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| {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFOiQQTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9909290014 DOC.DATE: 99/09/22 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFOiQQTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTF,.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION | | ACCESSION NBR:9909290014 DOC.DATE: 99/09/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTF,. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION |
| .RUBY,R.M.Rochester Gas&.Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C. | | . RUBY,R.M. Rochester Gas &. Electric Corp. |
| Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000244 VISSING,G.S. | | MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. |
| | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING,G.S. |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small tears were discovered in flexible duct work connector wt inlet of CR HVAC sys return air fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage greater than assumed.Joint was restored to leak tight condition. | | LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small tears were discovered in flexible duct work connector wt inlet of CR HVAC sys return air fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage greater than assumed. |
| With 990922 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). | | Joint was restored to leak tight condition. With 990922 ltr. |
| 05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LP INTE L: FILE CENTER R/DRIP~RERB RES/DET/ERAB RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING,G NRR/DIPM/IOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DRAA/OERAB LMITCO MARSHALL NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION L ST OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTRO DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 15 ENCL 15 4ND ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION | | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| ~89 EASTAVEhlUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y Id6d9-0001 AREA CODE 716 5'-2700 ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operations September 22, 1999 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate I Washington, D.C.20555 | | NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ' ENCL LP 1 1 VISSING,G 1 INTE L: FILE CENTER 1 1 NRR/DIPM/IOLB 1 1 R/DRIP~RERB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/ERAB 1 1 RES/DRAA/OERAB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LMITCO MARSHALL 1 ' |
| | NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 ' NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE L ST DOCUMENT CONTRO DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 15 ENCL 15 |
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| | 4ND ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EASTAVEhlUE, ROCHESTER, N. Y Id6d9-0001 AREA CODE 716 5'-2700 ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operations September 22, 1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I Washington, D.C. 20555 |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| LER 1999-011, Small Breach in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 | | LER 1999-011, Small Breach in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 |
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| ==Dear Mr.Vissing:== | | ==Dear Mr. Vissing:== |
| The attached Licensee Event Report LER 1999-011 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a)(2)(ii)(B)and (a)(2)(i)(B), which require a report of,"Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclt ar power plant being...In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant." or"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications".
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| Ver truly yours, Robert C.Mec xc: Mr.Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop SC2)Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior'esident Inspector 99092'st0014 990922 PDR AOQCK 05000244 8 PDR
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| NRC FORM 366 IB IBBB}U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)fsbCPel PurPeyn pe Yresponke tlat corIIpPywiNLIs rrdn<PaIory information collection request: 50 hrs.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to hdustiy.Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Ma'nagement Branch (T4 F33), U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001~and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (31504104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, OC 20503.If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a FACILITY NAME I1}R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant mLE I4)DQGKET NUMBER<2}05000244-PAGE f3}1 OF 6 Small Breach, in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis.MONTH OAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5),LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVSION NUMBER MONTH OAY REPORT DATE (7}DOCKET NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)08 23 1999 1999-011-00 09 22 1999 FAG ILrr Y NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) | | The attached Licensee Event Report LER 1999-011 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a) (2) (ii) (B) and (a) (2) (i) (B), which require a report of, "Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclt ar power plant being...In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant." or "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications". |
| (1)20.2203(a) | | Ver truly yours, Robert C. Mec xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop SC2) |
| (2)(i)20.2203(a) | | Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior'esident Inspector 99092'st0014 990922 PDR AOQCK 05000244 8 PDR |
| (2)(ii)20.2203(a) | | |
| (2)(iii)20.2203(a) | | NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB IBBB} |
| (2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a) | | fsbCPel PurPeyn pe Yresponke tlat corIIpPywiNLIs rrdn<PaIory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) hdustiy. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Ma'nagement Branch (T4 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001 and to ~ |
| (3)(i)20.2203(a) | | (See reverse for required number of the Paperwork Reduction Project (31504104), Office of digits/characters for each block) Management and Budget, Washington, OC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a FACILITY NAME I1} DQGKET NUMBER <2} - PAGE f3} |
| (3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12}50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 36BA TELEPHONE NUMBER Iirciude Aiee Code)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED P URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMEN TS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more)'11)'Robert M.Ruby-Senior Licensing Engineer (716)771-3572 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPOR'TABLE TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX Vl ECON VOB7 SUPPLEMENTAL REP08T ExPEGTED (14}YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).NO X EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On August 23, 1999, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.At approximately 10:15 EDST, small tears were discovered in the flexible duct work connector at the inlet of the Control Room HVAC, System Return Air Fan (AKF08).The plant entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 for approximately 48 minutes while temporary repairs were made.Subsequently, it was determined that the openings could have caused an in-leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis, placing the plant in e condition outside its design basis.This was reported to the NRC within one hour of the determination per 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B). | | R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1 OF 6 mLE I4) |
| | Small Breach, in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis. |
| | EVENT DATE (5) ,LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7} OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6) |
| | FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEOUENTIAL REVSION MONTH OAY YEAR MONTH OAY NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FAG ILrrY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 23 1999 1999 011 00 09 22 1999 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED P URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) '11) |
| | MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| | POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a) (3)(i) 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) (x) |
| | LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 73.71 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 20.2203(a) (2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a) (2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2)(vii) or in NRC Form 36BA LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12} |
| | TELEPHONE NUMBER Iirciude Aiee Code) |
| | 'Robert M. Ruby - Senior Licensing Engineer (716) 771-3572 REPOR'TABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX TO EPIX Vl ECON VOB7 SUPPLEMENTAL REP08T ExPEGTED (14} MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X DATE (15) |
| | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| | On August 23, 1999, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% steady state reactor power. At approximately 10:15 EDST, small tears were discovered in the flexible duct work connector at the inlet of the Control Room HVAC, System Return Air Fan (AKF08). The plant entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 for approximately 48 minutes while temporary repairs were made. |
| | Subsequently, it was determined that the openings could have caused an in-leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis, placing the plant in e condition outside its design basis. This was reported to the NRC within one hour of the determination per 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B). |
| Corrective action to prevent recurrence is listed in Section V.B. | | Corrective action to prevent recurrence is listed in Section V.B. |
| l I NRC FORM 366A IB IBBB)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)DOCKET I2)LER NUMBER I6)PAGE I3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 TEAR SEQUENTIAL REMSIQN NUMBER NUMBER 1999-O11..OP 2 OF 6 TEXT lif more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
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| On August 23, 1999 the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.Engineering management was making a tour/inspection of the Control Room HVAC system in preparation for an upcoming modification.
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| The Control Room HVAC system is designed to provide conditioned air at the proper temperature and to isolate and re-circulate the air upon receiving an isolation signal indicating the presence of radioactivity or toxic gas.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES' August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Event date and time.o~August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Discovery date and time.August 23, 1999, 1103 EDST: Temporary repairs completed.
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| August 23, 1999,.1145 EDST: Further evaluation indicates that the tear could have allowed in-leakage beyond design basis.August 23, 1999, 1225 EDST: NRC Operations Center is notified of this event per 1 0C FR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)EVENT: On August 23, 1999, at approximately 1015 EDST, while performing a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System, the Balance of Plarit Systems Engineering Manager discovered tears in the rubber portion of the inlet flexible ductwork connector (expansion joint)for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan (AKF08).A tear at this location would allow ou)qide air flow into the system in the post accident recirculation mode.The Control Room operators w~(e notified, the system was declared inoperable, and the plant entered Ginna Station Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)3.0.3.At approximately 1103 EPPT, Temporary Modification 99-029 was successfully installed which sealed the duct from potential in-leakage.
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| The system was then declared operable and ITS LCO 3.0.3.was exited;." Due to the timely repairs/modification, a unit shutdown was not required and a load reduction was not commenced.
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| Subsequent to returning the system to operable status, evaluations completed at approximately 1145 EDST indicated that the tear could have allowed in-leakage in excess of the assumed leak rate listed in the Ginna Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)Section 6.4, Table 6.4-1.With this information it was assumed that the system had been outside the design basis and this was reported to the NRC Operations Center per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), at 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999.
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| NRC FORM 366A (6 ISSB)'U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET (2)05000244 LER NUMBER (6)R BEUUENTNL RatISION NUMBER NUMBER 1999-011-00 PAGE (3)3 OF 6 TEXT (ll more space is required, use eddidonel copies of IVRC Form 366A)(17)C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | | lI NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB IBBB) |
| The condition was self-identified by engineering management personnel during a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System.F.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room Operators, upon notification of the condition, entered ITS LCO 3.0.3 and prepared to start a plant shutdown, if required.A'fter the system was declared operable at 1103 EDST, the LCO was exited.At approximately 1145 EDST, plant staff determined that a non-emergency one hour notification, per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), should be made to the NRC Operations Center.The Shift Supervisor made this notification at approximately 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999.The NRC Resident was also notified at this time.G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| None III.CAUSE OF EVENT: A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the plant being in outside its design basis was a small breach in the flexible duct connection for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan.The calculated leakage was in excess of the allowable in-leakage listed in UFSAR Table 6.4-1.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the small breach was two small tears in the flexible duct work connector on the suction of the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan.
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3) |
| NRC FORM 366A (6.1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I 1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET I2)05000244 LER NUMBER I6)~R BEOOENtIAL RDIISION NOMBER NUMBER 1999-011-00 PAGE (3)4 OF 6 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of hfRC Form 366AJ I17)C.ROOT CAUSE: Two tears were identified on opposite sides of the round duct at the inlet of the return air fan.Similar material from'stock was later cut by a knife and examined.It was confirmed that the knife cut was not similar to that which was discovered in the Control Building HVAC equipment room.It was also verified that the material is very strong and not subject to tearing with manual hand forces.All of the flexible joint connectors in the Control Building HVAC equipment room, including the damaged joint, had been replaced during the 1999 refueling outage.Post modification testing and QC inspections during and after the installations verified acceptable ductwork flexible joint configurations as part of the modification turnover process.The duct work up to the edge of the joint was insulated after the testing.The joint was not re-tested after completion of the insulation work and other post modification demobilization.
| | SEQUENTIAL REMSIQN TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 O11 .. OP 2 OF 6 TEXT lifmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17) |
| The characteristics of the Temporary Modification make visual inspection of the tears impossible at this time.Therefore, given that the joint was,intact and inspected for leakage at the end of the outage and, given the known physical characteristics of the tear, it was determined that further evaluation must be conducted when the joint is disassembled for replacement. | | PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS: |
| Due to the Technical Specification requirements for operability of the Control Room" HVAC System, it is expected that this will occur during the next refueling outage.IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclear power plant being...ln a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant" and 10CFR50.73, License Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(i)(B) which requires a report of"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications".
| | On August 23, 1999 the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% steady state reactor power. |
| The leakage due to the tear in the flexible coupling was greater than the assumed leakage in the accident analysis, as described in the UFSAR.An assessment considering the consequences and implications of this event resulted in the following conclusions:
| | Engineering management was making a tour/inspection of the Control Room HVAC system in preparation for an upcoming modification. |
| There were no operational or safety consequences and implications attributed to the increase in" leakage because: Although the in-leakage was in excess of that assumed in the UFSAR, the actual amount was only 2.2%of the total flow in the system.In addition, during accident conditions, approximately 20%of the total flow is diverted through the charcoal filter unit down stream of the in-leakage.
| | The Control Room HVAC system is designed to provide conditioned air at the proper temperature and to isolate and re-circulate the air upon receiving an isolation signal indicating the presence of radioactivity or toxic gas. |
| This would serve to reduce the effect of any excess activity ingested into the system due to the tear.Any event that results in a significant release would require entry into the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, resulting in continuous Radiation Protection (RP)technician coverage in the Control Room.In this situation the Control Room area radiation and airborne activity are continuously monitored.
| | DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: |
| Should the activity concentration reach unacceptable levels, the RP technician would implement appropriate protective actions.Some of the contingencies available are respirators and potassium iodide tablets to limit the uptake of radioactive iodine.
| | A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES' August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Event date and time. |
| NRC FORM 366A (6 1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET (2)LER NUMBER (6)PAGE (3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 VEAR SEOUENEIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMSER 1999-.011..OP 5 OF 6 TEXT ilf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)~From a toxic gas perspective, the most likely source of significant toxic gas release was removed from site several years ago with the removal of the anhydrous ammonia tank outside the Condensate Demineralizer building.The remaining on-site chemicals, which could result in a toxic gas situation (chlorine, ammonia, hydrazine, sulfuric acid, and sodium hydroxide) are in a liquid state.Therefore, due to the slower evaporation rate, the Control Room atmosphere is less likely to reach hazardous airborne concentrations during a spill.In addition, the sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide tanks in the primary demineralizer room have been emptied and are no longer in use.Similar tanks in the Condensate Demineralizer building are located in separate pits which prevents inadvertent mixing of these chemicals.
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| The next most likely toxic gas release source is gaseous chlorine located at the Ontario water plant, approximately one mile to the east of the plant.The distance involved would, allow significant dilution of the gas in the atmosphere. | | August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Discovery date and time. |
| Also, the water plant is in a location, where the prevailing winds in the area tend to blow the gas away from the plant.Finally, the presence of these gasses in the Control Room atmosphere would be readily apparent to the Operators due to the noxious nature of the fumes.There are two Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)units located in the Control Room with an additional five units located in the fire lockers outside the Control Room door.Based on the above, it is concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION: ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: Temporary Modification 99-029 was implemented to restore the joint to a leak tight condition.
| | August 23, 1999, 1103 EDST: Temporary repairs completed. |
| Work Order 19902982 is planned to replace the existing flexible joint material with a new flexible joint.Other flexible joint material joints in the Control Building HVAC equipment room were examined and were found to be in new condition with no tears.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
| | August 23, 1999,.1145 EDST: Further evaluation indicates that the tear could have allowed in-leakage beyond design basis. |
| ~A sign was added to this location to state that the ductwork should not be stepped upon.~The joint will be closely inspected for potential damage mechanism during the replacement, presently planned for the next refueling outage.Should this inspection yield any additional information relating to root cause, appropriate corrective actions will be implemented and a revised LER will be.transmitted to the NRC. | | August 23, 1999, 1225 EDST: NRC Operations Center is notified of this event per 1 0C FR 50.72(b) (1 ) (ii)(B) |
| | EVENT: |
| | On August 23, 1999, at approximately 1015 EDST, while performing a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System, the Balance of Plarit Systems Engineering Manager discovered tears in the rubber portion of the inlet flexible ductwork connector (expansion joint) for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan (AKF08). A tear at this location would allow ou)qide air flow into the system in the post accident recirculation mode. The Control Room operators w~(e notified, the system was declared inoperable, and the plant entered Ginna Station Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) |
| | Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. At approximately 1103 EPPT, Temporary Modification 99-029 was successfully installed which sealed the duct from potential in-leakage. |
| | The system was then declared operable and ITS LCO 3.0.3. was exited;." Due to the timely repairs/modification, a unit shutdown was not required and a load reduction was not commenced. |
| | Subsequent to returning the system to operable status, evaluations completed at approximately 1145 EDST indicated that the tear could have allowed in-leakage in excess of the assumed leak rate listed in the Ginna Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 6.4, Table 6.4-1. |
| | With this information it was assumed that the system had been outside the design basis and this was reported to the NRC Operations Center per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), at 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999. |
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| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 ISSB) |
| | ' |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | BEUUENTNL RatISION R |
| | NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 00 3 OF 6 TEXT (llmore space is required, use eddidonel copies of IVRC Form 366A) (17) |
| | C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: |
| | None D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: |
| | None E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| | The condition was self-identified by engineering management personnel during a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System. |
| | F. OPERATOR ACTION: |
| | The Control Room Operators, upon notification of the condition, entered ITS LCO 3.0.3 and prepared to start a plant shutdown, if required. A'fter the system was declared operable at 1103 EDST, the LCO was exited. At approximately 1145 EDST, plant staff determined that a non-emergency one hour notification, per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), should be made to the NRC Operations Center. The Shift Supervisor made this notification at approximately 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999. The NRC Resident was also notified at this time. |
| | G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| | None III. CAUSE OF EVENT: |
| | A. IMMEDIATECAUSE: |
| | The immediate cause of the plant being in outside its design basis was a small breach in the flexible duct connection for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan. The calculated leakage was in excess of the allowable in-leakage listed in UFSAR Table 6.4-1. |
| | B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: |
| | The intermediate cause of the small breach was two small tears in the flexible duct work connector on the suction of the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan. |
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| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE (3) |
| | RDIISION |
| | ~R BEOOENtIAL NOMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 - 00 4 OF 6 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of hfRC Form 366AJ I17) |
| | C. ROOT CAUSE: |
| | Two tears were identified on opposite sides of the round duct at the inlet of the return air fan. |
| | Similar material from'stock was later cut by a knife and examined. It was confirmed that the knife cut was not similar to that which was discovered in the Control Building HVAC equipment room. It was also verified that the material is very strong and not subject to tearing with manual hand forces. All of the flexible joint connectors in the Control Building HVAC equipment room, including the damaged joint, had been replaced during the 1999 refueling outage. Post modification testing and QC inspections during and after the installations verified acceptable ductwork flexible joint configurations as part of the modification turnover process. The duct work up to the edge of the joint was insulated after the testing. The joint was not re-tested after completion of the insulation work and other post modification demobilization. |
| | The characteristics of the Temporary Modification make visual inspection of the tears impossible at this time. Therefore, given that the joint was,intact and inspected for leakage at the end of the outage and, given the known physical characteristics of the tear, it was determined that further evaluation must be conducted when the joint is disassembled for replacement. Due to the Technical Specification requirements for operability of the Control Room" HVAC System, it is expected that this will occur during the next refueling outage. |
| | IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT: |
| | This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclear power plant being...ln a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant" and 10CFR50.73, License Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(i)(B) which requires a report of "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications". The leakage due to the tear in the flexible coupling was greater than the assumed leakage in the accident analysis, as described in the UFSAR. |
| | An assessment considering the consequences and implications of this event resulted in the following conclusions: |
| | There were no operational or safety consequences and implications attributed to the increase in" leakage because: |
| | Although the in-leakage was in excess of that assumed in the UFSAR, the actual amount was only 2.2% of the total flow in the system. In addition, during accident conditions, approximately 20% of the total flow is diverted through the charcoal filter unit down stream of the in-leakage. This would serve to reduce the effect of any excess activity ingested into the system due to the tear. |
| | Any event that results in a significant release would require entry into the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, resulting in continuous Radiation Protection (RP) technician coverage in the Control Room. In this situation the Control Room area radiation and airborne activity are continuously monitored. Should the activity concentration reach unacceptable levels, the RP technician would implement appropriate protective actions. |
| | Some of the contingencies available are respirators and potassium iodide tablets to limit the uptake of radioactive iodine. |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENEIAL REVISION VEAR NUMBER NUMSER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 -. 011 .. OP 5 OF 6 TEXT ilfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) |
| | ~ From a toxic gas perspective, the most likely source of significant toxic gas release was removed from site several years ago with the removal of the anhydrous ammonia tank outside the Condensate Demineralizer building. The remaining on-site chemicals, which could result in a toxic gas situation (chlorine, ammonia, hydrazine, sulfuric acid, and sodium hydroxide) are in a liquid state. Therefore, due to the slower evaporation rate, the Control Room atmosphere is less likely to reach hazardous airborne concentrations during a spill. In addition, the sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide tanks in the primary demineralizer room have been emptied and are no longer in use. Similar tanks in the Condensate Demineralizer building are located in separate pits which prevents inadvertent mixing of these chemicals. |
| | The next most likely toxic gas release source is gaseous chlorine located at the Ontario water plant, approximately one mile to the east of the plant. The distance involved would, allow significant dilution of the gas in the atmosphere. Also, the water plant is in a location, where the prevailing winds in the area tend to blow the gas away from the plant. Finally, the presence of these gasses in the Control Room atmosphere would be readily apparent to the Operators due to the noxious nature of the fumes. There are two Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units located in the Control Room with an additional five units located in the fire lockers outside the Control Room door. |
| | Based on the above, it is concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times. |
| | V. CORRECTIVE ACTION: |
| | ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: |
| | Temporary Modification 99-029 was implemented to restore the joint to a leak tight condition. |
| | Work Order 19902982 is planned to replace the existing flexible joint material with a new flexible joint. |
| | Other flexible joint material joints in the Control Building HVAC equipment room were examined and were found to be in new condition with no tears. |
| | ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| | ~ A sign was added to this location to state that the ductwork should not be stepped upon. |
| | ~ The joint will be closely inspected for potential damage mechanism during the replacement, presently planned for the next refueling outage. Should this inspection yield any additional information relating to root cause, appropriate corrective actions will be implemented and a revised LER will be. transmitted to the NRC. |
|
| |
|
| NRC FORM 366A (8 1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET (2)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBEA BEYISION NUMBER PAGE (3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999-011-00 6 OF 6 TEXT iif more space is required, use addi rional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)Vl.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: | | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8 1998) |
| A.~FAILED COMPONENTS: | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| The failed component is"Flexglas", manufactured by Vent Fabrics, Inc.The specific application is as a Flexible Duct Connector SCS152 in the Control Room HVAC system.B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events, with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. | | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None}} | | SEQUENTIAL BEYISION YEAR NUMBEA NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 00 6 OF 6 TEXT iifmore space is required, use addi rional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17) |
| | Vl. ADDITIONALINFORMATION: |
| | A. ~ FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| | The failed component is "Flexglas", manufactured by Vent Fabrics, Inc. The specific application is as a Flexible Duct Connector SCS152 in the Control Room HVAC system. |
| | B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: |
| | A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: |
| | No documentation of similar LER events, with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. |
| | C. SPECIAL COMMENTS: |
| | None}} |
Similar Documents at Ginna |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
REGULATORY INFOiQQTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9909290014 DOC.DATE: 99/09/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTF,. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
. RUBY,R.M. Rochester Gas &. Electric Corp.
MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING,G.S.
SUBJECT:
LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small tears were discovered in flexible duct work connector wt inlet of CR HVAC sys return air fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage greater than assumed.
Joint was restored to leak tight condition. With 990922 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ' ENCL LP 1 1 VISSING,G 1 INTE L: FILE CENTER 1 1 NRR/DIPM/IOLB 1 1 R/DRIP~RERB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/ERAB 1 1 RES/DRAA/OERAB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LMITCO MARSHALL 1 '
NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 ' NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE L ST DOCUMENT CONTRO DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 15 ENCL 15
4ND ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EASTAVEhlUE, ROCHESTER, N. Y Id6d9-0001 AREA CODE 716 5'-2700 ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operations September 22, 1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
LER 1999-011, Small Breach in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Vissing:
The attached Licensee Event Report LER 1999-011 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a) (2) (ii) (B) and (a) (2) (i) (B), which require a report of, "Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclt ar power plant being...In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant." or "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications".
Ver truly yours, Robert C. Mec xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop SC2)
Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior'esident Inspector 99092'st0014 990922 PDR AOQCK 05000244 8 PDR
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB IBBB}
fsbCPel PurPeyn pe Yresponke tlat corIIpPywiNLIs rrdn<PaIory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) hdustiy. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Ma'nagement Branch (T4 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001 and to ~
(See reverse for required number of the Paperwork Reduction Project (31504104), Office of digits/characters for each block) Management and Budget, Washington, OC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a FACILITY NAME I1} DQGKET NUMBER <2} - PAGE f3}
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1 OF 6 mLE I4)
Small Breach, in Ventilation System Results in Plant Being Outside Design Basis.
EVENT DATE (5) ,LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7} OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEOUENTIAL REVSION MONTH OAY YEAR MONTH OAY NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FAG ILrrY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 23 1999 1999 011 00 09 22 1999 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED P URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) '11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a) (3)(i) 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) (x)
LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 73.71 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 20.2203(a) (2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a) (2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2)(vii) or in NRC Form 36BA LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12}
TELEPHONE NUMBER Iirciude Aiee Code)
'Robert M. Ruby - Senior Licensing Engineer (716) 771-3572 REPOR'TABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX TO EPIX Vl ECON VOB7 SUPPLEMENTAL REP08T ExPEGTED (14} MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On August 23, 1999, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% steady state reactor power. At approximately 10:15 EDST, small tears were discovered in the flexible duct work connector at the inlet of the Control Room HVAC, System Return Air Fan (AKF08). The plant entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 for approximately 48 minutes while temporary repairs were made.
Subsequently, it was determined that the openings could have caused an in-leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis, placing the plant in e condition outside its design basis. This was reported to the NRC within one hour of the determination per 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B).
Corrective action to prevent recurrence is listed in Section V.B.
lI NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB IBBB)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3)
SEQUENTIAL REMSIQN TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 O11 .. OP 2 OF 6 TEXT lifmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)
PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
On August 23, 1999 the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% steady state reactor power.
Engineering management was making a tour/inspection of the Control Room HVAC system in preparation for an upcoming modification.
The Control Room HVAC system is designed to provide conditioned air at the proper temperature and to isolate and re-circulate the air upon receiving an isolation signal indicating the presence of radioactivity or toxic gas.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES' August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Event date and time.
o ~
August 23, 1999, 1015 EDST: Discovery date and time.
August 23, 1999, 1103 EDST: Temporary repairs completed.
August 23, 1999,.1145 EDST: Further evaluation indicates that the tear could have allowed in-leakage beyond design basis.
August 23, 1999, 1225 EDST: NRC Operations Center is notified of this event per 1 0C FR 50.72(b) (1 ) (ii)(B)
EVENT:
On August 23, 1999, at approximately 1015 EDST, while performing a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System, the Balance of Plarit Systems Engineering Manager discovered tears in the rubber portion of the inlet flexible ductwork connector (expansion joint) for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan (AKF08). A tear at this location would allow ou)qide air flow into the system in the post accident recirculation mode. The Control Room operators w~(e notified, the system was declared inoperable, and the plant entered Ginna Station Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. At approximately 1103 EPPT, Temporary Modification 99-029 was successfully installed which sealed the duct from potential in-leakage.
The system was then declared operable and ITS LCO 3.0.3. was exited;." Due to the timely repairs/modification, a unit shutdown was not required and a load reduction was not commenced.
Subsequent to returning the system to operable status, evaluations completed at approximately 1145 EDST indicated that the tear could have allowed in-leakage in excess of the assumed leak rate listed in the Ginna Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 6.4, Table 6.4-1.
With this information it was assumed that the system had been outside the design basis and this was reported to the NRC Operations Center per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), at 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 ISSB)
'
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
BEUUENTNL RatISION R
NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 00 3 OF 6 TEXT (llmore space is required, use eddidonel copies of IVRC Form 366A) (17)
C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:
None D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
None E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
The condition was self-identified by engineering management personnel during a walkdown of the Control Room HVAC System.
F. OPERATOR ACTION:
The Control Room Operators, upon notification of the condition, entered ITS LCO 3.0.3 and prepared to start a plant shutdown, if required. A'fter the system was declared operable at 1103 EDST, the LCO was exited. At approximately 1145 EDST, plant staff determined that a non-emergency one hour notification, per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), should be made to the NRC Operations Center. The Shift Supervisor made this notification at approximately 1225 EDST on August 23, 1999. The NRC Resident was also notified at this time.
G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
None III. CAUSE OF EVENT:
A. IMMEDIATECAUSE:
The immediate cause of the plant being in outside its design basis was a small breach in the flexible duct connection for the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan. The calculated leakage was in excess of the allowable in-leakage listed in UFSAR Table 6.4-1.
B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:
The intermediate cause of the small breach was two small tears in the flexible duct work connector on the suction of the Control Room HVAC System Return Air Fan.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE (3)
RDIISION
~R BEOOENtIAL NOMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 - 00 4 OF 6 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of hfRC Form 366AJ I17)
C. ROOT CAUSE:
Two tears were identified on opposite sides of the round duct at the inlet of the return air fan.
Similar material from'stock was later cut by a knife and examined. It was confirmed that the knife cut was not similar to that which was discovered in the Control Building HVAC equipment room. It was also verified that the material is very strong and not subject to tearing with manual hand forces. All of the flexible joint connectors in the Control Building HVAC equipment room, including the damaged joint, had been replaced during the 1999 refueling outage. Post modification testing and QC inspections during and after the installations verified acceptable ductwork flexible joint configurations as part of the modification turnover process. The duct work up to the edge of the joint was insulated after the testing. The joint was not re-tested after completion of the insulation work and other post modification demobilization.
The characteristics of the Temporary Modification make visual inspection of the tears impossible at this time. Therefore, given that the joint was,intact and inspected for leakage at the end of the outage and, given the known physical characteristics of the tear, it was determined that further evaluation must be conducted when the joint is disassembled for replacement. Due to the Technical Specification requirements for operability of the Control Room" HVAC System, it is expected that this will occur during the next refueling outage.
IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition...that resulted in the nuclear power plant being...ln a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant" and 10CFR50.73, License Event Reporting System, item (a)(2)(i)(B) which requires a report of "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications". The leakage due to the tear in the flexible coupling was greater than the assumed leakage in the accident analysis, as described in the UFSAR.
An assessment considering the consequences and implications of this event resulted in the following conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences and implications attributed to the increase in" leakage because:
Although the in-leakage was in excess of that assumed in the UFSAR, the actual amount was only 2.2% of the total flow in the system. In addition, during accident conditions, approximately 20% of the total flow is diverted through the charcoal filter unit down stream of the in-leakage. This would serve to reduce the effect of any excess activity ingested into the system due to the tear.
Any event that results in a significant release would require entry into the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, resulting in continuous Radiation Protection (RP) technician coverage in the Control Room. In this situation the Control Room area radiation and airborne activity are continuously monitored. Should the activity concentration reach unacceptable levels, the RP technician would implement appropriate protective actions.
Some of the contingencies available are respirators and potassium iodide tablets to limit the uptake of radioactive iodine.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEOUENEIAL REVISION VEAR NUMBER NUMSER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 -. 011 .. OP 5 OF 6 TEXT ilfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
~ From a toxic gas perspective, the most likely source of significant toxic gas release was removed from site several years ago with the removal of the anhydrous ammonia tank outside the Condensate Demineralizer building. The remaining on-site chemicals, which could result in a toxic gas situation (chlorine, ammonia, hydrazine, sulfuric acid, and sodium hydroxide) are in a liquid state. Therefore, due to the slower evaporation rate, the Control Room atmosphere is less likely to reach hazardous airborne concentrations during a spill. In addition, the sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide tanks in the primary demineralizer room have been emptied and are no longer in use. Similar tanks in the Condensate Demineralizer building are located in separate pits which prevents inadvertent mixing of these chemicals.
The next most likely toxic gas release source is gaseous chlorine located at the Ontario water plant, approximately one mile to the east of the plant. The distance involved would, allow significant dilution of the gas in the atmosphere. Also, the water plant is in a location, where the prevailing winds in the area tend to blow the gas away from the plant. Finally, the presence of these gasses in the Control Room atmosphere would be readily apparent to the Operators due to the noxious nature of the fumes. There are two Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units located in the Control Room with an additional five units located in the fire lockers outside the Control Room door.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
Temporary Modification 99-029 was implemented to restore the joint to a leak tight condition.
Work Order 19902982 is planned to replace the existing flexible joint material with a new flexible joint.
Other flexible joint material joints in the Control Building HVAC equipment room were examined and were found to be in new condition with no tears.
ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
~ A sign was added to this location to state that the ductwork should not be stepped upon.
~ The joint will be closely inspected for potential damage mechanism during the replacement, presently planned for the next refueling outage. Should this inspection yield any additional information relating to root cause, appropriate corrective actions will be implemented and a revised LER will be. transmitted to the NRC.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8 1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL BEYISION YEAR NUMBEA NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 011 00 6 OF 6 TEXT iifmore space is required, use addi rional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)
Vl. ADDITIONALINFORMATION:
A. ~ FAILED COMPONENTS:
The failed component is "Flexglas", manufactured by Vent Fabrics, Inc. The specific application is as a Flexible Duct Connector SCS152 in the Control Room HVAC system.
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results:
No documentation of similar LER events, with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.
C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None