ML20212N680

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Summary of Operating Reactor Events Meeting 86-30 on 860825 to Discuss Events Which Occurred Since Last Meeting on 860818
ML20212N680
Person / Time
Site: Fermi, Brunswick, Turkey Point, Vermont Yankee, 05000000
Issue date: 08/27/1986
From: Holahan G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harold Denton
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8608290117
Download: ML20212N680 (14)


Text

.

AUS 2 71986

~

-4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Gary M. Holahan, Dire.ctor Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING ON AUGUST 25, 1986 - MEETING 86-30 On August 25, 1986, an Operating Reactor Events meeting (86-30) was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on August 18, 1986. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant ele'nents of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. In addition, the assignmant of followup review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 3.

Completion dates have been assigned for items in Enclo~sure 3. Each assignee should review Enclosure 3 with regard to their respective responsibilities.

Note that several assignments are approaching the due date. Please be responsive and advise ORAS (D. Tarnoff, X27864) if the target completion date cannot be met.

M/

Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

Enclosures:

As Stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Page

_ DISTRIBUTION

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AUG 27 386 Harold R. Denton .

cc: R. Vollmer V. Rooney -

J. Taylor D. Muller C. Heltemes D. Mcdonald D. Ross L. Rubenstein T. Murley, Reg. I D. Lynch J. Nelson Grace, Reg. II D. Hickman J. Keppler, Reg. III E. Adensam R. D. Martin, Reg. IV E. Sylvester J. B. Martin, Reg. V R. Starostecki, Reg. I S. Ebneter, Reg. I .

R. Walker, Reg. II C. Norelius, Reg. III E. Johnson. Reg. IV D. Kirsch, Reg. V H. Thompson F. Miraglia R. Bernero T. Speis W. Russell T. Novak F. Schroeder W. Houston B. Sheron B. Boger D. Crutchfield G. Lainas V. Benaroya W. Regan D. Vassallo

E. Jordan E. Rossi R. Baer E. Weiss R. Hernan S. Showe S. Rubin l P. Baranowsky O

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r ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES -

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (86-30)

AUGUST 25, 1986 NAMF DIVISION NAME DIVISION R. Vollmer NRR ,

G. Holahan ORAS/NRR J. T. Beard ORAS/NRR E. Clayton DPL-A/NRR G. Murphy ORNL/NOAC D. Basdekas -

DRSS/RES E. Weiss IE/DEPER D. Hickman PAF0/NRR V. Benaroya PAF0/NRR F. Ashe R0AB/AE0D N. Trehan DBL /NRR L. Rubenstein PAD-2/NRR K. Eccleston TOSB B. Boger DHFT/NRR W. Swenson ORAS/NRR J. Stone IE/DQAVT/VPB K. Kniel DSR0/NRR J. Hopkins DPL-A/NRR V. Rooney PAD-2/NRR E. Sylvester PAD-2/NRR D. Muller PAD-2/NRR W. Regan PBF0/NRR D. Persinko DHFT/NRR C. Ader OCM/TR D. Humenansky OCM/LZ C. Rossi PWR-A/NRR T. Novak DPL-A/NRR J. Rosenthal EAB/IE E. Jordan IE M. Virgilio ORAS/NRR R. Baer IE R. Bernero DBL /NRR F. Schroeder DPL-B/NRR D. Tarnoff ORAS/NRR

-.---.--.--,7, - , , , . , - . ,

. ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTOR' EVENTS BRIEFING 86-30 AUGUST 25, 1986 TURKEY POINT'3,'4 DESIGN DEFICIENCY IN EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM-OTHER-EVENTS OF INTEREST FERMI 2- MOTOR OPERATED VALVES CONTROL PROBLEMS i

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-VERMONT YANKEE REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SEAL FAILURE BRUNSWICK 1 SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS .

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O TURKEY POINT 3, 4 - DESIGN DEFICIENCY IN EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM AUGUST 15, 1986 (D. HICKMAN, NRR)

PROBLEM: IF OVERCURRENT RELAY IN TIE-BREAKER ACTUATES, ONE OR BOTH

, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS MAY BE LOST SIGNIFICANCE:

STATION DESIGN PROVIDES ONLY TWO EDGs, SHARED BETWEEN TWO NUCLEAR UNITS. UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, SINGLE FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL FEEDER BREAKERS TO BOTH REDUNDANT DIVISIONS GF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM, INCLUDING BOTH EDGs SAME FAILURE COULD ALSO PREVENT ACCESS TO BACKUP " CRANKING" DIESELS LOW PROBABILITY EVENT ONE OF MANY DEFICIENCIES DISCOVERED IN EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM CIRCUMSTANCES:

ORIGINAL LICENSED DESIGN INCLUDED CAPABILITY TO CROSSTIE REDUNDANT EMERGENCY BU,SES WITHIN EACH UNIT, T0.BE ABLE TO FEED BOTH DIVISIONS FROM ONE EDG OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FEATURES INCLUDED FOR " ADD-ON" BUS OPERATION OF OVERCURRENT RELAY CAUSES TRIPPING OF ALL FEEDERS T0 " ADD-0N" EUS, AND TRIPPING OF EDG IF SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL IS PRESENT'

CONNECTION TO FOSSIL PLANT " CRANKING" DIESELS WAS MADE BETWEEN TIE BREAKERS IN 1983 UPGRADE WEAKNESS DISCOVERED DURING MAJOR SYSTEMS EVALUATION CROSSTIE BREAKERS EXPECTED 10 BE USED INFREQUENTLY, I.E., IF ONE EDG INOPERABLE, ACCESS T0 " CRANKING" DIESELS FOLLOWUP:

LICENSEE JUSTIFIED CONTINUED OPERATION " TEMPORARILY" BY LIFTING LEADS FOR RELAYS, UNDER 50.59 NRR/ PROJECT MANAGER TO INITIATE NRC TECHNICAL REVIEW

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OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST FERMI - MOTOR OPERATED VALVES CONTROL PROBLEMS AUGUST 9, 1986 (R BAER, IE)

PROBLEM: VALVE C,0NTROLS HAVE IMPROPER SETPOINT LOGIC SIGNIFICANCE: POTENTIAL FOR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF MULTIPLE SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS

, DISCUSSION:

MARCH 1986 - RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HAMMERING PROBLEM SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN IN 85-20.

VALVE CONTROLS MODIFIED TO SHUT OFF MOTOR ON POSITION RATHER THAN TORQUE AUGUST 9, 1986 - FOUND RCIC VALVE DID NOT FULLY CLOSE.

POSITION INDICATION SETPOINT WAS AT 95% CLOSED AND VALVE STOPPED AT THAT POSITION AUGUST 9 - 14, 1986 - LICENSEE REVIEWED 47 OTHER VALVES TO DETERMINE

' IF PROBLEM DESCRIBED AB0VE IS APPLICABLE TO OTHER VALVES, t -

FOUND 3 OTHER VALVES (2 SUPPRESSION P0OL SPRAY INJECTION VALVES AND RCIC STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE) HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS FOLLOWUP:

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VERMONT YANKEE - REACTOR WATER CLEANilP PUMP SEAL FAILURE AUGUST 15, 1986 (V, L. ROONEY, NRR)

PROBLEM: "A" REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PUMP MECHANICAL SEAL FAILED WHILE OPERATING, CAUSING RAD 10 ACTIVE WATER AND STEAM LEAKAGE SIGNIFICANCE:

NO AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OCCURRED AS DESIGNED NOT CONSIDERED LOCA (IS0LABLE)

NOT CONSIDERED TO BE RCS LEAKAGE LIMITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISCUSSION:

SEAL LEAKAGE HAD GRADUALLY INCREASED WHEN SWITCHED FROM "A" T0 "B" PUMP TWO-FOOT STEAM PLUME OBSERVED PUMP ROOM AIR TEMPERATURE REACHED ALARM POINT (110F), BUT DID NOT REACH ISOLATION TEMPERATURE (125F)

LEAKING "A" PUMP MANUALLY ISOLATED AND DEPRESSURIZED SURFACE AND AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WITHIN PUMP ROOM SOME CONTAMINATION TRACKED ELSEWHERE IN REACTOR BUILDING LICENSEE CONSIDERS RWCS LEAKAGE OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOLLOW-UP:

LICENSEE CALCULATING MAXIMUM POSSIBLE LEAK RATE GIVEN TOTAL SEAL FAILURE LICENSEE TO RE-CONFIRM THE ADEQUACY OF THE ISOLATION SETPOINT (125'F)

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9 BRUNSWICK UNIT 1 - SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS AUGUST 19, 1986 (E. SYLVESTER, NRR)

PROBLEM: HPCI AND RCIC DID NOT ACTUATE ON SHORT DURATION LOW LEVEL 2 SIGNAL SIGNIFICANCE: POTENTIAL FOR MISLEADING HPCI/RCIC STATUS INFORMATION DISCUSSION:

TURBINE TRIP CAUSED REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER SHORT DURATION VESSEL WATER LEVEL TRANSIENT REACHED LOW-LOW SETPOINT (LEVEL 2) MOMENTARILY; CAUSED GROUP 1 ISOLATION (RELAYS DE-ENERGIZED)

LOW LEVEL 2 SIGNAL T00 BRIEF TO CAUSE HPCI/RCIC INITIATION (RELAYS ENERGIZED)

'HPCI AND RCIC MANUALLY STARTED TO MAINTAIN WATER LEVEL SIMILAR TO 2 PREVIOUS BRUNSWICK EVENTS SLIGHTLY LONGER LOW LEVEL 2 SIGNAL PUMP DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN ACTUATION LIGHT LIT

- -SIGNAL CLEARS BEFORE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SUFFICIENT TO OPEN STEAM INLET VALVES LICENSEE RESOLVED POTENTIAL FOR MISLEADING INFORMATION WITH CHANGES TO PROCEDURES AND OPERATOR TRAINING SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH HPCI INITIATION AND SEAL-IN INDICATION IDENTIFIED IN IE INFORMATION NOTICE 84-64 FOLLOW-UP: NRR FOLLOWUP TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SCRAM W

REACTOR SCRAM

SUMMARY

WEEK ENDING 08/24/86

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA UNIT POWER RPS CAUSE COMPLI- YTD YTD YTD DATE SITE TOTAL CATIONS ABOVE BELOW 15% 15%

+

  1. 100 A EQUIP / ELECTRIC. YES 3 1 4 08/19/86 BRUNSWICK 1 2 0 2 08/23/06 BRUNSWICK 2 100 A EQUIP /MSIV CLOS tJO

^ 4 1M EQUIP / RODS DROP NO O 1 1 09/23/86 TURKEY POINT

SUMMARY

OF COMPLICATIONS SITE UNIT ' COMPLICATIONS .

s BRUNSWICK 1 GROUP 1 ISOLATION WITHOUT AUTO-START OF HPCI AND RCIC O

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II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 08/24/86 SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD (3)(4) on POWER >15%

EQUIP. RELATED >15% 2 4.4 5.4 (68%)

PERS. RELATED(6) >15% O 2.0 2.0 (25%)

OTHER(7) >15% 0 0.6 0.6 ( 7%)

oo Subtotal **

2 7.0 8.0 no POWER <15%

EQUIP. RELATED <15% ~

1 1.5 1.3 (54%)

PERS. RELATED <15% 0 1.0 '

O.9 (38%)

OTHER <15% 0 0.1 0.2 ( 8%)

on Subtotal **

1 2.6 2.4 000 Total ***

. 3 9.6 10.4

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MkNUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS , ,

TYPE NUMBER 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD ,

MANUAL SCRAMS 1 0.8 1.0 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 2 8.8 9.4 -

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NOTES

1. PLAtR SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY SCRAMS AE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R0D MDTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE Willi A PLANT PROCEDURE,
2. RECOVERY C0FPLICATED BY EQUIPENT FAILUES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3. 1985 INFORMATION DERIVED FROM RECENT ORAS PRELIMINARY STUDY OF UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS IN 1985. WEEKLY DATA DETERMINED BY TAKINS TOTAL TRIPS IN A GIVEN CATEGORY AND DIVIDING BY 52 WEEKS / YEAR.
4. IN 1985, THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF 541 AlH0MATIC Ato MANUAL UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS AT 93 REACTORS (HOLDING FULL POWER LICENSES). THIS YIELDS AN AVERAGE RATE OF 5.8 TRIPS ER REACTOR ER YEAR AND AN AVERAGE RATE OF 10.4 TRIPS PER WEEK FOR ALL REACTORS.
5. BASED ON 100 REACTORS HOLDING A FULL POWER LICENSE.
6. KRSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE Hlf%N ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL C0t#ROL PROBLEMS.
7. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIROWENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

+ .

Pg'e No. 1 ENCLOSURE 3

' C/27/06 l 0FERATINS REACTOR 5 EVENTS MEETINS FOLLCWUF ITEMS A5 0F MEETINS 26-30 DN AUGUST 25,1986 (IN A5CENDINS MEETING DATE, N555 VEND 0R, FACILITY ORDER) ,

RESF0NSIBLE Tait DESCRIPTICN SCHEDULE CLOSED DATE COMMENTS

' MEETINS FACILIT(

COMPLET. BY DOCUMENT, NUMBER / N!55 VENDOR / DIVISION!

INDIVIDUAL I DATE(5) MEETINS,ETC.

MEETIN5 EVENT DESCRIP.

I DATE h;R /HOU5T0h W RESOLVE THE CUESTIDN 0F THE 10/30/E6 0?EN / / FOLL2WLP ACTION TD I B6-10 DV5TER CREEt

/ ACCEPTA51tlTV 0F BLIND SWITCHE5 / / EE INCORPORATED IN 03/31/B6 SE / LEVEL AhD DELETION OF DAILY CHANNEL / / REVIEW 0F JUNE SWITCH SETF0thT

~l CHECK 1,1926 EVENT AT CGIFT LASEALLE 3 E6-21 VERM0kT YANTEE NRR /n0LAHAN 5. DETERM'hE STATUS AND , 09/30/06 0 FEN / /

06/23/06 SE / FROBLEMS / EFFECT!YENESS 0F STAFF AND / / -

WITH SCRAM LICEN5EE ACT10N ON / /

) 50LEh01D VALVES FOST-MAINTENANCE TESTIk5 (EL E3-22). DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION

) ,

96-21 TURiEY F0!hi NRR /RD5A F. CONSIDER REVIEWIh5 ELECTRICAL 09/15/E6 0 FEN / /

D6/23/86 W / FOTENTIAL / SYSTEM CF FLANT WITH SIMILAR 09/30/E6

) FAILURE OF ALL EWIN5 EU5 DESIGN / /

EMER6ENCY D!ESEL SENERAT0R5 ,

s FERR(' hRR / HOUSTON W. OBTAIN AND REVIEW INFORMATICN 09/30/26 0 FEN / /

86-23 07/07/B6 SE / FIRE IN / RELATED TO RECURRENCE OF FIRE 05/29/86

- 0FF5A5 CHARC0AL AND INVEST!5 ATE FROF05ED / /

BED 5 ACTIONS hRR /H005 ION W. DETERMINE AFFROPRIATE 09/30/26 0 FEN / /

) 96-23 MULTI 07/07/Es hA / / FESULATORY REQUIFEMENTS EASED / /

EsRS-RESIDUAL CN REC 0"MENDAT10N5 DISCUSSED AT / /

1 HEAT PEMOVAL ERIEFIN5 FUMF/ WEAR RING

, FAILURES -

/ FDLLOWUP

, B6-23 Mutil ARR /EERLlh5ER C. ASSURE NF.R AND IE C00RDINAT10N 09/30/E6 CLGEED 05/25/E6

/ / / AU5b5T 14,1926

> 07/07/E6 NA / TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR AN IE F0S-INADEQUATE ELLETIN  ! / MEMD C.

DE515N 03 ECCi SEFLINSER TO 5.

- HOLAHAN FUMF MINIMLM

LOW FATH5

- Ec *E GSA O SULF !E /30REAh E. ASSESS FUTEhilAL FOR SENERIC 00:0/26 CFEN / /

02/11 56 SE / CONTROL F;D / AFFLICAEILITY  ! i kITHDFAWAL r / /

. FROELEM File has been deleted.

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