Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities

Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities

ML031130259
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 03000306, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	03/14/1990
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-019, NUDOCS 9003080213
Download: ML031130259 (8)

I UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 14, 1990 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 90-19: POTENTIAL

LOSS OF EFFECTIVE

VOLUME FOR CONTAINMENT

RECIRCULATION

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for pressurized

water 1 reactors (PWRs).

Purpose

This information

notice is intended to alert addressees

to the possible loss of effective

volume for containment

recirculation

spray caused by the entrapment

of water in the refueling

canal of PWRs. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

This infor-mation notice resolves and completes

action on Generic Safety Issue 95,*Loss of Effective

Volume for Containment

Recirculation

Spray." Description

of Circumstances:

In 1983, the NRC staff resident inspector

at H. B. Robinson Unit 2 questioned

the licensee's

practice of leaving the refueling

canal drain valve in the closed position during plant operation.

The specific concern was that if the refueling

canal drain valve tina PWR dry containment

Is closed during plant operation

and the plant experiences

a loss-of-coolant

accident (LOCA), that fraction of the containment

spray which falls into the refueling

canal would be prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump. Eventu-ally the entire volume of the refueling

canal could be filled with water, preventing

that amount of water from being available

for the post-LOCA

re-circulation

mode for containment

and reactor cooling.A subsequent

investigation

by the H. B. Robinson licensee revealed that Westinghouse

had intended the refueling

canal drain valve to be open during operation.

However, operation

with the valve closed was found to have negligible

safety significance

because the maximum volume of water that could be entrapped

in the refueling

canal was small relative to the large volume of water available

from the refueling

water storage tank. Never-theless, the licensee decided to operate the plant with the valve open and revise plant procedures

accordingly.

9003080213 b

I C IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's

response and corrective

action (operation

with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.

Further, the staff considered

the potential

generic implications

of this issue. Of particular

concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation

water and whether this water can be adequately

drained to the containment

sump.The staff addresses

this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, 'Containment

Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine

if the entrapment

of containment

recirculation

water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures

may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated

for this safety matter.Safety Significance:

The principal

concern is the potential

for the entrapment

of containment

spray water in operating

PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient

volume of spray water is prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump, adequate flow in the containment

spray recirculation

and emergency

core coolant recirculation

mode may not be provided.

Insufficient

flow to the sump can result in inadequate

net positive suction head to the containment

spray and low pressure safety injection

pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA

contain-ment cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation

of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance

of this issue depends primarily

upon whether en-trapment of an unacceptable

volume of containment

spray water could occur during the recirculation

phase. Licensees

may wish to review the adequacy of their procedures

for ensuring proper water drainage to the containment

emergency

sump.Requiring

that the refueling

canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating

or other comparable

provisions

may be appropriate.

In this con-nection, we note that the current plant technical

specifications

for PWRs with ice-condenser

containments

include operability

and surveillance

require-ments for the refueling

canal drain valve during power operation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Chang-Yang

Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

.,, I i Attachment

IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date ot Notice No. Subject -Issuance Issued-to 90-18 90-17 Potential

Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies

for Copes-Vulcan

Valves 3/9/90 3/8/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-59, ..Supp. 2 Suppliers

of Potentially

Misrepresented

Fasteners 3/7/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.90-16 Compliance

with New Decommissioning

Rule 90-15 Reciprocity:

Notification

of Agreement

State Radiation Control Directors

Be ore Beginning

Work in Agreement States 90-14 Accidental

Disposal of Radioactive

Materials 90-13 Importance

of Review and Analysis of Safeguards

Event Logs 90-12^ Monitoring

or Interruption

of Plant Communications

90-11 Maintenance

Deficiency

Associated

with Solenoid-Operated Valves 90-10 Primary Water Stress Corrosion

Cracking (PWSCC)of Inconel 600 3/7/90 3/7/90 3/6/90 3/5/90 2/28/90 2/28/90 2/23/90 All materials

licensees.

All holders of NRC materials

licenses _._which authorize

use of radioactive

material at temporary, Job sites.All U.S. NRC byproduct material licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

~ IN 90-19 March 14, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's

response and corrective

action (operation

with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.

Further, the staff considered

the potential

generic implications

of this issue. Of particular

concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation

water and whether this water can be adequately

drained to the containment

sump.The staff addresses

this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, *Containment

Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine

if the entrapment

of containment

recirculation

water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures

may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated

for this safety matter.Safety Significance:

The principal

concern is the potential

for the entrapment

of containment

spray water in operating

PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient

volume of spray water is prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump, adequate flow in the containment

spray recirculation

and emergency

core coolant recirculation

mode may not be provided.

Insufficient

flow to the sump can result in inadequate

net positive suction head to the containment

spray and low pressure safety injection

pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA

contain-ment cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation

of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance

of this issue depends primarily

upon whether en-trapment of an unacceptable

volume of containment

spray water could occur during the recirculation

phase. Licensees

may wish to review the adequacy of their procedures

for ensuring proper water drainage to the containment

emergency

sump.Requiring

that the refueling

canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating

or other comparable

provisions

may be appropriate.

In this con-nection, we note that the current plant technical

specifications

for PWRs with ice-condenser

containments

include operability

and surveillance

require-ments for the refueling

canal drain valve during power operation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Chang-Yang

Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 $ % \Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

NoticesW:2

0-t_ -6 Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

h W -*OGCB:DOEA:NRR

• SPLB:DST:NRR

• RPB:ADM *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

• D/DET:NRR

l NPKadambi

CYLi TechEd H ?3CBerlinger

AThadani ,^02/26/90

03/07/90 03/02/90 03/7/90 03/7/90 03/4 /90I I kv 3 (* V

IN 90-XX March xx, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's

response and corrective

action (operation

with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.

Further, the staff considered

the potential

generic implications

of this issue. Of particular

concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation

water and whether this water can be adequately

drained to the containment

sump. The staff addresses

this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, Containment

Heat Removal System." However, there are PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 to determine if the entrapment

of containment

recirculation

water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was Issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures

may not have been ex-plicitly evaluated

for this safety matter.Safety Significance:

The principal

concern is the potential

for the entrapment

of containment

spray water in operating

PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient

volume of spray water is prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump, adequate flow in the containment

spray recirculation

and emergency

core coolant recirculation

mode may not be provided.

Insufficient

flow to the sump can result in inadequate

net positive suction head to the containment

spray and low pressure safety injection

pumps. Subsequently, proper post-LOCA

containment

cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation

of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance

of this issue depends primarily

upon whether entrapment

of an unacceptable

volume of containment

spray water could occur during the recirculation

phase. In order to resolve this potential

safety problem, licensees

may wish to incorporate

procedures

to ensure proper water drainage to the containment

emergency

sump, such as requiring

that the refuel-ing canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating

or consider other comparable

provisions.

In this connection, we note that the current plant technical

specifications

for PWRs with ice-condenser

containments

include operability

and surveillance

requirements

for the refueling

canal drain valve during power operation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Chang-Yang

Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI Jel\"SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

I*OGCB:DOEA:NRR

• SPLB:DST:NRR

• RPB:ADM X /OGCB:DOEA:NRR

D/D'T:NRR

D/DOEA:NRR ,gNPKadambi

CYLi TechEd CHBerlinger

AThadani CERossi 02/26/90 03/07/90 03/02/90 03/7/90 0317 /90 03/ /90

IN 90-XX March xx, 1990 The staff reviewed the licensee's

response and corrective

action (operation

with the drain valve open) and found them acceptable.

Further, the staff considered

the potential

generic implications

of this issue. Of particular

concern was whether there are large spaces that might entrap the recirculation

water and whether these spaces can be adequately

drained to the containment

sump. The staff addresses

this concern in the design review under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.2, "Containment

Heat Removal System." Those PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 may need to be reviewed carefully

to determine

if the entrapment

of containment

recirculation

water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2, but plant procedures

may not have been explicitly

evaluated

for this safety matter.Safety Significance:

The principal

concern is the potential

for the entrapment

of containment

spray water in operating

PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient

volume of spray water is prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump, adequate flow in the containment

spray recirculation

and emergency

core coolant recirculation

mode may not be provided.

Insufficient

flow to the sump can result in inadequate

net positive suction head to the containment

spray and low pressure safety injection

pumps. Subsequently

proper post-LOCA

containment

cooling and reactor core cooling can be disabled.In the NRC staff's evaluation

of Generic Safety Issue 95, the staff concluded that the safety significance

of this issue depends primarily

upon whether entrapment

of an unacceptable

volume of containment

spray water could occur during the recirculation

phase. In order to resolve this potential

safety problem, licensees

may wish to incorporate

procedures

to ensure proper water drainage to the containment

emergency

sump, such as requiring

that the refuel-ing canal drain valves be open while the reactor is operating

or consider other comparable

provisions.

In this connection, we note that the current plant technical

specifications

for PWRs with ice-condenser

containments

include operability

and surveillance

requirements

for the refueling

canal drain valve during power operation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Chang-Yang

Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices gfK Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR

SPLB: 51 NRR *RPB:ADM C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

D/DOEA:NRR

NPKadambi

CYLi* TechEd CHBerlinger

CERossi 02/26/90 03/7 /90 03/02/90 03/ /90 03/ /90

-IN 90-XX February xx, 1990 The licensee's

response and corrective

action (operation

with the drain valve open) were reviewed and found acceptable

by the staff. Further, the staff considered

the potential

generic implications

of this issue. Of particular

concern was whether there are large volumes that might entrap the recirculation

water and whether these volumes can be adequately

drained to the containment

sump. Because of the lack of specific guidance, those PWR plants that were not reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 L "Containment

Heat Removal System," may need to be reviewed carefully

to determine

if entrapment

of containment

recircula- tion water could occur. There are 27 PWR plants licensed before SRP Section 6.2.2 was issued. Other PWR plants were reviewed under SRP Section 6.2.2 but plant procedures

may not have been explicitly

evaluated

for this safety matter.Safety Significance:

The principal

concern is the potential

for containment

spray water entrapment

in operating

PWRs. The concern arises because if a sufficient

volume of spray water is prevented

from returning

to the containment

emergency

sump, adequate flow in the containment

spray recirculation

and emergency

core coolant recircu-lation mode may not be provided.

This can result in inadequate

net positive suction head to the containment

spray and low pressure safety injection

pumps and subsequent

inability

to provide proper post-LOCA

containment

and reactor core cooling.In the NRC staff's evaluation

of Generic Safety Issue 95 the staff concluded that the safety significance

of this issue depends primarily

upon whether entrapment

of an unacceptable

volume of containment

spray water could occur during the recirculation

phase. In order to ameliorate

this potential

safety problem, licensees

may wish to incorporate

procedures

to ensure proper water drainage to the containment

emergency

sump, such as requiring

that the refuel-ing canal drain valve(s) be open while the reactor is operating

or consider other comparable

provisions.

It is noted that the current plant technical specifications

for PWRs with ice-condenser

containments

include operability

and surveillance

requirements

for the refueling

canal drain valve during power operation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Chang-Yang

Li, NRR (301) 492-0875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: INFO NOTICE -KADAMBI, LI OGCB mOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR

R d4;6/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

D/DOEA:NRR

NPKadambi

CYLi chEd CHBerlinger

CERossi 0 2/1.b/9 0 02/ /90 f 2-/c2 /90 02/ /90 02/ /90 3