ML15280A387: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
{{#Wiki_filter:10/07/2015                     10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report                     P~
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
Panel Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                   Event#       51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN                                                 Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06       (EDT)
10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
Supplier: GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI                                     Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00       (CDT)
ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)
Last Modification: 10/06/20 15 Region: 3                                                   Docket #:
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
City: MORRIS                                     Agreement State:             Yes County:                                                     License #:
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
State: IL NRC Notified by:     AARON THOMPSON                       Notifications:   ANN MARIE STONE                     R3DO HQ Ops Officer:     JEFF HERRERA                                           PART 21/50.55 REACTORS             EMAIL Emergency Class:       NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
21.21(d)(3)(i)       DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT       - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH "Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3.
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
"The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21  
"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."
Part 21  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
EN #51386


EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
10/07/2015                 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
 
OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553  
NRC FORM 361                                                                                                         U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)                                                                                                                               OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - [j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
[2r*] 301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553                                 *'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
NOTIFICATION TIME           FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION                             UNIT           NAME OF CALLER                                     CALL BACK #
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)
2206 EDT                     Dresden                                               2/3             Aaron Thompson                                     (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE           EVENT DATE                         POWER/MODE BEFORE                                           POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI - Unit 2                                         97% ModelI - Unit 2 1200 CDT                     10/05/2015                       100% Model1 - Unit 3                                         100% ModelI     - Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS                               1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)                       EJ (v)(A)       Safe S/D Capability                   AINA
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
-]     GENERAL EMERGENCY                       GEN/AAEC       []               TS Deviation                     ADEV     El     (v)(B)   RHR Capability                       AINB
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
-]     SITE AREA EMERGENCY                       SIT/AAEC       4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)                       L] j(v)(C)     Control of Rad Release               AINC
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
-1     ALERT                                     ALE/AAEC       [1   (i)     TS Required S/D                       ASHU     El     (v)(D)   Accident Mitigation                   AIND
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
-I     UNUSUAL EVENT                           UNU/AAEC       17) (iv)IA)   ECCS Dischargle to RCS               ACCS     []     (xii)   Offsite Medical                     AMED
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
-I     50.72 NON-EMERGENCY             (see next columns)       []   (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram)               ARPS     El     (xiii)   Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp                 ACOM
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
-1     PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)                     DODD     l[j   (xi)     Offsite Notification               APRE               60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)
State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
"J     MATERIAL/EXPOSURE                               B???     8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)                       []l   Invalid Specified System Actuation             AINV
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
-I     FITNESS FOR DUTY                                 HFIT   EIJ (ii)(A)   Degraded Condition                 ADEG       Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT.             (see last column)     17) (ii)(B)   Unanalyzed Condition                 AUNA     []       101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect               NONR
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
: 7)     INFORMATION ONLY                                 NNF     []   (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation           ASEF     0]                                                   NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______
PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH "This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.
10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS               YES     NO       WILL BE           ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR                             L._.i   YES (Explain above)         I x     NO NRC Resident                   x     _______NOT                         UNDERSTOOD?
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2 10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
State~s)                   ___       X     _____DID                 ALL SYSTEMS                                 Lx      YES                         I   I. NO (Explain above)
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
Local                       ___       X     _____FUNCTION                     AS REQUIRED?
10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
IADDITIONAL Other Gov Agencies Media/Press Release
ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)
___       X x
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: Mode I FSTIMATFD
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
{Mv/D/)NATE                     IYs   WN INFO ON BACK NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)                                                                                                                                           PAGE 1 OF 2
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
 
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)                                                               REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS DAI*If'.I f*lt"ZI/Al_ Dri: IrArra.:*  PUEP~'*lf  r*D  ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I *    ;f;,. rlTallvhaIeh~i,.     a;        l~lk...I.k~ p~u   ir ;n aun   lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec)           % T. S. Limit     HOO Guide                 Total Activity (Ci)         %T. S. Limit       HOO Guide Noble Gas                                                                                 0.1 Cilsec                                                                 1000 Ci Iodine                 '   "10                                                             ijCilsec                                                                 0.01 Ci Particulate                                                                               1 pCi/sec                                                                       mCi 1_____
Liquid (excluding tritium                                                                 10 giCi/min                                                                   0.1 Ci
  & dissolved noble gas)
Liquid (tritium)                                                                         0.2 Cilmin             __________5                                               Ci Total Activity,______
o            lP~.o.o ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown                                                                               Other ALARM SETPOINTS
  %T. S. LIMIT if a licable*
RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL INAPPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG       #. valve, pipe, etc.)
LEAK RATE                                     UNITS: gpm/gpd         T. S. LIMITS                                 SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE                               TIME                   COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS                     PRIMARY                         /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)
Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.
  "Number and Locations of All Defective Components: 1 - EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.
  "Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch.
  "Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2                                                                                                                                   PAGE 2 OF 2
 
10/07/2015                     10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report                     P~
Panel Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                   Event#       51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN                                                 Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06       (EDT)
Supplier: GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI                                     Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00       (CDT)
Last Modification: 10/06/20 15 Region: 3                                                   Docket #:
City: MORRIS                                     Agreement State:             Yes County:                                                     License #:
State: IL NRC Notified by:     AARON THOMPSON                       Notifications:   ANN MARIE STONE                     R3DO HQ Ops Officer:     JEFF HERRERA                                           PART 21/50.55 REACTORS             EMAIL Emergency Class:       NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i)       DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT       - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH "Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3.
"The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.
"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."
Part 21  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
EN #51386
10/07/2015                  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NRC FORM 361                                                                                                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)                                                                                                                                OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - [j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*
[2r*] 301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553                                *'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.
NOTIFICATION TIME            FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION                              UNIT            NAME OF CALLER                                      CALL BACK #
2206 EDT                    Dresden                                              2/3            Aaron Thompson                                      (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE            EVENT DATE                        POWER/MODE BEFORE                                            POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI - Unit 2                                          97% ModelI - Unit 2 1200 CDT                    10/05/2015                        100% Model1 - Unit 3                                        100% ModelI      - Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS                                1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)                      EJ (v)(A)      Safe S/D Capability                  AINA
-]    GENERAL EMERGENCY                        GEN/AAEC        []                TS Deviation                    ADEV      El    (v)(B)  RHR Capability                        AINB
-]    SITE AREA EMERGENCY                      SIT/AAEC        4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)                      L]  j(v)(C)    Control of Rad Release                AINC
-1    ALERT                                    ALE/AAEC      [1    (i)    TS Required S/D                      ASHU    El    (v)(D)  Accident Mitigation                  AIND
-I    UNUSUAL EVENT                            UNU/AAEC        17) (iv)IA)  ECCS Dischargle to RCS                ACCS    []    (xii)    Offsite Medical                      AMED
-I    50.72 NON-EMERGENCY            (see next columns)      []    (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram)                ARPS      El    (xiii)  Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp                  ACOM
-1    PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)                      DODD      l[j  (xi)    Offsite Notification                APRE              60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)
"J    MATERIAL/EXPOSURE                                B???    8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)                        []l    Invalid Specified System Actuation            AINV
-I    FITNESS FOR DUTY                                HFIT    EIJ (ii)(A)    Degraded Condition                  ADEG        Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT.            (see last column)    17) (ii)(B)    Unanalyzed Condition                AUNA    []      101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect                NONR
: 7)    INFORMATION ONLY                                NNF    []    (iv)IA)  Specified System Actuation          ASEF    0]                                                  NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)
PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH "This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.
Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.
The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.
Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.
Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.
Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS                YES    NO        WILL BE            ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR                              L._.i  YES (Explain above)        I x    NO NRC Resident                  x    _______NOT                          UNDERSTOOD?
State~s)                    ___        X      _____DID                  ALL SYSTEMS                                Lx      YES                        I    I. NO (Explain above)
Local                      ___        X      _____FUNCTION                      AS REQUIRED?
IADDITIONAL Other Gov Agencies Media/Press Release
___        X x
MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: Mode I FSTIMATFD
{Mv/D/)NATE                    IYs    WN INFO ON BACK NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)                                                                                                                                          PAGE 1 OF 2


EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)                                                               REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS DAI*If'.I f*lt"ZI/Al_ Dri: IrArra.:*  PUEP~'*lf  r*D   ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I *    ;f;,. rlTallvhaIeh~i,.     a;        l~lk...I.k~ p~u   ir ;n aun   lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec)           % T. S. Limit     HOO Guide                 Total Activity (Ci)         %T. S. Limit       HOO Guide Noble Gas                                                                                 0.1 Cilsec                                                                 1000 Ci Iodine                 '   "10                                                             ijCilsec                                                                 0.01 Ci Particulate                                                                               1 pCi/sec                                                                       mCi 1_____
OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553
Liquid (excluding tritium                                                                 10 giCi/min                                                                   0.1 Ci
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
  & dissolved noble gas)
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
Liquid (tritium)                                                                         0.2 Cilmin             __________5                                               Ci Total Activity,______
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)
o            lP~.o.o ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown                                                                               Other ALARM SETPOINTS
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
  %T. S. LIMIT if a licable*
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL INAPPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG       #. valve, pipe, etc.)
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
LEAK RATE                                     UNITS: gpm/gpd         T. S. LIMITS                                 SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE                               TIME                   COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS                     PRIMARY                         /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
  "Number and Locations of All Defective Components: 1 - EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.
State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
  "Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch.
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
  "Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "
REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______
NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2                                                                                                                                   PAGE 2 OF 2}}
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2}}

Latest revision as of 06:54, 31 October 2019

Part 21 Report - Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) Cutout Switch, Dresden, Units 2 and 3
ML15280A387
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/2015
From: Thompson A
Exelon Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML15280A387 (4)
v • d • e


Text

10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~

Panel Part 21 (PAR) Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)

Supplier: GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)

Last Modification: 10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #:

City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications: ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21.21(d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH "Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3.

"The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."

Part 21

Reference:

EN #51386

10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000) OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - [j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2r*] 301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553 *'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.

NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI - Unit 2 97% ModelI - Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 - Unit 3 100% ModelI - Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1) EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA

-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB

-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2) L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC

-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND

-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED

-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM

-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)

"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3) []l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV

-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR

7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH "This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.

Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.

The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.

Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?

State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS Lx YES I I. NO (Explain above)

Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

IADDITIONAL Other Gov Agencies Media/Press Release

___ X x

MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: Mode I FSTIMATFD

{Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN INFO ON BACK NRC FORM 361 (12-2000) PAGE 1 OF 2

NRC FORM 361 (12-2000) REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS DAI*If'.I f*lt"ZI/Al_ Dri: IrArra.:* PUEP~'*lf r*D ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I * ;f;,. rlTallvhaIeh~i,. a; l~lk...I.k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec)  % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) %T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec mCi 1_____

Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci

& dissolved noble gas)

Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______

o lP~.o.o ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS

%T. S. LIMIT if a licable*

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL INAPPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)

LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)

Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.

"Number and Locations of All Defective Components: 1 - EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.

"Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch.

"Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2

10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~

Panel Part 21 (PAR) Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)

Supplier: GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)

Last Modification: 10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #:

City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications: ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21.21(d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH "Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3.

"The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

"Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function "Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."

Part 21

Reference:

EN #51386

10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000) OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - [j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2r*] 301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553 *'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.

NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI - Unit 2 97% ModelI - Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 - Unit 3 100% ModelI - Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1) EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA

-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB

-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2) L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC

-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND

-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED

-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM

-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)

"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3) []l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV

-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR

7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH "This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.

Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.

The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.

Identification of Facility and Component: DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.

Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function. Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?

State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS Lx YES I I. NO (Explain above)

Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

IADDITIONAL Other Gov Agencies Media/Press Release

___ X x

MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: Mode I FSTIMATFD

{Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN INFO ON BACK NRC FORM 361 (12-2000) PAGE 1 OF 2

NRC FORM 361 (12-2000) REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS DAI*If'.I f*lt"ZI/Al_ Dri: IrArra.:* PUEP~'*lf r*D ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I * ;f;,. rlTallvhaIeh~i,. a; l~lk...I.k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec)  % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) %T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec mCi 1_____

Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci

& dissolved noble gas)

Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______

o lP~.o.o ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS

%T. S. LIMIT if a licable*

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL INAPPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)

LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)

Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.

"Number and Locations of All Defective Components: 1 - EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.

"Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch.

"Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Plants with similar GEH cutout switches: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML15280A387&oldid=2028242"