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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
REGION II SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
                                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
  July 3, 2008  
                                                  REGION II
Mr. Bruce H. Hamilton  
                                    SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
Vice President  
                                    61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC  
                                        ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
McGuire Nuclear Station  
                                        July 3, 2008
12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985  
Mr. Bruce H. Hamilton
SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301  
Vice President
Dear Mr. Hamilton:  
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
During the period May 12 - 21, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the  
McGuire Nuclear Station
McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed the tests and preliminary findings with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by your staff on May 23, 2008.  
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both  
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.
SUBJECT:       MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.  
              05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301
      Sincerely,             /RA/                       Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief       Operations Branch       Division of Reactor Safety  
Dear Mr. Hamilton:
During the period May 12 - 21, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered
operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the
McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed
the tests and preliminary findings with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed
report. The written examination was administered by your staff on May 23, 2008.
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both
the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The
NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions
concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.
                                              Sincerely,
                                              /RA/
                                              Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
                                              Operations Branch
                                              Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370
License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosures:    1. Report Details
              2. NRC Resolution to the Facility Comments
cc: See Page 2


Docket Nos.:  50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosures: 1. Report Details 2. NRC Resolution to the Facility Comments
  cc: See Page 2


_________________________ OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RIV:DRS  
_________________________
  SIGNATURE * / RA / * /RA / * /RA/ /RA/  
OFFICE           RII:DRS           RII:DRS           RII:DRS           RIV:DRS
  NAME RAiello: RBaldwin SRose MWidmann  
SIGNATURE         * / RA /         * /RA /           * /RA/           /RA/
  DATE 06/26/2008 06/26/2008 06/30/2008 07/03/2008 7/     /2008 7/     /2008 7/     /2008 E-MAIL COPY?     YES NO   YES NO   YES NO   YES NO   YES NO   YES NO   YES NO
NAME             RAiello:           RBaldwin         SRose             MWidmann
DPC    2
DATE                   06/26/2008       06/26/2008       06/30/2008       07/03/2008     7/   /2008     7/ /2008     7/   /2008
  cc w/encl:
E-MAIL COPY?         YES         NO YES           NO YES           NO YES         NO YES         NO YES       NO YES         NO
Bruce Hamilton
Vice President
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke
Energy Carolinas, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Steven D. Capps
Engineering Manager
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Scotty L. Bradshaw
Training Manager
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke
Energy Carolinas, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Kenneth L. Ashe
Regulatory Compliance Manager
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution
 
R. L. Gill, Jr.
Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Issues & Industry Affairs
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke
Energy Carolinas, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Lisa F. Vaughn
Associate General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street-EC07H
Charlotte, NC  28202
 
 
    
    
DPC                                          2
Kathryn B. Nolan  
cc w/encl:
Senior Counsel  
Bruce Hamilton                                Kathryn B. Nolan
Duke Energy Corporation  
Vice President                                Senior Counsel
526 South Church Street-EC07H  
McGuire Nuclear Station                        Duke Energy Corporation
Charlotte, NC  28202  
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke            526 South Church Street-EC07H
Energy Carolinas, LLC                          Charlotte, NC 28202
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                              David A. Repka
Steven D. Capps                                Winston Strawn LLP
Engineering Manager                            Electronic Mail Distribution
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke
Energy Carolinas, LLC                          County Manager of Mecklenburg County
Electronic Mail Distribution                  720 East Fourth Street
                                              Charlotte, NC 28202
Scotty L. Bradshaw
Training Manager                              Beverly O. Hall
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke            Chief, Radiation Protection Section
Energy Carolinas, LLC                          Department of Environmental Health
Electronic Mail Distribution                  N.C. Department of Environment and
                                              Natural Resources
Kenneth L. Ashe                                Electronic Mail Distribution
Regulatory Compliance Manager
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke            Dhiaa M. Jamil
Energy Carolinas, LLC                          Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer
Electronic Mail Distribution                  Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
                                              Electronic Mail Distribution
R. L. Gill, Jr.
Manager                                        Senior Resident Inspector
Nuclear Regulatory Issues & Industry Affairs   Duke Energy Corporation
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke            William B. McGuire Nuclear Station
Energy Carolinas, LLC                          U.S. NRC
Electronic Mail Distribution                  12700 Hagers Ferry Rd
                                              Huntersville, NC 28078
Lisa F. Vaughn
Associate General Counsel                      Duke Energy Corporation
Duke Energy Corporation                        ATTN: Mr. Scotty L. Bradshaw
526 South Church Street-EC07H                  Training Manager
Charlotte, NC 28202                           McGuire Nuclear Station
                                              Maintenance Training Facility
                                              Courier Mail Code MG03MT
                                              12700 Hagers Ferry Road
                                              Huntersville, NC 28078-8985


DPC                                        3
David A. Repka
Letter to Bruce H. Hamilton from Malcolm T. Widmann dated July 3, 2008
Winston Strawn LLP
SUBJECT:      MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
Electronic Mail Distribution  
              05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301
County Manager of Mecklenburg County
Distribution w/encl:
720 East Fourth Street
RIDSNRRDIRS
Charlotte, NC   28202
PUBLIC
J. Stang, NRR (PM: CAT, MCG)
NRC Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28078


              U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Beverly O. Hall
                                REGION II
Chief, Radiation Protection Section
Docket Nos.:      50-369, 50-370
Department of Environmental Health
License Nos.:      NPF-9, NPF-17
N.C. Department of Environment and
Report No.:        05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301
Natural Resources
Licensee:          Duke power Company (DPC)
Electronic Mail Distribution
Facility:          McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:          12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
                  Huntersville, NC 28078
Dates:            Operating Tests - May 12 - 21, 2008
                  Written Examination - May 23, 2008
Examiners:        R. Aiello, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer
                  R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer
                  S. Rose, Senior Reactor Inspector
                  R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved by:      Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
                  Operations Branch
                  Division of Reactor Safety


Dhiaa M. Jamil Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer
                                  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
ER 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301; 05/12-21/08 & 05/23/08; McGuire Nuclear
Electronic Mail Distribution
Plant, Units 1& 2, Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Revision 9, Supplement 1. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements
of 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. Members of
the McGuire training staff administered the written examination on May 23, 2008. The written
examination and the operating test was developed by the McGuire Training Department.
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both
the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The
NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.
No findings of significance were identified.
                                                                                  Enclosure 1


                                        Report Details
Senior Resident Inspector
4.  OTHER ACTIVITIES
Duke Energy Corporation
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
William B. McGuire Nuclear Station
a.  Inspection Scope
U.S. NRC  
    The facility developed both the operating test and the written examination in accordance
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd
    with NUREG-1021,Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Huntersville, NC  28078
    Revision 9, Supplement 1. The NRC reviewed the proposed written examination and
    operating test. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee
    were made according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the test
    materials.
    The examiners reviewed the licensees examination and test security measures while
    preparing and administering the examinations and tests to ensure examination and test
    security and integrity complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.
    The examiners evaluated three RO and nine SRO applicants who were being assessed
    under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the
    operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The written examination was
    administered by the McGuire training staff on May 23, 2008. The evaluations of the
    applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine if the applicants,
    who applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant, met requirements
    specified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.
b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
    The licensee and the NRC reviewed the final version of the written examination and
    operating test, and indicated that these exams were within the range of acceptability
    expected for the proposed examination and test, respectively. Nine Senior Reactor
    Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the written
    examination and operating test.
    The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As)
    question references/answers and examination references may be accessed in the
    ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers, ML081770368, ML 081770373,
    ML081770443 and ML081770463.)
                                                                                  Enclosure 1


Duke Energy Corporation ATTN:  Mr. Scotty L. Bradshaw
                                                  4
Training Manager  
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
McGuire Nuclear Station  
        Annual Sample Review
Maintenance Training Facility
        Inspection Scope
Courier Mail Code MG03MT
        The inspectors selected Problem Identification Process (PIP) M-08-03242 and M-08-
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
        03260 for a detailed review. PIP M-08-03242 was initiated because AP-14, Rod Control
Huntersville, NC  28078-8985
        Malfunction, Enclosure 1, Step 3 Response Not Obtained (RNO) needed clarification to
        ensure consistency of plant direction if a load rejection occurs coincident with a rod
        control malfunction. PIP M-08-03260 was initiated to document the lessons learned
        from the 2008 NRC initial examination for Hot License Prep (HLP) class 24. These
        issues were identified during the NRC examination that was administered during the
        period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The inspectors checked that these issues had been
        completely and accurately identified in the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP)
        and that safety concerns were properly classified, prioritized for resolution, and the
        scope of the apparent cause determinations were sufficient. Corrective actions include a
        review to determine the impacts on future initial and continuing training classes.
4OA6 Meetings
        Exit Meeting Summary
        On May 21, 2008, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. Bruce
        Hamilton, Site Vice President, and members of his staff. The examiners asked the
        licensee whether any materials examined during the examination should be considered
        proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
                              PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager
S. Bradshaw, Training Manager
S. Capps, Engineering Manager
K. Crane, Regulatory Compliance
L. Gabbert, Operations Instructor
B. Hamilton, Site Vice president
S. Helms Operations Training Supervisor
F. Kirk, Operations Shift Supervisor
J. Jenkins, Independent Nuclear Oversight Manager
R. Repko, Station Manager
T. Simril, Operations Superintendent
R. Pope, Operations Training manager
NRC personnel
J. Brady, Senior Resident inspector
                                                                                        Enclosure 1


 
                            NRC Resolution to the Facility Comment
DPC    3
A complete text of the licensee's post examination comments can be found in ADAMS under
  Letter to Bruce H. Hamilton from Malcolm T. Widmann dated July 3, 2008
Accession Number ML 081770470 and ML081770473.
RO QUESTION # 53
LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to not
having a correct answer. The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be
viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.
The original correct answer stated that the reactor would first trip due to a turbine trip on a loss
of both main feedwater pumps. According to the licensees post exam analysis, the reactor will
not trip due to a turbine trip; rather the reactor will trip due to low steam generator level. The
licensee argues that the conditions presented in the stem, namely the loss of station air (VI),
would cause the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) to drift closed. The slow closure of the
FRVs would cause an increase in dP across the FRVs, which would cause the feedwater
control system to lower the speed of the feedwater pumps. The lowering feedwater pump
speed would maintain the FRV dP below the setpoint that would cause a direct feedwater pump
trip due to that dP, thus delaying a turbine trip. However, due to the slow closure of the FRVs
and the lowering main feedwater pump speed, the reactor would first receive a trip signal due to
low steam generator level.
The licensee supplied simulator and actual plant data that supports the reactor receiving a trip
signal due to low steam generator level. The licensee contends that all VI failures, except a
catastrophic failure of the VI header, would result in a reactor trip signal being generated due to
low steam generator level. The licensee contends that the conditions in the stem are not
representative of a catastrophic VI header failure.
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC reviewed the simulator data and documentation from the actual plant event. The NRC
agrees that in all cases, except for a catastrophic VI header failure, the reactor will first receive a
trip signal generated due to low steam generator level. Therefore, the original correct answer is
NOT a correct answer choice. Since none of the answer choices state that the reactor will first
trip due to low steam generator level, there is no correct answer for this question.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was deleted due to not
having a correct answer.
                                                                                          Enclosure 2


SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301
                                                6
SRO QUESTION # 77
Distribution w/encl:
LICENSEE COMMENT:
RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC J. Stang, NRR (PM:  CAT, MCG)
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The
NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd. Huntersville, NC 28078
original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the
 
above referenced ML numbers.
   
The licensee states that the second part of both answer choices C and D are correct; with
     
the first part of those answer choices being the same. The licensee states that NUREG-1021,
                 
Appendix E, instructs the applicants not to make assumptions with respect to operator actions
      U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
that are not stated in the question. Therefore, the applicant should rightfully not assume that
  REGION II
nuclear service water makeup was aligned to the component cooling water (KC) surge tank.
 
With no nuclear service water aligned to the KC surge tank, the level in the tank would continue
Docket Nos.:  50-369, 50-370
to drop. The level drop described in the stem is greater than 0.10 ft/min, thereby requiring the
          License Nos.:  NPF-9, NPF-17
operators to isolate the A KC train from the B KC train in accordance with AP-21, Loss of KC
  Report No.:  05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301
or KC System Leakage, Step 20 (Answer Choice D). The KC surge tank level would continue
 
to decrease to 2 ft, which would then meet the Foldout Page requirement which requires
Licensee:  Duke power Company (DPC)  
isolation of KC non-essential headers in accordance with AP-21, Enclosure 2 (Answer Choice
  Facility:  McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
D).
NRC DISCUSSION:
Location:  12700 Hagers Ferry Rd. Huntersville, NC 28078
The NRC agrees that the applicants rightfully were not permitted to assume that nuclear service
  Dates:  Operating Tests - May 12 - 21, 2008    Written Examination - May 23, 2008
water makeup was aligned to the KC surge tank in accordance with NUREG-1021, Appendix E
 
guidance. The NRC also agrees that with no nuclear service water makeup aligned to the KC
  Examiners:  R. Aiello, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer S. Rose, Senior Reactor Inspector
surge tank, the level in the tank would continue to decrease until the criteria for AP-21, Step 20
R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector
was met and continue to decrease until the Foldout Page criteria was met. Therefore, the NRC
      Approved by:  Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief    Operations Branch
agrees that both answer choices C and D are correct answers.
    Division of Reactor Safety
NRC RESOLUTION
 
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer
Enclosure 1
choices C and D as correct answers.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
                                                                                        Enclosure 2
 
ER 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301; 05/12-21/08 & 05/23/08; McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1& 2, Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the  
guidance in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008.  Members of  
the McGuire training staff administered the written examination on May 23, 2008.  The written examination and the operating test was developed by the McGuire Training Department. 
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments.  The NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2
No findings of significance were identified. 
Enclosure 1  Report Details
  4. OTHER ACTIVITIES        4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
  a. Inspection Scope
  The facility developed both the operating test and the written examination in accordance with NUREG-1021,"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"
Revision 9, Supplement 1. The NRC reviewed the proposed written examination and operating test.  Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the test materials. 
The examiners reviewed the licensee's examination and test security measures while preparing and administering the examinations and tests to ensure examination and test
security and integrity complied with 10 CFR 55.49, "Integrity of examinations and tests." 
The examiners evaluated three RO and nine SRO applicants who were being assessed under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021.  The examiners administered the operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008.  The written examination was  
administered by the McGuire training staff on May 23, 2008.  The evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant, met requirements specified in 10 CFR 55, "Operators' Licenses." 
  b. Findings
      No findings of significance were identified.
The licensee and the NRC reviewed the final version of the written examination and
operating test, and indicated that these exams were within the range of acceptability expected for the proposed examination and test, respectively.  Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the written examination and operating test.
The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As) question references/answers and examination references may be accessed in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers, ML081770368, ML 081770373, ML081770443 and ML081770463.)
4 Enclosure 1
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
  Annual Sample Review
 
  Inspection Scope
  The inspectors selected Problem Identification Process (PIP) M-08-03242 and M-08-03260 for a detailed review.  PIP M-08-03242 was initiated because AP-14, Rod Control Malfunction, Enclosure 1, Step 3 Response Not Obtained (RNO) needed clarification to
ensure consistency of plant direction if a load rejection occurs coincident with a rod control malfunction.  PIP M-08-03260 was initiated to document the lessons learned from the 2008 NRC initial examination for Hot License Prep (HLP) class 24.  These issues were identified during the NRC examination that was administered during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The inspectors checked that these issues had been completely and accurately identified in the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and that safety concerns were properly classified, prioritized for resolution, and the
scope of the apparent cause determinations were sufficient.  Corrective actions include a review to determine the impacts on future initial and continuing training classes.  
4OA6 Meetings
  Exit Meeting Summary
        On May 21, 2008, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. Bruce Hamilton, Site Vice President, and members of his staff.  The examiners asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the examination should be considered proprietary.  No proprietary information was identified.
    PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
  K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager S. Bradshaw, Training Manager S. Capps, Engineering Manager K. Crane, Regulatory Compliance
L. Gabbert, Operations Instructor B. Hamilton, Site Vice president S. Helms Operations Training Supervisor F. Kirk, Operations Shift Supervisor J. Jenkins, Independent Nuclear Oversight Manager R. Repko, Station Manager T. Simril, Operations Superintendent
R. Pope, Operations Training manager
NRC personnel
          J. Brady, Senior Resident inspector 
Enclosure 2  
NRC Resolution to the Facility Comment
  A complete text of the licensee's post examination comments can be found in ADAMS under Accession Number ML 081770470 and ML081770473.
RO QUESTION # 53
  LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to not
having a correct answer.  The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.


The original correct answer stated that the reactor would first trip due to a turbine trip on a loss of both main feedwater pumps.  According to the licensee's post exam analysis, the reactor will not trip due to a turbine trip; rather the reactor will trip due to low steam generator level.  The licensee argues that the conditions presented in the stem, namely the loss of station air (VI),
                                                  7
would cause the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) to drift closed.  The slow closure of the FRVs would cause an increase in dP across the FRVs, which would cause the feedwater control system to lower the speed of the feedwater pumps.  The lowering feedwater pump speed would maintain the FRV dP below the setpoint that would cause a direct feedwater pump trip due to that dP, thus delaying a turbine trip.  However, due to the slow closure of the FRVs
SRO QUESTION # 84
and the lowering main feedwater pump speed, the reactor would first receive a trip signal due to low steam generator level.
LICENSEE COMMENT:
The licensee supplied simulator and actual plant data that supports the reactor receiving a trip signal due to low steam generator level.  The licensee contends that all VI failures, except a catastrophic failure of the VI header, would result in a reactor trip signal being generated due to low steam generator level.  The licensee contends that the conditions in the stem are not
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The
representative of a catastrophic VI header failure.
original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the
NRC DISCUSSION: The NRC reviewed the simulator data and documentation from the actual plant event.  The NRC agrees that in all cases, except for a catastrophic VI header failure, the reactor will first receive a
above referenced ML numbers.
trip signal generated due to low steam generator level.  Therefore, the original correct answer is NOT a correct answer choice.  Since none of the answer choices state that the reactor will first trip due to low steam generator level, there is no correct answer for this question.
The licensee contends that answer choices A and D are both correct answers. A was the
NRC RESOLUTION In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was deleted due to not
correct choice per the original answer key and D was originally thought to be an incorrect
having a correct answer.
response. The licensee contends that D provides correct dose limits as stated in their Site
   
Licensing Commitment (SLC); therefore, making D an alternate correct answer.
6 Enclosure 2 SRO QUESTION # 77
  LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the  
above referenced ML numbers.  
The licensee states that the second part of both answer choices "C" and "D" are correct; with the first part of those answer choices being the same. The licensee states that NUREG-1021, Appendix E, instructs the applicants not to make assumptions with respect to operator actions
that are not stated in the question.  Therefore, the applicant should rightfully not assume that nuclear service water makeup was aligned to the component cooling water (KC) surge tank. With no nuclear service water aligned to the KC surge tank, the level in the tank would continue to drop.  The level drop described in the stem is greater than 0.10 ft/min, thereby requiring the operators to isolate the "A" KC train from the "B" KC train in accordance with AP-21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage, Step 20 (Answer Choice "D").  The KC surge tank level would continue to decrease to 2 ft, which would then meet the Foldout Page requirement which requires
isolation of KC non-essential headers in accordance with AP-21, Enclosure 2 (Answer Choice "D").
NRC DISCUSSION:
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC agrees that the applicants rightfully were not permitted to assume that nuclear service water makeup was aligned to the KC surge tank in accordance with NUREG-1021, Appendix E guidance. The NRC also agrees that with no nuclear service water makeup aligned to the KC surge tank, the level in the tank would continue to decrease until the criteria for AP-21, Step 20 was met and continue to decrease until the Foldout Page criteria was met.  Therefore, the NRC agrees that both answer choices "C" and "D" are correct answers.  
The NRC disagrees with the licensees assessment of the correct answers. The question
specifically asks the applicants to state the requirements of 10CFR50. 10CFR50 does not
contain any quarterly limits, such as those stated in the SLC. Therefore, the only correct
answer is D, which states the correct annual dose limits from 10CFR50. Answer choice A is
an incorrect answer choice because it contains quarterly dose limits.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.b, the question was graded with D
being the correct answer and A not being a correct answer.
                                                                                      Enclosure 2


                                                    8
NRC RESOLUTION In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer
SRO QUESTION # 87
choices "C" and "D" as correct answers.   
LICENSEE COMMENT:
7 Enclosure 2
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to having
SRO QUESTION # 84
two correct answers containing conflicting information. The original post exam comments
  LICENSEE COMMENT:
submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.  
The licensee contends that the second part of answer choices A and B are both correct; with
The licensee contends that answer choices "A" and "D" are both correct answers. "A" was the correct choice per the original answer key and "D" was originally thought to be an incorrect
the first part of those answer choices being identical. The licensee contends that the second
response. The licensee contends that "D" provides correct dose limits as stated in their Site Licensing Commitment (SLC); therefore, making "D" an alternate correct answer.  
part of answer choice A, the original correct answer, remains correct because Step 8 of FR-
Z.1 allows the rest of the procedure to be treated as a Yellow Path when a faulted steam
generator exists. Thus, the applicant could consider this to be an early transition out of the
procedure. The licensee also contends that the second part of answer choice B is correct
because the transition out of the procedure as defined in answer choice A, can be interpreted
as a structured exit from the procedure. In this instance, an early transition out of FR-Z.1 would
only occur if a higher priority yellow or orange path existed. Therefore, the licensee contends
that both A and B are correct answer choices.
NRC DISCUSSION:
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC disagrees with the licensee's assessment of the correct answers.  The question
The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that two answer choices are correct. Early
specifically asks the applicants to state the requirements of 10CFR50.  10CFR50 does not contain any quarterly limits, such as those stated in the SLC.  Therefore, the only correct answer is "D", which states the correct annual dose limits from 10CFR50.  Answer choice "A" is an incorrect answer choice because it contains quarterly dose limits.
transition out of a procedure is not a defined term in the licensees administrative procedures;
therefore, it is left to the applicants to determine what this is intended to mean. The applicant
NRC RESOLUTION In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.b, the question was graded with "D" being the correct answer and "A" not being a correct answer.   
was forced to either assume that an early transition out of FR-Z.1 meant that the question was
8 Enclosure 2
asking for a non-structured exit OR that the question was asking for a transition out of the
  SRO QUESTION # 87
procedure prior to completing all of the applicable steps in that procedure. Depending on the
  LICENSEE COMMENT:
assumption made by the applicant, either answer choice A or B could be considered a
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to having two correct answers containing conflicting information.  The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.
correct answer.
The licensee contends that the second part of answer choices "A" and "B" are both correct"; with the first part of those answer choices being identical.  The licensee contends that the second
The NRC disagrees with the licensees contention that the two correct answer choices contain
part of answer choice "A", the original correct answer, remains correct because Step 8 of FR-Z.1 allows the rest of the procedure to be treated as a Yellow Path when a faulted steam generator exists.  Thus, the applicant could consider this to be an early transition out of the procedure.  The licensee also contends that the second part of answer choice "B" is correct because the transition out of the procedure as defined in answer choice "A", can be interpreted as a structured exit from the procedure.  In this instance, an early transition out of FR-Z.1 would only occur if a higher priority yellow or orange path existed.  Therefore, the licensee contends
conflicting information. The answer choices are not diametrically opposed, as detailed in the
that both "A" and "B" are correct answer choices.
examples in NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c. The answer choices contain two different
NRC DISCUSSION:
and independent reasons for exiting FR-Z.1; therefore, the question was not deleted.
The NRC agrees with the licensee's contention that two answer choices are correct. "Early transition" out of a procedure is not a defined term in the licensee's administrative procedures;  
NRC RESOLUTION
therefore, it is left to the applicants to determine what this is intended to mean. The applicant was forced to either assume that an "early transition" out of FR-Z.1 meant that the question was asking for a "non-structured" exit OR that the question was asking for a transition out of the procedure prior to completing all of the applicable steps in that procedure. Depending on the assumption made by the applicant, either answer choice "A" or "B" could be considered a  
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer
correct answer.  
choices A and B as correct answers due to the answer choices not containing conflicting
The NRC disagrees with the licensee's contention that the two correct answer choices contain conflicting information. The answer choices are not diametrically opposed, as detailed in the examples in NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c. The answer choices contain two different  
and independent reasons for exiting FR-Z.1; therefore, the question was not deleted.  
NRC RESOLUTION In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer choices "A" and "B" as correct answers due to the answer choices not containing conflicting  
information.
information.
                                                                                        Enclosure 2
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:11, 14 November 2019

Er 05000369-08-301 and 05000370-08-301, on 05/12-21/08 & 05/23/08, McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1& 2, Licensed Operator Examinations
ML081850231
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/03/2008
From: Widmann M
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To: Brandi Hamilton
Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co
References
50-369/08-301, 50-370/08-301 50-369/08-301, 50-370/08-301
Download: ML081850231 (12)


See also: IR 05000369/2008301

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

July 3, 2008

Mr. Bruce H. Hamilton

Vice President

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

McGuire Nuclear Station

12700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT

05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

During the period May 12 - 21, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered

operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the

McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed

the tests and preliminary findings with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed

report. The written examination was administered by your staff on May 23, 2008.

Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both

the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The

NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions

concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosures: 1. Report Details

2. NRC Resolution to the Facility Comments

cc: See Page 2

_________________________

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RIV:DRS

SIGNATURE * / RA / * /RA / * /RA/ /RA/

NAME RAiello: RBaldwin SRose MWidmann

DATE 06/26/2008 06/26/2008 06/30/2008 07/03/2008 7/ /2008 7/ /2008 7/ /2008

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

DPC 2

cc w/encl:

Bruce Hamilton Kathryn B. Nolan

Vice President Senior Counsel

McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke 526 South Church Street-EC07H

Energy Carolinas, LLC Charlotte, NC 28202

Electronic Mail Distribution

David A. Repka

Steven D. Capps Winston Strawn LLP

Engineering Manager Electronic Mail Distribution

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke

Energy Carolinas, LLC County Manager of Mecklenburg County

Electronic Mail Distribution 720 East Fourth Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

Scotty L. Bradshaw

Training Manager Beverly O. Hall

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Chief, Radiation Protection Section

Energy Carolinas, LLC Department of Environmental Health

Electronic Mail Distribution N.C. Department of Environment and

Natural Resources

Kenneth L. Ashe Electronic Mail Distribution

Regulatory Compliance Manager

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Dhiaa M. Jamil

Energy Carolinas, LLC Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer

Electronic Mail Distribution Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Electronic Mail Distribution

R. L. Gill, Jr.

Manager Senior Resident Inspector

Nuclear Regulatory Issues & Industry Affairs Duke Energy Corporation

Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke William B. McGuire Nuclear Station

Energy Carolinas, LLC U.S. NRC

Electronic Mail Distribution 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd

Huntersville, NC 28078

Lisa F. Vaughn

Associate General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation

Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. Scotty L. Bradshaw

526 South Church Street-EC07H Training Manager

Charlotte, NC 28202 McGuire Nuclear Station

Maintenance Training Facility

Courier Mail Code MG03MT

12700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

DPC 3

Letter to Bruce H. Hamilton from Malcolm T. Widmann dated July 3, 2008

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT

05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301

Distribution w/encl:

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

J. Stang, NRR (PM: CAT, MCG)

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Report No.: 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301

Licensee: Duke power Company (DPC)

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078

Dates: Operating Tests - May 12 - 21, 2008

Written Examination - May 23, 2008

Examiners: R. Aiello, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer

R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer

S. Rose, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301; 05/12-21/08 & 05/23/08; McGuire Nuclear

Plant, Units 1& 2, Licensed Operator Examinations.

The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the

guidance in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,

Revision 9, Supplement 1. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements

of 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. Members of

the McGuire training staff administered the written examination on May 23, 2008. The written

examination and the operating test was developed by the McGuire Training Department.

Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both

the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The

NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.

No findings of significance were identified.

Enclosure 1

Report Details

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The facility developed both the operating test and the written examination in accordance

with NUREG-1021,Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,

Revision 9, Supplement 1. The NRC reviewed the proposed written examination and

operating test. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee

were made according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the test

materials.

The examiners reviewed the licensees examination and test security measures while

preparing and administering the examinations and tests to ensure examination and test

security and integrity complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.

The examiners evaluated three RO and nine SRO applicants who were being assessed

under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the

operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The written examination was

administered by the McGuire training staff on May 23, 2008. The evaluations of the

applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine if the applicants,

who applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant, met requirements

specified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The licensee and the NRC reviewed the final version of the written examination and

operating test, and indicated that these exams were within the range of acceptability

expected for the proposed examination and test, respectively. Nine Senior Reactor

Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the written

examination and operating test.

The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As)

question references/answers and examination references may be accessed in the

ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers, ML081770368, ML 081770373,

ML081770443 and ML081770463.)

Enclosure 1

4

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Sample Review

Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected Problem Identification Process (PIP) M-08-03242 and M-08-

03260 for a detailed review. PIP M-08-03242 was initiated because AP-14, Rod Control

Malfunction, Enclosure 1, Step 3 Response Not Obtained (RNO) needed clarification to

ensure consistency of plant direction if a load rejection occurs coincident with a rod

control malfunction. PIP M-08-03260 was initiated to document the lessons learned

from the 2008 NRC initial examination for Hot License Prep (HLP) class 24. These

issues were identified during the NRC examination that was administered during the

period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The inspectors checked that these issues had been

completely and accurately identified in the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP)

and that safety concerns were properly classified, prioritized for resolution, and the

scope of the apparent cause determinations were sufficient. Corrective actions include a

review to determine the impacts on future initial and continuing training classes.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On May 21, 2008, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. Bruce

Hamilton, Site Vice President, and members of his staff. The examiners asked the

licensee whether any materials examined during the examination should be considered

proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee personnel

K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager

S. Bradshaw, Training Manager

S. Capps, Engineering Manager

K. Crane, Regulatory Compliance

L. Gabbert, Operations Instructor

B. Hamilton, Site Vice president

S. Helms Operations Training Supervisor

F. Kirk, Operations Shift Supervisor

J. Jenkins, Independent Nuclear Oversight Manager

R. Repko, Station Manager

T. Simril, Operations Superintendent

R. Pope, Operations Training manager

NRC personnel

J. Brady, Senior Resident inspector

Enclosure 1

NRC Resolution to the Facility Comment

A complete text of the licensee's post examination comments can be found in ADAMS under

Accession Number ML 081770470 and ML081770473.

RO QUESTION # 53

LICENSEE COMMENT:

In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to not

having a correct answer. The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be

viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.

The original correct answer stated that the reactor would first trip due to a turbine trip on a loss

of both main feedwater pumps. According to the licensees post exam analysis, the reactor will

not trip due to a turbine trip; rather the reactor will trip due to low steam generator level. The

licensee argues that the conditions presented in the stem, namely the loss of station air (VI),

would cause the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) to drift closed. The slow closure of the

FRVs would cause an increase in dP across the FRVs, which would cause the feedwater

control system to lower the speed of the feedwater pumps. The lowering feedwater pump

speed would maintain the FRV dP below the setpoint that would cause a direct feedwater pump

trip due to that dP, thus delaying a turbine trip. However, due to the slow closure of the FRVs

and the lowering main feedwater pump speed, the reactor would first receive a trip signal due to

low steam generator level.

The licensee supplied simulator and actual plant data that supports the reactor receiving a trip

signal due to low steam generator level. The licensee contends that all VI failures, except a

catastrophic failure of the VI header, would result in a reactor trip signal being generated due to

low steam generator level. The licensee contends that the conditions in the stem are not

representative of a catastrophic VI header failure.

NRC DISCUSSION:

The NRC reviewed the simulator data and documentation from the actual plant event. The NRC

agrees that in all cases, except for a catastrophic VI header failure, the reactor will first receive a

trip signal generated due to low steam generator level. Therefore, the original correct answer is

NOT a correct answer choice. Since none of the answer choices state that the reactor will first

trip due to low steam generator level, there is no correct answer for this question.

NRC RESOLUTION

In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was deleted due to not

having a correct answer.

Enclosure 2

6

SRO QUESTION # 77

LICENSEE COMMENT:

In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The

original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the

above referenced ML numbers.

The licensee states that the second part of both answer choices C and D are correct; with

the first part of those answer choices being the same. The licensee states that NUREG-1021,

Appendix E, instructs the applicants not to make assumptions with respect to operator actions

that are not stated in the question. Therefore, the applicant should rightfully not assume that

nuclear service water makeup was aligned to the component cooling water (KC) surge tank.

With no nuclear service water aligned to the KC surge tank, the level in the tank would continue

to drop. The level drop described in the stem is greater than 0.10 ft/min, thereby requiring the

operators to isolate the A KC train from the B KC train in accordance with AP-21, Loss of KC

or KC System Leakage, Step 20 (Answer Choice D). The KC surge tank level would continue

to decrease to 2 ft, which would then meet the Foldout Page requirement which requires

isolation of KC non-essential headers in accordance with AP-21, Enclosure 2 (Answer Choice

D).

NRC DISCUSSION:

The NRC agrees that the applicants rightfully were not permitted to assume that nuclear service

water makeup was aligned to the KC surge tank in accordance with NUREG-1021, Appendix E

guidance. The NRC also agrees that with no nuclear service water makeup aligned to the KC

surge tank, the level in the tank would continue to decrease until the criteria for AP-21, Step 20

was met and continue to decrease until the Foldout Page criteria was met. Therefore, the NRC

agrees that both answer choices C and D are correct answers.

NRC RESOLUTION

In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer

choices C and D as correct answers.

Enclosure 2

7

SRO QUESTION # 84

LICENSEE COMMENT:

In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The

original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the

above referenced ML numbers.

The licensee contends that answer choices A and D are both correct answers. A was the

correct choice per the original answer key and D was originally thought to be an incorrect

response. The licensee contends that D provides correct dose limits as stated in their Site

Licensing Commitment (SLC); therefore, making D an alternate correct answer.

NRC DISCUSSION:

The NRC disagrees with the licensees assessment of the correct answers. The question

specifically asks the applicants to state the requirements of 10CFR50. 10CFR50 does not

contain any quarterly limits, such as those stated in the SLC. Therefore, the only correct

answer is D, which states the correct annual dose limits from 10CFR50. Answer choice A is

an incorrect answer choice because it contains quarterly dose limits.

NRC RESOLUTION

In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.b, the question was graded with D

being the correct answer and A not being a correct answer.

Enclosure 2

8

SRO QUESTION # 87

LICENSEE COMMENT:

In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to having

two correct answers containing conflicting information. The original post exam comments

submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.

The licensee contends that the second part of answer choices A and B are both correct; with

the first part of those answer choices being identical. The licensee contends that the second

part of answer choice A, the original correct answer, remains correct because Step 8 of FR-

Z.1 allows the rest of the procedure to be treated as a Yellow Path when a faulted steam

generator exists. Thus, the applicant could consider this to be an early transition out of the

procedure. The licensee also contends that the second part of answer choice B is correct

because the transition out of the procedure as defined in answer choice A, can be interpreted

as a structured exit from the procedure. In this instance, an early transition out of FR-Z.1 would

only occur if a higher priority yellow or orange path existed. Therefore, the licensee contends

that both A and B are correct answer choices.

NRC DISCUSSION:

The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that two answer choices are correct. Early

transition out of a procedure is not a defined term in the licensees administrative procedures;

therefore, it is left to the applicants to determine what this is intended to mean. The applicant

was forced to either assume that an early transition out of FR-Z.1 meant that the question was

asking for a non-structured exit OR that the question was asking for a transition out of the

procedure prior to completing all of the applicable steps in that procedure. Depending on the

assumption made by the applicant, either answer choice A or B could be considered a

correct answer.

The NRC disagrees with the licensees contention that the two correct answer choices contain

conflicting information. The answer choices are not diametrically opposed, as detailed in the

examples in NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c. The answer choices contain two different

and independent reasons for exiting FR-Z.1; therefore, the question was not deleted.

NRC RESOLUTION

In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer

choices A and B as correct answers due to the answer choices not containing conflicting

information.

Enclosure 2