Information Notice 1985-43, Radiography Events at Power Reactors

Radiography Events at Power Reactors

ML031180352
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date:	05/30/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-043, NUDOCS 8505280187
Download: ML031180352 (4)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-43

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

May 30, 1985

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-43:

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert licensees to three events that

occurred at nuclear power plants in the preoperational phase.

No significant

personnel exposures resulted from these events; however, such events indicate a

potential for significant exposures.

Licensee corrective actions and lessons

learned from the events are discussed.

It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar

problems at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this notice do

not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Description of Circumstances

A brief description of each of the three events is provided in Attachment 1.

In each event, the responsible radiographers failed to maintain a high radia- tion area (created by radiographing) clear of unauthorized personnel.

In each

case, the radiographer did not use all reasonable means to ensure the affected

"shot" area was evacuated.

In two of the events, bullhorns (voice amplifiers)

were either unavailable, in disrepair, or simply not effectively used, even

though required by local procedures.

In highly congested areas, such as BWR

drywells, visual-only searches for clearing/warning personnel simply are not

effective.

In one case, the radiographer left his watch area during the

exposure.

In all the events, the radiographers promptly retrieved and stored

the sources when they discovered unauthorized personnel in the affected area.

Discussion:

10 CFR 34 establishes licensing and radiation safety requirements for radiogra- phers.

Part 34 specifically requires certain precautionary procedures, making

the radiographer responsible for ensuring worker safety by maintaining proper

access controls for areas affected by radiographic operations.

However, each

power plant licensee can help increase worker awareness of radiography opera- tions.

Power plant licensees can help increase overall worker safety by

cooperating with and augmenting the radiographer's control actions, where

appropriate.

8505280187

IN 85-43 May 30, 1985 Appropriate enforcement actions against the radiographers as a result of the

events either have been taken or are under consideration.

In an effort to improve control and increase their oversight during radiograph- ing, power plant licensees have taken the following corrective actions as a

result of their review and lessons learned from the three events.

1. Plant control procedures for radiographing have been strengthened by

clearly defining specific plant actions to provide additional oversight

measures to augment the radiographers control efforts.

2.

Plant worker awareness of on-going radiography was increased by training

opportunities offered by routine plant safety meetings.

The importance of

remaining vigilant and obeying all radiological warning postings was

reemphasized.

3. Appropriate plant health physics coverage is provided for radiographic

operations.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

war§L.Jordan, Director

Divi fjn of Emergency Preparedness

anY Engineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: J. E. Wigginton, IE

(301) 492-4697

R. L. Pedersen, IE

(301) 492-9425 Attachments:

1. Event Summaries

2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1

IN 85-43

May 30, 1985

Event Summaries

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Event Date: 6/16/84 While radiographing in the drywell using a 200 curie Ir-192 source, radiogra- phers noticed two workers leaving the controlled shot high radiation area.

These workers had been working near the reactor vessel, about 15 feet from the

source (on a lower elevation) while a full radiographic exposure (13 min.) and

an abbreviated (2 min.) exposure had occurred.

According to the radiographers, a visual search was made, radiation warning signs and barriers erected, but no

bullhorn was used to warn personnel. The bullhorn normally used had been

inoperable for several weeks.

The NRC inspector noted that the workers'

location was shielded from view in most directions by piping, components, and

scaffolding.

Based on a reenactment of the incident (exposing dosimeters in

the location that had been occupied by the workers), a maximum dose reading of

15 mrem was observed.

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Event Date: 1/5/85 While radiographing the biological shield on the 737-foot elevation in the

drywell, a radiographer noticed two workers descending a ladder approximately

20 feet from the exposed 76-curie Ir-192 sealed source.

Although bullhorn and

public address system warnings were given (but none on the elevation where the

workers had been located), workers on the 755-foot elevation reportedly could

not hear warnings.

Based on a reenactment of the incident, workers were each

assigned 20 mrem from their stay in the high radiation area (maximum exposure

rate of 600mR/hr).

Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 Event Date: 3/21/85 While radiographing a piping weld inside the control building, a radiographer

noticed a worker inside the no-access area.

Contrary to the surveillance

requirements for a high radiation area, the radiographer had left his watch

area when the 53 curie Ir-192 source was exposed; upon returning, he noticed

the apparent inadvertent entry.

Further search found a second worker in the

affected area.

Based on the licensee's worst-case evaluation, it is unlikely

that any worker received a dose greater than 12 mrem.

Attachment 2

IN 85-43

May 30, 1985

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issue

Issued to

?J!-4z

Loose Phosphor In Panasonic

800 Series Badge Thermo- luminescent Dosimeter (TLD)

Elements

85-41

85-40

85-39

85-38 Scheduling Of Pre-Licensing

Emergency Preparedness

Exercises

Deficiencies' In Equipment

Qualification Testing And

Certification Process

Auditability of Electrical

Equipment Qualification

Records At Licensees'

Facilities

Loose Parts Obstruct Control

Rod Drive Mechanism

Chemical Cleaning Of Steam

Generator At Milestone 2

Seal Table Leaks At PWRs

Motor-Operated Valve Failures

Due To Hammering Effect

5/29/85

5/24/85

5/22/85

5/22/85

5/21/85

5/14/85

5/14/85

5/14/85

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

atCP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All PWR facilities

designed by B&W

holding an OL or CP

All pressure water

reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL-or CP

All licensees

possessing gamma

irradiators

85-37

84-55 Sup. 1

85-20

Sup. 1

85-36 Malfunction Of A Dry-Storage, 5/9/85 '

Panoramic, Gamma Exposure

Irradiator

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit