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NRCFORM366A(B.IBBS)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERI999-003-00PAGEI3)5OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofftlRCForm366A/I17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Declaringbothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesinoperableresultedinentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.SincetheplantenteredITSLCO3.0.3,thisconditionisreportable.Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:TherewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesattributedtonotmeetingtheacceptancecriteriaspecifiedinprocedurePT-2.10.15because:oTheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15wasconservativelychosenin1992tobewellbelowthevaluecalculatedinDesignAnalysisDA-ME-92-147.ThisconservativevaluehadbeenutilizedastheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortodefiningtheoperabilityrequirementsinITSSR3.7.2.2.TheengineeringtechnicalevaluationperformedonMarch1,1999,determinedthattheas-foundbreakawaytorquevaluesforthenon-returncheckvalveswerewithinthispreviousanalysis.oThetwoMSIVsisolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).BothMSIVswereclosed,asspecifiedintheInitialConditionsoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortoinitiationofthesurveillancetestonMarch1,1999.TheMSIVsaredesignedtoworkwiththemainsteamnon-returncheckvalves,locatedimmediatelydownstreamofeachMSIV,toprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB).Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastodeclarebothvalvesinoperableandenterITSLCO3.0.3.FollowinganevaluationofthetestdatabyNES,itwasdeterminedthatthevalveswereoperable.TheplantexitedITSLCO3.0.3.Theplantisstillinthe1999refuelingoutage.
NRCFORM366A(B.IBBS)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERI999-003-00PAGEI3)5OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofftlRCForm366A/I17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Declaringbothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesinoperableresultedinentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.SincetheplantenteredITSLCO3.0.3,thisconditionisreportable.Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:TherewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesattributedtonotmeetingtheacceptancecriteriaspecifiedinprocedurePT-2.10.15because:oTheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15wasconservativelychosenin1992tobewellbelowthevaluecalculatedinDesignAnalysisDA-ME-92-147.ThisconservativevaluehadbeenutilizedastheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortodefiningtheoperabilityrequirementsinITSSR3.7.2.2.TheengineeringtechnicalevaluationperformedonMarch1,1999,determinedthattheas-foundbreakawaytorquevaluesforthenon-returncheckvalveswerewithinthispreviousanalysis.oThetwoMSIVsisolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).BothMSIVswereclosed,asspecifiedintheInitialConditionsoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortoinitiationofthesurveillancetestonMarch1,1999.TheMSIVsaredesignedtoworkwiththemainsteamnon-returncheckvalves,locatedimmediatelydownstreamofeachMSIV,toprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB).Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastodeclarebothvalvesinoperableandenterITSLCO3.0.3.FollowinganevaluationofthetestdatabyNES,itwasdeterminedthatthevalveswereoperable.TheplantexitedITSLCO3.0.3.Theplantisstillinthe1999refuelingoutage.
NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)9(RU(N(IALRENSIOIIIIUMBIR1999-003-00PAGE(3)6OF6TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCEoPackingglandtorqueforthesecheckvalveswillbeadjustedtoavaluespecifiedbytheISTEngineer.Anas-foundbaselinebreakawaytorquevaluewillbeobtainedforeachvalveduringthe1999outage.0Thedesignanalysiswillberevisedtoprovideacceptancecriteria,bothfortheASMECodedegradationvalueandfordeterminationofvalveoperability.IA"referencevalue"willbeestablishedinaccordancewithASME/ANSIOM-1987Part10forbreakawaytorqueforthesevalves.ThisvaluewillbeincludedinafuturerevisiontotestprocedurePT-2.10.15.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILED"COMPONENTS:NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None fi  
NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)9(RU(N(IALRENSIOIIIIUMBIR1999-003-00PAGE(3)6OF6TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCEoPackingglandtorqueforthesecheckvalveswillbeadjustedtoavaluespecifiedbytheISTEngineer.Anas-foundbaselinebreakawaytorquevaluewillbeobtainedforeachvalveduringthe1999outage.0Thedesignanalysiswillberevisedtoprovideacceptancecriteria,bothfortheASMECodedegradationvalueandfordeterminationofvalveoperability.IA"referencevalue"willbeestablishedinaccordancewithASME/ANSIOM-1987Part10forbreakawaytorqueforthesevalves.ThisvaluewillbeincludedinafuturerevisiontotestprocedurePT-2.10.15.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILED"COMPONENTS:NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None fi}}
}}

Revision as of 13:04, 18 May 2018

LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A614
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/1999
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-99-003, LER-99-3, NUDOCS 9904080027
Download: ML17265A614 (14)


Text

'ATEGORYREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9904080027DOC.DATE:99/03/31NOTARIZED:NO(SCIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG,'AUTH.NAME.AUTHORAFFILIATION.ST.MARTIN,J.T.RochesterGas&,ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET05000244VISSING,G.S.CAQ050002440NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

SUBJECT:

LER99-003-00:on990301,twomainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesweredeclaredinoperableduetoexceedanceofacceptancecriteria.Causedbychangesinm'ethodology&matls.Packingglandtorquewillbeadjusted.With990331ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRIENCL(SIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PDINTERNAL:AEODRAB~ENZNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,G.AEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DRCH/HOHBNRR/DRPM/PECBRES/DET/EIBLMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL,1111111'11111111DNNOTETOALL"RZDS"RECIPZENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEHASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR18ENCL18 III ANDgM~giESTHCASli'gD".'E~ICRFC&Crv~89&54~=.S"E'C."$5'.7V'Sa-'-.sg',i+CE.';6Ac-27KMarch31,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirecto'rateI-1Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

LER1999-003,TwoValvesDeclaredInoperableResultsinConditionProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

TheattachedLicenseeEventReportLER1999-003issubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Vertrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorateI-1DivisionofReactorProjects-I/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555RegionalAdministrator,RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector990408002799033iPDRADOCK050002448PDR 0I NRCFORM366IBISSSIU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI11R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)PAGE(3)1OF6DocKETNUMBERI2I05000244fN5lt'aJeeprrVpBe'I'o'N'gAL(s%88P'informationcoactionrequest:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporatedintothelicensingprocessandfedbacktoindustry.ForwardcommentsregardingburdenestimatetotheRecordsManagementBranch(TAF33).U.S.NudearRegulatoryCommission,Washington,DC205554001.andtothePaperworkReductionproject(31504I04),OfficeofManagementandBudget,Washington,DC20503.Ifan.informationcoBectiondoesnotdisplayacunentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor.andaTITLE(elTwoValvesDeclaredInoperableResultsinConditionProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)MONTHOAYYEARSEOUENTIALREYISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHOAYFACIUTYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER050000301OPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)199901999-003-0003311999FACIUTYNAME20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)X50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)5073(a)(2)(u)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRE:(CheckDOCKETNUMBER05000oneormorel(11)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifylnAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366ANAMEJohnT.St.Martin-TechnicalAssistantLICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONENUMBER(rneivdeAreeCadet(716)771-3641CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABIETOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABlETOEPIXSUPPLEMEIITALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHOATABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnMarch1,1999,atapproximately1707EST,itwasdeterminedthattherequiredtorquetoinitiatevalvediscclosureforthetwomainsteamnon-returncheckvalveswasgreaterthantheacceptancecriteriaspecifiedinplanttestprocedures.ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastodeclarebothvalvesinoperableandenterTechnicalSpecificationLimitingCondition'orOperation3.0.3.FollowinganevaluationofthetestdatabyNuclearEngineeringServices,itwasdeterminedthatthevalveswereoper'able.TheplantexitedLimitingConditionforOperation3.0.3.Theunderlyingcauseoftheeventwaschangesinthemethodologyandmaterialsforpackingthesevalves,whichresultedinagreaterthananticipatedshaftbreakawaytorque.CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceisoutlinedinSectionV.B.

1 NRCFORM366AIB1999)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION'ACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETl2)05000244LERNUMBERI6ISMUENTIALRBBBIBNNUMBERNUMBER1999-003-00PAGE(3I2OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/I17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:Since1992,PerformanceMonitoringtechnicianshaveperformedsurveillancetestprocedurePT-2.10.15,"MainSteamNon-ReturnCheckValveClosureVerification",usingthetestmethodologyestablishedbyNuclearEngineeringServices(NES).PerformanceoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15satisfiesGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)SurveillanceRequirement(SR)3.7.2.2andsatisfiestherequirementsofSectionXIoftheASMECodeforthesevalves.Therequiredtorquetoinitiatevalvediscclosure(breakawaytorque)forthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalves(CV-3518andCV-3519)hasconsistentlybeenmeasuredsignificantlylowerthantheacceptancecriteriaspecifiedwithinthetestprocedure(600ft-lbs).OnMarch1,1999,theplantwasinMode3,coolingdowntoMode4forascheduledrefuelingoutage.Bothmainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVs)wereclosed.Atapproximately1707EST,PerformanceMonitoringtechnicianswereperformingprocedurePT-2.10.15.Thetechnicianswereutilizingacalibratedtorquewrenchwitharangeof0to600ft-lbs,astheyhadinpreviousyears.Thetechnicianscouldnotinitiatevalvediscclosure(achievebreakawaytorque),evenatthefullrangeofthetorquewrench.Theyconsulted'withsupervision,andinitiatedaplantACTION'Reporttodocumenttheinabilitytoachievecheckvalvediscmovementupto600ft-Ibsoftorque.DESCRIPTIOAOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:March1,1999,1707EST:EventDateandTimeandDiscoveryDateandTime.March1,1999,.1734EST:Bothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesaredeclaredinoperable.0March1,1999,1930EST:EngineeringTechnicalEvaluationdeterminesthatbothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesareoperable.March1,1999,2018EST:ThePlantentersMode4,whereITSLCO3.7.2isnotapplicable.ITSLCO3.0.3forthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesisexited.B.EVENT:OnMarch1,1999,theplantwasinMode3,coolingdowntoMode4forascheduledrefuelingoutage.Bothmainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVs)wereclosed,asspecifiedbytheInitialConditionsfortestprocedurePT-2.10.15.ThePerformanceMonitoringtechniciansnotifiedtheShiftSupervisorofthefailureofthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalvestomeettheclosuretorqueacceptancecriteriaoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15.

NRCFORM366A(6IBBS)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION'ACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)TEARSEOUENTIALRENSIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-OO3LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONPAGE(3)3OF6TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)TheShiftSupervisorreviewedITSLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.7.2,notifiedtheNESstaffofthe'event,andrequestedanengineeringtechnicalevaluation.Atapproximately1734ESTtheShiftSupervisordeclaredbothvalvesCV-3518andCV-3519inoperablebasedonexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15.AsspecifiedinITSLCORequiredAction3.7.2.E.1,with"oneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromeachsteamgenerator(SG)",immediateentryintoITSLCO3.0.3isrequired.TheShiftSupervisordirectedentryintoITSLCO3.0.3atthistime.PerformanceMonitoringtechniciansobtainedatorquewrenchoflargerrangeandagainattemptedtoachievebreakawaytorque.Atapproximately700ft-Ibstorque,thevalved(scforCV-3518startedtoclose,andatapproximately900ft-IbstorquethevalvediscforCV-3519startedtoclose.Theseas-foundbreakawaytorquevalueswereprovidedtoNESstaff.NESstaffperformedanengineeringtechnicalevaluationofthisevent.Atapproximately1930EST,NESstaffhadreviewedanengineeringanalysis(Design'AnalysisDA-ME-92-147)thathadbeenperformedpreviouslyforthesevalves,anddeterminedthattheas-foundbreakawaytorquewaswithintheboundsoftheanalysis.ThisinformationwasprovidedtotheShiftSupervisor.Whilethevalveswerenowcapableofbeingdeclaredoperable,theplantcontinuedtheplannedcooldownandenteredMode4atapproximately2018ESTonMarch1,1999.InMode4,ITSLCO3.7.2isnotapplicable,andITSLCO3.0.3wasformallyexitedatthistime.TheentryintoITSLCO3.0.3asaresultofdeclaringbothCV-3518andCV-3519inoperableisconsideredtobeaconditionprohibitedbyTechnicalSpecifications.EntryintoITSLCO3.0.3foranyreasonorjustificationisconsideredreportablepertheNRCguidanceinNUREG-1022Revision1.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.,OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:ThiseventwasdiscoveredbyPerformanceMonitoringtechnicianswhowereperformingaroutinesurveillancetestduringtheplantcooldown.

.~

NRCFORM366A(BIBBB)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LERjTEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKET(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244VEARSEOUENTIAEREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-003-004OF6TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)OPERATORACTION:TheShiftSupervisorreviewedITSLCO3.7.2anddeclaredbothvalvesCV-3518andCV-3519inoperablebasedonexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15.TheShiftSupervisordirectedentryintoITSLCO3.0.3atthistime.TheShiftSupervisornotifiedNESstaffoftheevent,andrequestedanengineeringtechnicalevaluation.Theoperatorscontinuedtheprocessofperformingaplantcooldownperoperatingprocedure0-2.2,"PlantShutdownfromHotShutdowntoColdConditions".AftertheplantwasinMode4,ITSLCO3.7.2wasnotapplicableandLCO3.0.3wasexitedforthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalves.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseoftheconditionprohibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationswasenteringITSLCORequiredAction3.7.2.E.1fortwovalvesinoperable,whichrequiredimmediateentryintoITSLCO.3.0.3.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:TheintermediatecauseofentryintoITSLCO3.7.2.E.1wasthedecisiontodeclarebothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesinoperableforexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaofSteps6.1.3and6.2.3oftestprocedurePT-2.10.15.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlyingcauseforexceedingtheacceptancecriteriawaschangesinthemethodologyandmaterialsforpackingthesevalves,institutedduringthepreviousoutage.Thesechangesinmethodologyandvendor-recommendedreplacementshaftbushingmaterialsweremadeinordertoprovideimprovedshaftsealabilityandvibrationmitigation,andresultedinagreaterthananticipatedshaftbreakawaytorque.Overtime,duringthepreviousplantoperatingcycle,heatandmoisturewereabsorbedbythepacking,whichcausedtheshaftfrictiontoincreasetotheas-foundvaluesof700and900ft-lbs,whichwerehigherthananticipated,basedontestingresultsfrompreviousyears.

NRCFORM366A(B.IBBS)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERI999-003-00PAGEI3)5OF6TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofftlRCForm366A/I17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(8),"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications".Declaringbothmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvesinoperableresultedinentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.SincetheplantenteredITSLCO3.0.3,thisconditionisreportable.Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:TherewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesattributedtonotmeetingtheacceptancecriteriaspecifiedinprocedurePT-2.10.15because:oTheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15wasconservativelychosenin1992tobewellbelowthevaluecalculatedinDesignAnalysisDA-ME-92-147.ThisconservativevaluehadbeenutilizedastheacceptancecriteriaintestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortodefiningtheoperabilityrequirementsinITSSR3.7.2.2.TheengineeringtechnicalevaluationperformedonMarch1,1999,determinedthattheas-foundbreakawaytorquevaluesforthenon-returncheckvalveswerewithinthispreviousanalysis.oThetwoMSIVsisolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).BothMSIVswereclosed,asspecifiedintheInitialConditionsoftestprocedurePT-2.10.15,priortoinitiationofthesurveillancetestonMarch1,1999.TheMSIVsaredesignedtoworkwiththemainsteamnon-returncheckvalves,locatedimmediatelydownstreamofeachMSIV,toprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB).Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastodeclarebothvalvesinoperableandenterITSLCO3.0.3.FollowinganevaluationofthetestdatabyNES,itwasdeterminedthatthevalveswereoperable.TheplantexitedITSLCO3.0.3.Theplantisstillinthe1999refuelingoutage.

NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)9(RU(N(IALRENSIOIIIIUMBIR1999-003-00PAGE(3)6OF6TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCEoPackingglandtorqueforthesecheckvalveswillbeadjustedtoavaluespecifiedbytheISTEngineer.Anas-foundbaselinebreakawaytorquevaluewillbeobtainedforeachvalveduringthe1999outage.0Thedesignanalysiswillberevisedtoprovideacceptancecriteria,bothfortheASMECodedegradationvalueandfordeterminationofvalveoperability.IA"referencevalue"willbeestablishedinaccordancewithASME/ANSIOM-1987Part10forbreakawaytorqueforthesevalves.ThisvaluewillbeincludedinafuturerevisiontotestprocedurePT-2.10.15.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILED"COMPONENTS:NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:None fi