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Division of Operating Reactor Safety | Division of Operating Reactor Safety | ||
SUMMARY | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees | |||
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in | |||
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs | |||
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to | |||
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified | |||
non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.24. | |||
List of Findings and Violations | |||
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified. | |||
Additional Tracking Items | |||
None. | |||
PLANT STATUS | |||
Hope Creek began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 7, 2025, Hope Creek | |||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | was reduced to 75 percent power in response to a main condenser 'C' North circulating | ||
water outlet through-wall leak. The leak was plugged and the unit returned to 100 percent power | |||
the next day. On July 10, 2025, Hope Creek was reduced to 85 percent power for a control rod | |||
pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power the next day. On July 19, 2025, Hope | |||
Creek was reduced to 84 percent power for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to | |||
100 percent power the next day. Between July 12 and August 17, 2025, Hope Creek was | |||
periodically lowered a few percent due to condenser backpressure limitations. On August 19, | |||
2025, Hope Creek was reduced to 81 percent power for main condenser 'C' North waterbox | |||
leak repairs as well as 'A' North and 'A' South waterbox tube leak searches. The unit returned to | |||
100 percent rated thermal power on August 24, 2025. On August 25, 2025, Hope Creek | |||
commenced its end-of-cycle coastdown. On September 25, 2025, Hope Creek commenced a | |||
shutdown from 87 percent power for a refueling outage. | |||
INSPECTION SCOPES | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in | |||
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with | |||
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading- | |||
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared | |||
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met | |||
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection | |||
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, | |||
Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of | |||
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and | |||
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules | |||
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
REACTOR SAFETY | |||
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment | |||
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following | |||
systems/trains: | |||
(1) | (1) | ||
'B' residual heat removal (RHR) division during 'A' RHR pump breaker replacement and motor inspection, July 31, 2025 (2) | 'B' residual heat removal (RHR) division during 'A' RHR pump breaker replacement | ||
'B' core spray division post-maintenance walkdown, September 5, 2025 (3) | and motor inspection, July 31, 2025 | ||
'A RHR as alternate decay heat removal method with 'B' RHR in shutdown cooling and reactor water level at the vessel flange, September 28, 2025 | (2) | ||
'B' core spray division post-maintenance walkdown, September 5, 2025 | |||
(3) | |||
'A RHR as alternate decay heat removal method with 'B' RHR in shutdown cooling | |||
and reactor water level at the vessel flange, September 28, 2025 | |||
71111.05 - Fire Protection | |||
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a | |||
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, | |||
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas: | |||
(1) | |||
Electric access area and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) wing, Fire | |||
Area 3543, July 3, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
Diesel generator rooms, Fire Area 3531, July 21, 2025 | |||
(3) | |||
Electric access area, Fire Area 3533, during major loss of emergency assessment | |||
capability (EN# 57878), August 20, 2025 | |||
(4) | |||
Control rod drive hydraulic control unit area, Fire Area 3435, September 18, 2025 | |||
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an | |||
announced fire drill on July 22, 2025. | |||
(2) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an | |||
unannounced fire drill on September 9, 2025. | |||
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures | |||
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the safety | |||
The inspectors evaluated the | auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) rooms on July 17, 2025. | ||
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance | |||
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors observed operations personnel during the reactor power reduction | |||
and trip for the refueling outage on September 25, 2025. | |||
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated annual simulator examinations on | |||
July 10, 2025. | |||
(2) | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated annual simulator examinations on | |||
July 24, 2025. | |||
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial) | Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial) | ||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function: | The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following | ||
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended | |||
function: | |||
(1) | (1) | ||
(Partial) | (Partial) | ||
Unresolved item (05000354/2025050-03) regarding the lantern ring and packing on emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger floating heads, August 6, 2025 | Unresolved item (05000354/2025050-03) regarding the lantern ring and packing on | ||
emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger floating heads, August 6, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
B2 SACS heat exchanger flange leak, effectiveness review after temporary | |||
modification completion to address all SACS heat exchanger flanges, | |||
September 29, 2025 | |||
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control | |||
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the | ||
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and | |||
appropriate work controls were addressed: | |||
'A' emergency diesel generator due to noise from intercooler piping during monthly surveillance, July 31, 2025 | (1) | ||
Elevated risk during scheduled activity on 'C' emergency diesel generator, | |||
July 7, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
Elevated risk during emergent trip of 'B' reactor protection system electrical protection | |||
assembly breakers, August 13, 2025 | |||
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments | |||
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the | |||
following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | |||
(1) | |||
Oscillating power range monitor due to confirmation counts during power reduction, | |||
July 15, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
Control room HVAC due to low differential pressure on control room supply fan, on | |||
July 15, 2025 | |||
(3) | |||
Final feedwater heating temperature reduction due to core end of life coastdown, | |||
July 29, 2025 | |||
(4) | |||
'A' emergency diesel generator due to noise from intercooler piping during monthly | |||
surveillance, July 31, 2025 | |||
(5) | |||
No record of standby liquid control squib valve surveillance test, August 12, 2025 | |||
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities | |||
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial) | Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial) | ||
(1) | (1) | ||
(Partial) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 26 activities from September 25 to 30, 2025 | (Partial) | ||
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 26 activities from September 25 | |||
to 30, 2025 | |||
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system | |||
operability and/or functionality: | |||
'B' service water pump 4 kilovolt breaker replacement, July 14, 2025 (4)480 volt motor control center starter preventive maintenance on drywell nitrogen supply motor-operated valve 1GSHV-4984B, July 17, 2025 | Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples) | ||
(1) | |||
Barrier breach of control room envelope, July 8, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
Channel calibration following high pressure coolant injection relay replacement, | |||
July 9, 2025 | |||
(3) | |||
'B' service water pump 4 kilovolt breaker replacement, July 14, 2025 | |||
(4) | |||
480 volt motor control center starter preventive maintenance on drywell nitrogen | |||
supply motor-operated valve 1GSHV-4984B, July 17, 2025 | |||
(5) | |||
Core spray division 2 channel discharge line flow (minimum flow bypass), | |||
August 18, 2025 | August 18, 2025 | ||
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples) | |||
'C' main steam line flow sensor B21-N687C calibration, July 11, 2025 (3) | (1) | ||
Refueling floor and reactor building exhaust process radiation monitoring channel | |||
time response testing, July 1, 2025 | |||
(2) | |||
'C' main steam line flow sensor B21-N687C calibration, July 11, 2025 | |||
(3) | |||
'C' RHR pump surveillance test, September 3, 2025 | 'C' RHR pump surveillance test, September 3, 2025 | ||
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
Reactor core isolation cooling surveillance test, September 8, 2025 | |||
RADIATION SAFETY | |||
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) | |||
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed | |||
collection of environmental samples. | |||
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological | |||
environmental monitoring program. Partial completed in second quarter and | |||
remaining part of sample completed in third quarter. | |||
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater | |||
Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program | |||
elements. | |||
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE | |||
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | ||
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) | MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample) | ||
(1) | |||
July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025 | |||
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | |||
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples) | |||
(1) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the failure of the main control room master fire control panel | |||
and PSEG's performance on August 20, 2025 (EN# 57878). | |||
(2) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the B2 SACS heat exchanger leak and emergency | |||
operating procedure entry, September 10, 2025. | |||
INSPECTION RESULTS | |||
Violation: Hope Creek Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A which includes procedures for operation of safety-related boiling water reactor systems such as emergency core cooling systems in section 4.H. Procedure HC.IC-FT.BE-0004, "Core Spray Division 2 Channel E21-N651B Discharge Line Flow (Minimum Flow Bypass)," Revision 11, step 4.3.9 directed the technicians to notify the reactor operator that the core spray loop B minimum flow bypass valve may be positioned as required by plant conditions. Contrary to this, following notification by the technician, the reactor operator subsequently did not return the minimum flow bypass valve to an open position as required by plant conditions to restore the core spray system to an operable status. As a result, PSEG identified that from 9:41 p.m. on August 14, 2025, to 4:42 p.m. on August 15, 2025, control room operators had not returned the Division 2 core spray minimum flow valve to an open position following completion of an instrumentation and control surveillance test and was therefore inoperable until restored to an open position. | Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation | ||
71111.24 | |||
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been | |||
entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited | |||
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | |||
Violation: Hope Creek Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be | |||
implemented covering the activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, | |||
Appendix A which includes procedures for operation of safety-related boiling water reactor | |||
systems such as emergency core cooling systems in section 4.H. Procedure HC.IC-FT.BE- | |||
0004, "Core Spray Division 2 Channel E21-N651B Discharge Line Flow (Minimum Flow | |||
Bypass)," Revision 11, step 4.3.9 directed the technicians to notify the reactor operator that | |||
the core spray loop B minimum flow bypass valve may be positioned as required by plant | |||
conditions. Contrary to this, following notification by the technician, the reactor operator | |||
subsequently did not return the minimum flow bypass valve to an open position as required | |||
by plant conditions to restore the core spray system to an operable status. As a result, PSEG | |||
identified that from 9:41 p.m. on August 14, 2025, to 4:42 p.m. on August 15, 2025, control | |||
room operators had not returned the Division 2 core spray minimum flow valve to an open | |||
position following completion of an instrumentation and control surveillance test and was | |||
therefore inoperable until restored to an open position. | |||
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding screened to very low safety significance (Green), by answering No to all the questions in Exhibit 2A. | Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using | ||
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At- | |||
Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors | |||
determined the finding screened to very low safety significance (Green), by answering No to | |||
all the questions in Exhibit 2A. | |||
Corrective Action References: Notifications 20999492 and | Corrective Action References: Notifications 20999492 and 21000111 | ||
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS | |||
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this | |||
report. | |||
* On November 19, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to | |||
Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
* | |||
On July 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the REMP Exit/Debrief for Hope Creek and | |||
Salem inspection results to Eric Larson, Hope Creek Site Vice President, and David | |||
Sharbaugh, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | |||
Inspection | Inspection | ||
| Line 307: | Line 474: | ||
HC.MD-PM.PB- | HC.MD-PM.PB- | ||
0001 | 0001 | ||
4.16 KV Breaker Cleaning and P.M. | 4.16 KV Breaker Cleaning and P.M. | ||
OP-HC-103-106 | OP-HC-103-106 | ||
Control Room Envelope Integrity | Control Room Envelope Integrity | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders | ||
30312533 | 30312533 | ||
50226599 | |||
71152A | 71152A | ||
Revision as of 00:36, 21 February 2026
| ML25351A122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2025 |
| From: | Nicole Warnek Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Mcfeaters C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25351A122 (0) | |
Text
December 17, 2025
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2025003
Dear Charles McFeaters:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station. On November 19, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the Regional Offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025, 3rd quarter integrated inspection reports normally issued by November 15, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC will resume the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on a quarterly basis beginning with the calendar year 2025, 4th quarter integrated inspection reports, which will be issued 45 days after the 4th quarter ends on December 31, 2025.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hope Creek Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Nicole S. Warnek, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000354 License No. NPF-57
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000354
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-003-0037
Licensee:
Facility:
Hope Creek Generating Station
Location:
Hancocks Bridge, NJ
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2025 to September 30, 2025
Inspectors:
J. Bresson, Project Engineer
P. Finney, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Harmon, Health Physicist
J. Morgan, Operations Engineer
R. Rolph, Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:
Nicole S. Warnek, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified
non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.24.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Hope Creek began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 7, 2025, Hope Creek
was reduced to 75 percent power in response to a main condenser 'C' North circulating
water outlet through-wall leak. The leak was plugged and the unit returned to 100 percent power
the next day. On July 10, 2025, Hope Creek was reduced to 85 percent power for a control rod
pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power the next day. On July 19, 2025, Hope
Creek was reduced to 84 percent power for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to
100 percent power the next day. Between July 12 and August 17, 2025, Hope Creek was
periodically lowered a few percent due to condenser backpressure limitations. On August 19,
2025, Hope Creek was reduced to 81 percent power for main condenser 'C' North waterbox
leak repairs as well as 'A' North and 'A' South waterbox tube leak searches. The unit returned to
100 percent rated thermal power on August 24, 2025. On August 25, 2025, Hope Creek
commenced its end-of-cycle coastdown. On September 25, 2025, Hope Creek commenced a
shutdown from 87 percent power for a refueling outage.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,
Appendix DProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 2515,</br></br>Appendix D" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1)
'B' residual heat removal (RHR) division during 'A' RHR pump breaker replacement
and motor inspection, July 31, 2025
(2)
'B' core spray division post-maintenance walkdown, September 5, 2025
(3)
'A RHR as alternate decay heat removal method with 'B' RHR in shutdown cooling
and reactor water level at the vessel flange, September 28, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
Electric access area and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) wing, Fire
Area 3543, July 3, 2025
(2)
Diesel generator rooms, Fire Area 3531, July 21, 2025
(3)
Electric access area, Fire Area 3533, during major loss of emergency assessment
capability (EN 57878), August 20, 2025
(4)
Control rod drive hydraulic control unit area, Fire Area 3435, September 18, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an
announced fire drill on July 22, 2025.
(2)
The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an
unannounced fire drill on September 9, 2025.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the safety
auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) rooms on July 17, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed operations personnel during the reactor power reduction
and trip for the refueling outage on September 25, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated annual simulator examinations on
July 10, 2025.
(2)
The inspectors observed and evaluated annual simulator examinations on
July 24, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended
function:
(1)
(Partial)
Unresolved item (05000354/2025050-03) regarding the lantern ring and packing on
emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger floating heads, August 6, 2025
(2)
B2 SACS heat exchanger flange leak, effectiveness review after temporary
modification completion to address all SACS heat exchanger flanges,
September 29, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)
Elevated risk during scheduled activity on 'C' emergency diesel generator,
July 7, 2025
(2)
Elevated risk during emergent trip of 'B' reactor protection system electrical protection
assembly breakers, August 13, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
Oscillating power range monitor due to confirmation counts during power reduction,
July 15, 2025
(2)
Control room HVAC due to low differential pressure on control room supply fan, on
July 15, 2025
(3)
Final feedwater heating temperature reduction due to core end of life coastdown,
July 29, 2025
(4)
'A' emergency diesel generator due to noise from intercooler piping during monthly
surveillance, July 31, 2025
(5)
No record of standby liquid control squib valve surveillance test, August 12, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 26 activities from September 25
to 30, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system
operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)
Barrier breach of control room envelope, July 8, 2025
(2)
Channel calibration following high pressure coolant injection relay replacement,
July 9, 2025
(3)
'B' service water pump 4 kilovolt breaker replacement, July 14, 2025
(4)
480 volt motor control center starter preventive maintenance on drywell nitrogen
supply motor-operated valve 1GSHV-4984B, July 17, 2025
(5)
Core spray division 2 channel discharge line flow (minimum flow bypass),
August 18, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)
Refueling floor and reactor building exhaust process radiation monitoring channel
time response testing, July 1, 2025
(2)
'C' main steam line flow sensor B21-N687C calibration, July 11, 2025
(3)
'C' RHR pump surveillance test, September 3, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
Reactor core isolation cooling surveillance test, September 8, 2025
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed
collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological
environmental monitoring program. Partial completed in second quarter and
remaining part of sample completed in third quarter.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater
Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program
elements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
(1)
July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the failure of the main control room master fire control panel
and PSEG's performance on August 20, 2025 (EN 57878).
(2)
The inspectors evaluated the B2 SACS heat exchanger leak and emergency
operating procedure entry, September 10, 2025.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been
entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Hope Creek Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be
implemented covering the activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
Appendix A which includes procedures for operation of safety-related boiling water reactor
systems such as emergency core cooling systems in section 4.H. Procedure HC.IC-FT.BE-
0004, "Core Spray Division 2 Channel E21-N651B Discharge Line Flow (Minimum Flow
Bypass)," Revision 11, step 4.3.9 directed the technicians to notify the reactor operator that
the core spray loop B minimum flow bypass valve may be positioned as required by plant
conditions. Contrary to this, following notification by the technician, the reactor operator
subsequently did not return the minimum flow bypass valve to an open position as required
by plant conditions to restore the core spray system to an operable status. As a result, PSEG
identified that from 9:41 p.m. on August 14, 2025, to 4:42 p.m. on August 15, 2025, control
room operators had not returned the Division 2 core spray minimum flow valve to an open
position following completion of an instrumentation and control surveillance test and was
therefore inoperable until restored to an open position.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-
Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors
determined the finding screened to very low safety significance (Green), by answering No to
all the questions in Exhibit 2A.
Corrective Action References: Notifications 20999492 and 21000111
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this
report.
- On November 19, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the REMP Exit/Debrief for Hope Creek and
Salem inspection results to Eric Larson, Hope Creek Site Vice President, and David
Sharbaugh, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997508
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997021
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997872
21002528
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997578
20999301
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20999638
20999469
Corrective Action
Documents
20996525
20997306
20998326
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21001545
21001544
21001677
21003422
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997725
20997742
20997892
20997457
20997306
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20999022
21001138
Procedures
HC.MD-PM.PB-
0001
4.16 KV Breaker Cleaning and P.M.
OP-HC-103-106
Control Room Envelope Integrity
Work Orders
30312533
50226599
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
20997262
20997594
20998461
20998853
20999085
20999084
20999652
20999594
20999693
21000269
21000208
21000318
21000317
21000933
21000932
20998155
21000855
21000974
21000973
21000931
21001259
21001515
21003541
21003540
21003308
Corrective Action
Documents
21000840
21000838
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21000794
21000795
21000796
20999815
20999816
20999817
20999818
20999819
20999820
21000793
21000794
21000795
21000796