Information Notice 1992-85, Potential Failures of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blackage: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:;-                                   UNITED STATES
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===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C.


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 23, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85:  POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
20555


===December 23, 1992===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85:
===POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING===
SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE


Line 34: Line 40:
notice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core cooling
notice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core cooling


systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage. It is expected that
systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage.


===It is expected that===
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
  therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==


===H. B. Robinson Unit 2===
===H. B. Robinson Unit 2===
  On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot
On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot


shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of
shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of
Line 51: Line 58:


was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,
was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,
  1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light
1992.
 
Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light


Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no
Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no


recirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the
recirculation flow.
 
===The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the===
recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.


recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured. The
The


licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.
licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.
Line 71: Line 83:
inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that
inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that


it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9,
it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute.
  1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.
 
On July 9,
1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.


The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found that
The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found that
Line 78: Line 92:
debris was obstructing the inline orifice.
debris was obstructing the inline orifice.


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9212170209 Pyt


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IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that
IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that
Line 88: Line 109:
recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned
recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned


the unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could
the unit to service.
 
The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could


have had contact with foreign material. The licensee believed, prior to plant
have had contact with foreign material.


===The licensee believed, prior to plant===
startup, that all debris had been removed.
startup, that all debris had been removed.


Point Beach Unit 2 On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)
===Point Beach Unit 2===
On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)
performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps and
performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps and


Line 101: Line 126:
the A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an
the A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an


abnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.
abnormal noise.
 
The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.


Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the
Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the


impeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. The
impeller suction.
 
The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump.
 
The


test was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.
test was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.
Line 117: Line 148:
of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March through
of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March through


June 1992. The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade name
June 1992.
 
The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade name
 
is Delrin-AF.


is Delrin-AF. At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had
At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had


been cut into-four 23=centimeter [9-inch]-diameter,-circular pieces for use-as
been cut into-four 23=centimeter [9-inch]-diameter,-circular pieces for use-as
Line 125: Line 160:
weld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee did
weld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee did


not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system
not account for two of the four pieces.
 
Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system


conditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. The
conditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. The
Line 137: Line 174:
The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the
The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the


plastic. The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also other
plastic.
 
The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also other


pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recovered
pieces of miscellaneous debris.


===The location and size of the recovered===
Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the
Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the


Line 149: Line 189:
lines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and
lines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and


remove any foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potential
remove any foreign material.


===Also, the licensee evaluated the potential===
effect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would
effect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would


Line 163: Line 204:
install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety
install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety


injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC reviewed the
injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage.


===The NRC reviewed the===
event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was
event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was


rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of the
rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of the


plug. This condition had continued for about a year and was caused by
plug.
 
This condition had continued for about a year and was caused by


inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modifications
inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modifications
Line 177: Line 221:
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post


modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the
modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.
 
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the
 
debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.


debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. These
These


examples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability of
examples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability of
Line 188: Line 236:


===Related Generic Communication===
===Related Generic Communication===
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Line 196: Line 244:
sumps.
sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 206: Line 256:
rnan K. Grimes, Director
rnan K. Grimes, Director


Division of Operating Reactor Support
===Division of Operating Reactor Support===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact:


Technical contact:  Eric Benner, NRR
===Eric Benner, NRR===
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:


(301) 504-1171 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===


z
z-4 V


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                                                                                Attachment


IN 92-85 z-4                                                                              December 23, 1992 V                                                                              Page I of 1
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V
 
-v


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z


-_          _
C
                11                                      LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


0
D
                                                        NRCINFORMATION NOTICES


--
>n
>n


V
-_
 
_
0-4U    Information                                  Vate of
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-v                  Notice No.            Subject                Issuance    Issued to
11
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U1 0 Cfl


U1      92-84          Release of Patients
Ca/
z


Treated with Temporary
Attachment


Implants
IN 92-85 December 23,
1992 Page I of 1


12/17/92    All Nuclear Regulatory
===LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


Comnission Medical
Information


Licensees.
Notice No.


(
Subject
      Ca/            88-23,        Potential for Gas              12/18/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


Supp. 4        Binding of High-Pres-                      for nuclear power reactors
92-84


sure Safety Injection
===Release of Patients===
Treated with Temporary


Pumps during A Design
Implants


z                    Basis Accident
88-23,


92-83          Thrust Limits for             12/17/92    All holders of OLs or CPs
===Potential for Gas===
Supp. 4 Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection


Limitorque Actuators                        for nuclear power reactors
===Pumps during A Design===
Basis Accident


and Potential Over- stressing of Motor- Operated Valves
92-83


92-82          Results of Thermo-Lag          12/15/92    All holders of OLs or CPs
===Thrust Limits for===
Limitorque Actuators


330-1 Combustibility                       for nuclear power reactors
and Potential Over- stressing of Motor-
 
===Operated Valves===
92-82 Results of Thermo-Lag
 
330-1 Combustibility


Testing
Testing


92-81         Potential Deficiency          12/11/92    All holders of OLs or CPs
92-81  


of Electrical Cables                       for nuclear power reactors.
===Potential Deficiency===
of Electrical Cables


with Bonded Hypalon
with Bonded Hypalon
Line 288: Line 352:
Jackets
Jackets


92-80         Results of Thermo-Lag         12/07/92    All holders of OLs or CPs
92-80  
Results of Thermo-Lag


330-1 Combustibility                       for nuclear power reactors.
330-1 Combustibility


Testing
Testing


92-79         Non-Power Reactor             12/01/92   All holders of OLs or CPs(
92-79 Non-Power Reactor
                                    Emergency Event Response                  for test and research
 
===Emergency Event Response===
92-78
 
===Piston to Cylinder===
Liner Tin Smearing on
 
Cooper-Bessemer KSV
 
===Diesel Engines===
Vate of
 
Issuance
 
Issued to
 
12/17/92
 
===All Nuclear Regulatory===
Comnission Medical
 
(
Licensees.
 
12/18/92
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors
 
12/17/92  
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors
 
12/15/92
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors
 
12/11/92
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.
 
12/07/92


reactors.
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


92-78          Piston to Cylinder            11/30/92   All holders of OLs or CPs
12/01/92 All holders of OLs or CPs(
for test and research


Liner Tin Smearing on                      for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


Cooper-Bessemer KSV
11/30/92


Diesel Engines
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


DL - Operating License
DL - Operating License


CP- Construction Permit
CP - Construction Permit


'U
'U
Line 327: Line 439:
system piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the
system piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the


presence of the plug. The NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed
presence of the plug.


Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, which
===The NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed===
Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000.


===This violation, which===
was classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and was
was classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and was


Line 339: Line 453:
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post


modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the
modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.
 
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the
 
debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.


debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Whenever
Whenever


safety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of any
safety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of any
Line 350: Line 468:


===Related Generic Communication===
===Related Generic Communication===
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Line 358: Line 476:
sumps.
sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 366: Line 486:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Brian K. Grimes, Director
===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
Division of Operating Reactor Support
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical contact: Eric Benner, NRR
 
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:
 
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OEAB:DORS
 
ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
ADM:RPB
 
PM:PD2-1:DRPE


Division of Operating Reactor Support
DGarcia*
AGautam*
JMain*
BMozafari*
10/07/92
10/14/92
09/28/92
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS


Technical contact:  Eric Benner, NRR
OE


(301) 504-1171 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
C/OGCB:DORS


*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
D/DORS


OEAB:DORS      ASC/OEAB:DORS    ADM:RPB      PM:PD2-1:DRPE
RJones*
AChaffee*
JBirmingham , Lieberman* GMarcus


DGarcia*      AGautam*        JMain*        BMozafari*
BGrimes
10/07/92      10/14/92        09/28/92      10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA    C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS      OE            C/OGCB:DORS    D/DORS


RJones*        AChaffee*    JBirmingham , Lieberman* GMarcus            BGrimes
10/08/92
11/09/92
12////92 ~/ '
2/09/92
12/1 i/927
12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME:
G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG


10/08/92      11/09/92      12////92 ~/'  2/09/92      12/1i/927      12/  /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
4 I


' J
'  
J


4 I                                K)
K)
                                                              IN 92-XX
IN 92-XX


December xx, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that
===December xx, 1992===
The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that


the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to
the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to
Line 427: Line 580:


===Related Generic Communication===
===Related Generic Communication===
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Line 435: Line 588:
sumps.
sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 443: Line 598:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Brian K. Grimes, Director
===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
Division of Operating Reactor Support
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical contact: Eric Benner, NRR
 
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:
 
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OEAB:DORS
 
ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
ADM:RPB
 
PM:PD2-1:DRPE


Division of Operating Reactor Support
DGarcia*
AGautam*
JMain*
BMozafari*
10/07/92
10/14/92
09/28/92
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS


Technical contact:  Eric Benner, NRR
OE AzK


(301) 504-1171 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
C/OGCB:DORS


*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
RJones*  
AChaffee*
JBirmingham


OEAB:DORS      ASC/OEAB:DORS    ADM:RPB        PM:PD2-1:DRPE
===JLieberman GMarcus===
10/08/92
11/09/92
12/ /92
12/f /92
12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG


DGarcia*        AGautam*        JMain*        BMozafari*
D/DORS
10/07/92      10/14/92        09/28/92      10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA    C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS      OE AzK      C/OGCB:DORS    D/DORS


RJones*        AChaffee*    JBirmingham    JLieberman GMarcus            BGrimes
BGrimes


10/08/92      11/09/92    12/ /92        12/f /92    12/ /92          12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
12/  
/92


I I
I I
Line 468: Line 654:
IN 92-XX
IN 92-XX


December xx, 1992 pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recovered
===December xx, 1992===
pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recovered


Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the
Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the
Line 478: Line 665:
lines, and visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and remove
lines, and visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and remove


any foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potential effect on
any foreign material.


===Also, the licensee evaluated the potential effect on===
other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would continue to
other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would continue to


be operable and reliable.
be operable and reliable.


7-1- t- The staff notes thatl$resence of small debris may not be detected by
7-1- t-
The staff notes thatl$resence of small debris may not be detected by


operational or post-modification testing since blockages may not appear
operational or post-modification testing since blockages may not appear


immediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross
immediately.
 
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross


sections where the debris can collect and cause blockage after extended
sections where the debris can collect and cause blockage after extended
Line 499: Line 690:


===Related Generic Communication===
===Related Generic Communication===
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Line 507: Line 698:
sumps.
sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 515: Line 708:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Brian K. Grimes, Director
===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
Division of Operating Reactor Support
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical cor
 
Attachment:
*SEE PREVIOUS
 
OEAB:DORS
 
DGarcia*
10/07/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
 
RJones*
10/08/92
 
===DOCUMENT NAME===
itact:
 
===Eric Benner, NRR===
(301) 504-1171
 
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
CONCURRENCE
 
ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
ADM:RPB
 
PM:PD2-1:DRPE
 
AGautam*
JMain*
BMozafari*
10/14/92
09/28/92
10/13/92 C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS
 
OE
 
C/OGC
 
AChaffee*
JBirmingham* JLieberman* GMarc
 
11/09/92
12/11/92
12/09/92
12/11 E:
G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG


Division of Operating Reactor Support
B:DORS


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
us*
/92 D/DORS


Technical coritact:  Eric Benner, NRR
BGrimes


(301) 504-1171 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
12/ /92


*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


OEAB:DORS       ASC/OEAB:DORS     ADM:RPB       PM:PD2-1:DRPE
OEAB:DORS
 
DGarcia*
10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
AGautam*
10/14/92 ADM:RPB
 
JMain*
09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE


DGarcia*        AGautam*          JMain*        BMozafari*
BMozafari*
10/07/92        10/14/92          09/28/92      10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA     C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS        OE            C/OGC B:DORS  D/DORS
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA


RJones*         AChaffee*      JBirmingham* JLieberman* GMarc us*        BGrimes
RJones*
10/08/92 DOCUMENT NAME:
C/OEAB:DORS


10/08/92        11/09/92        12/11/92      12/09/92      12/11 /92      12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME E: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
C/OGCB:DORS


*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
AChaffee*  
GMarcus


OEAB:DORS      ASC/OEAB:DORS        ADM:RPB    PM:PD2-1:DRPE
11/09/92
/ /92 G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG


DGarcia*      AGautam*            JMain*      BMozafari*
D/DORS
10/07/92      10/14/92            09/28/92    10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA    C/OEAB:DORS          C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS


RJones*        AChaffee*            GMarcus    BGrimes
BGrimes


10/08/92       11/09/92              / /92      / /92 DOCUMENT NAME:  G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
/  
/92


IN 92-XX
IN 92-XX


November xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
===November xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication===
 
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, 'Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it
Line 559: Line 815:
emergency sumps.
emergency sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 567: Line 825:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Brian K. Grimes, Director
===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
 
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Division of Operating Reactor Support


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
Technical contacts:
Technical contacts:     D. Garcia, NRR


===D. Garcia, NRR===
(301) 504-1170
(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


OEAB:DORS     ASC/OEAB:DORS           ADM:RPB         PM:PD2-1:DRPE
OEAB:DORS
 
DGarcia*
10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
AGautam*
10/14/92 ADM:RPB
 
JMain*
09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
 
BMozafari*
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
 
RJones*
10/08/92 C/OE f DORS
 
AChaffee
 
Il /.ci/92 C/OGCB:DORS
 
GMarcus
 
/
/92 I


DGarcia*      AGautam*                JMain*          BMozafari*
D/DORS
10/07/92        10/14/92              09/28/92        10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA    C/OE f DORS            C/OGCB:DORS    D/DORS


RJones*        AChaffee                GMarcus        BGrimes
BGrimes


10/08/92        Il /.ci/92                / /92 I        / /92 DOCUMENT NAME:   G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMC
/  
/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMC


IN 92-XX
IN 92-XX


October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
===October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication===
 
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it
Line 602: Line 882:
emergency sumps.
emergency sumps.


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If


you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
Line 610: Line 892:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Brian K. Grimes, Director
===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
 
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Division of Operating Reactor Support


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
Technical contacts:
Technical contacts:   D. Garcia, NRR


===D. Garcia, NRR===
(301) 504-1170
(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
Attachment:
Line 624: Line 905:
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


OEAB:DORS       ASC/OEAB:DgRS       ADM:RPB         PM:PD2-1:DRPE
OEAB:DORS
 
DGarcia*
10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DgRS
 
/cLAGautamOC
 
/6 //~/
92 ADM:RPB
 
JMain*
09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
 
BMozafari*
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
 
RJones*
10/08/92 C/OEAB:DORS
 
AChaffee
 
/
/92 C/OGCB:DORS
 
GMarcus


DGarcia*    /cLAGautamOC            JMain*          BMozafari*
/  
10/07/92      /6 //~/92             09/28/92        10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA    C/OEAB:DORS          C/OGCB:DORS    D/DORS
/92 D/DORS


RJones*        AChaffee            GMarcus        BGrimes
BGrimes


10/08/92          / /92                / /92          / /92 DOCUMENT NAME:   G:\DEBRIS.DMG
/  
/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DEBRIS.DMG


IN 92-XX
IN 92-XX


October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
===October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication===
 
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, 'Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations,' in which it
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations,' in which it
Line 651: Line 956:
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR)  
 
project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director


===Brian K. Grimes, Director===
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Division of Operating Reactor Support


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
Technical contacts:
Technical contacts:   Denise M. Garcia, NRR


===Denise M. Garcia, NRR===
(301) 504-1170
(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
Attachment:


===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
*SEE PREVIOUS
 
0
:
RS
 
,92 C/
SA
 
RJon'es
 
/0 /1(/92 CONCURRENCE
 
ASC/OEAB:DORS
 
AGautam
 
/
/92 C/OEAB:DORS
 
AChaffee
 
/
/92 ADM:RPB
 
JMain*
09/28/92 C/OGCB:DORS
 
GMarcus
 
/
/92 PM:PD2-1 :DRP


0    :  RS    ASC/OEAB:DORS        ADM:RPB        PM:PD2-1 :DRP  fl,_fv, AGautam              JMain*          BMozafari
fl,_fv, BMozafari


,92          / /92              09/28/92      /0//13/92 C/        SA  C/OEAB:DORS          C/OGCB:DORS    D/DORS
/0//13/92 D/DORS


RJon'es        AChaffee            GMarcus        BGrimes
BGrimes


/0/1(/92        / /92                / /92            / /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG
/  
/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DEBRIS.DMG


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
Line 683: Line 1,020:
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Charles E. Rossi, Director
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
Technical contacts:
Technical contacts: Denise M. Garcia, NRR


===Denise M. Garcia, NRR===
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:


===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
OEAB:DOEA     SC/OEAB:DOEA         ADM:RPB       PM:PD2-1:DRPE
OEAB:DOEA
 
DGarcia
 
/
/92 SC/OEAB:DOEA
 
AGautam
 
/
/92 ADM:RPB
 
JMain Q h
 
9/ 2J /f2 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
 
BMozafari
 
/
/92 C/SRXB:DST
 
RJones
 
/
/92 C/OEAB:DOEA
 
AChaffee
 
/
/92 C/OGCB:DOEA


DGarcia        AGautam              JMain Q h    BMozafari
GMarcus


/ /92         / /92                9/ 2J /f2      / /92 C/SRXB:DST    C/OEAB:DOEA          C/OGCB:DOEA  D/DOEA
/  
/92 D/DOEA


RJones        AChaffee              GMarcus      CRossi
CRossi


/ /92          / /92                / /92          / /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG
/  
/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DEBRIS.DMG


K-)
K-)
                                  UNITED STATES


===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
20555


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 23, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85:   POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
===December 23, 1992===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING


SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
===SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
Line 729: Line 1,100:
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


Line 739: Line 1,112:
shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of
shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of


the B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation flow
the B safety injection (SI) pump.


===This test found that the recirculation flow===
was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,
was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,
1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light
1992.
 
Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light


Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no
Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no
Line 748: Line 1,124:
recirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the
recirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the


recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured. The
recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.
 
The


licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.
licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.
Line 762: Line 1,140:
inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that
inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that


it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9,
it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute.
 
On July 9,
1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.
1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.


Line 769: Line 1,149:
debris was obstructing the inline orifice.
debris was obstructing the inline orifice.


9212 0209
9212  
0209


<-2                     <off92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that
<-2  
<off92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that


recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned
recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned
Line 811: Line 1,193:
been cut into four 23-centimeter (9-inch] diameter, circular pieces for use as
been cut into four 23-centimeter (9-inch] diameter, circular pieces for use as


weld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee did
weld purge dams.
 
However, after completing the modification, the licensee did


not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system
not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system
Line 849: Line 1,233:
install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety
install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety


injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC reviewed the
injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage.


===The NRC reviewed the===
event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was
event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was


Line 863: Line 1,248:
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post
The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post


modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the
modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.
 
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the


debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. These
debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. These
Line 874: Line 1,261:


===Related Generic Communication===
===Related Generic Communication===
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)89-77, "Debris In
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In


Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which
Line 892: Line 1,279:
rnan K. Grimes, Director
rnan K. Grimes, Director


Division of Operating Reactor Support
===Division of Operating Reactor Support===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact:


Technical contact:  Eric Benner, NRR
===Eric Benner, NRR===
(301) 504-1171 Attachment:


(301) 504-1171 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===


l
l


I    1 K"
I
I


1 K"
K-,
K-,
                                                            Attachment
I
 
Attachment


IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IN 92-85


===December 23, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


Information                                   Date of
Information
 
Date of


Notice No.             Subject                Issuance  Issued to
Notice No.


92-84          Release of Patients            12/17/92  All Nuclear Regulatory
Subject


Treated with Temporary                    Commission Medical
Issuance


Implants                                  Licensees.
Issued to


88-23,         Potential for Gas              12/18/92   All holders of OLs or CPs
92-84
88-23, Supp. 4
92-83
92-82
92-81
92-80


Supp. 4        Binding of High-Pres-                      for nuclear power reactors.
===Release of Patients===
Treated with Temporary


sure Safety Injection
Implants


Pumps during A Design
===Potential for Gas===
Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection


===Pumps during A Design===
Basis Accident
Basis Accident


92-83          Thrust Limits for               12/17/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
===Thrust Limits for===
 
Limitorque Actuators
Limitorque Actuators                       for nuclear power reactors.


and Potential Over- stressing of Motor- Operated Valves
and Potential Over- stressing of Motor-


92-82          Results of Thermo-Lag           12/15/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
===Operated Valves===
Results of Thermo-Lag


330-1 Combustibility                       for nuclear power reactors.
330-1 Combustibility


Testing
Testing


92-81          Potential Deficiency           12/11/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
===Potential Deficiency===
 
of Electrical Cables
of Electrical Cables                       for nuclear power reactors.


with Bonded Hypalon
with Bonded Hypalon
Line 952: Line 1,353:
Jackets
Jackets


92-80          Results of Thermo-Lag           12/07/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
Results of Thermo-Lag


330-1 Combustibility                       for nuclear power reactors.
330-1 Combustibility


Testing
Testing


92-79          Non-Power Reactor               12/01/92   All holders of OLs or CPs
Non-Power Reactor
 
===Emergency Event Response===
Piston to Cylinder
 
===Liner Tin Smearing on===
Cooper-Bessemer KSV
 
===Diesel Engines===
12/17/92
12/18/92
12/17/92
12/15/92
12/11/92
12/07/92
12/01/92
11/30/92
 
===All Nuclear Regulatory===
Commission Medical
 
Licensees.
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.
 
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


Emergency Event Response                  for test and research
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


reactors.
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


92-78          Piston to Cylinder              11/30/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


Liner Tin Smearing on                      for nuclear power reactors.
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for test and research


Cooper-Bessemer KSV
reactors.


Diesel Engines
===All holders of OLs or CPs===
for nuclear power reactors.


OL = Operating License
92-79
92-78 OL = Operating License


CP = Construction Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 10:17, 16 January 2025

Potential Failures of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blackage
ML031190717
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000419, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/1992
From: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-085, NUDOCS 9212170209
Download: ML031190717 (16)
v • d • e


-

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

December 23, 1992

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85:

POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING

SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core cooling

systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage.

It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

H. B. Robinson Unit 2

On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot

shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of

the B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation flow

was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,

1992.

Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light

Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no

recirculation flow.

The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the

recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.

The

licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.

On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation line and

removed a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from the

inline orifice.

Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pump

inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that

it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute.

On July 9,

1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.

The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found that

debris was obstructing the inline orifice.

9212170209 Pyt

I (

/'a

q9A Ac

s

e

0C20 28

IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that

recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned

the unit to service.

The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could

have had contact with foreign material.

The licensee believed, prior to plant

startup, that all debris had been removed.

Point Beach Unit 2

On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)

performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps and

valves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge pressure for

the A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an

abnormal noise.

The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.

Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the

impeller suction.

The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump.

The

test was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.

Discussion

The licensee at H. B. Robinson determined that the foreign material found in

the SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modification

of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March through

June 1992.

The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade name

is Delrin-AF.

At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had

been cut into-four 23=centimeter [9-inch]-diameter,-circular pieces for use-as

weld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee did

not account for two of the four pieces.

Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system

conditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. The

licensee suspected that the purge dam pieces broke,. entered the RHR piping

after breaking, and migrated into the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and

SI header during initial cavity draindown.

The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the

plastic.

The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also other

pieces of miscellaneous debris.

The location and size of the recovered

Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the

pieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.

The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation

lines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and

remove any foreign material.

Also, the licensee evaluated the potential

effect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would

continue to be operable and reliable.

a

IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that

the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to

install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety

injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage.

The NRC reviewed the

event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was

rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of the

plug.

This condition had continued for about a year and was caused by

inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modifications

made in the previous outage.

The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post

modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.

However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the

debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.

These

examples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability of

all materials that are used when safety systems are opened and to perform

cleanliness checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.

Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which

addressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergency

sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

rnan K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact:

Eric Benner, NRR

(301) 504-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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Attachment

IN 92-85 December 23,

1992 Page I of 1

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Notice No.

Subject

92-84

Release of Patients

Treated with Temporary

Implants

88-23,

Potential for Gas

Supp. 4 Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection

Pumps during A Design

Basis Accident

92-83

Thrust Limits for

Limitorque Actuators

and Potential Over- stressing of Motor-

Operated Valves

92-82 Results of Thermo-Lag

330-1 Combustibility

Testing

92-81

Potential Deficiency

of Electrical Cables

with Bonded Hypalon

Jackets

92-80

Results of Thermo-Lag

330-1 Combustibility

Testing

92-79 Non-Power Reactor

Emergency Event Response

92-78

Piston to Cylinder

Liner Tin Smearing on

Cooper-Bessemer KSV

Diesel Engines

Vate of

Issuance

Issued to

12/17/92

All Nuclear Regulatory

Comnission Medical

(

Licensees.

12/18/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors

12/17/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors

12/15/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors

12/11/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/07/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/01/92 All holders of OLs or CPs(

for test and research

reactors.

11/30/92

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

DL - Operating License

CP - Construction Permit

'U

IN 92-XX

December xx, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that

the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to

install full flow test lines-in the residual heat removal (RHR), containment

spray and safety injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC

reviewed the event and determined that one train of the safety injection

system piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the

presence of the plug.

The NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000.

This violation, which

was classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and was

caused by inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system

modifications made in the previous outage.

The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post

modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.

However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the

debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.

Whenever

safety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of any

materials that are used and to perform cleanliness checks of all affected

areas prior to system closure.

Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which

addressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergency

sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Eric Benner, NRR

(301) 504-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OEAB:DORS

ASC/OEAB:DORS

ADM:RPB

PM:PD2-1:DRPE

DGarcia*

AGautam*

JMain*

BMozafari*

10/07/92

10/14/92

09/28/92

10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS

OE

C/OGCB:DORS

D/DORS

RJones*

AChaffee*

JBirmingham , Lieberman* GMarcus

BGrimes

10/08/92

11/09/92

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2/09/92

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12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME:

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IN 92-XX

December xx, 1992

The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that

the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to

install full flow test lines in the residual heat removal (RHR), containment

spray and safety injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC

reviewed the event and determined that one train of the safety injection

system piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the

presence of the plug. The NRC is issuing a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, which

has been classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and was

caused by inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system

modifications made in the previous outage.

The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post

modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the

debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Whenever

safety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of any

materials that are used and to perform cleanliness checks of all affected

areas prior to system closure.

Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which

addressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergency

sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Eric Benner, NRR

(301) 504-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OEAB:DORS

ASC/OEAB:DORS

ADM:RPB

PM:PD2-1:DRPE

DGarcia*

AGautam*

JMain*

BMozafari*

10/07/92

10/14/92

09/28/92

10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS

OE AzK

C/OGCB:DORS

RJones*

AChaffee*

JBirmingham

JLieberman GMarcus

10/08/92

11/09/92

12/ /92

12/f /92

12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG

D/DORS

BGrimes

12/

/92

I I

IN 92-XX

December xx, 1992

pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recovered

Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the

pieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.

The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation

lines, and visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and remove

any foreign material.

Also, the licensee evaluated the potential effect on

other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would continue to

be operable and reliable.

7-1- t-

The staff notes thatl$resence of small debris may not be detected by

operational or post-modification testing since blockages may not appear

immediately.

However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross

sections where the debris can collect and cause blockage after extended

operation. Whenever safety systems are opened, it is important to ensure

accountability of any materials that are used and to perform'cleanliness

checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.

Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which

addressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergency

sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical cor

Attachment:

  • SEE PREVIOUS

OEAB:DORS

DGarcia*

10/07/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

RJones*

10/08/92

DOCUMENT NAME

itact:

Eric Benner, NRR

(301) 504-1171

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE

ASC/OEAB:DORS

ADM:RPB

PM:PD2-1:DRPE

AGautam*

JMain*

BMozafari*

10/14/92

09/28/92

10/13/92 C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS

OE

C/OGC

AChaffee*

JBirmingham* JLieberman* GMarc

11/09/92

12/11/92

12/09/92

12/11 E:

G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG

B:DORS

us*

/92 D/DORS

BGrimes

12/ /92

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OEAB:DORS

DGarcia*

10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS

AGautam*

10/14/92 ADM:RPB

JMain*

09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE

BMozafari*

10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

RJones*

10/08/92 DOCUMENT NAME:

C/OEAB:DORS

C/OGCB:DORS

AChaffee*

GMarcus

11/09/92

/ /92 G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMG

D/DORS

BGrimes

/

/92

IN 92-XX

November xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it

discussed problems that could result from debris found in containment

emergency sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

D. Garcia, NRR

(301) 504-1170

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OEAB:DORS

DGarcia*

10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS

AGautam*

10/14/92 ADM:RPB

JMain*

09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE

BMozafari*

10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

RJones*

10/08/92 C/OE f DORS

AChaffee

Il /.ci/92 C/OGCB:DORS

GMarcus

/

/92 I

D/DORS

BGrimes

/

/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DMG\\INDEBRIS.DMC

IN 92-XX

October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which it

discussed problems that could result from debris found in containment

emergency sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

D. Garcia, NRR

(301) 504-1170

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OEAB:DORS

DGarcia*

10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DgRS

/cLAGautamOC

/6 //~/

92 ADM:RPB

JMain*

09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE

BMozafari*

10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA

RJones*

10/08/92 C/OEAB:DORS

AChaffee

/

/92 C/OGCB:DORS

GMarcus

/

/92 D/DORS

BGrimes

/

/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DEBRIS.DMG

IN 92-XX

October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations,' in which it

discussed problems that could result from debris found in containment

emergency sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR)

project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Denise M. Garcia, NRR

(301) 504-1170

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS

0

RS

,92 C/

SA

RJon'es

/0 /1(/92 CONCURRENCE

ASC/OEAB:DORS

AGautam

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/92 ADM:RPB

JMain*

09/28/92 C/OGCB:DORS

GMarcus

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fl,_fv, BMozafari

/0//13/92 D/DORS

BGrimes

/

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This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Denise M. Garcia, NRR

(301) 504-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OEAB:DOEA

DGarcia

/

/92 SC/OEAB:DOEA

AGautam

/

/92 ADM:RPB

JMain Q h

9/ 2J /f2 PM:PD2-1:DRPE

BMozafari

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RJones

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AChaffee

/

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GMarcus

/

/92 D/DOEA

CRossi

/

/92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DEBRIS.DMG

K-)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

December 23, 1992

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING

SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core cooling

systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage. It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

H. B. Robinson Unit 2

On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot

shutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test of

the B safety injection (SI) pump.

This test found that the recirculation flow

was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,

1992.

Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light

Company (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no

recirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the

recirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.

The

licensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.

On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation line and

removed a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from the

inline orifice.

Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pump

inoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found that

it was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute.

On July 9,

1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.

The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found that

debris was obstructing the inline orifice.

9212

0209

<-2

<off92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying that

recirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned

the unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could

have had contact with foreign material. The licensee believed, prior to plant

startup, that all debris had been removed.

Point Beach Unit 2

On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)

performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps and

valves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge pressure for

the A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an

abnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.

Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the

impeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. The

test was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.

Discussion

The licensee at H. B. Robinson determined that the foreign material found in

the SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modification

of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March through

June 1992. The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade name

is Delrin-AF. At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had

been cut into four 23-centimeter (9-inch] diameter, circular pieces for use as

weld purge dams.

However, after completing the modification, the licensee did

not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS system

conditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. The

licensee suspected that the purge dam pieces broke, entered the RHR piping

after breaking, and migrated into the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and

SI header during initial cavity draindown.

The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the

plastic. The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also other

pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recovered

Delrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of the

pieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.

The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation

lines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and

remove any foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potential

effect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would

continue to be operable and reliable.

IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined that

the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made to

install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safety

injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage.

The NRC reviewed the

event and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping was

rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of the

plug. This condition had continued for about a year and was caused by

inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modifications

made in the previous outage.

The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or post

modification testing since blockages may not appear immediately.

However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the

debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. These

examples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability of

all materials that are used when safety systems are opened and to perform

cleanliness checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.

Related Generic Communication

On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In

Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," which

addressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergency

sumps.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

rnan K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact:

Eric Benner, NRR

(301) 504-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

l

I

1 K"

K-,

I

Attachment

IN 92-85

December 23, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

92-84

88-23, Supp. 4

92-83

92-82

92-81

92-80

Release of Patients

Treated with Temporary

Implants

Potential for Gas

Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection

Pumps during A Design

Basis Accident

Thrust Limits for

Limitorque Actuators

and Potential Over- stressing of Motor-

Operated Valves

Results of Thermo-Lag

330-1 Combustibility

Testing

Potential Deficiency

of Electrical Cables

with Bonded Hypalon

Jackets

Results of Thermo-Lag

330-1 Combustibility

Testing

Non-Power Reactor

Emergency Event Response

Piston to Cylinder

Liner Tin Smearing on

Cooper-Bessemer KSV

Diesel Engines

12/17/92

12/18/92

12/17/92

12/15/92

12/11/92

12/07/92

12/01/92

11/30/92

All Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Medical

Licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for test and research

reactors.

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

92-79

92-78 OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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