Information Notice 1985-85, Systems Interaction Event Resulting in Reactor System Safety Relief Valve Opening Following a Fire-Protection Deluge System Malfunction: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| page count = 4 | | page count = 4 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-85 UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-85 UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF INSPECTION | OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT | ||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE 85-85: SYSTEMS INTERACTION EVENT RESULTING IN REACTOR | |||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1985 IE INFORMATION | |||
SYSTEM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE OPENING FOLLOWING | |||
A FIRE-PROTECTION DELUGE SYSTEM MALFUNCTION | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
: | : | ||
All nuclear power reactor facilities | All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a | ||
holding an operating | |||
construction permit (CP). | |||
permit (CP). | |||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
: This notice is provided to alert licensees | : | ||
This notice is provided to alert licensees of a serious systems interaction | |||
event involving the fire-protection deluge system located in the control room | |||
ventilation charcoal filter housing. Following inadvertent actuation of this | |||
system, an analog transient trip system (ATTS) panel was sprayed with water | |||
causing malfunctions in certain safety system components. | |||
It is expected that recipients will review this notice for applicability to | |||
their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar | |||
problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this | |||
notice do not constitute requirements; therefore, no specific action or written | |||
response is required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
: | |||
On May 15, 1985, at Georgia Power Company's Hatch Unit 1, personnel manually | |||
of Circumstances: | |||
On May 15, 1985, at Georgia Power Company's | |||
Hatch Unit 1, personnel | |||
manually | |||
scrammed the reactor from 75% power because of a stuck open low-low-set safety | |||
relief valve (LLS-SRV). Shorting of one of the two redundant power supplies | |||
and/or possibly intermittent shorting of logic system contacts in the ATTS | |||
of | panel is believed to have caused the stuck open LLS-SRV. The panel is one of | ||
two redundant panels located in the control room. The cause of the electrical | |||
shorts in the affected panel was water intrusion into the panel. | |||
The event began about 8:35 p.m. when an instrument water supply vent valve was | |||
damaged, apparently by dragging of a crane hook along the line. The instru- ment water supply line eventually depressurized causing a portion of the fire- protection deluge system to actuate. The water supply line is located above | |||
the control building and the deluge system is located in the control room | |||
charcoal filter housing. | |||
Following actuation of the deluge system, approximately 15 to 25 gal of water | |||
backed up into the ventilation header before the system could be secured. The | |||
8510290039 | |||
IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 backup was caused by plugged drains in the charcoal filter housing. Water | |||
eventually leaked through a hole in the ventilation piping that was located | |||
above the ATTS panel in the control room. Whenthe water sprayed onto the panel, one of two redundant panel power supplies apparently shorted because of water | |||
intrusion into the panel. As a result, a LLS-SRV valve began to cycle open and | |||
closed. The SRV cycled three times and then opened and remained open. The | |||
operator manually scrammed the reactor from 75% power. A false turbine high | |||
exhaust pressure trip signal also was generated, temporarily disabling the high | |||
pressure core injection (HPCI) system. The reactor core isolation cooling | |||
(RCIC) system was inoperable at the time, so neither HPCI nor RCIC was imme- diately available for use. Fortunately, neither system was needed during the | |||
event. This is because the water level was restored and maintained by the | |||
reactor feedwater system until the MSIVs were shut. Subsequent to MSIV closure, water level was maintained by the control rod drive (CRD) system with the | |||
excess water being dumped to the condenser via the reactor-water cleanup-system. | |||
The LLS-SRV closed without operator action at 9:52 pm. | |||
Discussion: | |||
The event is of considerable concern because of the potential for multiple | |||
deluge system in the control room caused | safety system failures through unanalyzed systems interactions. In this event, the water from the fire-suppression deluge system in the control room caused | ||
The | opening of a safety relief valve and loss of primary system inventory. The | ||
aggravated | event could have been seriously aggravated by the spurious HPCI turbine high | ||
exhaust pressure-trip-that-wasreceived-also apparently as a result of the | |||
water intrusion. Because the RCIC system was inoperable at-the time of the | |||
event, no safety-related high pressure injection system'would have been imme- diately available to restore water level should that have been necessary. | |||
The HPCI turbine trip signal was reset shortly after it occurred, however, and | |||
the system was returned to operability. | |||
Perhaps more serious is the potential effect the water could have had on | |||
numerous other safety systems. The ATTS panels have permissive and arming | |||
logic and trip, logic for various safety systems, as well as water level inputs | |||
to | to the HPCI, RCIC, core spray (CS)., automatic depressurization system (ADS), | ||
residual heat removal (RHR) system, and diesel activation logic. It is hard to | |||
predict the anomalous behavior that could occur if both power supplies had been | |||
lost, or if other portions of the logic had been shorted; but quite possibly, several safety systems could have malfunctioned, seriously handicapping the | |||
operators during their efforts to stabilize the unit. | |||
Prior to this event, no procedures were in place at Hatch Unit 1 for adequately | |||
cleaning the ventilation plenums or drains in the charcoal filter units. Had | |||
these procedures been prepared and implemented, the drain's would have functioned | |||
as designed with no serious adverse effects. In response to this event, the | |||
licensee cleaned and inspected drains in the remaining filter units and is | |||
preparing cleanout and inspection procedures to be added to the maintenance | |||
cleanout and inspection | |||
procedures | |||
to be added to the maintenance | |||
schedules. | schedules. | ||
IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 Another example of a design feature which | IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 Another example of a design feature which could cause potential adverse system | ||
adverse system | |||
of | interactions was recently found at Unit 1 of the South Texas Project. A non- seismic, non-category I potable water line> was found to pass through the control | ||
a | room envelope via a relay room next to the> control room. This could subject the | ||
solid-state protection system cabinets ancI the Westinghouse 7300 process control | |||
system located nearby to water damage foll owing a seismic event. Although this | |||
unit is under construction, it does point out that these problems can occur. | |||
Also, IE Information Notice 83-41, "Actuation of Fire Suppression System | |||
Causing Inoperability of Safety Related Equipment," was issued on June 22, 1983. | |||
of | That notice identified a number of instances in which automatic actuation of | ||
fire suppression systems degraded or jeopardized the operability of safety- related equipment. | |||
notice. | No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. | ||
regarding | If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional | ||
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact | |||
listed below. | |||
w4ar . Jordan, Director | |||
Divis n of Emergency Preparedness | |||
and Engineering Response | |||
and Engineering | |||
Office of Inspection and Enforcement | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
===David R. Powell, IE=== | |||
(301) 492-8373 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices | |||
Attachment 1 IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
IE INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to | |||
85-84 Inadequate Inservice Testing 10/30/85 All power reactor | |||
Of Main Steam Isolation Valves facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
85-83 Potential Failures Of General 10/30/85 All power reactor | |||
Electric PK-2 Test Blocks facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
Differen- | 85-82 Diesel Generator Differen- 10/18/85 All power reactor | ||
10/18/85 | |||
Relay Not | tial Protection Relay Not facilities holding | ||
Qualified | Seismically Qualified an OL or CP | ||
In 10/17/85 | 85-81 Problems Resulting In 10/17/85 All power reactor | ||
High Reading | Erroneously High Reading facilities holding | ||
800 Series | With Panasonic 800 Series an OL or CP and | ||
Dosimeters | Thermoluminescent Dosimeters certain material | ||
and fuel cycle | |||
licensees | |||
85-80 Timely Declaration Of An 10/15/85 All power reactor | |||
Emergency Class Implemienta- facilities holding | |||
tion Of An Emergency Plan, an OL or CP | |||
And Emergency Notifications | |||
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 10/1/85 All power reactor | |||
Sup. 1 Solenoid Valves facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor | |||
holding | Between Maintenance, facilities holding | ||
Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research | |||
Personnel and nonpower reactor | |||
facilities; fuel | |||
fabrication and | |||
processing facilities | |||
85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
License | OL = Operating License | ||
Permit}} | CP = Construction Permit}} | ||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} | ||
Revision as of 02:39, 24 November 2019
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-85 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE 85-85: SYSTEMS INTERACTION EVENT RESULTING IN REACTOR
SYSTEM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE OPENING FOLLOWING
A FIRE-PROTECTION DELUGE SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose
This notice is provided to alert licensees of a serious systems interaction
event involving the fire-protection deluge system located in the control room
ventilation charcoal filter housing. Following inadvertent actuation of this
system, an analog transient trip system (ATTS) panel was sprayed with water
causing malfunctions in certain safety system components.
It is expected that recipients will review this notice for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar
problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this
notice do not constitute requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On May 15, 1985, at Georgia Power Company's Hatch Unit 1, personnel manually
scrammed the reactor from 75% power because of a stuck open low-low-set safety
relief valve (LLS-SRV). Shorting of one of the two redundant power supplies
and/or possibly intermittent shorting of logic system contacts in the ATTS
panel is believed to have caused the stuck open LLS-SRV. The panel is one of
two redundant panels located in the control room. The cause of the electrical
shorts in the affected panel was water intrusion into the panel.
The event began about 8:35 p.m. when an instrument water supply vent valve was
damaged, apparently by dragging of a crane hook along the line. The instru- ment water supply line eventually depressurized causing a portion of the fire- protection deluge system to actuate. The water supply line is located above
the control building and the deluge system is located in the control room
charcoal filter housing.
Following actuation of the deluge system, approximately 15 to 25 gal of water
backed up into the ventilation header before the system could be secured. The
8510290039
IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 backup was caused by plugged drains in the charcoal filter housing. Water
eventually leaked through a hole in the ventilation piping that was located
above the ATTS panel in the control room. Whenthe water sprayed onto the panel, one of two redundant panel power supplies apparently shorted because of water
intrusion into the panel. As a result, a LLS-SRV valve began to cycle open and
closed. The SRV cycled three times and then opened and remained open. The
operator manually scrammed the reactor from 75% power. A false turbine high
exhaust pressure trip signal also was generated, temporarily disabling the high
pressure core injection (HPCI) system. The reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC) system was inoperable at the time, so neither HPCI nor RCIC was imme- diately available for use. Fortunately, neither system was needed during the
event. This is because the water level was restored and maintained by the
reactor feedwater system until the MSIVs were shut. Subsequent to MSIV closure, water level was maintained by the control rod drive (CRD) system with the
excess water being dumped to the condenser via the reactor-water cleanup-system.
The LLS-SRV closed without operator action at 9:52 pm.
Discussion:
The event is of considerable concern because of the potential for multiple
safety system failures through unanalyzed systems interactions. In this event, the water from the fire-suppression deluge system in the control room caused
opening of a safety relief valve and loss of primary system inventory. The
event could have been seriously aggravated by the spurious HPCI turbine high
exhaust pressure-trip-that-wasreceived-also apparently as a result of the
water intrusion. Because the RCIC system was inoperable at-the time of the
event, no safety-related high pressure injection system'would have been imme- diately available to restore water level should that have been necessary.
The HPCI turbine trip signal was reset shortly after it occurred, however, and
the system was returned to operability.
Perhaps more serious is the potential effect the water could have had on
numerous other safety systems. The ATTS panels have permissive and arming
logic and trip, logic for various safety systems, as well as water level inputs
to the HPCI, RCIC, core spray (CS)., automatic depressurization system (ADS),
residual heat removal (RHR) system, and diesel activation logic. It is hard to
predict the anomalous behavior that could occur if both power supplies had been
lost, or if other portions of the logic had been shorted; but quite possibly, several safety systems could have malfunctioned, seriously handicapping the
operators during their efforts to stabilize the unit.
Prior to this event, no procedures were in place at Hatch Unit 1 for adequately
cleaning the ventilation plenums or drains in the charcoal filter units. Had
these procedures been prepared and implemented, the drain's would have functioned
as designed with no serious adverse effects. In response to this event, the
licensee cleaned and inspected drains in the remaining filter units and is
preparing cleanout and inspection procedures to be added to the maintenance
schedules.
IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 Another example of a design feature which could cause potential adverse system
interactions was recently found at Unit 1 of the South Texas Project. A non- seismic, non-category I potable water line> was found to pass through the control
room envelope via a relay room next to the> control room. This could subject the
solid-state protection system cabinets ancI the Westinghouse 7300 process control
system located nearby to water damage foll owing a seismic event. Although this
unit is under construction, it does point out that these problems can occur.
Also, IE Information Notice 83-41, "Actuation of Fire Suppression System
Causing Inoperability of Safety Related Equipment," was issued on June 22, 1983.
That notice identified a number of instances in which automatic actuation of
fire suppression systems degraded or jeopardized the operability of safety- related equipment.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact
listed below.
w4ar . Jordan, Director
Divis n of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
David R. Powell, IE
(301) 492-8373 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 85-85 October 31, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-84 Inadequate Inservice Testing 10/30/85 All power reactor
Of Main Steam Isolation Valves facilities holding
85-83 Potential Failures Of General 10/30/85 All power reactor
Electric PK-2 Test Blocks facilities holding
85-82 Diesel Generator Differen- 10/18/85 All power reactor
tial Protection Relay Not facilities holding
Seismically Qualified an OL or CP
85-81 Problems Resulting In 10/17/85 All power reactor
Erroneously High Reading facilities holding
With Panasonic 800 Series an OL or CP and
Thermoluminescent Dosimeters certain material
and fuel cycle
licensees
85-80 Timely Declaration Of An 10/15/85 All power reactor
Emergency Class Implemienta- facilities holding
tion Of An Emergency Plan, an OL or CP
And Emergency Notifications
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 10/1/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Solenoid Valves facilities holding
85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor
Between Maintenance, facilities holding
Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research
Personnel and nonpower reactor
facilities; fuel
fabrication and
processing facilities
85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit