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NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective,themostlikelysourceofsignificanttoxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrousammoniatankoutsidetheCondensateDemineralizerbuilding.Theremainingon-sitechemicals,whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation(chlorine,ammonia,hydrazine,sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide)areinaliquidstate.Therefore,duetotheslowerevaporationrate,theControlRoomatmosphereislesslikelytoreachhazardousairborneconcentrationsduringaspill.Inaddition,thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxidetanksintheprimarydemineralizerroomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensateDemineralizerbuildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertentmixingofthesechemicals.ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximatelyonemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificantdilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.Also,thewaterplantisinalocation,wheretheprevailingwindsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmospherewouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperatorsduetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditionalfiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:TemporaryModification99-029wasimplementedtorestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewconditionwithnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspectedforpotentialdamagemechanismduringthereplacement,presentlyplannedforthenextrefuelingoutage.Shouldthisinspectionyieldanyadditionalinformationrelatingtorootcause,appropriatecorrectiveactionswillbeimplementedandarevisedLERwillbe.transmittedtotheNRC.  
NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective,themostlikelysourceofsignificanttoxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrousammoniatankoutsidetheCondensateDemineralizerbuilding.Theremainingon-sitechemicals,whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation(chlorine,ammonia,hydrazine,sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide)areinaliquidstate.Therefore,duetotheslowerevaporationrate,theControlRoomatmosphereislesslikelytoreachhazardousairborneconcentrationsduringaspill.Inaddition,thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxidetanksintheprimarydemineralizerroomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensateDemineralizerbuildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertentmixingofthesechemicals.ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximatelyonemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificantdilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.Also,thewaterplantisinalocation,wheretheprevailingwindsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmospherewouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperatorsduetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditionalfiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:TemporaryModification99-029wasimplementedtorestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewconditionwithnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspectedforpotentialdamagemechanismduringthereplacement,presentlyplannedforthenextrefuelingoutage.Shouldthisinspectionyieldanyadditionalinformationrelatingtorootcause,appropriatecorrectiveactionswillbeimplementedandarevisedLERwillbe.transmittedtotheNRC.  


NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALNUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentis"Flexglas",manufacturedbyVentFabrics,Inc.ThespecificapplicationisasaFlexibleDuctConnectorSCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None  
NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALNUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentis"Flexglas",manufacturedbyVentFabrics,Inc.ThespecificapplicationisasaFlexibleDuctConnectorSCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None}}
}}

Revision as of 13:02, 18 May 2018

LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A754
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/22/1999
From: MECREDY R C, RUBY R M
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-99-011, NUDOCS 9909290014
Download: ML17265A754 (12)


Text

REGULATORYINFOiQQTIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9909290014DOC.DATE:99/09/22NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterGAUTF,.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION.RUBY,R.M.RochesterGas&.ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET¹05000244VISSING,G.S.

SUBJECT:

LER99-011-00:on990823,smalltearswerediscoveredinflexibleductworkconnectorwtinletofCRHVACsysreturnairfan(AKF08).Causedbyin-leakagegreaterthanassumed.Jointwasrestoredtoleaktightcondition.With990922ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMELPINTEL:FILECENTERR/DRIP~RERBRES/DET/ERABRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111'RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,GNRR/DIPM/IOLBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DRAA/OERABLMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1'1111111'1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLSTORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRODESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR15ENCL15 4NDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVEhlUE,ROCHESTER,N.YId6d9-0001AREACODE7165'-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidentNvcleorOperationsSeptember22,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateIWashington,D.C.20555

Subject:

LER1999-011,SmallBreachinVentilationSystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasisR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

TheattachedLicenseeEventReportLER1999-011issubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii)(B)and(a)(2)(i)(B),whichrequireareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...thatresultedinthenucltarpowerplantbeing...Inaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant."or"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Vertrulyyours,RobertC.Mecxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorateIDivisionofLicensingProjectManagementOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555RegionalAdministrator,RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSenior'esidentInspector99092'st0014990922PDRAOQCK050002448PDR

NRCFORM366IBIBBB}U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)fsbCPelPurPeynpeYresponketlatcorIIpPywiNLIsrrdn<PaIoryinformationcollectionrequest:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporatedintothelicensingprocessandfedbacktohdustiy.ForwardcommentsregardingburdenestimatetotheRecordsMa'nagementBranch(T4F33),U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,Washington,DC205554001~andtothePaperworkReductionProject(31504104),OfficeofManagementandBudget,Washington,OC20503.IfaninformationcollectiondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andaFACILITYNAMEI1}R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantmLEI4)DQGKETNUMBER<2}05000244-PAGEf3}1OF6SmallBreach,inVentilationSystemResultsinPlantBeingOutsideDesignBasis.MONTHOAYYEAREVENTDATE(5),LERNUMBER(6)SEOUENTIALNUMBERREVSIONNUMBERMONTHOAYREPORTDATE(7}DOCKETNUMBER05000FACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(6)082319991999-011-0009221999FAGILrrYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12}50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm36BATELEPHONENUMBERIirciudeAieeCode)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)'11)'RobertM.Ruby-SeniorLicensingEngineer(716)771-3572CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPOR'TABLETOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXVlECONVOB7SUPPLEMENTALREP08TExPEGTED(14}YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).NOXEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnAugust23,1999,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately10:15EDST,smalltearswerediscoveredintheflexibleductworkconnectorattheinletoftheControlRoomHVAC,SystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).TheplantenteredTechnicalSpecificationLimitingConditionforOperation3.0.3forapproximately48minuteswhiletemporaryrepairsweremade.Subsequently,itwasdeterminedthattheopeningscouldhavecausedanin-leakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis,placingtheplantineconditionoutsideitsdesignbasis.ThiswasreportedtotheNRCwithinonehourofthedeterminationper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceislistedinSectionV.B.

lI NRCFORM366AIBIBBB)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETI2)LERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244TEARSEQUENTIALREMSIQNNUMBERNUMBER1999-O11..OP2OF6TEXTlifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AII17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnAugust23,1999theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Engineeringmanagementwasmakingatour/inspectionoftheControlRoomHVACsysteminpreparationforanupcomingmodification.TheControlRoomHVACsystemisdesignedtoprovideconditionedairatthepropertemperatureandtoisolateandre-circulatetheairuponreceivinganisolationsignalindicatingthepresenceofradioactivityortoxicgas.DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES'August23,1999,1015EDST:Eventdateandtime.o~August23,1999,1015EDST:Discoverydateandtime.August23,1999,1103EDST:Temporaryrepairscompleted.August23,1999,.1145EDST:Furtherevaluationindicatesthatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakagebeyonddesignbasis.August23,1999,1225EDST:NRCOperationsCenterisnotifiedofthiseventper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)EVENT:OnAugust23,1999,atapproximately1015EDST,whileperformingawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem,theBalanceofPlaritSystemsEngineeringManagerdiscoveredtearsintherubberportionoftheinletflexibleductworkconnector(expansionjoint)fortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan(AKF08).Atearatthislocationwouldallowou)qideairflowintothesysteminthepostaccidentrecirculationmode.TheControlRoomoperatorsw~(enotified,thesystemwasdeclaredinoperable,andtheplantenteredGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.0.3.Atapproximately1103EPPT,TemporaryModification99-029wassuccessfullyinstalledwhichsealedtheductfrompotentialin-leakage.ThesystemwasthendeclaredoperableandITSLCO3.0.3.wasexited;."Duetothetimelyrepairs/modification,aunitshutdownwasnotrequiredandaloadreductionwasnotcommenced.Subsequenttoreturningthesystemtooperablestatus,evaluationscompletedatapproximately1145EDSTindicatedthatthetearcouldhaveallowedin-leakageinexcessoftheassumedleakratelistedintheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Section6.4,Table6.4-1.WiththisinformationitwasassumedthatthesystemhadbeenoutsidethedesignbasisandthiswasreportedtotheNRCOperationsCenterper10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),at1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.

NRCFORM366A(6ISSB)'U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)RBEUUENTNLRatISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)3OF6TEXT(llmorespaceisrequired,useeddidonelcopiesofIVRCForm366A)(17)C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:Theconditionwasself-identifiedbyengineeringmanagementpersonnelduringawalkdownoftheControlRoomHVACSystem.F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomOperators,uponnotificationofthecondition,enteredITSLCO3.0.3andpreparedtostartaplantshutdown,ifrequired.A'fterthesystemwasdeclaredoperableat1103EDST,theLCOwasexited.Atapproximately1145EDST,plantstaffdeterminedthatanon-emergencyonehournotification,per10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),shouldbemadetotheNRCOperationsCenter.TheShiftSupervisormadethisnotificationatapproximately1225EDSTonAugust23,1999.TheNRCResidentwasalsonotifiedatthistime.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheplantbeinginoutsideitsdesignbasiswasasmallbreachintheflexibleductconnectionfortheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.Thecalculatedleakagewasinexcessoftheallowablein-leakagelistedinUFSARTable6.4-1.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:TheintermediatecauseofthesmallbreachwastwosmalltearsintheflexibleductworkconnectoronthesuctionoftheControlRoomHVACSystemReturnAirFan.

NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)~RBEOOENtIALRDIISIONNOMBERNUMBER1999-011-00PAGE(3)4OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofhfRCForm366AJI17)C.ROOTCAUSE:Twotearswereidentifiedonoppositesidesoftheroundductattheinletofthereturnairfan.Similarmaterialfrom'stockwaslatercutbyaknifeandexamined.ItwasconfirmedthattheknifecutwasnotsimilartothatwhichwasdiscoveredintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroom.Itwasalsoverifiedthatthematerialisverystrongandnotsubjecttotearingwithmanualhandforces.AlloftheflexiblejointconnectorsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroom,includingthedamagedjoint,hadbeenreplacedduringthe1999refuelingoutage.PostmodificationtestingandQCinspectionsduringandaftertheinstallationsverifiedacceptableductworkflexiblejointconfigurationsaspartofthemodificationturnoverprocess.Theductworkuptotheedgeofthejointwasinsulatedafterthetesting.Thejointwasnotre-testedaftercompletionoftheinsulationworkandotherpostmodificationdemobilization.ThecharacteristicsoftheTemporaryModificationmakevisualinspectionofthetearsimpossibleatthistime.Therefore,giventhatthejointwas,intactandinspectedforleakageattheendoftheoutageand,giventheknownphysicalcharacteristicsofthetear,itwasdeterminedthatfurtherevaluationmustbeconductedwhenthejointisdisassembledforreplacement.DuetotheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsforoperabilityoftheControlRoom"HVACSystem,itisexpectedthatthiswilloccurduringthenextrefuelingoutage.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportingSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition...thatresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeing...lnaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant"and10CFR50.73,LicenseEventReportingSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B)whichrequiresareportof"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Theleakageduetothetearintheflexiblecouplingwasgreaterthantheassumedleakageintheaccidentanalysis,asdescribedintheUFSAR.Anassessmentconsideringtheconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventresultedinthefollowingconclusions:Therewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesandimplicationsattributedtotheincreasein"leakagebecause:Althoughthein-leakagewasinexcessofthatassumedintheUFSAR,theactualamountwasonly2.2%ofthetotalflowinthesystem.Inaddition,duringaccidentconditions,approximately20%ofthetotalflowisdivertedthroughthecharcoalfilterunitdownstreamofthein-leakage.Thiswouldservetoreducetheeffectofanyexcessactivityingestedintothesystemduetothetear.AnyeventthatresultsinasignificantreleasewouldrequireentryintotheNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan,resultingincontinuousRadiationProtection(RP)techniciancoverageintheControlRoom.InthissituationtheControlRoomarearadiationandairborneactivityarecontinuouslymonitored.Shouldtheactivityconcentrationreachunacceptablelevels,theRPtechnicianwouldimplementappropriateprotectiveactions.Someofthecontingenciesavailablearerespiratorsandpotassiumiodidetabletstolimittheuptakeofradioactiveiodine.

NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENEIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMSER1999-.011..OP5OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)~Fromatoxicgasperspective,themostlikelysourceofsignificanttoxicgasreleasewasremovedfromsiteseveralyearsagowiththeremovaloftheanhydrousammoniatankoutsidetheCondensateDemineralizerbuilding.Theremainingon-sitechemicals,whichcouldresultinatoxicgassituation(chlorine,ammonia,hydrazine,sulfuricacid,andsodiumhydroxide)areinaliquidstate.Therefore,duetotheslowerevaporationrate,theControlRoomatmosphereislesslikelytoreachhazardousairborneconcentrationsduringaspill.Inaddition,thesulfuricacidandsodiumhydroxidetanksintheprimarydemineralizerroomhavebeenemptiedandarenolongerinuse.SimilartanksintheCondensateDemineralizerbuildingarelocatedinseparatepitswhichpreventsinadvertentmixingofthesechemicals.ThenextmostlikelytoxicgasreleasesourceisgaseouschlorinelocatedattheOntariowaterplant,approximatelyonemiletotheeastoftheplant.Thedistanceinvolvedwould,allowsignificantdilutionofthegasintheatmosphere.Also,thewaterplantisinalocation,wheretheprevailingwindsintheareatendtoblowthegasawayfromtheplant.Finally,thepresenceofthesegassesintheControlRoomatmospherewouldbereadilyapparenttotheOperatorsduetothenoxiousnatureofthefumes.TherearetwoSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)unitslocatedintheControlRoomwithanadditionalfiveunitslocatedinthefirelockersoutsidetheControlRoomdoor.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:TemporaryModification99-029wasimplementedtorestorethejointtoaleaktightcondition.WorkOrder19902982isplannedtoreplacetheexistingflexiblejointmaterialwithanewflexiblejoint.OtherflexiblejointmaterialjointsintheControlBuildingHVACequipmentroomwereexaminedandwerefoundtobeinnewconditionwithnotears.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:~Asignwasaddedtothislocationtostatethattheductworkshouldnotbesteppedupon.~Thejointwillbecloselyinspectedforpotentialdamagemechanismduringthereplacement,presentlyplannedforthenextrefuelingoutage.Shouldthisinspectionyieldanyadditionalinformationrelatingtorootcause,appropriatecorrectiveactionswillbeimplementedandarevisedLERwillbe.transmittedtotheNRC.

NRCFORM366A(81998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALNUMBEABEYISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant050002441999-011-006OF6TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useaddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.~FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponentis"Flexglas",manufacturedbyVentFabrics,Inc.ThespecificapplicationisasaFlexibleDuctConnectorSCS152intheControlRoomHVACsystem.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLERevents,withthesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None