Information Notice 1985-04, Inadequate Management of Security Response Drills

Inadequate Management of Security Response Drills

ML031180712
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, 05000262, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date:	01/17/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-004, NUDOCS 8501160196
Download: ML031180712 (3)

SSINS No.:

6835 IN 85-04

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

January 17, 1985

IE Information Notice No. 85-04:

INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY RESPONSE

DRILLS

Addresses:

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or

construction permit (CP), and fuel fabrication and processing facilities

using or processing a formula quantity of special nuclear material.

Purpose

This Information Notice is provided to inform addressees of: (1) a potential

danger in conducting security response drills without properly notifying

participants; and (2) the need to ensure, through proper management control, that such drills do not decrease the overall effectiveness of the security

program. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if-appropriate, to

preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

During a recent test of response force capabilities at an operating nuclear power

facility, the following occurred. A security shift supervisor announced during

a pre-shift briefing of security officers arriving for duty that a drill would

be conducted that evening. However, not all shift personnel attended the briefing.

Less than one hour into the midnight shift, a security officer posted in a guard

tower challenged an unidentified individual who was attempting to unlock a nearby

vehicle gate at the protected area perimeter.

Ignoring the challenge, the indi- vidual opened the gate, entered the protected area in his privately owned vehicle, leaving the vehicle gate open, and proceeded toward the nearest vital area. At

the time of the intrusion, the central alarm station was notified of the un- authorized entry and the armed response force was immediately dispatched.

Apprehended by the response force at the boundary of a vital area as he attempted

to climb a chain link fence, the intruder was identified as the security shift

supervisor responsible for conducting response drills.

8501160196

IN 85-04 January 17, 1985 Discussion:

A review of applicable records and interviews with response force participants

determined that the security officer in the guard tower had seriously considered

the use of small arms fire when his warning was ignored by the intruder. Another

security officer, who responded to the alert from his post outside the protected

area, also considered the use of his weapon as he arrived at the open protected

area gate.

Neither' officer was present for the pre-shift briefing. Violations

of several aspects of access control, as well as the failure to announce that a

drill was in progress as required by procedure, created a doubt in the minds of

other responders as to whether the event was a drill or an actual intrusion.

The NRC strongly supports the use of drills as a valuable method of assessing

the security force training program. However, it is imperative that security

requirements are strictly followed and that drills are adequately managed to

preclude danger to plant employees and degradation of site security controls.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or this office.

w ard4t Jordan, Director

Divisiof of Emergency Preparedness

and Engineering Response

Loren L. Bush, IE

(301) 492-8080

John J. Davidson, NMSS

(301) 427-4708 Attachment: List of recently issued IE Information Notices

Attachment

IN 85-04

January 17, 1985

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issue

Issued to

85-03

85-02

85-01

84-94

84-93

84-92

84-91

84-90

Separation Of Primary Reactor 1/15/85

Coolant Pump Shaft And

Impeller

Improper Installation And

Testing Of Differential

Pressure Transmitters

Continuous Supervision Of

Irradiators

Reconcentration Of Radio- nuclides Involvlng Discharges

Into Sanitary Sewage Systems

Permitted Under 10 CFR 20.303

Potential For Loss Of Water

From The Refueling Cavity

Cracking Of Flywheel On

Cummins Fire Pump Diesel

Engines

Quality Control Problem

Of Meteorological

Measurements Problems

Main Steam Line Break

Effect On Environmental

Qualification Of Equipment

1/15/85

1/10/85

12/21/84

12/17/84

12/17/84

12/10/84

12/7/84

All pressurized water

power reactor

facilities holding an

OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All material licensees

possessing irradiators

that are not self- shielded and contain

more than 10,000

curies of radioactive

material

All NRC materials

licensees other than

licensees that use

sealed sources only

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All pressurized

water reactor and

gas cooled power

facilities holding

an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit