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Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2023004; 05000260/2023004 and 05000296/2023004
	ML24037A104
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	02/06/2024
From:	Louis Mckown; NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Jim Barstow; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	IR 2023004
	Download: ML24037A104 (18)
	v • d • e

SUBJECT:

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2023004, 05000260/2023004 AND 05000296/2023004

Dear Jim Barstow:

On December 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. On January 11, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Daniel Komm, Plant Manager and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.February 6, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Louis J. McKown, II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch #5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000259, 05000260 and 05000296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000259, 05000260 and 05000296

License Numbers: DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68

Report Numbers: 05000259/2023004, 05000260/2023004 and 05000296/2023004

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-004-0013

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Location: Athens, Alabama

Inspection Dates: October 01, 2023 to December 31, 2023

Inspectors: S. Billups, Resident Inspector D. Lanyi, Senior Operations Engineer K. Pfeil, Resident Inspector T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Louis J. McKown, II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch #5 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Maintain Adequate Boron Concentration in Standby Liquid Control Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.3] - 71152A Systems NCV 05000259/2023004-01 Resolution Open/Closed An NRC-identified Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-33, License Condition 2.C(14)was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that the sodium pentaborate concentration in the Unit 1 SLC tank met the criterion of Surveillance Requirement 3.1.7.3. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct the source of demineralized water in-leakage to the tank which diluted the tank contents rendering the system inoperable from January 18 to 19, 2023.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at full (100 percent) rated thermal power (RTP). On December 1, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 68 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On December 3, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP where it operated at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full RTP. On December 9, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 63 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On December 10, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP where it operated at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at full RTP. On October 20, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 74 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On October 21, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP.

On November 10, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 68 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On November 11, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP.

On November 24, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 71 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On November 25, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP.

On December 8, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 71 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On December 9, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP.

On December 22, 2023, operators lowered reactor power to 72 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On December 23, 2023, the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP where it operated at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Cold weather preparations for the residual heat removal service water pump room, condenser circulating water pumping station, unit 1/2 control bay chiller, and the security diesel generator on October 23, 2023

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 standby liquid control system following quarterly surveillance testing on November 09, 2023

(2) Unit 2 loop II residual heat removal following system maintenance on December 19, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection pump room, fire area 01-01, reactor building elevation 519' on October 27, 2023

(2) Unit 2 fire area 02-01, reactor building elevation 565' on November 07, 2023

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam completed on October 18, 2023 and the biennial written examinations completed on November 22, 2023.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 1 control room during a power reduction for a rod sequence exchange on December 1, 2023

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Licensed operator requalification examination in the Unit 3 simulator on October 03, 2023

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 3 residual heat removal 4kv and 480 V breakers exceeded component level unreliability on October 26, 2023

(2) Maintenance practices related to high moisture content in Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection oil system on October 27, 2023

(3) Trend in Unit 1, 2, and 3 recirculation pump variable frequency drive issues on November 02, 2023

Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following structures, systems, and components that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:

(1) Raw cooling water and fire protection on November 16, 2023

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Protected equipment lineup while Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling unavailable for scheduled maintenance on October 04, 2023

(2) Protected system lineup while unit 1 high pressure coolant injection was in a maintenance outage and emergent work on unit 1 high pressure coolant injection electro-mechanical hydraulic actuator on October 17, 2023

(3) Maintenance risk and emergent work control during shutdown board 1 maintenance outage on November 03, 2023

(4) Maintenance risk and emergent work control during main bank battery 2 replacement on November 09, 2023

(5) Protected system lineup while unit 1 core spray loop 1 unavailable for scheduled maintenance on November 20, 2023

(6) Maintenance risk and emergent work control during Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection maintenance outage on December 20, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 1885383, Rust identified in unit 1 high pressure coolant injection electro-mechanical hydraulic actuator on October 11, 2023

(2) CR 1885650, Unit 3 3EB battery cell operability assessment on October 13, 2023

(3) CR 1886202, Unit 1 operability of high-pressure coolant injection with a vacudyne/filter cart installed on October 31, 2023

(4) CR 1891412, Inadvertent dilution of Unit 1 standby liquid control tank on November 15, 2023

(5) CR 1884699, Unit 3 3B emergency diesel generator brush holder clip loose on November 16, 2023

(6) CR 1894285, low indicated oil level on Unit 1/2 A emergency diesel generator on November 27, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

(1) WO 123816438, Unit 3 250 VDC 3EB battery cell replacement on October 12, 2023

(2) WO 123212830, Post maintenance testing following unit 1 high pressure coolant injection maintenance outage on October 19, 2023

(3) WO 123000744, 250 VDC main bank 1 battery cell replacement on October 23, 2023

(4) WO 121621054, Generator replacement for the Unit 3 3B emergency diesel generator on October 31, 2023

(5) WO 124047141, Door seal replacement for control room envelope door BFN-1-DOOR-260-0600 on December 11, 2023

(6) WO 119168592, Rebuild reactor core isolation cooling inboard discharge valve, 2-MVOP-071-0039 on December 12, 2023

(7) WO 123415634, Residual heat removal pump C suppression pool suction valve, 2-MVOP-074-0012, testing after stem nut removal and installation on December 13, 2023

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unidentified drywell leakage monitoring for Units 2 and 3 on November 22,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(3) Unit 3 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(3) Unit 3 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

(3) Unit 3 (October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

Main article: IP 71152

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR 1810303, Standby liquid control pump flow rates failed acceptance criteria on November 07, 2023

(2) CR 1790061, Maintenance performed on incorrect component on November 08, 2023

(3) CR 1830186, Rising level in Unit 1 standby liquid control tank on November 15, 2023

(4) CR 1816156, 2B Reactor feed pump discharge check valve failed to close on December 15, 2023

===71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)===

Main article: IP 71152

(1) The inspectors performed a review of potential adverse trends in housekeeping that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors performed interviews and plant walkdowns and sampled a population of condition reports during the period of July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71153

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000259/2022-002-01 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable Due to a Corroded Actuator (ADAMS Accession No. ML23285A192). This LER was a revision to an LER which was previously inspected as documented in inspection report 05000259/2023-040 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23305A350). No findings or violations were identified as a result of the review of this revision. This LER is Closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Maintain Adequate Boron Concentration in Standby Liquid Control Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.3] - 71152A Systems NCV 05000259/2023004-01 Resolution Open/Closed An NRC-identified Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-33, License Condition 2.C(14)was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that the sodium pentaborate concentration in the Unit 1 SLC tank met the criterion of Surveillance Requirement 3.1.7.3. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct the source of demineralized water in-leakage to the tank which diluted the tank contents rendering the system inoperable from January 18 to 19, 2023.

Description:

On October 20, 2022, Chemistry tested the Unit 1 standby liquid control (SLC)storage tank following Mode 5 squib valve testing. During the test, the licensee identified an inadvertent tank level increase and a sodium pentaborate (SPB) concentration below 8.0%. Surveillance requirement (SR) 3.1.7.3 requires, in part, that the SPB concentration is greater than or equal to 8.0% by weight while in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

The purpose of this SR is to ensure that the proper concentration of boron exists in the tank for post-LOCA suppression pool pH control. Suppression pool pH control is a required license condition alternative source term function defined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 3.8.4.2.

Based on reviewing the plant computer data point for the tank level (data point 63-1), the level increase started at the completion of a routine SLC pump surveillance test on October 18, 2022. The licensee added SPB to the tank and created a corrective action to CR 1810980 to observe the next Unit 1 SLC pump surveillance test to identify the source of the in-leakage to the tank.

The next Unit 1 SLC pump test was performed on January 18, 2023, with the Unit in Mode 1. The following day, Engineering reviewed data point 63-1 and identified that the level increased from 88.89% when the SLC system was restored at 10:35 a.m. the previous day to the then-current level of approximately 90.16%. Engineering initiated CR 1830186 on January 19, 2023, to document the tank level rise. The licensee discovered that the SLC tank demineralized water supply isolation valve, 1-SHV-002-1208, was not consistently seating properly and was the source of the in-leakage for both this and the previous occurrence in October 2022. After closing 1-SHV-002-1208, the licensee added SPB to the tank, took a chemistry sample, and verified that all surveillance requirements were met after the SPB addition.

Later, on November 8, 2023, operators identified a level rise in the Unit 1 tank coincident with SLC pump surveillance testing completed the previous day. Operators re-seated 1-SHV-002-1208 which stopped the leak and documented the issue in CR 1891412. On November 9, 2023, after adding SPB to the tank, the licensee verified compliance with the applicable surveillance requirements.

However, during assessment of each of the January and November 2023 events the inspectors observed that the licensee failed to evaluate the immediate operability and compliance with SR 3.1.7.3 in the as-found condition. The inspectors calculated that the concentration following the January 2023 event was 7.97% which would have rendered both SLC subsystems inoperable for the failure to meet SR 3.1.7.3. The licensee entered the inspectors past operability concerns into the corrective action program as CRs 1892408 and 1892410 for the November 2023 and January 2023 events, respectively. The licensee determined that SR 3.1.7.3 was not met starting at 8:32 p.m. on January 18, 2023, based upon the leakage rate into the tank, until SPB was added to the tank at approximately 1:05 p.m. the following day; however, SR 3.1.7.3 was met for the November 2023 event. The inspectors concluded that SLC was restored to operable prior to the expiration of the allowed outage time of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on January 19, 2023.

The inspectors reviewed the historical data plots that were available to the licensee at the time (such as data point 63-1) and noted a discreet, essentially constant rise in tank level starting around 10:35 a.m. on January 18, 2023, and continuing until the next day when 1-SHV-002-1208 was reseated and the leakage stopped. This level rise would have been within the licensees ability to identify within at least two to four hours after the test concluded which would have given the licensee sufficient time to investigate the level rise and stop the in-leakage before SLC became inoperable.

Corrective Actions: The licensee tagged 1-SHV-002-1208 to alert operators to the degraded valve seat and the correct direction to close the valve. The licensee also planned a modification to the demineralized water supply to provide a more leak tight makeup system.

Corrective Action References: CRs 1718733, 1810980, 1830186, 1885544, 1891412, 1892408, and 1892410

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to ensure that the sodium pentaborate concentration in the Unit 1 SLC tank met the requirement of SR 3.1.7.3 was a performance deficiency. The licensee failed to identify and correct the source of demineralized water in-leakage to the tank prior to the system becoming inoperable on January 18, 2023.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the final operability determination concluded that SLC was inoperable.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The affected cornerstone was Mitigating Systems, as determined by IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency using Exhibit 2 of Appendix A and determined that the issue screened to Green because the inspectors answered No to all six screening questions.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensees corrective actions to identify the cause of the SLC tank in-leakage failed to utilize all available information to identify and correct the source of the leakage before SLC became inoperable.

Enforcement:

Violation: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-33, License Condition 2.C(14) states in part that the licensee shall maintain the Augmented Quality Program for the SLC system to provide quality control elements to ensure component reliability for the required alternative source term function defined in the UFSAR. UFSAR Section 3.8.4.2 states that post-LOCA suppression pool pH control is a required alternative source term function of the SLC system. LCO 3.1.7 describes the required conditions that must be met for SLC to be considered operable. SR 3.1.7.3 requires that the SPB concentration in the SLC storage tank is greater than or equal to 8.0 percent by weight.

Contrary to the above, from January 18, 2023, until January 19, 2023, the licensee failed to ensure the capability of the standby liquid control system for the required alternative source term function as defined in the UFSAR. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement effective quality control elements to ensure that the Unit 1 standby liquid control storage tank was filled with at least 8.0 percent by weight of sodium pentaborate.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Assessment 71152S Semi-Annual Trend in Housekeeping

The inspectors performed interviews and plant walkdowns and sampled a population of condition reports during the period of July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. Based upon the samples reviewed, the inspectors found that there was an apparent increasing trend in housekeeping events. For example, during walkdowns of the refueling floor, the inspectors identified miscellaneous loose trash and debris, clear plastic, and other items which were did not meet the licensee's expectations. Additionally, several walkdowns of the three units identified various forms of trash, loose tools, and unsecure chemicals. The inspectors were concerned that the items identified could affect various programs such as fire protection and foreign material exclusion. In each instance identified by the inspectors, the material did not constitute an issue that was of more than minor significance. This conclusion was due primarily to the amount of material identified and its relative location to the potential target.

After identifying these issues, station management properly identified the need for trend review upon reaching condition and performance monitoring thresholds generating corrective actions consistent with their programs to address the decline in performance related to housekeeping controls and worker behavior. The licensee implemented an aggressive enhanced focus on housekeeping controls and behaviors in an effort to ensure the cleanliness of the station in accordance with their expectations and procedures. The inspectors determined that the licensee took appropriate actions to address the identified issues and the behaviors that contributed to this trend. The inspectors did not identify any findings as a result of this inspection.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On January 11, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.

Daniel Komm, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Procedures 0-GOI-200-1 Freeze Protection Inspection 99

71111.04 Corrective Action 1891374

Documents

71111.04 Drawings Drawing 2-47E811-1 Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System Revision 79

71111.04 Procedures 2-OI-74 Residual Heat Removal Revision 202

71111.04 Work Orders 122376101

71111.05 Corrective Action 1890893

Documents

71111.12 Corrective Action 1376489, 1436003,

Documents 1497471, 1512606,

1669854, 1886180,

1886202, 1886583,

1886818, 1887313,

1805633, 1818706,

21836, 1821838,

22705, 1824436,

1839983, 1856232,

1859553

71111.12 Engineering EWR23NSSS073107 Evaluation of HPCI operability with Vacudyne filter cart Revision 3

Evaluations installed

71111.12 Work Orders 119349882

71111.15 Corrective Action 1885383, 1885650,

Documents 1886202, 1892263,

1892408, 1892410,

1830186, 1891412,

1884699, 1894285

71111.15 Engineering EWR23NSSS073107 Evaluation of HPCI operability with Vacudyne or filter cart Revision 3

Evaluations installed

71111.15 Miscellaneous Selected control room operator logs from November 25-

26, 2023

71111.15 Work Orders 122497848,

2626265,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

23052369,

23421550,

23264839

71111.24 Corrective Action 1884687, 1887201,

Documents 1885650, 1895048

71111.24 Miscellaneous Selected completed SR-2, control room shiftly

surveillances, from the third and fourth quarter, 2023.

71111.24 Miscellaneous MMTP-144 Motor Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing Revision 9

71111.24 Miscellaneous Purchase Order Procure and test new wet cell battery from C & D 02/10/2022

7187164 Technologies INC

71111.24 Miscellaneous Purchase Order Procure and test new wet cell battery from C &D 09/05/2023

7464841 Technologies INC

71111.24 Miscellaneous Purchase Order Procure and test new wet cell battery from C &D 05/02/2023

7464841 Technologies INC

71111.24 Work Orders 123000744,

2161054,

2954805,

23212830,

23816438,

24047141,

119168592,

23228092,

23487093,

23415634,

23423798

71151 Corrective Action 1831866, 1831457,

Documents 1832151, 1813580,

1804476, 1813978

71151 Miscellaneous Brown's Ferry Keeping Current - variable frequency drive downpower 11/02/2022

Nuclear daily update

71151 Miscellaneous Brown's Ferry 11/01/2022

Nuclear plan of the

day

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71151 Miscellaneous Brown's Ferry 11/02/2022

Nuclear plan of the

day

71151 Miscellaneous Brown's Ferry 10/31/2022

Nuclear plan of the

day

71151 Miscellaneous Selected control

room operator logs

from October 1,

22, through

September 30, 2023

71151 Work Orders 123279027

71152A Corrective Action 1810303, 1871406,

Documents 1873415, 1873952,

1875004, 1884238.

1790061, 1830186,

1891412, 1892263,

1892408, 1892410,

PER-108732,

1816156, 1816153,

1816200, 1816152,

1816205, 1816202,

1816135, 1816995,

23099

71152A Procedures 1-SR-3.1.7.3 Standby Liquid Control System Enriched Sodium Revision 57

Pentaborate Solution Concentration, Quantity Calculation,