ML23219A188

NRC Inspection Report 05000228/2023001, and Notice of Violation

ML23219A188
Person / Time
Site:	Aerotest
Issue date:	08/24/2023
From:	Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS/DIOR
To:	Slaughter D Aerotest
Anderson S
References
IR 2023001
Download: ML23219A188 (9)

See also: IR 05000228/2023001

Text

August 24, 2023

Dr. David M. Slaughter, President

and Reactor Administrator

Aerotest Operations, Inc.

3455 Fostoria Way

San Ramon, CA 94583

SUBJECT: AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT

050-00228/2023-001, AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear David Slaughter:

This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on

June 27, 2023, at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) in San Ramon,

California. The NRC inspectors discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with you and

members of your staff on June 27, 2023. A final exit meeting was conducted via Microsoft Teams

on July 13, 2023, to inform you of the final inspection results. The inspection results are

documented in the enclosure to this letter.

During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses

as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the

Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these

areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative

records, tour of the reactor and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and

interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV

violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with

the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the

NRCs website at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The violations are cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances

surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report, Enclosure 2. The

violations are being cited in the Notice because they were identified by the NRC and corrective

actions had not been fully articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting.

Therefore, you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified

in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that

you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The

NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement

action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

D. Slaughter 2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a

copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for

public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs

website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response

should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made

available to the Public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this inspection report, please contact Stephanie Anderson

at 817-200-1213, or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.

Sincerely,

Signed by Warnick, Gregory

on 08/24/23

Gregory G. Warnick, Chief

Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating

Reactor Branch

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Docket No. 050-00228

License No: R-98

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

2. Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001

ML23219A188

SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword

By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002

OFFICE DRSS/DIOR DRSS/DIOR NMSS/RDB DRSS/DD

NAME SAnderson MLaFranzo JParrott GMiller

SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

DATE 08/17/23 08/10/23 08/17/23 08/14/23

OFFICE C:DIOR

NAME GWarnick

SIGNATURE /RA/

DATE 08/24/23

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Aerotest Operations, Inc. Docket No: 050-00228

Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor License No: R-98

During an NRC inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, two violations of NRC requirements of

greater than minor significance were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement

Policy, the violations are listed below:

A. NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that

whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition

2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the

NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.

Contrary to the above, from December 6, 2021, to June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to

maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel

Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel

elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to have a

qualified Certified Fuel Handler and a qualified Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor and

implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR CFH

Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the

qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel

Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the

reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of

spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant

emergencies.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.3).

B. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2, states, in part, detailed written procedures shall be

provided and followed for normal operating of all systems and components involving

nuclear safety at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor facility.

Technical Specifications Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron Survey Instrument as a

system.

Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5,

2021, section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if the meter is more

than 20 percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for

adjustment and/or repair.

Contrary to the above, on January 11, 2023, the licensee failed to route the survey meter

to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair when a meter was more than 20

percent off expected readings. Specifically, the licensee noted during a calibration of a

neutron monitor that the surface reading was expected to be 102 mrem/hr but rather was

150 mrem/hr, more than 20 percent of expected readings, and the survey meter was not

routed to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair. The neutron meter is a

component involving nuclear safety at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor

facility.

Enclosure 1

This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.3).

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 2.201,

Aerotest Operations, Inc. is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation

to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Director, Division of Radiological Safety

and Security, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511, within 30 days

of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be

clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation and should include for each violation:

(1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or

severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3)

the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be

achieved.

Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence if the

correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not

received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be

issued requiring information as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or

revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is

shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To

the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,

then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that

should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you

request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response

that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding

(e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for

withholding confidential commercial or financial information).

Dated this 24th day of August 2023.

2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No: 050-00228

License No: R-98

Report No: 050-00228/2023-001

Licensee: Aerotest Operations, Inc.

Facility: Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)

Location: 3455 Fostoria Way

San Ramon, California

Dates: June 27, 2023

Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson

Senior Health Physicist

Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Michael M. LaFranzo

Senior Health Physicist

Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Jack D. Parrott

Senior Project Manager

Reactor Decommissioning Branch

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Accompanied By: Nathan A. Fuguet

Health Physicist

Reactor Decommissioning Branch

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Chief

Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Aerotest Operations, Inc.

NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001

This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection

of licensed activities being conducted at the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)

of Aerotest Operations, Inc. (licensee). The inspectors identified two Severity Level IV violations,

one minor violation, and opened one unresolved item. Other than the identified violations and the

one unresolved item, the licensee was conducting site activities in accordance with site

procedures, license requirements, and applicable NRC regulations.

Staffing and Audits

The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with its technical specifications

and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation

of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the Aerotest

Radiography and Research Reactor Certified Fuel Handler training and requalification

program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the technical specification

requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually. (Section 1.2)

Radiological Surveys

The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved

licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the

licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for

adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings.

One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration

program. (Section 2.2)

Emergency Preparedness

The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercise and drills as required by the

emergency plan and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in

accordance with their emergency plan commitments. (Section 3.2)

2

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

On October 15, 2010, Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO or licensee), notified the NRC that they will

voluntarily not operate the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) reactor until

further decisions were made concerning the ownership issue (Agencywide Documents Access

and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140289). By letter dated December 6,

2021, (ML21242A463), license amendment number 6 was issued, which revised Facility

Operating License No. 98 and the associated technical specifications to remove the authority to

operate ARRR, to authorize possession-only of the reactor and fuel, and removed all operational

requirements not needed for possession-only status.

By letter dated July 20, 2021 (ML21230A304), and supplemented by letter dated January 20,

2022 (ML22025A200), the licensee submitted a license amendment to the NRC for approval of

the Decommissioning Plan (DP) for ARRR. These submittals were made pursuant to Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.82, Termination of license, paragraph (b)(1),

which requires AO to apply for license termination within 2 years of permanently ceasing

operations and that each application for termination of a license be accompanied or preceded by

a proposed DP.

By letter dated April 11, 2022 (ML22098A092), the NRC accepted the amendment request

application to perform the technical review to approve the proposed DP.

1 Staffing and Audits (IP 69002)

1.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed that the staffing was maintained and that required audits were

conducted in accordance with the technical specification requirements.

1.2 Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the licensees administrative requirements for staffing and

audits as required by the site license and technical specifications (TSs) 12.0. The

licensee organization was fully staffed except for a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and a

CFH Supervisor.

License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA

fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect

and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training

and Requalification Program. The document states the qualification, training, and

retraining of the CFH and CFH Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight

commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems

needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent

fuel, and response to plant emergencies. During review of the licensees organization

chart and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined the licensee

failed to implement the requirements of the ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program

to have a qualified CFH and CFH Supervisor, this is considered a violation of Licensee

Condition 2.C.(4) (VIO 050-00228/2023001-01).

3

The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor safeguards committee requirements and

verified the licensee maintained at least five members, of whom no more than three are

members of AO. The licensees records indicated that the reactor safeguards committee

consisted of five members, of which two were outside of AO. The requirements further

state that the committee shall meet on the call of the chairman and they shall meet at

least annually. The inspectors reviewed the committee meeting records and determined

that the committee did meet annually in 2018, 2019, 2020, and January and December

of 2022. The committee was not able to meet annually in 2021, but the committee did

meet in January 2022 to review the 2021 activities. Technical Specification 12.1.6

requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually.

Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at

least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a

minor violation of TS 12.1.6.

1.3 Conclusions

The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with the TSs and

completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation

of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the ARRR CFH

Training and Requalification Program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of

the TS requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually.

2 Radiological Surveys (IP 69002)

2.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed if required radiological surveys were performed in accordance

with approved licensee procedures.

2.2 Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiological survey program as required by the

site license and TS 12.2. The licensee had procedures associated with the radiological

survey program.

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensees survey meter calibration

program associated with portable gamma and neutron detectors. The licensee

demonstrated the calibration program with a portable neutron survey instrument used by

the licensee detected approximately 150 mrem/hr on the surface of a neutron source

and the expected reading was 102 mrem/hr. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2 states, in

part, detailed written procedures shall be provided and followed for normal operation of

all systems and components involving nuclear safety at ARRR facility. Procedure

Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5, 2021,

section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if a meter is more than 20

percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for

adjustment and/or repair. Technical specification in Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron

Survey Instrument as a system. A review of calibration records for 2022 and 2023

showed that the neutron meter had detected approximately 150 mrem/hr while the

expected reading was 102 mrem, a difference of approximately 47 percent. The licensee

stated that the neutron survey meter was appropriately calibrated as the radiation

readings were consistent with past measurements. However, the calibration records for

4

January 5, 2021, were approximately 125 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102,

a difference of approximately 22.5 percent.

Although the values read were more than 20 percent of the expected reading, the

neutron survey instrument was not adjusted and/or sent for repair. Failure of the licensee

to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or

repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings is a violation of

TS 12.2.1.2 (VIO 050-00228/2023001-02). The licensee committed to send the neutron

meter for repairs to an appropriate contractor that could adjust and/or repair the

instrument.

In addition, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI 050-00228/2023001-003)

regarding the licensees calibration program. Procedure Instrument Calibration

Instruction - Safety Procedures references the use of NIST-traceable source for the

calibration of radiation detection instrumentation. A selected review of the

NIST-traceable source records indicated that the sources have Certificate of Calibration

dates for Thorium-230, Cesium-137, and Strontium/Yttrium-90 of December 15, 1989,

January 3, 1990, and December 19, 1989, respectively. Within the Thorium-230 and

Strontium/Yttrium-90 Certificate of Calibration record is a statement that it is

recommended that the source be recertified on an annual basis. Industry standards

regarding the certification of accuracy for NIST-traceable sources is typically one year.

However, the sources referenced above have calibration dates that exceed 30 years

and, in discussions with the licensee, these sources had not been recertified pursuant to

the recommendations on the Certificate of Calibration. The NRC has questioned the

accuracy of the NIST-traceable sources, barring radioactive decay, over such a long

period of time beyond recommended recertification. This unresolved item remains under

NRC review.

2.3 Conclusions

The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved

licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the

licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for

adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected

readings. One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees

calibration program.

3 Emergency Preparedness (IP 69002)

3.1 Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed if the licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises

and drills as required by the emergency plan and if the licensee completed emergency

preparedness training in accordance with the emergency plan commitments.

5

3.2 Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Section III of the licensees procedures

entitled General Emergency and Emergency Plan, dated as last reviewed by the

licensee on April 27, 2023, and the Emergency Plan for Possession Only dated

June 30, 2021. Specifically evaluated were completion of emergency preparedness

exercises and drills and emergency preparedness training and interaction with offsite

agencies that may be needed to assist in a radiological emergency.

The licensee had established emergency action levels in both the General Emergency

and Emergency Plan procedure and the Emergency Plan (EP). The inspectors verified

that, per the EP, unannounced emergency drills were held on a twice-yearly basis and

that there is a monthly test of the various automatic alarms associated with an

emergency (fire, earthquake resulting in damage to the fuel storage pool, bomb threat,

and reactor tank rupture). The inspectors verified that the emergency alarm system is

continuously monitored and that the alarm company monitors unauthorized entry, fire,

and radiation. The alarm company has instructions to notify pre-designated ARRR

personnel, the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and local law enforcement. The

inspectors also verified that annual refresher training of personnel with emergency

response responsibilities had been conducted within the last year, that drills, as required

by the EP, had been conducted twice yearly, and that a company vehicle was available

to transport contaminated personnel to the designated medical facility.

Two outside agencies are required by the EP to be notified in event of an emergency

requiring offsite assistance: the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and the

Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center in Pleasanton, CA. The inspectors

verified that the fire protection district personnel had visited the facility in the last year as

part of an annual inspection and interacted with the Radiation Safety Officer who is the

alternate Emergency Coordinator in the case of a radiological emergency. The

inspectors verified that the licensee had contacted the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley

Medical Center and had a signed agreement with them to admit radiation-exposed or

contaminated individuals requiring medical treatment. That agreement had been

renewed on May 23, 2023. In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had

identified the NRC on the notification list of agencies to be contacted in the event of a

facility emergency.

3.3 Conclusions

The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the

EP and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with its

EP commitments.

4 Exit Meeting Summary

On July 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to the Dr.

David M. Slaughter, President. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material

examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary information. No

proprietary information was identified.

6

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

D. Slaughter, President and Reactor Administrator

T. Richey, Radiological Safety Officer

T. Holt, Radiation Safety Analyst

M. McCarthy, Nuclear Analyst

K. Reichert, Office Manager

INSPECTION PROCEDURE

IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000228/2023001-001 VIO Failure to implement the ARRR CFH Training and

Requalification Program. (Section 1.2)05000228/2023001-002 VIO Failure to route a neutron monitor to the electronics shop for

adjustment and/or repair if meter is more than 20% off

expected readings. (Section 2.2)05000228/2023001-003 URI NIST-Traceable sources recertification. (Section 2.2)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems

AO Aerotest Operations, Inc.

ARRR Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor

CFH Certified Fuel Handler

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DP Decommissioning Plan

EP Emergency Plan

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NOV Notice of Violation

POL Possession-Only License

TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic

TS Technical Specification

URI Unresolved Item

VIO Violation

7