ML17261A138

LER 79-016/01T-0 on 790804:14-h Interval of Reactor Operation Lapsed Prior to Trip During Trip Testing Following Maint Outage & Restoration of Criticality.Caused by Unclear Checkoff procedure.On-shift Training Held

ML17261A138
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/16/1979
From:	PECK C H ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML17244A769	List: ML17244A768 ML17261A138
References
LER-79-016-01T, LER-79-16-1T, NUDOCS 7908210524
Download: ML17261A138 (4)

Text

U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION79-016/01T-0LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(CAR1231)Q)(PLEASEPRINTORTYPEALLREQUIREDINFORMATION)60000000Q341111Q4~QsLICENSENUMBER2526LICENSETYPE3057CAT58NRCFOQM366{7.7I+CONTROLBLOCK:INYREG1Q2009LICENSEECODE1415~078CON'T~0178soURcE~LQB050002447080479QB081679Qe6061DOCKETNUMBEREVENTDATE7475REPORTDATE80EVENTDESCRIPTIONANDPROBABLECONSEQUENCESQ10Followingamaintenanceoutaeandrestorationofcriticalita14hr.intervalofreac-~03toroperationlapsedpriortoatripduringtriptesting,inwhichA.C.powerwasonforaccumuinjectionMOV'sandRWSTdeliverytoRHRMOV.(T.S.3.3.1.1g).Thiscon-ditionwasnotedduringprecriticalcheckoffperformanceaftertriptesting.Valves~06~08wereinpropersafeguardpositionduringthisintervalofoperation.Before14hr.intervalcktbkrpositionshadbeenreportedbutcheckoffdidnotdirectrepositioning.Cktbkrswererecheckedba2ndoeratoronbasisofoerabilitforalinmentsandnothingunusualwasreported.Controloperatorcompletedprocedureassumingpre-criticalrequirementwasfulfilled.8078~oeSYSTEMCAUSECAUSECOMP.VALVECODECODFSUBCODECOMPONENTCODESUBCODESUBCODERQll~DQ12~ZQ13CKTBRKQE~AQls~ZQs78910111213181920SEQUENTIALOCCURRENCEREPORTREVISIONLERiROEVENTYEARREPORTNO.CODETYPENO.Q17REPQRT~79~~010~W~01~T~~021222324262728293031ACTIONFUTUREEFFECTSHUTDOWNATTACHMENTNPRDQPRIMECOMP,COMPONENTTAKENACTIONONPLANTMETHODHOURSQ22SUBMITTEDFORMSUB.SUPPLIERMANUFACTURER~GQlg~HQlg~ZQEo~ZQET0000~YQ33~NQ34~NQEsW120QER3334353637404142434447CAUSEDESCRIPTIONANDCORRECTIVEACTIONSQ270Unclearprecriticalcheckoffprocedure.Cktbkrsforthesevalvesareclosedforpre-startuplineupandstrokingduringheatup.Laterprecriticalcheckoffspecifiesvalvepositionwithcktbkr"open"whilecktbkrpanelmarked"on"and"off."Thereisno3directiontorepositioncktbkr.A.C.powerwasremoved.Checkoffwaschangedtodirectrepositioningandtogiveconsistentnomenclature.On-shifttrainingonpowerremovalreuirementwasheldandfuhtaiib789FACILITYSTATUS%POWEROTHERSTATUS)6C280002eNAMETHODOFDISCOVERYDISCOVERYDESCRIPTIONQ32LJQ3)Performingpre-criticalrocedure4546LOCATIONOFRELEASE36NACClMQ~QACTIVITYCONTENTRELEASEDOFRELEASEAMOUNTOFACTIVITYQQ33ZQ34NA789101144PERSONNELEXPOSURESNUMBERTYPEDESCRIPTIONQ3e7~000Q37ZQ33NA789111213PERSONNELINJURIES789II12LOSSOFORDAMAGETOFACILITY43TYPEDESCRIPTIONe~zQ42NA8910PUBLICITYISSUEDDESCRIPTIONo~NQ44NA8910804580808090821O5Z80NRCUSEONLY80NAMEOFPREPARERCarlH.Peck686980oPHQNE716/'546-2700,ext.291-205 0

AttachmenttoLER79-016/01T-0RochesterGasandElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,UnitNo.1DocketNo.50-244AfteramaintenanceoutagethereactorwastakencriticalAugust4,1979at0425hours.Laterthatdayturbinetriptestingwasperformedinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendations,andduringthisareactortripoccurred,at1824hours.Duringperformanceoftherestartpre-criticalcheckoffithadbeendiscoveredthattheA.C.powerwas"on"forsafetyinjectionaccumulatorinjectionvalvesMOV-841andMOV-865andtherefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliverytoresidualheatremovalpumpsuctionvalveMOV-856.ThisindicatedthatafourteenhourintervalhadelapsedinwhichthereactorhadbeenmadecriticalandwasoperatedwiththeA.C.poweravailabletothesevalvescontrarytoPlantTechnicalSpeci-ficationswhichrequireA.C.powertoberemoved.Duringthatinterval,however,thevalveswereintheirpropersafeguardspositionandwouldhaveperformedtheirintendedfunction.Investigationrevealedthat,asaresultoftheprecriticalcheckforthefirststartup,thecircuitbreakerpositionsforthevalveshadbeenreported,butsincetheprecriticalcheckoffdidnotdirectchangingthebreakerpositions,theywerenotimmediatelyrepositioned.Thesepositionswerenecessarytooperatethesevalvestoestablishproperalignmentforsafeguardsoperationpriortoheatupandforvalvestrokingduringtheheatup.Anotheroperatorwaslaterorderedtocheckthebreakerstatusforthesevalves.Heviewedtheirconditionasnormalforoperability,reportednothingunusual,anddidnotrepositionthemforremovalofA.C.power.Further,theprecriticalcheckoffintroducedconfusiontooperatorsbyspecifyingthatthebreakersaretobe"open"whilethebreakerpanelsaremarked"on"and"off."TheprecriticalcheckoffhasbeencorrectedtodirectrepositioningofcircuitbreakerswhereremovalofA.C.powerisrequiredbeforereactorcriticality,andtoprovidenomenclatureconsistenttothebreakerpanels.Inaddition,theOperationsEngineerinstructedeachshifttoconducton-'shiftdiscussionsontherequirementforremovalofA.C.powertothesevalves.Furtherformalclassroomtrainingdevotedtothisrequirementhasbeeninitiatedfortheoperatorsintheirregularlyscheduledtrainingperiods.

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