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{{#Wiki_filter:Risk CommunicationLecture 8-41 Key TopicsDefinitionChallenges2Overview Resourcesrisk-informed regulatory decision-Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)J. PersenskyNUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.3Overview Other ReferencesNational Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg(eds), National Academies Press, 1996.V.T. CovelloOPA-87-020, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1988.B. FischhoffRisk Analysis, 15, 137145, 1995.Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.4Overview Defining Risk CommunicationFor PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed asa means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)Note: educational approach Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needsneeds to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk5Communication, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.Definition Points of Communication BreakdownsDifferences in perception of informationRelevanceConsistency with prior beliefsLack of understanding of underlying scienceConflicting agendasFailure to listenTrustGiven breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns 6Challenges Different Perceptions of InformationPerception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of RelevanceDoes risk information address important issues?-Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?si, Ci, pi} 7-P.S. Dull, 1978Challenges Relevance: Example Stakeholder IssuesAppropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) Digital I&CSecurity-related applicationsCompleteness of scenariosRelevance of computed consequence metrics to valuesPersonal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)Environment (contamination)Scope of risk management actions8 Lack of UnderstandingSimplificationsCan be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processesCan be overdone => sound bites, memesEducation is only part of solutionEmphasize science/engineering, not mathIntended recipient needs to be receptiveMajor decision problems can last for years => educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes9ChallengesRisk information is broad, complex, and uncertain unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?
{{#Wiki_filter:Risk Communication Lecture 8-4 1
Conflicting AgendasNeutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisionsAdvocacyPersuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes) Rationalize past decisions10RiskInformationChallenges Failure to ListenFailure to hear underlying questions and concernsVarious driversSocial (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)Common behaviorsIgnoringTalking overLeads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication11Challenges TrustCritical to effective communicationIs a result of social processesCan be difficult to gain, easy to loseFor complex subjects, can be a substitute for understandingPast relationships (rapport) and credentials can be importantCan be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,Acceptance of new information12Challenges Communication ConsiderationsCommunications 101Why are we communicating?Who is our audience?What do our audiences want to know?How will we communicate?How will we respond?Who will carry out the plans? When?What problems or barriers have we planned for?Have we succeeded (in communicating)?Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance => multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)dynamic, interactive process13Social Aspect => No Easy Solution()Sympathetic Listening:Critical to trust by someViewed as sign of weakness by others Additional Cautions Be extremely careful when using PRA to Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) => (often including intended target audience)Can lead to bad behaviors14 WASH-1400 (1975)15 Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation16er 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).
 
Additional Cautions Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communicationMetricFrequency vs. probabilityRadiological vs. all effectsUnit of analysisSingle plantFleet17 Additional Cautions Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.Examples-Responses to different presentation modesBiasing from video18 StateTotalNumber%MA3169631MD51315931USA35,09210,26529On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast enough to avoid speed camera detection ("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had just left an underage drinking party and were drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.19Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015)-DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.
Overview Key Topics
Video 9/11Fire and ExplosionsFlood20Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S. Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/OECD/NEA High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) Program Phase 1Project information: http://www.oecd-nea.org/jointproj/heaf.htmlHEAF VideoTsunami Video Others Require More Work (Story Telling + Viewer Processing)Human ErrorsSuccesses/Safety21Non-Event Video Additional CautionsBe cognizant of potential unintended consequencesMessage persistenceUnanticipated response to message22 Message PersistenceRecognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions23 Unanticipated Responses24IDIDI1Adequacy of fire events databaseP1Circuit interactionsI2Scenario frequenciesP2Availability of safe shutdown equipmentI3Effect of plant operations, including comp measuresP3Fire scenario cognitive impactI4Likelihood of severe firesP4Impact of fire induced environment on operatorsE1Source fire modelingP5Role of fire brigade in plant responseE2Compartment fire modelingR1Main control room firesE3Multi-compartment fire modelingR2Turbine building firesE4Smoke generation and transport modelingR3Containment firesH1Circuit failure mode and likelihoodR4Seismic/fire interactionsH2Thermal fragilitiesR5Multiple unit interactionsH3Smoke fragilitiesR6Non-power and degraded conditionsH4Suppressant-related fragilitiesR7Decommissioning and decontaminationB1Adequacy of data for active and passive barriersR8Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releasesB2Barrier performance analysis toolsR9Flammable gas linesB3Barrier qualificationR10Scenario dynamicsB4Penetration sealsR11Precursor analysis methodsS1Adequacy of detection time dataR12Uncertainty analysisS2Fire protection system reliability/availabilityO1Learning from experienceS3Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual)O2Learning from othersS4Effect of compensatory measures on suppressionO3Comparison of methodologiesS5Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysisO4Standardization of methodsFrom: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.42 Looking Ahead Beyond Paper?Many displays based on paper formsNot always easy to understandEffectiveness in message transmission? Retention?Technology can enable different ways to engage audienceVideoOthers?InteractionImmersionNon-visualNeed to consider biases, appropriate balancing25}}
* Definition
* Challenges
* Dos and Donts 2
 
Overview Resources
* J.L. Marble, N. Siu, and K. Coyne, Risk communication within a risk-informed regulatory decision-making environment, Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)
* J. Persensky, et al., Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Guidelines for External Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.
* A. Szabo, et al., Effective Risk Communication: Guidelines for Internal Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.
3
 
Overview Other References
* National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg (eds), National Academies Press, 1996.
* V.T. Covello and F. Allen, Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, OPA-87-020, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1988.
* B. Fischhoff, Risk perception and communication unplugged: 20 years of process, Risk Analysis, 15, 137-145, 1995.
* Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Health Organization, Risk Characterization of Microbiological Hazards in Foods: Guidelines, Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.
* P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.
4
 
Definition Defining Risk Communication Com*mu*ni*ca*tion, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.
* For PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed as
  - imparting rather than interchange, education rather than dialog (information deficit model)
  - a means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)
* Note: educational approach
  - Works for some, can be resented and resisted (equal and opposite reaction) by others
  - Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needs
  - Involves more than just the numbers - needs to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk 5
 
Challenges Points of Communication Breakdowns
* Between risk managers and public:
  - Differences in perception of information
* Relevance
* Consistency with prior beliefs
  - Lack of understanding of underlying science
  - Conflicting agendas
  - Failure to listen
  - Trust
* Given breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns with internal risk communication 6
 
Challenges Different Perceptions of Information
* Perception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of stereotypes (e.g., the public)
* Relevance
    - Does risk information address important issues?
    - Is information timely? ( traffic cop vs. co-pilot)
* Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?
    - Technical, e.g., Risk  {si, Ci, pi}
    - Others, e.g., Risk  Hazard + Outrage Language is not merely a tool for human communication; language is itself a means by which the realities of the world are divided and viewed.
                                                                - P.S. Dull, 1978 7
 
Relevance: Example Stakeholder Issues
* Appropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) failures to stakeholders domain of expertise
  - Digital I&C
  - Security-related applications
* Completeness of scenarios
  - Acknowledged gaps (known unknowns)
  - Unrecognized gaps (unknown unknowns)
* Relevance of computed consequence metrics to values
  - Personal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)
  - Impact on particular groups (sensitive cohorts)
  - Environment (contamination)
* Scope of risk management actions 8
 
Challenges Lack of Understanding Risk information is broad, complex, and uncertain - unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?
* Simplifications
    -  Can be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processes
    -  Require considerable effort (messaging)
    -  Can be overdone => sound bites, memes
* Education is only part of solution              Aleatory
    -  Emphasize science/engineering, not math
    -  Intended recipient needs to be receptive
    -  Major decision problems can last for years
        => educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes 9
 
Challenges Conflicting Agendas
* Neutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisions Risk Information
* Advocacy
  - Persuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes)
  - Rationalize past decisions 10
 
Challenges Failure to Listen
* Failure to hear underlying questions and concerns
* Various drivers
  - Social (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)
  - Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)
* Common behaviors
  - Ignoring
  - Talking over
  - Helpful translation
* Leads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication 11
 
Challenges Trust
* Critical to effective communication
* Is a result of social processes
  - Can be difficult to gain, easy to lose
  - For complex subjects, can be a substitute for understanding
  - Past relationships (rapport) and credentials can be important
* Can be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,
  - Right actions demonstrating shared values
  - Acceptance of new information 12
 
Dos and Donts Communication Considerations
* Communications 101                                          Social Aspect =>
  - Why are we communicating?                                No Easy Solution
  - Who is our audience?                                  (One mans meat)
  - What do our audiences want to know?
Sympathetic Listening:
  - How will we communicate?                              Critical to trust by some
  - How will we respond?                                  Viewed as sign of weakness by others
  - Who will carry out the plans? When?
  - What problems or barriers have we planned for?
  - Have we succeeded (in communicating)?
* For risk communication
  - Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance =>
multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)
  - No cookbook beyond general good practices; need to treat as a dynamic, interactive process 13
 
Dos and Donts Additional Cautions
* Be extremely careful when using PRA to prove plant safety
  - Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)
  - Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) =>
argument doesnt work with many stakeholders (often including intended target audience)
  - Can lead to bad behaviors 14
 
Dos and Donts WASH-1400 (1975) 15
 
Dos and Donts Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation G. Krueger and F. Ferrante, Facilitating Regulatory Change through an Understanding of the Current Levels of Safety, November 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).
16
 
Dos and Donts Additional Cautions
* Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communication
  - Metric
* Frequency vs. probability
* Radiological vs. all effects
  - Unit of analysis
* Single plant
* Fleet 17
 
Dos and Donts Additional Cautions
* Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.
* Examples
  - Desire for certainty (one-handed scientist)
  - Responses to different presentation modes
* Analytics vs. stories
* Biasing from video 18
 
Dos and Donts Analytics vs. Narratives (Stories)
Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015)                                              On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton High Schools star quarterback was going over 100 BAC  0.08                  mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast State                  Total                  Number                      %  enough to avoid speed camera detection
("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, MA                      316                          96                  31 the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the MD                      513                        159                    31 scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had USA                  35,092                      10,265                    29 just left an underage drinking party and were National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts: Alcohol- drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular Impaired Driving, DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.
manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.
19
 
Dos and Donts Video - Some Subjects Are Easy
* 9/11 HEAF Video
* Fire and Explosions OECD/NEA High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) Program Phase 1 Project information: http://www.oecd-nea.org/jointproj/heaf.html
* Flood                                  Tsunami Video Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S.
Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/                      20
 
Dos and Donts Others Require More Work (Story Telling +
Viewer Processing)
* Human Errors
* Successes/Safety Non-Event Video 21
 
Dos and Donts Additional Cautions
* Be cognizant of potential unintended consequences
  - Message persistence
  - Unanticipated response to message 22
 
Dos and Donts Message Persistence Recognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions 23
 
Dos and Donts Unanticipated Responses ID    Fire PRA Issue                                      ID    Fire PRA Issue I1  Adequacy of fire events database                        P1  Circuit interactions I2  Scenario frequencies                                    P2  Availability of safe shutdown equipment I3  Effect of plant operations, including comp measures    P3  Fire scenario cognitive impact I4  Likelihood of severe fires                              P4  Impact of fire induced environment on operators E1  Source fire modeling                                    P5  Role of fire brigade in plant response 42 E2  Compartment fire modeling                              R1  Main control room fires E3  Multi-compartment fire modeling                        R2  Turbine building fires E4  Smoke generation and transport modeling                R3  Containment fires H1  Circuit failure mode and likelihood                    R4  Seismic/fire interactions H2  Thermal fragilities                                    R5  Multiple unit interactions H3  Smoke fragilities                                      R6  Non-power and degraded conditions H4  Suppressant-related fragilities                        R7  Decommissioning and decontamination B1  Adequacy of data for active and passive barriers        R8  Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releases B2  Barrier performance analysis tools                      R9  Flammable gas lines B3  Barrier qualification                                  R10  Scenario dynamics B4  Penetration seals                                      R11  Precursor analysis methods S1  Adequacy of detection time data                        R12  Uncertainty analysis S2  Fire protection system reliability/availability        O1  Learning from experience S3  Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual)          O2  Learning from others S4  Effect of compensatory measures on suppression          O3  Comparison of methodologies S5  Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysis    O4  Standardization of methods From: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah, Research Needs in Fire Risk Assessment, NUREG/CP-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.
24
 
Looking Ahead - Beyond Paper?
* Many displays based on paper forms
  - Not always easy to understand
  - Effectiveness in message transmission?
Retention?
* Technology can enable different ways to engage audience
  - Video
  - Others?
* Interaction
* Immersion
* Non-visual
* Need to consider biases, appropriate balancing 25}}

Latest revision as of 07:54, 20 October 2019

Lecture 8-4 Risk Communication 2019-01-22
ML19011A441
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/16/2019
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
Nathan Siu 415-0744
Shared Package
ML19011A416 List:
References
Download: ML19011A441 (25)
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Text

Risk Communication Lecture 8-4 1

Overview Key Topics

  • Definition
  • Challenges
  • Dos and Donts 2

Overview Resources

  • J.L. Marble, N. Siu, and K. Coyne, Risk communication within a risk-informed regulatory decision-making environment, Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)
  • J. Persensky, et al., Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Guidelines for External Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.
  • A. Szabo, et al., Effective Risk Communication: Guidelines for Internal Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.

3

Overview Other References

  • National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg (eds), National Academies Press, 1996.
  • B. Fischhoff, Risk perception and communication unplugged: 20 years of process, Risk Analysis, 15, 137-145, 1995.
  • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Health Organization, Risk Characterization of Microbiological Hazards in Foods: Guidelines, Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.
  • P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.

4

Definition Defining Risk Communication Com*mu*ni*ca*tion, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.

  • For PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed as

- imparting rather than interchange, education rather than dialog (information deficit model)

- a means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)

  • Note: educational approach

- Works for some, can be resented and resisted (equal and opposite reaction) by others

- Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needs

- Involves more than just the numbers - needs to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk 5

Challenges Points of Communication Breakdowns

  • Between risk managers and public:

- Differences in perception of information

  • Relevance
  • Consistency with prior beliefs

- Lack of understanding of underlying science

- Conflicting agendas

- Failure to listen

- Trust

  • Given breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns with internal risk communication 6

Challenges Different Perceptions of Information

  • Perception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of stereotypes (e.g., the public)
  • Relevance

- Does risk information address important issues?

- Is information timely? ( traffic cop vs. co-pilot)

  • Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?

- Technical, e.g., Risk {si, Ci, pi}

- Others, e.g., Risk Hazard + Outrage Language is not merely a tool for human communication; language is itself a means by which the realities of the world are divided and viewed.

- P.S. Dull, 1978 7

Relevance: Example Stakeholder Issues

  • Appropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) failures to stakeholders domain of expertise

- Digital I&C

- Security-related applications

  • Completeness of scenarios

- Acknowledged gaps (known unknowns)

- Unrecognized gaps (unknown unknowns)

  • Relevance of computed consequence metrics to values

- Personal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)

- Impact on particular groups (sensitive cohorts)

- Environment (contamination)

  • Scope of risk management actions 8

Challenges Lack of Understanding Risk information is broad, complex, and uncertain - unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?

  • Simplifications

- Can be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processes

- Require considerable effort (messaging)

- Can be overdone => sound bites, memes

  • Education is only part of solution Aleatory

- Emphasize science/engineering, not math

- Intended recipient needs to be receptive

- Major decision problems can last for years

=> educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes 9

Challenges Conflicting Agendas

  • Neutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisions Risk Information
  • Advocacy

- Persuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes)

- Rationalize past decisions 10

Challenges Failure to Listen

  • Failure to hear underlying questions and concerns
  • Various drivers

- Social (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)

- Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)

  • Common behaviors

- Ignoring

- Talking over

- Helpful translation

  • Leads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication 11

Challenges Trust

  • Critical to effective communication
  • Is a result of social processes

- Can be difficult to gain, easy to lose

- For complex subjects, can be a substitute for understanding

- Past relationships (rapport) and credentials can be important

  • Can be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,

- Right actions demonstrating shared values

- Acceptance of new information 12

Dos and Donts Communication Considerations

  • Communications 101 Social Aspect =>

- Why are we communicating? No Easy Solution

- Who is our audience? (One mans meat)

- What do our audiences want to know?

Sympathetic Listening:

- How will we communicate? Critical to trust by some

- How will we respond? Viewed as sign of weakness by others

- Who will carry out the plans? When?

- What problems or barriers have we planned for?

- Have we succeeded (in communicating)?

  • For risk communication

- Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance =>

multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)

- No cookbook beyond general good practices; need to treat as a dynamic, interactive process 13

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Be extremely careful when using PRA to prove plant safety

- Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)

- Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) =>

argument doesnt work with many stakeholders (often including intended target audience)

- Can lead to bad behaviors 14

Dos and Donts WASH-1400 (1975) 15

Dos and Donts Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation G. Krueger and F. Ferrante, Facilitating Regulatory Change through an Understanding of the Current Levels of Safety, November 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).

16

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communication

- Metric

  • Frequency vs. probability
  • Radiological vs. all effects

- Unit of analysis

  • Single plant
  • Fleet 17

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.
  • Examples

- Desire for certainty (one-handed scientist)

- Responses to different presentation modes

  • Analytics vs. stories
  • Biasing from video 18

Dos and Donts Analytics vs. Narratives (Stories)

Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015) On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton High Schools star quarterback was going over 100 BAC 0.08 mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast State Total Number  % enough to avoid speed camera detection

("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, MA 316 96 31 the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the MD 513 159 31 scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had USA 35,092 10,265 29 just left an underage drinking party and were National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts: Alcohol- drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular Impaired Driving, DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.

manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.

19

Dos and Donts Video - Some Subjects Are Easy

  • Flood Tsunami Video Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S.

Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/ 20

Dos and Donts Others Require More Work (Story Telling +

Viewer Processing)

  • Human Errors
  • Successes/Safety Non-Event Video 21

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Be cognizant of potential unintended consequences

- Message persistence

- Unanticipated response to message 22

Dos and Donts Message Persistence Recognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions 23

Dos and Donts Unanticipated Responses ID Fire PRA Issue ID Fire PRA Issue I1 Adequacy of fire events database P1 Circuit interactions I2 Scenario frequencies P2 Availability of safe shutdown equipment I3 Effect of plant operations, including comp measures P3 Fire scenario cognitive impact I4 Likelihood of severe fires P4 Impact of fire induced environment on operators E1 Source fire modeling P5 Role of fire brigade in plant response 42 E2 Compartment fire modeling R1 Main control room fires E3 Multi-compartment fire modeling R2 Turbine building fires E4 Smoke generation and transport modeling R3 Containment fires H1 Circuit failure mode and likelihood R4 Seismic/fire interactions H2 Thermal fragilities R5 Multiple unit interactions H3 Smoke fragilities R6 Non-power and degraded conditions H4 Suppressant-related fragilities R7 Decommissioning and decontamination B1 Adequacy of data for active and passive barriers R8 Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releases B2 Barrier performance analysis tools R9 Flammable gas lines B3 Barrier qualification R10 Scenario dynamics B4 Penetration seals R11 Precursor analysis methods S1 Adequacy of detection time data R12 Uncertainty analysis S2 Fire protection system reliability/availability O1 Learning from experience S3 Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual) O2 Learning from others S4 Effect of compensatory measures on suppression O3 Comparison of methodologies S5 Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysis O4 Standardization of methods From: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah, Research Needs in Fire Risk Assessment, NUREG/CP-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.

24

Looking Ahead - Beyond Paper?

  • Many displays based on paper forms

- Not always easy to understand

- Effectiveness in message transmission?

Retention?

  • Technology can enable different ways to engage audience

- Video

- Others?

  • Interaction
  • Immersion
  • Non-visual
  • Need to consider biases, appropriate balancing 25
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