ML20127C780: Difference between revisions
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===Background=== | ===Background=== | ||
Control Room Habitability, TMI Item III.D.3.4, was closed out on October 18, 1983 as satisfactorily completed. Since that time CP&L has not been able to achieve the 1/8" water pressure as approved in the review of Item III.D.3.4. This was reported in letters dated October 3, 1984, January 16, February 21, and April 15, 1985. In addition, the chlorine detectors were not operating properly as reported in the licensee event report (LER) 1-84-33 dated December 19, 1984 and in the February 21 and April 15,1985 | Control Room Habitability, TMI Item III.D.3.4, was closed out on October 18, 1983 as satisfactorily completed. Since that time CP&L has not been able to achieve the 1/8" water pressure as approved in the review of Item III.D.3.4. This was reported in letters dated October 3, 1984, January 16, February 21, and April 15, 1985. In addition, the chlorine detectors were not operating properly as reported in the licensee event report (LER) 1-84-33 dated December 19, 1984 and in the February 21 and {{letter dated|date=April 15, 1985|text=April 15,1985 letter}}s. | ||
The chlorine monitoring system as approved consisted of six detectors; two in the control room vents, two at the service water building at the chlorine tank car and two in the service water building. The detectors in the service water building caused an alarm in the control room upon detection of chlorine, the remaining four detectors isolated the control room upon detection of chlorine. In the February 21, 1985 letter, CP&L proposed to modify the current design to ensure that the air transport time is greater than the isolation time. In the April 15, 1985 letter, CP&L stated that the modification would be completed by the end of the current Unit I refueling outage (approximately in October 1985). | The chlorine monitoring system as approved consisted of six detectors; two in the control room vents, two at the service water building at the chlorine tank car and two in the service water building. The detectors in the service water building caused an alarm in the control room upon detection of chlorine, the remaining four detectors isolated the control room upon detection of chlorine. In the {{letter dated|date=February 21, 1985|text=February 21, 1985 letter}}, CP&L proposed to modify the current design to ensure that the air transport time is greater than the isolation time. In the {{letter dated|date=April 15, 1985|text=April 15, 1985 letter}}, CP&L stated that the modification would be completed by the end of the current Unit I refueling outage (approximately in October 1985). | ||
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the CP&L proposed solutions to the two problems. The attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. The agenda for the 1/8" water pressure discussion is given in Enclosure 2. | The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the CP&L proposed solutions to the two problems. The attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. The agenda for the 1/8" water pressure discussion is given in Enclosure 2. | ||
Suninary The chlorine item was discussed with regard to the CP&L proposal outlined in the April 15, 1985 letter. Briefly, the system would be modified to provide an earlier response signal in lieu of the remote detectors and the modification would be complete for the joint control room at the end of the Unit I refueling to be completed about October 1985. | Suninary The chlorine item was discussed with regard to the CP&L proposal outlined in the {{letter dated|date=April 15, 1985|text=April 15, 1985 letter}}. Briefly, the system would be modified to provide an earlier response signal in lieu of the remote detectors and the modification would be complete for the joint control room at the end of the Unit I refueling to be completed about October 1985. | ||
8506240006 850607 PDR ADOCK 05000324 F PDR | 8506240006 850607 PDR ADOCK 05000324 F PDR | ||
Latest revision as of 06:02, 22 August 2022
ML20127C780 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Brunswick |
Issue date: | 06/07/1985 |
From: | Gratenhuis M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8506240006 | |
Download: ML20127C780 (7) | |
Text
-
, June 7,1985 DISTRIBUTION l-Docketfile Docket Nos. 50-325/324 NRC PDR~~ "
Local PDR ORB #2 Reading ORB #2 Mtg Summ DVassallo LICENSEE: Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) MGrotenhuis DELD FACILITY: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 ELJordan BGrimes
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON MAY 29, 1985, ACRS (10)
TO DISCUSS CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY NRC Participants
Background
Control Room Habitability, TMI Item III.D.3.4, was closed out on October 18, 1983 as satisfactorily completed. Since that time CP&L has not been able to achieve the 1/8" water pressure as approved in the review of Item III.D.3.4. This was reported in letters dated October 3, 1984, January 16, February 21, and April 15, 1985. In addition, the chlorine detectors were not operating properly as reported in the licensee event report (LER) 1-84-33 dated December 19, 1984 and in the February 21 and April 15,1985 letters.
The chlorine monitoring system as approved consisted of six detectors; two in the control room vents, two at the service water building at the chlorine tank car and two in the service water building. The detectors in the service water building caused an alarm in the control room upon detection of chlorine, the remaining four detectors isolated the control room upon detection of chlorine. In the February 21, 1985 letter, CP&L proposed to modify the current design to ensure that the air transport time is greater than the isolation time. In the April 15, 1985 letter, CP&L stated that the modification would be completed by the end of the current Unit I refueling outage (approximately in October 1985).
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the CP&L proposed solutions to the two problems. The attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. The agenda for the 1/8" water pressure discussion is given in Enclosure 2.
Suninary The chlorine item was discussed with regard to the CP&L proposal outlined in the April 15, 1985 letter. Briefly, the system would be modified to provide an earlier response signal in lieu of the remote detectors and the modification would be complete for the joint control room at the end of the Unit I refueling to be completed about October 1985.
8506240006 850607 PDR ADOCK 05000324 F PDR
The CP&L proposal regarding the 1/8" water pressure was presented according to the agenda. This involved numerous cable penetrations which in turn involved a consideration of fire protection as well as control room pressure. The problem involved the air leakage around the cable penetrations which were difficult and impractical to seal. This is also a fire barrier consideration according to the previous Appendix A fire protection considerations. The April 24, 1984 Alternate Shutdown Report, in response to Appendix R fire protection conditions, contained an exemption request regarding this area which is currently under review.
Conclusion After the various aspects of the above subjects were thoroughly discussed the following conclusions were reached:
- 1. The chlorine detection system modification, which was designed to eliminate the remote isolation detector and which would be installed by the end of the current Unit 1 outage (approximately October 1985) is still under staff review.
- 2. CP&L will define leakage characteristics of the control room by measuring the air pressure and the corresponding flow rate. A dose calculation based on inleakage corresponding to 1/8" pressure will be submitted. The schedule for this submittal will be provided in two weeks.
- 3. The schedule for the submittal of the Technical Specifications regarding quantification of the control room pressure requirements will be submitted in two weeks.
- 4. The fire protection aspects of the control room cable penetrations involve an exemption to Appendix R. This is in the April 24, 1984 submittal regarding alternate shutdown capability and is currently under review.
Original signed by/
Marshall Grotenhuis, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next DL:0RB#2 DL.0R #2 MGrotenhui ajs DVassallo 06/j/85 06/ } /85 1
Mr. E. E. Utley Carolina Power A Light Company Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 cc:
Pichard E. Jones, Esouire J. Nelson Grace Carolina Power & Light Company Regional Administrator 336 Fayetteville Street Region II Office Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. Dayne H. Brown, Chief Washington, D. C. 20036 Radiation Protection Branch Division of Facility Services Mr. Charles R. Dietz Department of Human Resources Plant Manager Post Office Box 12200 Post Office Box 458 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Southport, North Carolina 28461 Mr. Franky Thomas, Chairman Board of Commiscioners ~,
Post Office Box 249 Bolivia, North Carolina 28422 Mrs. Chrys Baggett State Clearinghouse Budget and Management 116 West Jones Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Star Route 1 Post Office Box 208 Southport, North Carolina 28461 a
i e
]
ENCLOSURE 1 ATTENDANCE LIST FOR MAY 29, 1985 MEETING RE: CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY Name Affiliation M. Grotenhuis NRC/DL S. West NRC/DE R. Hoffman CP&L K. Dempsey NRC/DSI T. Quay NRC/DSI R. Fasnacht CP&L R. Ferguson NRC/DE B. Hinkley CP&L J. Hulman NRC/DSI
ENCLOSURE 2 CP&L - BSEP CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION
- 1. Original Control Room Design Tech. Spec. 4.7.2.d.4 - slight positive pressure.
- 2. Factors affecting leakage:
- a. Wind stagnation pressure
- b. Positive barometer change
- c. Thermal column effect
- d. Effects from adjacent HVAC
- 3. Leakage paths predominantly in floor.
- 4. Adjacent NVAC - no detrimental contributing factor.
- 5. All leakage paths protected from wind effects.
- 6. Pressurization test only has a gross relationship to actual air exchange.
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