ML17266A145: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Initial Report-Se ember 17, 1979 NRC PORI0 260 P TTt LlCENSEE EYENT REPORT U S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAtISSIOI+
{{#Wiki_filter:Initial             Report-Se               ember 17, 1979 NRC PORI0 260                                                                                                                           U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAtISSIOI+
CONTROl BL,CCIC: I l l l t Ol=(PLEASE PAINT OR YPE ALL REQUIRED INPORAtATIONI O.9 LICCySEE CODE O.16 I.ECca St~YPC 10 S~CAF St UCMc 5'aIcac SEA 2 CON'T 9 OR 71 IQE.1 lll l O9 EVCKA O*T 15 AEPDAT OATS 50'.;;LL ca 0 51 0 0 3 I 5 QLAAA 60 6I OOCaI~NuaFaSSA 61 cEI EV ENT 0 ESCR IPTION~O PR 0 9 4SLE COaI5 ECU B4CES+Io While in the cold shutdown con%Cion during Hurricane David, a cable fell 0 2 across lines jnto the"B" S/U transformer, causing a lockout on the~0 East Bus and de-energizing the"B" S/U transformer.
P TTt LlCENSEE EYENT REPORT CONTROl BL,CCIC:                         l     l           l     t Ol       =         (PLEASE PAINT OR           YPE   ALLREQUIRED INPORAtATIONI QQIFILI2    9 1115111*1 LICCySEE CODE I
The"B" A.C.electri-cal system was de-energized, and the"B" Diesel Generator (.DG)failed to start.Following an electrical check-out, the"B" DG was manually started QQIFILI 1115111*1 I-I I.I I I-l 3\I I I Q~Q'Adequate core cooling was maintained at all times.This is the fifth occurrence of this'type (See LERs 335-76-21, 76-44, 77-3 and 77-]5).STSTEu CAVSE , CAVSS COMP..VAIVc CODE CODE SVSCDDS'CMIOKCKTCDOS SVS 005 SVSCDOc aac~EE Q LEJQ EAJQ~ll E L 11 Yl 3 Q LAJQ~2Q 1 6': 9 IO tl, Il!2'IS 19 10 ScDVCKTIAL OCCVAAEIICE REPORT REVISIOK~LcAIEIO EV EAT YEAA'AcroAT KO, CODE TYPE.PIO.QYE>>-Fa 0~79'+~02 8+~~01 2I 11 26'6 ll 15 29 20 SI IOK PVTVA c Clr EC.Sy VTDDEEa ATT*Caa&SIaT NPR~PRIME CI>>MI, COMPOK cKT TA)CSN AiTIOac CK>LrLK~SIETAOO IIOVAS 2'1 SVScaI~~ao PCAM 1 VS, SV PPLI EA MAIIVSA~VAEA LAaa~ZQ cZQ~ZQ'~00 0~YQ~AQ 13 IQ 3 3 4 51'c SS 26.2I 40 41 42 40 44 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRM'PIV ACTiONS O2l An investighti on revealed that a rela in the auto-start circuitr of the~"B" DG was mechanically binding.This relay was.replaced.An operational test was then satisfactorily completed whereby the"B" S/U transformer (which had been repaired and tested)was intentionally de-energized.
O.                  I-          I  I. I UCMc 5'aIcac SEA I      I-l    3      \ O.16 I    I I.ECca St ~
The"B" DG was observed to auto-start an 0'2 9 P*CIU.Y.Sa ATVS!~POWSA 5~~QEZ~00 D Qc l 2 t0 ll 12*CttVITY CoaITS."IT
I YPC   10 Q~Q S ~ CAF St CON'T
~ACLSA&0 OIa ASLEASE AMOV KTora ACTIV ITY OSS 9~Z Q22~ZQ24 NA l 5 9 I0 I~P A505>>Ecii cXrOSVAES~D>>(P 0 QZF~ZQza NA l 5'I I 11 Il PcASOaaaa tl.IHJVAI ES a~+5 0 Qa'II LOCATION oP ASLEASS OSE NA~4, 45 METIIOO OC CTKEA sTA'555~olscov EAT olscovcAY 05$cAI pTIDK'Q~2 NA IRAQI 0 erator Observation
                  '.;;         LL ca 0 60              6I 51 0 OOCaI 0
!AI 45 20 50 1 5 0 9 I'I 12 5 LOSS OC CA OCaICCE TO PCCILtTY 2 TTTc OES Aactloaa LIB 2 l0 PVSLIr.t Y tSSVEO OCSCA:PT:Oy 9 LlLIO44~0'AAIA OP PREPARER D-K.James EOOSNIQ+Q NRC US=ONLY (3051 552-3813 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-79-.28, Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Additional Event Descri tion and Probable Conseouences 4 While in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5)during the passage of Hurricane David, a support cable for the tower crane in th ,Unit 2 construction area fell across'lines'into the"B" Start-up'Trans=ormer.
                                                                      ~
A lockout occurred on the East Bus and.the"B" Start-up Tra.sform r was de-energized.
3 NuaFaSSA I     5     QLAAA 61     cEI 9    OR EVCKA  O*T 71          IQE 15
The"B" side of the electrical system de-energized with the exception of the"B" DC Bus which was carried by the"8" battery.The"B" Inverter failed to respond but the"D" Inverter remained in service.A blown fuse was discovered later in the"B" Inverter circuit.Tne"AB" A.C.Busses were lost as they were tied to the"B" side.The"AB" D.C.Bus was lost as it was tied to"B" D.C.Bus, which is assumed to have de-energized as a result of the current transient produced by the event.The SUPS (including instrumentation, annunciation, lighting, communications
                                                                                                                                                          . 1    lll AEPDAT OATS l
[except PAX and BELL], NAMAS and Sequence of Events Recorder)was also lost.At this tim i-: was discovered that"B" Diesel Generator was not supplying loads (failed to start).Follovong a visual and electrical check-out of'he"B" Diesel Generator,'it was manua'}ly started.Adequate core cooling was maintained and verified>y starting the"A" IPSI pump and manually controlling Shutdown Cooling flow.Additional Cause D sc.i~t'.on and Corrective'Action The"A" Diesel Generator was yepified OPERABLE.All of the electrjca]
50 O9 EV ENT 0 ESCR IPTION             ~O PR 0 9 4SLE COaI5 ECU B4CES +Io 0  2          While in the cold shutdown con%Cion during Hurricane David, a cable                                                                                                     fell across lines jnto the "B" S/U transformer, causing a lockout on the
busses and components lost during event were re-energiz d.Since the reason fop the"B" Diesel Generator not starting autorqatjc~lly on vndervoltage was not.known, and the potential for a faulted bus or ground was suspected, a thorough check-out was conducted prior to manually starting and loading the"B" Diesel Generator.
~0 East Bus and de-energizing the "B" S/U transformer. The "B" A.C. electri-cal system was de-energized, and the "B" Diesel Generator (.DG) failed to start. Following an electrical check-out, the "B" DG was manually started
Two days following the event, a plant staff review and investigation revealed that the K22 relay in the auto-start circuitry of the"B" Diesel'enerator was mechanically binding.This relay was replaced.'Subsequently, an operational test was.satisfactorily completed whereby the"8" Start-up Transformer (which was repaired and tested)was intentionally de-ener g'ized, and auto-start and loading of the"B" Diesel Generator was verified to occup, 0 0}}
              'Adequate core cooling was maintained                                                       at all times.                       This is the               fifth occurrence of this'type (See                                             LERs       335-76-21, 76-44, 77-3 and 77-]5).
STSTEu             CAVSE             CAVSS                                                             COMP..           VAIVc CODE               CODE
                                                                      ,
SVSCDDS         'CMIOKCKTCDOS                                   SVS     005         SVSCDOc aac 1      6        ':                ~EE 9          IO Q
                                                        '
LEJQ EAJQ ~ll tl,              Il              !2 E   L   11     Yl 3
                                                                                                                              'IS OCCVAAEIICE Q         LAJQ 19
                                                                                                                                                                ~2Q 10 REVISIOK ~
                                                          '+
ScDVCKTIAL                                                       REPORT LcAIEIO       EV EAT YEAA                                 AcroATKO,                                   CODE                   TYPE                         .PIO.
QYE>>-Fa       0       ~79 2I          11
                                                                            ~02 '6 26 8             +~
ll
                                                                                                                      ~01 15         29           20               SI IOK PVTVAc                    Clr EC.         Sy VTDDEEa                                     ATT*Caa&SIaT           NPR~           PRIME CI>>MI,             COMPOK cKT TA)CSN   AiTIOac               CK >LrLK~         SIETAOO                     IIOVAS 2'1         SVScaI     ao     PCAM 1 VS,           SV PPLI EA           MAIIVSA ~ VAEA LAaa~ZQ cZQ ~ZQ '~00
                                                                                                                      ~ ~
SS                26.                2I 0
40
                                                                                                                  ~YQ ~AQ 41                  42 13 40 IQ     44 3       3 4     51'c 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRM'PIV ACTiONS O2l An   investighti on revealed that                                           a   rela         in the auto-start circuitr of the
          ~     "B" DG was mechanically binding. This relay was. replaced. An operational test was then satisfactorily completed whereby the "B" S/U transformer (which had been repaired and tested)                                                       was     intentionally de-energized.                                         The "B"     DG         was observed                     to auto-start                   an                   0' 2   9 P*CIU.Y.
Sa ATVS
            ~~QEZ         ~00
                                  ! POWSA
                                  ~
D CTKEA sTA'555 NA
                                                                                        ~        METIIOO OC olscov EAT 0    erator Observation olscovcAY 05$ cAIpTIDK 'Q~2 l
5 2                   t0                   ll Qc 12                                 AI IRAQI 45
                                                                                                                                                                                      !
20
          *CttVITY CoaITS."IT               ~
ACLSA&0     OIa ASLEASE                     AMOVKTora ACTIVITY OSS                                                           LOCATION oP ASLEASS OSE l
9       ~Z 9
Q22     ~ZQ24 I0             I~
NA
                                                                                          ~ 4,          45 NA 50
                                                                  'II 5
P A505>>Ecii cXrOSVAES
            ~D>>     (P 0         QZF ~ZQza                                       NA l       5 PcASOaaaa
                            'I I       11 tl. IHJVAIES Il a       ~+5           0 Qa I 'I                            5 1       5   9                         12 LOSS OC CA OCaICCE TO PCCILtTY TTTc LIB 2
OES Aactloaa l0 2
EOOSNIQ                      +Q PVSLIr.tY                                                                                                                                            NRC US= ONLY tSSVEO     OCSCA:PT:Oy           9 0      LlLIO44
                        ~
0'AAIA OP PREPARER D- K. James                                                                   (3051 552-3813
 
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE   335-79-.28, Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Additional Event Descri tion   and Probable Conseouences 4
While in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5) during the passage of Hurricane David, a support cable for the tower crane in th ,Unit 2 construction area fell across 'lines 'into the "B" Start-up 'Trans=ormer. A lockout occurred on the East Bus and.the "B" Start-up Tra .sform r was de-energized.
The "B" side of the electrical system de-energized with the exception of the "B" DC Bus which was carried by the "8" battery. The "B" Inverter failed to respond but the "D" Inverter remained in service.       A blown fuse was discovered later in the "B" Inverter circuit. Tne "AB" A.C. Busses were lost as they were tied to the "B" side. The "AB" D.C. Bus was lost as     it "B" D.C. Bus, which is assumed to have de-energized as a result of the current was tied to transient produced by the event. The SUPS (including instrumentation, annunciation, lighting, communications [except PAX and BELL], NAMAS and Sequence of Events Recorder) was also lost. At this tim i-: was discovered that "B" Diesel Generator was not supplying loads (failed to start). Follovong a visual and electrical check-out of'he "B" Diesel Generator,       'it was manua'}ly started.
Adequate core cooling was maintained and verified >y starting the "A" IPSI pump and manually controlling Shutdown Cooling flow.
Additional Cause D sc. i~t'.on and Corrective'Action The "A" Diesel Generator was yepified OPERABLE. All of   the electrjca] busses and components lost during event were re-energiz     d. Since the reason fop the "B" Diesel Generator not starting autorqatjc~lly on vndervoltage was not
.known, and the potential for a faulted bus or ground was suspected, a thorough check-out was conducted prior to manually starting and loading the "B" Diesel Generator. Two days following the event, a plant staff review and investigation revealed that the K22 relay in the auto-start circuitry of the "B" was mechanically binding. This relay was replaced.       'Subsequently, Diesel'enerator an operational test was .satisfactorily completed whereby the "8" Start-up Transformer (which was repaired and tested) was intentionally de-ener g'ized, and auto-start and loading of the "B" Diesel Generator was verified to occup,
 
0 0}}

Revision as of 17:38, 29 October 2019

Updated LER 79-028/01X-1:on 790903,in Cold Shutdown During Hurricane,Cable Fell Into Startup Transformer B.Ac Electrical Sys B de-energized & Diesel Generator Failed to Start.Caused by Delay in B Diesel Binding
ML17266A145
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/11/1980
From: James D
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17207A841 List:
References
LER-79-028-01X, LER-79-28-1X, NUDOCS 8002220334
Download: ML17266A145 (3)


Text

Initial Report-Se ember 17, 1979 NRC PORI0 260 U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAtISSIOI+

P TTt LlCENSEE EYENT REPORT CONTROl BL,CCIC: l l l t Ol = (PLEASE PAINT OR YPE ALLREQUIRED INPORAtATIONI QQIFILI2 9 1115111*1 LICCySEE CODE I

O. I- I I. I UCMc 5'aIcac SEA I I-l 3 \ O.16 I I I.ECca St ~

I YPC 10 Q~Q S ~ CAF St CON'T

'.;; LL ca 0 60 6I 51 0 OOCaI 0

~

3 NuaFaSSA I 5 QLAAA 61 cEI 9 OR EVCKA O*T 71 IQE 15

. 1 lll AEPDAT OATS l

50 O9 EV ENT 0 ESCR IPTION ~O PR 0 9 4SLE COaI5 ECU B4CES +Io 0 2 While in the cold shutdown con%Cion during Hurricane David, a cable fell across lines jnto the "B" S/U transformer, causing a lockout on the

~0 East Bus and de-energizing the "B" S/U transformer. The "B" A.C. electri-cal system was de-energized, and the "B" Diesel Generator (.DG) failed to start. Following an electrical check-out, the "B" DG was manually started

'Adequate core cooling was maintained at all times. This is the fifth occurrence of this'type (See LERs 335-76-21, 76-44, 77-3 and 77-]5).

STSTEu CAVSE CAVSS COMP.. VAIVc CODE CODE

,

SVSCDDS 'CMIOKCKTCDOS SVS 005 SVSCDOc aac 1 6 ': ~EE 9 IO Q

'

LEJQ EAJQ ~ll tl, Il !2 E L 11 Yl 3

'IS OCCVAAEIICE Q LAJQ 19

~2Q 10 REVISIOK ~

'+

ScDVCKTIAL REPORT LcAIEIO EV EAT YEAA AcroATKO, CODE TYPE .PIO.

QYE>>-Fa 0 ~79 2I 11

~02 '6 26 8 +~

ll

~01 15 29 20 SI IOK PVTVAc Clr EC. Sy VTDDEEa ATT*Caa&SIaT NPR~ PRIME CI>>MI, COMPOK cKT TA)CSN AiTIOac CK >LrLK~ SIETAOO IIOVAS 2'1 SVScaI ao PCAM 1 VS, SV PPLI EA MAIIVSA ~ VAEA LAaa~ZQ cZQ ~ZQ '~00

~ ~

SS 26. 2I 0

40

~YQ ~AQ 41 42 13 40 IQ 44 3 3 4 51'c 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRM'PIV ACTiONS O2l An investighti on revealed that a rela in the auto-start circuitr of the

~ "B" DG was mechanically binding. This relay was. replaced. An operational test was then satisfactorily completed whereby the "B" S/U transformer (which had been repaired and tested) was intentionally de-energized. The "B" DG was observed to auto-start an 0' 2 9 P*CIU.Y.

Sa ATVS

~~QEZ ~00

! POWSA

~

D CTKEA sTA'555 NA

~ METIIOO OC olscov EAT 0 erator Observation olscovcAY 05$ cAIpTIDK 'Q~2 l

5 2 t0 ll Qc 12 AI IRAQI 45

!

20

  • CttVITY CoaITS."IT ~

ACLSA&0 OIa ASLEASE AMOVKTora ACTIVITY OSS LOCATION oP ASLEASS OSE l

9 ~Z 9

Q22 ~ZQ24 I0 I~

NA

~ 4, 45 NA 50

'II 5

P A505>>Ecii cXrOSVAES

~D>> (P 0 QZF ~ZQza NA l 5 PcASOaaaa

'I I 11 tl. IHJVAIES Il a ~+5 0 Qa I 'I 5 1 5 9 12 LOSS OC CA OCaICCE TO PCCILtTY TTTc LIB 2

OES Aactloaa l0 2

EOOSNIQ +Q PVSLIr.tY NRC US= ONLY tSSVEO OCSCA:PT:Oy 9 0 LlLIO44

~

0'AAIA OP PREPARER D- K. James (3051 552-3813

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-79-.28, Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Additional Event Descri tion and Probable Conseouences 4

While in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5) during the passage of Hurricane David, a support cable for the tower crane in th ,Unit 2 construction area fell across 'lines 'into the "B" Start-up 'Trans=ormer. A lockout occurred on the East Bus and.the "B" Start-up Tra .sform r was de-energized.

The "B" side of the electrical system de-energized with the exception of the "B" DC Bus which was carried by the "8" battery. The "B" Inverter failed to respond but the "D" Inverter remained in service. A blown fuse was discovered later in the "B" Inverter circuit. Tne "AB" A.C. Busses were lost as they were tied to the "B" side. The "AB" D.C. Bus was lost as it "B" D.C. Bus, which is assumed to have de-energized as a result of the current was tied to transient produced by the event. The SUPS (including instrumentation, annunciation, lighting, communications [except PAX and BELL], NAMAS and Sequence of Events Recorder) was also lost. At this tim i-: was discovered that "B" Diesel Generator was not supplying loads (failed to start). Follovong a visual and electrical check-out of'he "B" Diesel Generator, 'it was manua'}ly started.

Adequate core cooling was maintained and verified >y starting the "A" IPSI pump and manually controlling Shutdown Cooling flow.

Additional Cause D sc. i~t'.on and Corrective'Action The "A" Diesel Generator was yepified OPERABLE. All of the electrjca] busses and components lost during event were re-energiz d. Since the reason fop the "B" Diesel Generator not starting autorqatjc~lly on vndervoltage was not

.known, and the potential for a faulted bus or ground was suspected, a thorough check-out was conducted prior to manually starting and loading the "B" Diesel Generator. Two days following the event, a plant staff review and investigation revealed that the K22 relay in the auto-start circuitry of the "B" was mechanically binding. This relay was replaced. 'Subsequently, Diesel'enerator an operational test was .satisfactorily completed whereby the "8" Start-up Transformer (which was repaired and tested) was intentionally de-ener g'ized, and auto-start and loading of the "B" Diesel Generator was verified to occup,

0 0