanconservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisbrtoenterITSLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.0.3,basedontherequirementsofprocedurePT-39andAdministrativeProcedureA-52.4,"ControlofLimitingConditionsforOperatingEquipment",eventhoughtheplantwasincompliancewithallITSLCOs.NRCFORM366A(4-95I NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF596-009-00TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:July22,1996,1130EDST:AleakisidentifiedonalineoutsideofContainment.July23,1996,0857EDST:EventDateandTimeandDiscoveryDateandTime.July23,1996,0900EDST:Loadreductionisstarted.July23,1996,1440EDST:IntegratedleakageoutsideContainmentisdeterminedtobelessthantwoGPH.Loadreductionisstopped.B.EVENT:OnJuly23,1996,atapproximately0857EDST,withtheplantinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower,thePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC)conservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisortoenterITSLCO3.0.3.TheShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoinitiateaplantshutdown.Atapproximately0900EDST,theControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperNormalOperatingProcedure0-2.1,"NormalShutdowntoHotShutdown".TheMechanicalSupportgroupinitiatedactionstoprovideafreezesealtoisolatethesourceofleakagefromtheRWST.AfreezesealwasinitiatedbetweentheleakingsocketandtheCSpumpsuctionlinefromtheRWST.Atapproximately1440EDSTonJuly23,1996,thefreezesealhadisolatedtheleak.ITSLCO3.0.3wasexitedandtheloadreductionwasstopped.Theaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandanewprefabricatedspoolpiecewasinstalled.Theaffectedweldwasretainedforfailuremodeanalysis.Aloadincreasetoreturntheplanttofullpowerwasinitiatedatapproximately1530EDSTonJuly23,1996.C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:Duetothelocationandsizeoftheleak,anoperabilityassessmentdeterminedthatnoemergencysafeguardssystemfunctionwasmadeinoperable.However,theleakwasnotisolablefromtheRWSTwithoutvalvemanipulationsthatwouldhaveresultedintheinoperabilityoftheRWSTandbothtrainsoftheECCS.NRCFORM366A(4.95)
NRCFORM366A(4-95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCONIMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6IYEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE(3I2OF5TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm886A/(17IPRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnJuly22,1996,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately1130EDST,aRadiationProtection(RP)technician,whowasperformingaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding,observedwaterdrippinginanareabehindtheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST).TheRPtechniciannotifiedtheControlRoomoperators.EffortstolocatethesourceofthedrippingwaterandtoquantifytheleakratewereinitiatedbyOperationsandNuclearEngineeringServices(NES).ThesourceofwaterwasdeterminedtobeasmallleakonatestlinefortheContainmentSpray(CS)systemintheAuxiliaryBuilding,whichisoutsidetheContainment(CNMT).Theleakratewasestimatedtobeapproximatelyone(1)gallonpernour(GPH).TheControlRoomoperatorsdidnotidentifyanyrequirementthatwouldlimitplantoperations.TheShiftSupervisornotifiedOperationsmanagement,maintenancemanagement,andplantandNESstaffoftheleak.Allreachedasimilarconclusion.Thestaffworkedondevelopingandimplementinganactionplantoaddresstheproblem.TheissuesoflineintegrityandRWSToperabilitywereinvestigatedbyNESandLaboratoryInspectionServices(LIS)personnel~LISpersonnelmeasuredtheamountofpipecross-sectionandweldmetalremaining,andNESpersonneldeterminedthattherewasamplemetalintheaffectedareatoprovidesystemintegrity.Thesourceoftheleakwasidentifiedasasmallpinholeleakonapipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweldonatwo(2)inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10stainlesssteeltestlinefortheCSsystem.Theleakwasinapart-oftheCSsystemthatcouldnotbeisolatedfromtheRWSTbyvalvemanipulationswithoutmakingbothtrainsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)inoperable.Theleakwasmonitoredthroughouttheremainderofthedayandnight.AnoperabilityassessmenthadbeenrequestedbytheShiftSupervisoronJuly22.Onthe'morningofJuly23,1996,thisassessmentwasreviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC).Thisassessment,whichwasbasedonconservativeassumptions,concludedthattheRWSTandECCSwerestilloperablewiththeunisolatedleak.Thisconclusionwassupportedbythefactthattherewasstillamplemetalareainthecross-sectionthatcanprovideintegrityofthepipeduringaseismicevent,andthatthetotalcombinedstresswaslessthantheyieldstrengthofthematerial.PORCrequestedamoreaccurateestimateoftheleakrate.Theleakratewasmeasuredandestimatedtobe2.5GPH.Thisleakrateisinexcessoftwo(2)GPH,whichisspecifiedinSurveillanceTestProcedurePT-39,"LeakageEvaluationofPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainment",astheprogramlimitforthemaximumintegratedleakrateoutsideCNMTfromthesesources.TheleakrateexceededtherequirementsofprocedurePT-39,anditwasinitiallyjudgedtobeaviolationofthe"PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgram",asspecifiedintheGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)Section5.5.2.ThePORCchairmanconservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisbrtoenterITSLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.0.3,basedontherequirementsofprocedurePT-39andAdministrativeProcedureA-52.4,"ControlofLimitingConditionsforOperatingEquipment",eventhoughtheplantwasincompliancewithallITSLCOs.NRCFORM366A(4-95I NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF596-009-00TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:July22,1996,1130EDST:AleakisidentifiedonalineoutsideofContainment.July23,1996,0857EDST:EventDateandTimeandDiscoveryDateandTime.July23,1996,0900EDST:Loadreductionisstarted.July23,1996,1440EDST:IntegratedleakageoutsideContainmentisdeterminedtobelessthantwoGPH.Loadreductionisstopped.B.EVENT:OnJuly23,1996,atapproximately0857EDST,withtheplantinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower,thePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC)conservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisortoenterITSLCO3.0.3.TheShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoinitiateaplantshutdown.Atapproximately0900EDST,theControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperNormalOperatingProcedure0-2.1,"NormalShutdowntoHotShutdown".TheMechanicalSupportgroupinitiatedactionstoprovideafreezesealtoisolatethesourceofleakagefromtheRWST.AfreezesealwasinitiatedbetweentheleakingsocketandtheCSpumpsuctionlinefromtheRWST.Atapproximately1440EDSTonJuly23,1996,thefreezesealhadisolatedtheleak.ITSLCO3.0.3wasexitedandtheloadreductionwasstopped.Theaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandanewprefabricatedspoolpiecewasinstalled.Theaffectedweldwasretainedforfailuremodeanalysis.Aloadincreasetoreturntheplanttofullpowerwasinitiatedatapproximately1530EDSTonJuly23,1996.C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:Duetothelocationandsizeoftheleak,anoperabilityassessmentdeterminedthatnoemergencysafeguardssystemfunctionwasmadeinoperable.However,theleakwasnotisolablefromtheRWSTwithoutvalvemanipulationsthatwouldhaveresultedintheinoperabilityoftheRWSTandbothtrainsoftheECCS.NRCFORM366A(4.95)
NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE{3)4OF5TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm38&A/(17)METHODOFDISCOVERY'heleakwasfirstdiscoveredbyanRPtechnicianduringaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.HenotifiedtheControlRoomoperators,andthepreciselocationwasconfirmedbyOperationsandEngineering.Confirmationthattheleakratewasabove2GPHoccurredaftermeasurementsperformedatthedirectionofPORC.F.OPERATORACTION:WhennotifiedbyPORC,theShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoenterITSLCO3.0.3andtoinitiateaplantshutdown.TheControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperprocedure0-2.1.TheShiftSupervisorsubsequentlynotifiedtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A),non-emergencyonehournotification,atapproximately0951EDSTonJuly23,1996.Whentheleakwasisolated,ITSLCO3.0.3wasexited,andtheplantwasreturnedtofullpower.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A;IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheconditionprohibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationswastheconservativedeterminationbyPORCtoenterITSLCO3.0.3duetotheleak.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Theintermediatecauseoftheleakwasapinholeleakintheweldattachingthepipetothesocketelbow.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theaffectedpipe,socket,andfilletweldwereanalyzedforthefailuremode.Thepinholewasdeterminedtobeanoriginalinstallationwelddefect(datingfromthe1960's)thatexistedoveranareaofslaginclusionintheweld.Almostalltheslaghadbeenleachedfromthepinholechanneloverthepast25years.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(B),"Design,Manufacturing,Construction/Installation".NRCFORM366AI4-95)
NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE{3)4OF5TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm38&A/(17)METHODOFDISCOVERY'heleakwasfirstdiscoveredbyanRPtechnicianduringaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.HenotifiedtheControlRoomoperators,andthepreciselocationwasconfirmedbyOperationsandEngineering.Confirmationthattheleakratewasabove2GPHoccurredaftermeasurementsperformedatthedirectionofPORC.F.OPERATORACTION:WhennotifiedbyPORC,theShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoenterITSLCO3.0.3andtoinitiateaplantshutdown.TheControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperprocedure0-2.1.TheShiftSupervisorsubsequentlynotifiedtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A),non-emergencyonehournotification,atapproximately0951EDSTonJuly23,1996.Whentheleakwasisolated,ITSLCO3.0.3wasexited,andtheplantwasreturnedtofullpower.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A;IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheconditionprohibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationswastheconservativedeterminationbyPORCtoenterITSLCO3.0.3duetotheleak.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Theintermediatecauseoftheleakwasapinholeleakintheweldattachingthepipetothesocketelbow.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theaffectedpipe,socket,andfilletweldwereanalyzedforthefailuremode.Thepinholewasdeterminedtobeanoriginalinstallationwelddefect(datingfromthe1960's)thatexistedoveranareaofslaginclusionintheweld.Almostalltheslaghadbeenleachedfromthepinholechanneloverthepast25years.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(B),"Design,Manufacturing,Construction/Installation".NRCFORM366AI4-95)
NRCFORM366AI4-95)LXCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGEI3)5OF5TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useeddidonelcopiesofNRCForm386AII17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Theintegratedleakrateinexcessof2GPHoutsideCNMTresultedinconservativeentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.Anassessmentwillbeperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthisevent.AsupplementtothisLERwillbesubmittedwiththeresultsofthisassessment.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:oThesourceoftheleakagewasisolatedfromtheRWSTbyfreezeseal,permittingexitfromITSLCO3.0.3.oTheaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandreplacedwithanewprefabricatedspoolpiece,andthefreezesealwasremoved.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:oFailureAnalysisoftheleakinthesocketweldhasbeenperformed.oTheadjacentoriginalexistingweldswerecutoutandreplaced.oAdditionalcorrectiveactionswillbeidentifiedinasupplementtothisLER.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentwasa2inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10pipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweld.Thepipeandsocketelbowarestainlesssteel,ASTMA312Type304andA182F304(forged)respectively.Thesocketweldwasar)originalinstallationweldmadebefore1970.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENT"AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NAAI4.)N  
NRCFORM366AI4-95)LXCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGEI3)5OF5TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useeddidonelcopiesofNRCForm386AII17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Theintegratedleakrateinexcessof2GPHoutsideCNMTresultedinconservativeentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.Anassessmentwillbeperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthisevent.AsupplementtothisLERwillbesubmittedwiththeresultsofthisassessment.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:oThesourceoftheleakagewasisolatedfromtheRWSTbyfreezeseal,permittingexitfromITSLCO3.0.3.oTheaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandreplacedwithanewprefabricatedspoolpiece,andthefreezesealwasremoved.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:oFailureAnalysisoftheleakinthesocketweldhasbeenperformed.oTheadjacentoriginalexistingweldswerecutoutandreplaced.oAdditionalcorrectiveactionswillbeidentifiedinasupplementtothisLER.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentwasa2inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10pipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweld.Thepipeandsocketelbowarestainlesssteel,ASTMA312Type304andA182F304(forged)respectively.Thesocketweldwasar)originalinstallationweldmadebefore1970.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENT"AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NAAI4.)N}}
}}

Revision as of 12:18, 18 May 2018

LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr
ML17264A589
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/22/1996
From: MARTIN J T, MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-009, LER-96-9, NUDOCS 9608300053
Download: ML17264A589 (8)


Text

CATEGORY3REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9608300053DOC.DATE:96/08/22NOTARIZED:NODOCKETgFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMARTIN,J.T.RochesterGasaElectricCorp.MEREDYiR.C.RochesterGasaElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER96-009-00:on960723,determinedfromleakonpiping,sysoutsidecontainmentgreaterthanprogramlimit.Causedbywelddefect.Pipeasocketweldswerecutout&replaced.W/960822ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244RECIPIENT~IDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PDINTERNAI~G~NRR/DE/EELBNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHY,G.ANRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME'ISSINGIG.AEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DSIR/EIBLITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOORE,W.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111221111DUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTECONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKiROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR25ENCL25 ANDRGCHfSTfROPSP~DflfCTRICCCR.CZ47lCiv~'PrJA'FMSTA'IENUf,RCCHfSTfR,N,YIdol&ml~ARE<COOf71oS46-2700v'+)volAugust22,1996U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyVissingProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

LER96-009,LeakOutsideContainment,DuetoWeldDefect,ResultsinLeakRateGreaterThanProgramLimitR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

Inaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-009ishereby'ubmitted.EntryintoLimitingConditionforOperation3.0.3ofTechnicalSpecificationswasaconservativeactionbaseduponGinnaStationT.S.5.5.2"PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgram".AfurtherassessmentwillbeprovidedinasupplementtothisLERwhichwillbesubmittedbySeptember20,1996.Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MecredyJSM:435xc:Mr.GuyVissing(MailStop14C7)ProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector9608300053960822PDRADOCK050002448PDRVLJV

NRCFORM366(4-95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereversoforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150.0104EXPIRES04/30/96ESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORYINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHELICENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKToINDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCH(T-6F33),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION,WASHINGTON.DC20555.0001,ANDToTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECTFACILITYNAME(11R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2105000244PAGE(3)1OF5TITLE(41LeakOutsideContainment,DuetoWeldDefect,ResultsinLeakRateGreaterThanProgramLimitEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(?IOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(6)MONTH07DAYYEAR2396SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00MONTH08DAY22YEAR96FACIUTYNAMEFACILrrYNAMEOOCKETNUMBEROOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRE:(Chockoneor20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2201(b)X50.73(a)(2)(i)more)(11)50.73(a)(2)(viii)POWERLEVEL(10)NAME10020.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)l2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(3)(il20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERSO.?3(a)(2)(ii)S0.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)(12)'(ELEFHONENUMBER(InorvdeAreaCode)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyInAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366AJohnT.St.Martin-TechnicalAssistantCOMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDES(716)771-3641CRIBFDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMBECOMPONENTMANUFACTURERPSFREPORTABLEToNPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToNPRDSSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(IIyos,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).NOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEAR092096ABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single.spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJuly23,1996,atapproximately0857EDST,itwasdeterminedthattheleakrate(fromaleakonapipingsystemoutsideContainment)wasgreaterthantheanalyzedvalueoftwogallonsperhourforaprimarycoolantsourceoutsideContainment.ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastoconservativelyenterTechnicalSpecificationLimitingConditionforOperation3.0.3andinitiateaplantshutdown,.andtoinitiateactionstoisolatetheleakusingafreezeseal.Oncetheleakwasisolated,theplantexitedTechnicalSpecification3.0.3andtheshutdownwasstopped.Theleakingpipewascutoutandreplaced.Theunderlyingcauseoftheleakwasawelddefectwhichdatesbacktooriginalconstructioninthe1960's.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(B).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceisoutlinedinSectionV.B.AdditionalcorrectiveactionswillbeidentifiedinasupplementtothisLER.NRCFORM366l4-95)

NRCFORM366A(4-95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCONIMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6IYEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE(3I2OF5TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm886A/(17IPRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnJuly22,1996,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately1130EDST,aRadiationProtection(RP)technician,whowasperformingaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding,observedwaterdrippinginanareabehindtheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST).TheRPtechniciannotifiedtheControlRoomoperators.EffortstolocatethesourceofthedrippingwaterandtoquantifytheleakratewereinitiatedbyOperationsandNuclearEngineeringServices(NES).ThesourceofwaterwasdeterminedtobeasmallleakonatestlinefortheContainmentSpray(CS)systemintheAuxiliaryBuilding,whichisoutsidetheContainment(CNMT).Theleakratewasestimatedtobeapproximatelyone(1)gallonpernour(GPH).TheControlRoomoperatorsdidnotidentifyanyrequirementthatwouldlimitplantoperations.TheShiftSupervisornotifiedOperationsmanagement,maintenancemanagement,andplantandNESstaffoftheleak.Allreachedasimilarconclusion.Thestaffworkedondevelopingandimplementinganactionplantoaddresstheproblem.TheissuesoflineintegrityandRWSToperabilitywereinvestigatedbyNESandLaboratoryInspectionServices(LIS)personnel~LISpersonnelmeasuredtheamountofpipecross-sectionandweldmetalremaining,andNESpersonneldeterminedthattherewasamplemetalintheaffectedareatoprovidesystemintegrity.Thesourceoftheleakwasidentifiedasasmallpinholeleakonapipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweldonatwo(2)inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10stainlesssteeltestlinefortheCSsystem.Theleakwasinapart-oftheCSsystemthatcouldnotbeisolatedfromtheRWSTbyvalvemanipulationswithoutmakingbothtrainsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)inoperable.Theleakwasmonitoredthroughouttheremainderofthedayandnight.AnoperabilityassessmenthadbeenrequestedbytheShiftSupervisoronJuly22.Onthe'morningofJuly23,1996,thisassessmentwasreviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC).Thisassessment,whichwasbasedonconservativeassumptions,concludedthattheRWSTandECCSwerestilloperablewiththeunisolatedleak.Thisconclusionwassupportedbythefactthattherewasstillamplemetalareainthecross-sectionthatcanprovideintegrityofthepipeduringaseismicevent,andthatthetotalcombinedstresswaslessthantheyieldstrengthofthematerial.PORCrequestedamoreaccurateestimateoftheleakrate.Theleakratewasmeasuredandestimatedtobe2.5GPH.Thisleakrateisinexcessoftwo(2)GPH,whichisspecifiedinSurveillanceTestProcedurePT-39,"LeakageEvaluationofPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainment",astheprogramlimitforthemaximumintegratedleakrateoutsideCNMTfromthesesources.TheleakrateexceededtherequirementsofprocedurePT-39,anditwasinitiallyjudgedtobeaviolationofthe"PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgram",asspecifiedintheGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)Section5.5.2.ThePORCchairmanconservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisbrtoenterITSLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.0.3,basedontherequirementsofprocedurePT-39andAdministrativeProcedureA-52.4,"ControlofLimitingConditionsforOperatingEquipment",eventhoughtheplantwasincompliancewithallITSLCOs.NRCFORM366A(4-95I NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF596-009-00TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:July22,1996,1130EDST:AleakisidentifiedonalineoutsideofContainment.July23,1996,0857EDST:EventDateandTimeandDiscoveryDateandTime.July23,1996,0900EDST:Loadreductionisstarted.July23,1996,1440EDST:IntegratedleakageoutsideContainmentisdeterminedtobelessthantwoGPH.Loadreductionisstopped.B.EVENT:OnJuly23,1996,atapproximately0857EDST,withtheplantinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower,thePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC)conservativelydirectedtheShiftSupervisortoenterITSLCO3.0.3.TheShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoinitiateaplantshutdown.Atapproximately0900EDST,theControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperNormalOperatingProcedure0-2.1,"NormalShutdowntoHotShutdown".TheMechanicalSupportgroupinitiatedactionstoprovideafreezesealtoisolatethesourceofleakagefromtheRWST.AfreezesealwasinitiatedbetweentheleakingsocketandtheCSpumpsuctionlinefromtheRWST.Atapproximately1440EDSTonJuly23,1996,thefreezesealhadisolatedtheleak.ITSLCO3.0.3wasexitedandtheloadreductionwasstopped.Theaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandanewprefabricatedspoolpiecewasinstalled.Theaffectedweldwasretainedforfailuremodeanalysis.Aloadincreasetoreturntheplanttofullpowerwasinitiatedatapproximately1530EDSTonJuly23,1996.C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:Duetothelocationandsizeoftheleak,anoperabilityassessmentdeterminedthatnoemergencysafeguardssystemfunctionwasmadeinoperable.However,theleakwasnotisolablefromtheRWSTwithoutvalvemanipulationsthatwouldhaveresultedintheinoperabilityoftheRWSTandbothtrainsoftheECCS.NRCFORM366A(4.95)

NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGE{3)4OF5TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm38&A/(17)METHODOFDISCOVERY'heleakwasfirstdiscoveredbyanRPtechnicianduringaroutineweeklysurveyoftheAuxiliaryBuilding.HenotifiedtheControlRoomoperators,andthepreciselocationwasconfirmedbyOperationsandEngineering.Confirmationthattheleakratewasabove2GPHoccurredaftermeasurementsperformedatthedirectionofPORC.F.OPERATORACTION:WhennotifiedbyPORC,theShiftSupervisordirectedtheControlRoomoperatorstoenterITSLCO3.0.3andtoinitiateaplantshutdown.TheControlRoomoperatorsinitiatedaplantshutdownperprocedure0-2.1.TheShiftSupervisorsubsequentlynotifiedtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A),non-emergencyonehournotification,atapproximately0951EDSTonJuly23,1996.Whentheleakwasisolated,ITSLCO3.0.3wasexited,andtheplantwasreturnedtofullpower.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A;IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheconditionprohibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationswastheconservativedeterminationbyPORCtoenterITSLCO3.0.3duetotheleak.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Theintermediatecauseoftheleakwasapinholeleakintheweldattachingthepipetothesocketelbow.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theaffectedpipe,socket,andfilletweldwereanalyzedforthefailuremode.Thepinholewasdeterminedtobeanoriginalinstallationwelddefect(datingfromthe1960's)thatexistedoveranareaofslaginclusionintheweld.Almostalltheslaghadbeenleachedfromthepinholechanneloverthepast25years.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(B),"Design,Manufacturing,Construction/Installation".NRCFORM366AI4-95)

NRCFORM366AI4-95)LXCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-009-00PAGEI3)5OF5TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useeddidonelcopiesofNRCForm386AII17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Theintegratedleakrateinexcessof2GPHoutsideCNMTresultedinconservativeentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.Anassessmentwillbeperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthisevent.AsupplementtothisLERwillbesubmittedwiththeresultsofthisassessment.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:oThesourceoftheleakagewasisolatedfromtheRWSTbyfreezeseal,permittingexitfromITSLCO3.0.3.oTheaffectedpipeandsocketweldswerecutoutandreplacedwithanewprefabricatedspoolpiece,andthefreezesealwasremoved.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:oFailureAnalysisoftheleakinthesocketweldhasbeenperformed.oTheadjacentoriginalexistingweldswerecutoutandreplaced.oAdditionalcorrectiveactionswillbeidentifiedinasupplementtothisLER.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentwasa2inchnominalpipesizeSchedule10pipe-to-90degreeforgedsocketelbowweld.Thepipeandsocketelbowarestainlesssteel,ASTMA312Type304andA182F304(forged)respectively.Thesocketweldwasar)originalinstallationweldmadebefore1970.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENT"AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NAAI4.)N