Results of Validation Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic EquipmentML031200445 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
03/27/1992 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-92-023, NUDOCS 9203230070 |
Download: ML031200445 (8) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 27, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-23: RESULTS OF VALIDATION TESTING OF MOTOR-OPERATED
VALVE DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors and all vendors of motor-operated valve (MOV) diagnostic equipment.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice
to alert addressees to the final results of validation testing of MOV diagnos- tic equipment conducted for the MOV Users Group (MUG) of nuclear power plant
licensees. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Background
In 1990, the MUG initiated a program to conduct tests-of MOV diagnostic equip- ment to validate the accuracy asserted by the equipment vendors. The MUG
requested the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to provide a test
stand for the program. The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
provided funds for INEL to participate, with the stipulation that the results
of the testing would be made available to the NRC and the public. The
MOV diagnostic equipment vendors participating in the MUG test program were
ASEA-Brown Boveri (ABB) Impell, ITI-MOVATS, Liberty Technologies, Siemens/KWU,
Teledyne, and Wyle Laboratories. The INEL test stand included a Limitorque
motor operator which pushes a valve stem into a water reservoir with a com- pressed air overcharge, providing various loading conditions on the valve
stem. INEL obtained accurate measurements of thrust using a stem-mounted load
cell as a reference standard. Each diagnostic equipment vendor installed and
operated its own equipment to measure various parameters so as to obtain
estimates of stem thrust.
At a public meeting on July 30, 1991, the MUG released a progress report of its
program to validate the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment. During the
meeting, the MUG stated that licensees and diagnostic equipment vendors should
review the progress report for its applicability to MOVs installed in nuclear
power plants. The MUG also alerted licensees and diagnostic equipment vendors
to their responsibilities under Part 21 of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 21). The NRC issued Information
_ .. . )
s.-
A IN 92-23 March 27, 1992 Notice 91-61 (September 30, 1991), "Preliminary Results
of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment," to of Validation Testing
raised by the MUG progress report. alert licensees to the issues
Description of Circumstances
-
At a public meeting on February 3, 1992, the MUG
Validation .Testing as Performed at Idaho National released "Final Report - MUG
(Volume 1)." The report has been placed in the Engineering Laboratories
NRC Public Document Room (PDR),
2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 (telephone
receiving the remaining three volumes, which will (202) 634-3273). Upon
documentation, and torque measurement information, provide data traces, test
volumes in the PDR. On March 4, 1992, the NRC staff the staff will place these
report with members of the MUG committee that conducted discussed the MUG final
The MUG final report presents the findings of the the validation program.
validation
specifies whether or not the tested diagnostic equipment program and
claimed by its vendors in predicting stem thrust. provided the accuracy
cates that the MOV diagnostic equipment that relied The MUG final report indi- to estimate stem thrust did not meet the accuracy on spring pack displacement
claims
MOV diagnostic equipment that relied on other parameters of its vendors.
strain was shown, in general, to meet the applicable such as stem or yoke
certain equipment did not meet the accuracy claims accuracy claims, although
in certain individual tests.
ABB Impell and ITI-MOVATS are two MOV diagnostic
equipment commercially available that relies on equipment vendors that have
spring pack displacement to
estimate-stem-thrust.- At the-MUG- meetingv 4n Febru-ar-y
sentatives stated that they would work with their 1992, ABB Impel1 repre- develop new accuracy values. On March 2, 1992, two licensee customers to
meeting with representatives of ITI-MOVATS to discussthe NRC staff held a public
thrust measuring device (TMD) used by ITI-MOVATS' the accuracy of the
on 'spring pack displacement. During the meeting to estimate stem thrust based
tives of ITI-MOVATS described the results of their on March 2, the representa- that had been initiated to address the preliminary own field validation program
progress report. However, the ITI-MOVATS program concerns raised in the MUG
of the TMD under static (zero differential pressure addressed only the accuracy
not the accuracy of this equipment under differentialand flow) conditions and
tions. Nevertheless, the results of the field validation pressure and flow condi- the inaccuracy of the TMD may be larger than assumed program showed that
licensees. The ITI-MOVATS representatives also in some instances by
efforts to resolve concerns regarding the fact discussed the results of their
that the TMD is calibrated in
the valve opening direction, but is also used to
by the actuator in the valve closing direction. predict the thrust delivered
directional effect by ITI-MOVATS focused on static Although this study of valve
indicated that the effect of the direction that conditions, the study
the valve moves could increase
significantly the uncertainty of the TMD.
Discussion
Many licensees rely on MOV diagnostic equipment
thrust required to open or close the valve and to provide information on the
on the thrust delivered by the
motor actuator. The various types of MOV diagnostic
stem thrust using different parameters, such as equipment estimate valve
the displacement of the spring
IN 92-23 March 27, 1992 pack or the strain in the stem, mounting bolts, or yoke. Some licensees make
decisions regarding the operability of safety-related MOVs based on the thrust
information obtained from the diagnostic equipment. Therefore, the use of
MOV diagnostic equipment can affect significantly the safe operation of a
nuclear power plant.
The MUG validation program indicated that the accuracy of MOV diagnostic
equipment that relies on spring pack displacement has not been verified to be
within its original stated accuracy under differential pressure and flow
conditions. Further, the field validation program and valve directional effect
study by ITI-MOVATS have shown an increase in the uncertainty of this
MOV diagnostic equipment under static conditions. Therefore, licensees who use
MOV diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack displacement to make
decisions regarding the capability of MOVs to operate under design-basis
conditions may have overestimated the capability of those MOVs. A particular
concern arises where a licensee has lowered the torque switch settings of its
MOVs below the settings recommended by the actuator manufacturer based on
thrust estimates from diagnostic equipment during tests conducted under static
or partial design-basis differential pressure conditions.
The NRC will address each case individually for MOV diagnostic equipment that
was not included in the MUG validation program. For example, the concerns
regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack
displacement apply to all commercial or plant-specific MOV diagnostic equipment
that relies on spring pack displacement to estimate stem thrust. Similar con- cerns might be present for other MOV diagnostic equipment that also predicts
stem thrust by indirect means, such as spring pack force.
"Load-sensitive behavior" in an MOV has been shown to result in less thrust
delivered by the actuator under differential pressure conditions than delivered
under static conditions. "Load-sensitive behavior" is independent of the type
of MOV diagnostic equipment used and such behavior can lead licensees to
overestimate the capability of their MOVs.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 504-2794 Edmund J. Sullivan, Jr., NRR
(301) 504-3266 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
2 C
0
Attachment
IN 92-23 z
March 27, 1992 Page I of I 50
I- 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
D A, .fli
NRC INFORI4ATION NOTICES Ur- (
Information Date of
Notice No. rM Z
Subject Issuance Issued to
on
G)C-
92-22 Criminal Prosecution and 03/24/92 All holders of OLs or CPs i
Conviction of Wrongdoing for nuclear power reactors.
Committed by A Commercial- Grade Valve Supplier
eon
92-21 Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity 03/24/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Calculations for nuclear power reactors. az
92-20 Inadequate Local Leak Rate 03/03/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Testing for nuclear power reactors.
92-19 Misapplication of Potter & 03/02/92 All holders of OLs or CPs!
Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays for nuclear power reactors.
92-18 Potential for Loss of Re- 02/28/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
mote Shutdown Capability for nuclear power reactors.
during A Control Room Fire
92-17 NRCInspections of Pro- 02/26/92 All holders of OLs or CPs.
grams being Developed at for nuclear power reactors.
Nuclear Power Plants in
Response to Generic
Letter 89-10
92-16 Loss of Flow from the 02/25/92 All holders of OLs or CPs!
Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors.
Pump during Refueling
Cavity Draindown
(.
92-15 Failure of Primary System 02/24/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Compression Fitting for nuclear power reactors .
92-14 Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel 02/21/92 All fuel cycle and uranium
Cycle Facilities fuel research and development
licensees.
OL - Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
7';!I
cmg0
2
- a toq"
IN 92-23 March 27, 1992 pack or the strain in the stem, mounting bolts, or yoke. Some licensees make
decisions regarding the operability of safety-related MOVs based on the thrust
information obtained from the diagnostic equipment. Therefore, the use of
MOV diagnostic equipment can affect significantly the safe operation of a
nuclear power plant.
The MUG validation program indicated that the accuracy of MOV diagnostic
equipment that relies on spring pack displacement has not been verified to be
within its original stated accuracy under differential pressure and flow
conditions. Further, the field validation program and valve directional effect
study by ITI-MOVATS have shown an increase in the uncertainty of this
MOV diagnostic equipment under static conditions. Therefore, licensees who use
MOV diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack displacement to make
decisions regarding the capability of MOVs to operate under design-basis
conditions may have overestimated the capability of those MOVs. A particular
concern arises where a licensee has lowered the torque switch settings of its
MOVs below the settings recommended by the actuator manufacturer based on
thrust estimates from diagnostic equipment during tests conducted under static
or partial design-basis differential pressure conditions.
The NRC will address each case individually for MOV diagnostic equipment that
was not included in the MUG validation program. For example, the concerns
regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack
displacement apply to all commercial or plant-specific MOV diagnostic equipment
that relies on spring pack displacement to estimate stem thrust. Similar con- cerns might be present for other MOV diagnostic equipment that also predicts
stem thrust by indirect means, such as spring pack force.
"Load-sensitive behavior" in an MOV has been shown to result in less thrust
delivered by the actuator under differential pressure conditions than delivered
under static conditions. "Load-sensitive behavior" is independent of the type
of MOV diagnostic equipment used and such behavior can lead licensees to
overestimate the capability of their MOVs.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or thee appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project maLnager. Oigifnal Signed by
Charles E. Rossi, Director Charles F.Rci
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 504-2794 Edmund J. Sullivan, Jr., NRR
(301) 504-3266 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
CHBerlinger TechEd
03/13/92 03/10/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *E :ET: R *C/EMEB:DET:NRR *D/DET:NRR
RJKiessel TGScarbrough EJSullivan JANorberg JERichardson
03/10/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/12/92 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-23
IN 92-XX
March xx, 1992 pack or the strain in the stem, mounting bolts, or yoke. Some licensees make
decisions regarding the operability of safety-related MOVs based on the thrust
information obtained from the diagnostic equipment. Therefore, the use of
MOY diagnostic equipment can affect significantly the safe operation of a
nuclear power plant.
The MUG validation program indicated that the accuracy of MOV diagnostic
equipment that relies on spring pack displacement has not been verified to be
within its original stated accuracy under differential pressure and flow
conditions. Further, the field validation program and valve directional effect
study by ITI-MOVATS have shown an increase in the uncertainty of this
MOV diagnostic equipment under static conditions. Therefore, licensees who use
MOV diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack displacement to make
decisions regarding the capability of MOVs to operate under design-basis
conditions may have overestimated the capability of those MOVs. A particular
concern arises where a licensee has lowered the torque switch settings of its
MOVs below the settings recommended by the actuator manufacturer based on
thrust estimates from diagnostic equipment during tests conducted under static
or partial design-basis differential pressure conditions.
The NRC will address each case individually for MOV diagnostic equipment that
was not included in the MUG validation program. For example, the concerns
regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment that rely on spring pack
displacement apply to all commercial or plant-specific MOY diagnostic equipment
that rely on spring pack displacement to estimate stem thrust. Similar con- cerns might be present for other MOV diagnostic equipment that also predicts
stem thrust by indirect means, such as spring pack force.
"Load-sensitive behavior" in an MOV has been shown to result in less thrust
delivered by the actuator under differential pressure conditions than delivered
under static conditions. "Load-sensitive behavior" is independent of the type
of MOV diagnostic equipment used and such behavior can lead licensees to
overestimate the capability of their MOVs.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 504-2794 Edmund J. Sullivan, Jr., NRR
(301) 504-3266 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES Document Name: MUG VALIDATION TEST DRAFT IN
D/DOEA:NR& C/OGCB:DOEA: RPB:ADM
CERossi a CHBerlinge TechEd
03/ /92 03/jf/92 03/10/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DE *D/DET:NRR
RJKiessel TGScarbrough EJSullivan JANorberg JERichardson
03/10/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/12/92
IN 92-XX
March xx, 1992 stem thrust using different parameters, such as the displacement of the spring
pack or the strain in the stem, mounting bolts, or yoke. Some licensees make
decisions regarding the operability of safety-related MOVs based on the thrust
information obtained from the diagnostic equipment. Therefore, using MOV
diagnostic equipment can affect significantly the safe operation of a nuclear
power plant.
The MUG validation program indicated that the accuracy of MOV diagnostic
equipment that relies on spring pack displacement has not been verified to be
within its original stated accuracy under differential pressure and flow
conditions. Further, the field validation program and valve directional effect
study by ITI-MOVATS have shown an increase in the uncertainty of this MOY
diagnostic equipment under static conditions. Therefore, licensees who use MOV
diagnostic equipment that relies on spring pack displacement to make decisions
regarding the capability of MOVs to operate under design-basis conditions may
have overestimated the capability of those MOYs. A licensee may have lowered
the torque switch settings of its MOVs below the settings recommended by the
actuator manufacturer based on thrust estimates from diagnostic equipment
during tests conducted under static or partial design-basis differential
pressure conditions.
The NRC will address each case individually for MOV diagnostic equipment that
was not included in the MUG validation program. For example, the concerns
regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment that rely on spring pack
displacement apply to all commercial or plant-specific MOV diagnostic equipment
that rely on spring pack displacement to estimate stem thrust. Similar con- cerns might be present for other MOY diagnostic equipment that also predicts
stem thrust by indirect means, such as spring pack force.
"Load-sensitive behavior" in an MOV has been shown to result in the capability
of the actuator to produce less thrust under differential pressure conditions
than it could under static conditions. Such load-sensitive behavior can lead
licensees to overestimate the capability of their MOYs.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 504-2794 Edmund J. Sullivan, Jr., NRR
(301) 504-3266 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Informati on Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES Document Name: MUG VALIDATION TEST DRAFT IN
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM
CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd
03/ /9 03/ 92 OXhO]9,/
EME X RR C/ NRR
RJKiessel TGSth rotigh EJSuTliAn J JtRichar o
03/10/92 03/l1/92 03/1% /92 03 /92 03//Z/
Document Name: MUG VALIDATION TEST DRAFT IN
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM
CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd Jtlain9}4
03/ /92 03/ /92 03/10 /92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR EMEB:DET:NRR EMEB:DET:NRR C/EMEB:DET:NRR D/DET: NRR
RJKiessel TGScarbrough EJSullivan JANorberg JERichardson
03//0/92 03/ /92 03/ /92 03/ /92 03/ /92
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list | - Information Notice 1992-01, Cable Damage Caused by Inadequate Cable Installation Procedures and Controls (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/MOD3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/Mod3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-03, Remote Trip Function Failures in General Electric F-Frame Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (6 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model Mdr Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs Rxmh2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in ABS RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment Not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-07, Rapid Flow-induced Erosion/Corrosion of Feedwater Piping (9 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-08, Revised Protective Action Guidance for Nuclear Incidents (23 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-09, Overloading and Subsequent Lock Out of Electrical Buses During Accident Conditions (30 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire Used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-11, Soil and Water Contamination at Fuel Cycle Facilities (5 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-12, Effects of Cable Leakage Currents on Instrument Settings and Indications (10 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-13, Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites (18 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-14, Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel Cycle Facilities (21 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-15, Failure of Primary Systems Compression Fitting (24 February 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-16, Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump During Refueling Cavity Draindown (25 February 1992, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level, Temporary Modification, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-17, NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10 (26 February 1992, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1992-18, Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire (28 February 1992, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield Mdr Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-20, Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing (3 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-21, Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity Calculations (24 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-23, Results of Validation Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (27 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-24, Distributor Modification to Certain Commercial-Grade Agastat Electrical Relays (30 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-25, Pressure Locking of Motor-Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves (2 April 1992, Topic: Stroke time, Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of ITE/Gould A.C. Relays used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of Ite/Gould A.C. Relays Used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-28, Inadequate Fire Suppression System Testing (8 April 1992, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-29, Potential Breaker Miscoordination Caused by Instantaneous Trip Circuitry (17 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-30, Falsification of Plant Records (23 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-31, Electrical Connection Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation YS-80 Programmable Indicating Controllers (27 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices Are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-34, New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-36, Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment (7 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-37, Implementation of the Deliberate Misconduct Rule (8 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-38, Implementation Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (26 May 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-39, Unplanned Return to Criticality During Reactor Shutdown (13 May 1992, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1992-40, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Logic Circuitry (27 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-41, Consideration of Stem Rejection Load In Calculation of Required Valve Thrust (29 May 1992, Topic: Anchor Darling)
... further results |
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