Inadequate Testing of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Logic CircuitryML031200294 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
05/27/1992 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-92-040, NUDOCS 9205200239 |
Download: ML031200294 (8) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C 20555 May 27, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-40: INADEQUATE TESTING OF EMERGENCY BUS
UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC CIRCUITRY
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
PurDose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to a safety problem that could result from the use
of an undervoltage logic test method that fails to verify the de-energization
of the emergency safety busses. It is expected that recipients will review
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
In November 1991, an NRC electrical distribution functional inspection team at
the LaSalle County Nuclear Station discovered that the surveillance testing
method used for the loss of offsite power test was not testing the capability
of the undervoltage logic circuitry to de-energize the emergency bus. This
deficiency affected all six of the electrical divisions for both nuclear power
units. The undervoltage circuitry automatically opens the emergency bus feed
breakers from the offsite power system to isolate the emergency bus when a
loss of voltage is sensed. This circuitry also initiates load shedding, starts the emergency diesel generator (EDG), re-energizes the emergency bus, and sequences the necessary emergency loads onto the emergency bus.
This test deficiency is significant because the failure of the normally closed
feed breaker to open automatically in response to a loss of offsite power
would prevent the emergency diesel from automatically re-energizing the
emergency bus and also would result in the emergency bus remaining connected
to a degraded offsite power source.
In conducting an internal lessons learned program for the Byron and Braidwood
stations, the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) determined that it
was performing inadequate tests of its undervoltage logic circuitry in a
manner similar to the LaSalle Station tests.
(9205200239 2 mob ZDO
r t - '4 IN 92-40
May 27, 1992 Discussion
The technical specifications for the LaSalle County Nuclear Station require
the licensee to simulate a loss of offsite power and to verify the
de-energization of the emergency busses. The licensee was simulating a loss
of offsite power by manually opening the emergency bus main feed breaker. By
simulating a loss of offsite power in this manner, the licensee did not
demonstrate that the undervoltage logic circuitry would automatically
de-energize the emergency bus in response to an undervoltage condition. Thus, the licensee did not test the capability of two undervoltage relay contacts to
trip the normal bus feed breaker from the main station transformer and the
unit tie breaker. These breakers provide an EDG output breaker closure
permissive. If a feed breaker failed to trip open automatically, it would
prevent the EDG output breaker from closing automatically and also result in
the emergency bus remaining connected to a degraded offsite power source.
After discovering this problem, LaSalle personnel successfully tested all of
the affected undervoltage logic circuits. The licensee simulated the loss of
offsite power by opening the undervoltage relay potential transformer test
switches and verifying that the appropriate breakers had tripped. The
licensee satisfactorily tested the capability of the logic circuits to shed
loads from the emergency busses, the capability of the EDGs to start automati- cally, and the capability to energize the emergency safety loads with the
--emergency busses.
g L_ ___
The Byron and Braidwood staff also revised their testing method and success- fully tested the capability of their undervoltage logic circuitry to auto- matically de-energize the emergency busses.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
-Is E b or
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: David S. Butler, RIII
(708) 790-5796 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
i.
3
v)J
Attachment
IN 92-40
May 27, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
92-39 Unplanned Return to 05/13/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Criticality during for nuclear power reactors.
Reactor Shutdown
92-38 Implementation Date for 05/12/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
the Revision to the EPA for nuclear power reactors, Manual of Protective non-power reactors and
Action Guides and Pro- materials licensees auth- tective Actions for orized to possess large
Nuclear Incidents quantities of radioactive
material.
92-37 Implementation of the 05/08/92 All Nuclear Regulatory
Deliberate Misconduct Rule Commission Materials
Licensees.
92-16, Loss of Flow from the Re- 05/07/92 All holders of OLs- or CPs
Supp. 1 sidual Heat Removal Pump for nuclear power reactors.
during Refueling Cavity
Draindown
92-36 Intersystem LOCA Outside 05/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Containment for nuclear power reactors.
92-35 Higher Than Predicted Ero- 05/06/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
sion/Corrosion in Unisol- for nuclear power reactors.
able Reactor Coolant Pres- sure Boundary Piping Inside
Containment at A Boiling
Water Reactor
92-34 New Exposure Limits for 05/06/92 All licensees whose opera- Airborne Uranium and tions can cause airborne
Thorium concentrations of uranium
and thorium.
92-33 Increased Instrument 04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Response Time When for nuclear power reactors.
Pressure Dampening
Devices are Installed
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
A
KJ
S IN 92-40
May 27, 1992 Discussion
The technical specifications for the LaSalle County Nuclear Station require
the licensee to simulate a loss of offsite power and to verify the
de-energization of the emergency busses. The licensee was simulating a loss
of offsite power by manually opening the emergency bus main feed breaker. By
simulating a loss of offsite power in this manner, the licensee did not
demonstrate that the undervoltage logic circuitry would automatically
de-energize the emergency bus in response to an undervoltage condition. Thus, the licensee did not test the capability of two undervoltage relay contacts to
trip the normal bus feed breaker from the main station transformer and the
unit tie breaker. These breakers provide an EDG output breaker closure
permissive. If a feed breaker failed to trip open automatically, it would
prevent the EDG output breaker from closing automatically and also result in
the emergency bus remaining connected to a degraded offsite power source.
After discovering this problem, LaSalle personnel successfully tested all of
the affected undervoltage logic circuits. The licensee simulated the loss of
offsite power by opening the undervoltage relay potential transformer test
switches and verifying that the appropriate breakers had tripped. The
licensee satisfactorily tested the capability of the logic circuits to shed
loads from the emergency busses, the capability of the EDGs to start automati- cally, and the capability to energize the emergency safety loads with the
emergency busses.
The Byron and Braidwood staff also revised their testing method and success- fully tested the capability of their undervoltage logic circuitry to auto- matically de-energize the emergency busses.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original Signed by
Charles E. Rossi
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: David S. Butler, RIII
(708) 790-5796 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: 9240.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRD *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM
C iei CHBerlinger TechEd
0i5/492- 05/15/92 04/13/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EB:DRS:RI II *C/EB:DRS:RII*D/DRS:RIII *C/SELB:DST:NRR
DCKirkpatrick DSButler MRing HMiller FRosa
04/10/92 05/04/92 05/04/92 05/04/92 04/24/92
J
\_j IN 92-XX
May xx, 1992 Discussion
The technical specifications for the LaSalle County Nuclear Station require
the licensee to simulate a loss of offsite power and to verify the
de-energization of the emergency busses. The licensee was simulating a loss
of offsite power by manually opening the emergency bus main feed breaker. By
simulating a loss of offsite power in this manner, the licensee did not
demonstrate that the undervoltage logic circuitry would automatically
de-energize the emergency bus in response to an undervoltage condition. Thus, the licensee did not test the capability of two undervoltage relay contacts to
trip the normal bus feed breaker from the main station transformer and the
unit tie breaker. These breakers provide an EDG output breaker closure
permissive. If a feed breaker failed to trip open automatically, it would
prevent the EDG output breaker from closing automatically.
After discovering this problem, LaSalle personnel successfully tested all of
the affected undervoltage logic circuits. The licensee simulated the loss of
offsite power by opening the undervoltage relay potential transformer test
switches and verifying that the appropriate breakers had tripped. The
licensee satisfactorily tested the capability of the logic circuits to shed
loads from the emergency busses, the capability of the EDGs to start automati- cally, and the capability to energize the emergency busses with the emergency
safety loads.
The Byron and Braidwood staff also revised their testing method and success- fully tested the capability of their undervoltage logic circuitry to auto- matically de-energize the emergency busses.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: David S. Butler, RIII
(708) 790-5796 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UVTEST.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D AN C C
D/DOEA: NRR lRRBADM
- /-C:OA
CERossi c4L CHBerlinger TechEd
05/ /92 05/1*-/92 04/13/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EB:DRS:RIII *C/EB:DRS:RII*D/DRS:RIII *C/SELB:DST:NRR
DCKirkpatrick DSButler MRing HMiller FRosa
04/10/92 05/04/92 05/04/92 05/04/92 04/24/92
fS_
IN 92-XX
April xx, 1992 Discussion
The technical specifications for the LaSalle County Nuclear Station require the
licensee to simulate a loss of offsite power and to verify the de-energization
of the emergency busses. The licensee was simulating a loss of offsite power
by manually opening the emergency bus main feed breaker. By simulating a loss
of offsite power in this manner, the licensee did not demonstrate that the
undervoltage logic circuitry would automatically de-energize the emergency bus
in response to an undervoltage condition. Thus, the licensee did not test the
capability of two undervoltage relay contacts to trip the bus feed breakers
from the main station transformer and the unit transformer. These breakers are
needed to provide the EDG output breaker closure permissives. If a tie breaker
failed to trip open automatically, it would prevent the EDG output breaker from
closing automatically.
After discovering this problem, the LaSalle personnel successfully tested all
of the affected undervoltage logic circuits. The licensee simulated the loss
of offsite power by opening the undervoltage relay potential transformer test
switches and verifying that the appropriate breakers had tripped. The licensee
satisfactorily tested the capability of the logic circuits to shed loads from
the emergency busses, the capability of the EDGs to start automatically, and
the capability to energize the emergency busses with the emergency safety
loads.
The Byron and Braidwood staff also revised their testing method and success- fully tested the capability of their undervoltage logic circuitry to auto- matically de-energize the emergency busses.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you
have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: David S. Butler, RIII
(708) 790-5796 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UVTEST
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM
CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd
04/ /92 04/ /92 04/13/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR EB:DRS:RII C/EB:DRS:RJII D/DRS:R I *C/SELB:DST:NRR
DCKirkpatrick DSButler#)C MRing e HMiller 9 FRosa
04/10/92 0 t /g2
.4/94,t
9J f l/ 0 04/24/92
11 ' -
IN 92-XX
April xx, 1992 Discussion
The technical specifications for the LaSalle County Nuclear Station require the
licensee to simulate a loss of offsite power and to verify the de-energization
of the emergency busses. The licensee was simulating a loss of offsite power
by manually opening the emergency bus main feed breaker. By simulating a loss
of offsite power in this manner, the licensee did not demonstrate that the
undervoltage logic circuitry would automatically de-energize the emergency bus
in response to an undervoltage condition. Thus, the licensee did not test the
capability of two undervoltage relay contacts to trip the tie breakers for the
main station transformer and the unit transformer. These breakers are needed
to provide the EDG output breaker closure permissives. If a tie breaker failed
to trip open automatically, it would prevent the EDG output breaker from
closing automatically.
After discovering this problem, the LaSalle personnel successfully tested all
of the affected undervoltage logic circuits. The licensee simulated the loss
of offsite power by opening the undervoltage relay potential transformer test
switches and verifying that the appropriate breakers had tripped. The licensee
satisfactorily tested the capability of the logic circuits to shed loads from
the emergency busses, the capability of the EDGs to start automatically, and
the capability to energize the emergency busses with the emergency safety
loads.
The Byron and Braidwood staff also revised their testing method and success- fully tested the capability of their undervoltage logic circuitry to auto- matically de-energize the emergency busses.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you
have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: David S. Butler, RIII
(708) 790-5796 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UVTEST
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM
CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd
04/ /92 04/ /92 04/13/92
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR EB:DRS:RIII C/EB:DRS:RIII D/DRS:RIII C/SELB:
DCKirkpatrick DSButler MRing HMiller FRosa
04/10/92 04/ /92 04/ /92 04/ /92 04/2W92
OGCB:DOEA:NRR EB:DRS:RIII C/EB:DRS:RIII D/DRS:RIII RPB:ADM
DCKirkpatrick DSButler .MRing HMiller TechEd K 9CA
04/lG/92 )D 04/ /92 04/ /92 04/ /92 04/13 /92
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list | - Information Notice 1992-01, Cable Damage Caused by Inadequate Cable Installation Procedures and Controls (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/MOD3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/Mod3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-03, Remote Trip Function Failures in General Electric F-Frame Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (6 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model Mdr Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs Rxmh2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in ABS RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment Not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-07, Rapid Flow-induced Erosion/Corrosion of Feedwater Piping (9 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-08, Revised Protective Action Guidance for Nuclear Incidents (23 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-09, Overloading and Subsequent Lock Out of Electrical Buses During Accident Conditions (30 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire Used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-11, Soil and Water Contamination at Fuel Cycle Facilities (5 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-12, Effects of Cable Leakage Currents on Instrument Settings and Indications (10 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-13, Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites (18 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-14, Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel Cycle Facilities (21 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-15, Failure of Primary Systems Compression Fitting (24 February 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-16, Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump During Refueling Cavity Draindown (25 February 1992, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level, Temporary Modification, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-17, NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10 (26 February 1992, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1992-18, Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire (28 February 1992, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield Mdr Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-20, Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing (3 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-21, Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity Calculations (24 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-23, Results of Validation Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (27 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-24, Distributor Modification to Certain Commercial-Grade Agastat Electrical Relays (30 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-25, Pressure Locking of Motor-Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves (2 April 1992, Topic: Stroke time, Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of ITE/Gould A.C. Relays used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of Ite/Gould A.C. Relays Used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-28, Inadequate Fire Suppression System Testing (8 April 1992, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-29, Potential Breaker Miscoordination Caused by Instantaneous Trip Circuitry (17 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-30, Falsification of Plant Records (23 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-31, Electrical Connection Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation YS-80 Programmable Indicating Controllers (27 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices Are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-34, New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-36, Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment (7 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-37, Implementation of the Deliberate Misconduct Rule (8 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-38, Implementation Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (26 May 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-39, Unplanned Return to Criticality During Reactor Shutdown (13 May 1992, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1992-40, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Logic Circuitry (27 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-41, Consideration of Stem Rejection Load In Calculation of Required Valve Thrust (29 May 1992, Topic: Anchor Darling)
... further results |
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