ML081850231
ML081850231 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Mcguire, McGuire |
Issue date: | 07/03/2008 |
From: | Widmann M NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB |
To: | Brandi Hamilton Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co |
References | |
50-369/08-301, 50-370/08-301 50-369/08-301, 50-370/08-301 | |
Download: ML081850231 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000369/2008301
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
July 3, 2008
Mr. Bruce H. Hamilton
Vice President
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
McGuire Nuclear Station
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301
Dear Mr. Hamilton:
During the period May 12 - 21, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered
operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the
McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed
the tests and preliminary findings with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed
report. The written examination was administered by your staff on May 23, 2008.
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both
the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The
NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions
concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370
Enclosures: 1. Report Details
2. NRC Resolution to the Facility Comments
cc: See Page 2
_________________________
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RIV:DRS
SIGNATURE * / RA / * /RA / * /RA/ /RA/
NAME RAiello: RBaldwin SRose MWidmann
DATE 06/26/2008 06/26/2008 06/30/2008 07/03/2008 7/ /2008 7/ /2008 7/ /2008
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
DPC 2
cc w/encl:
Bruce Hamilton Kathryn B. Nolan
Vice President Senior Counsel
McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke 526 South Church Street-EC07H
Energy Carolinas, LLC Charlotte, NC 28202
Electronic Mail Distribution
David A. Repka
Steven D. Capps Winston Strawn LLP
Engineering Manager Electronic Mail Distribution
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke
Energy Carolinas, LLC County Manager of Mecklenburg County
Electronic Mail Distribution 720 East Fourth Street
Charlotte, NC 28202
Scotty L. Bradshaw
Training Manager Beverly O. Hall
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Chief, Radiation Protection Section
Energy Carolinas, LLC Department of Environmental Health
Electronic Mail Distribution N.C. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources
Kenneth L. Ashe Electronic Mail Distribution
Regulatory Compliance Manager
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Dhiaa M. Jamil
Energy Carolinas, LLC Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer
Electronic Mail Distribution Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
R. L. Gill, Jr.
Manager Senior Resident Inspector
Nuclear Regulatory Issues & Industry Affairs Duke Energy Corporation
Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke William B. McGuire Nuclear Station
Energy Carolinas, LLC U.S. NRC
Electronic Mail Distribution 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd
Huntersville, NC 28078
Lisa F. Vaughn
Associate General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation
Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. Scotty L. Bradshaw
526 South Church Street-EC07H Training Manager
Charlotte, NC 28202 McGuire Nuclear Station
Maintenance Training Facility
Courier Mail Code MG03MT
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
DPC 3
Letter to Bruce H. Hamilton from Malcolm T. Widmann dated July 3, 2008
SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT- NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
05000369/2008301 AND 05000370/2008301
Distribution w/encl:
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
J. Stang, NRR (PM: CAT, MCG)
NRC Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28078
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370
Report No.: 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301
Licensee: Duke power Company (DPC)
Facility: McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28078
Dates: Operating Tests - May 12 - 21, 2008
Written Examination - May 23, 2008
Examiners: R. Aiello, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer
R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer
S. Rose, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000369/2008301 and 05000370/2008301; 05/12-21/08 & 05/23/08; McGuire Nuclear
Plant, Units 1& 2, Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Revision 9, Supplement 1. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements
of 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. Members of
the McGuire training staff administered the written examination on May 23, 2008. The written
examination and the operating test was developed by the McGuire Training Department.
Nine Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both
the written examination and operating test. There were four post examination comments. The
NRC resolutions to these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1
Report Details
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The facility developed both the operating test and the written examination in accordance
with NUREG-1021,Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Revision 9, Supplement 1. The NRC reviewed the proposed written examination and
operating test. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee
were made according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the test
materials.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination and test security measures while
preparing and administering the examinations and tests to ensure examination and test
security and integrity complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.
The examiners evaluated three RO and nine SRO applicants who were being assessed
under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the
operating tests during the period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The written examination was
administered by the McGuire training staff on May 23, 2008. The evaluations of the
applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine if the applicants,
who applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant, met requirements
specified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The licensee and the NRC reviewed the final version of the written examination and
operating test, and indicated that these exams were within the range of acceptability
expected for the proposed examination and test, respectively. Nine Senior Reactor
Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the written
examination and operating test.
The combined RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As)
question references/answers and examination references may be accessed in the
ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers, ML081770368, ML 081770373,
ML081770443 and ML081770463.)
Enclosure 1
4
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Sample Review
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected Problem Identification Process (PIP) M-08-03242 and M-08-
03260 for a detailed review. PIP M-08-03242 was initiated because AP-14, Rod Control
Malfunction, Enclosure 1, Step 3 Response Not Obtained (RNO) needed clarification to
ensure consistency of plant direction if a load rejection occurs coincident with a rod
control malfunction. PIP M-08-03260 was initiated to document the lessons learned
from the 2008 NRC initial examination for Hot License Prep (HLP) class 24. These
issues were identified during the NRC examination that was administered during the
period of May 12 - 21, 2008. The inspectors checked that these issues had been
completely and accurately identified in the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP)
and that safety concerns were properly classified, prioritized for resolution, and the
scope of the apparent cause determinations were sufficient. Corrective actions include a
review to determine the impacts on future initial and continuing training classes.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On May 21, 2008, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. Bruce
Hamilton, Site Vice President, and members of his staff. The examiners asked the
licensee whether any materials examined during the examination should be considered
proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager
S. Bradshaw, Training Manager
S. Capps, Engineering Manager
K. Crane, Regulatory Compliance
L. Gabbert, Operations Instructor
B. Hamilton, Site Vice president
S. Helms Operations Training Supervisor
F. Kirk, Operations Shift Supervisor
J. Jenkins, Independent Nuclear Oversight Manager
R. Repko, Station Manager
T. Simril, Operations Superintendent
R. Pope, Operations Training manager
NRC personnel
J. Brady, Senior Resident inspector
Enclosure 1
NRC Resolution to the Facility Comment
A complete text of the licensee's post examination comments can be found in ADAMS under
Accession Number ML 081770470 and ML081770473.
RO QUESTION # 53
LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to not
having a correct answer. The original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be
viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.
The original correct answer stated that the reactor would first trip due to a turbine trip on a loss
of both main feedwater pumps. According to the licensees post exam analysis, the reactor will
not trip due to a turbine trip; rather the reactor will trip due to low steam generator level. The
licensee argues that the conditions presented in the stem, namely the loss of station air (VI),
would cause the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) to drift closed. The slow closure of the
FRVs would cause an increase in dP across the FRVs, which would cause the feedwater
control system to lower the speed of the feedwater pumps. The lowering feedwater pump
speed would maintain the FRV dP below the setpoint that would cause a direct feedwater pump
trip due to that dP, thus delaying a turbine trip. However, due to the slow closure of the FRVs
and the lowering main feedwater pump speed, the reactor would first receive a trip signal due to
low steam generator level.
The licensee supplied simulator and actual plant data that supports the reactor receiving a trip
signal due to low steam generator level. The licensee contends that all VI failures, except a
catastrophic failure of the VI header, would result in a reactor trip signal being generated due to
low steam generator level. The licensee contends that the conditions in the stem are not
representative of a catastrophic VI header failure.
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC reviewed the simulator data and documentation from the actual plant event. The NRC
agrees that in all cases, except for a catastrophic VI header failure, the reactor will first receive a
trip signal generated due to low steam generator level. Therefore, the original correct answer is
NOT a correct answer choice. Since none of the answer choices state that the reactor will first
trip due to low steam generator level, there is no correct answer for this question.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was deleted due to not
having a correct answer.
Enclosure 2
6
SRO QUESTION # 77
LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The
original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the
above referenced ML numbers.
The licensee states that the second part of both answer choices C and D are correct; with
the first part of those answer choices being the same. The licensee states that NUREG-1021,
Appendix E, instructs the applicants not to make assumptions with respect to operator actions
that are not stated in the question. Therefore, the applicant should rightfully not assume that
nuclear service water makeup was aligned to the component cooling water (KC) surge tank.
With no nuclear service water aligned to the KC surge tank, the level in the tank would continue
to drop. The level drop described in the stem is greater than 0.10 ft/min, thereby requiring the
operators to isolate the A KC train from the B KC train in accordance with AP-21, Loss of KC
or KC System Leakage, Step 20 (Answer Choice D). The KC surge tank level would continue
to decrease to 2 ft, which would then meet the Foldout Page requirement which requires
isolation of KC non-essential headers in accordance with AP-21, Enclosure 2 (Answer Choice
D).
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC agrees that the applicants rightfully were not permitted to assume that nuclear service
water makeup was aligned to the KC surge tank in accordance with NUREG-1021, Appendix E
guidance. The NRC also agrees that with no nuclear service water makeup aligned to the KC
surge tank, the level in the tank would continue to decrease until the criteria for AP-21, Step 20
was met and continue to decrease until the Foldout Page criteria was met. Therefore, the NRC
agrees that both answer choices C and D are correct answers.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer
choices C and D as correct answers.
Enclosure 2
7
SRO QUESTION # 84
LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be graded with two correct answers. The
original post exam comments submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the
above referenced ML numbers.
The licensee contends that answer choices A and D are both correct answers. A was the
correct choice per the original answer key and D was originally thought to be an incorrect
response. The licensee contends that D provides correct dose limits as stated in their Site
Licensing Commitment (SLC); therefore, making D an alternate correct answer.
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC disagrees with the licensees assessment of the correct answers. The question
specifically asks the applicants to state the requirements of 10CFR50. 10CFR50 does not
contain any quarterly limits, such as those stated in the SLC. Therefore, the only correct
answer is D, which states the correct annual dose limits from 10CFR50. Answer choice A is
an incorrect answer choice because it contains quarterly dose limits.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.b, the question was graded with D
being the correct answer and A not being a correct answer.
Enclosure 2
8
SRO QUESTION # 87
LICENSEE COMMENT:
In summary, the licensee requested that this question be deleted from the exam due to having
two correct answers containing conflicting information. The original post exam comments
submitted by the licensee can be viewed in ADAMS under the above referenced ML numbers.
The licensee contends that the second part of answer choices A and B are both correct; with
the first part of those answer choices being identical. The licensee contends that the second
part of answer choice A, the original correct answer, remains correct because Step 8 of FR-
Z.1 allows the rest of the procedure to be treated as a Yellow Path when a faulted steam
generator exists. Thus, the applicant could consider this to be an early transition out of the
procedure. The licensee also contends that the second part of answer choice B is correct
because the transition out of the procedure as defined in answer choice A, can be interpreted
as a structured exit from the procedure. In this instance, an early transition out of FR-Z.1 would
only occur if a higher priority yellow or orange path existed. Therefore, the licensee contends
that both A and B are correct answer choices.
NRC DISCUSSION:
The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that two answer choices are correct. Early
transition out of a procedure is not a defined term in the licensees administrative procedures;
therefore, it is left to the applicants to determine what this is intended to mean. The applicant
was forced to either assume that an early transition out of FR-Z.1 meant that the question was
asking for a non-structured exit OR that the question was asking for a transition out of the
procedure prior to completing all of the applicable steps in that procedure. Depending on the
assumption made by the applicant, either answer choice A or B could be considered a
correct answer.
The NRC disagrees with the licensees contention that the two correct answer choices contain
conflicting information. The answer choices are not diametrically opposed, as detailed in the
examples in NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c. The answer choices contain two different
and independent reasons for exiting FR-Z.1; therefore, the question was not deleted.
NRC RESOLUTION
In accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-403, Section D.1.c, the question was graded with answer
choices A and B as correct answers due to the answer choices not containing conflicting
information.
Enclosure 2